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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
JAPAN’S RELATIONS WITH MUSLIM ASIA:
TRANS-CONTINENTAL NORMATIVITY AND POLICY
by
Bill Bryan Barber
Florida International University, 2019
Miami, Florida
Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor
In 2006, Japanese Foreign Minister Asō Tarō outlined a new pillar of Japan’s foreign
policy across Asia he called the ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity.’ The Arc would become
the most lucid case for values-based diplomacy elaborated by Tokyo in the postwar era. It
is a significant change from what was both a constrained and myopic approach for a state
of such global economic influence and substantial diplomatic potential. In practice,
however, is Japan’s values-based diplomacy actually working? How is Tokyo grappling
with reconceptualizing an Asia inclusive of Muslim societies in a time when the global
metanarrative is to protect against Islam?
Emphasis in this project is placed on Tokyo’s foreign policy with Muslim states
along this Arc. The key research question in this project is: “How does Japan’s new
conceptualization of Asia reconcile with its securitization of Islam?” Based on the two
variables set in the research question, the project is divided into two parts:
‘Conceptualization,’ and ‘Strategy.’ ‘Conceptualization’ seeks to grasp Japan’s vision for
Asia, and its role in the region. ‘Strategy’ builds on that, and surveys Japan’s relations
with Muslim Asia through five facets of interactions.
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This project relies heavily on three types of data sources: statements from political
elites, influential think tanks in Japan, and leading Japanese academic scholars. Of
particular value among statements from political elites are those from the Prime
Minister’s office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Primary sources in the Japanese
language and intended for Japanese readers are used as a research tool. Content analysis
software is utilized to analyze and code texts within cases from these sources to reinforce
the strength of the arguments made. By applying typological theory to refine conclusions
from observations, this project shows that Japan’s securitization of Islam is distinct from
Western, Russia, or Chinese securitization. Moreover, it demonstrates four concurrent
views of Islam in Asia evident in Japan’s foreign policy and strategy.
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PART ONE: CONCEPTUALIZATION

1

CHAPTER I
BRIDGING TWO ASIAS
In November 2006, Japanese Foreign Minister Asō Tarō outlined an expansion of Japan’s
foreign policy that he called the ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity.’ Japan’s foreign policy
had long stood on two key pillars: the Security Alliance with the United States, and
relations with neighboring states in Northeast Asia. The ‘Arc,’ however, would form a
new pillar of diplomacy for Tokyo in addition to the existing two, and also become the
most lucid case for values-based diplomacy elaborated by Tokyo in the post-War era. In
his speech on the new pillar, Asō emphasized “‘universal values’ such as democracy,
freedom, human rights, the rule of law, and the market economy” (Asō 2006b). He
colorfully added, “many countries are now walking down the road to ‘peace and
happiness through economic prosperity and democracy.’ And, as I am fond of saying, this
is exactly the road that Japan herself walked down after the war” (2006b). As to Japan’s
role in these developments, Asō analogized “Japan will serve as an ‘escort runner’ to
support these countries that have just started into this truly never-ending marathon”
(2006b).
There is a double sense to this depiction of an Arc: firstly, it is a sanguine
recasting of the phrase, ‘Arc of Instability,’ frequently uttered by U.S. diplomats in the
first George W. Bush administration, but secondly, the new pillar to Japan’s foreign
policy would emphasize relations with states geographically spanning across Eurasia.
Asō elaborated, “there are the successfully budding democracies that line the outer rim of
the Eurasian continent, forming an arc” (2006b). He added, “take a look around the outer
edge of Eurasia – just follow that line all the way around. This belt has seen great
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changes upon the end of the Cold War as the curtain was being drawn on the
confrontation between East and West” (2006b). Throughout the speech, Asō listed an
extensive range of regions included in the Arc: Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent,
the Middle East, Central Asia, the Caucasus, continuing on to include Turkey and all of
Eastern Europe. Asō concluded his speech with the commitment, “[i]n assisting countries
as they take these steps forward, Japan aims to usher in a world order that is tranquil and
peaceful” (2006b).
Momentarily setting aside disagreements with Asō’s assertion that “budding
democracies” are forming along this Arc, the new pillar to Japan’s foreign policy is,
indeed, a significant development from what was both a constrained and myopic foreign
policy for a state of such global economic influence and substantial diplomatic potential.
Nearly a decade later, in January 2016 Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzō reiterated
Japan’s values-based diplomacy in a speech at the Shared Values and Democracy in Asia
Symposium. Abe opened with “Asia is now poised to become a champion of
democracy,” pointing out that “Asia’s democracy has a distinct mark engraved in it from
ancient times, reflecting the values we have held dear for generations” (2016). Abe
outlined ‘Asian democracy’ as uniquely imparting values such as “lovingkindness,”
“benevolence,” and an “utmost priority on harmony,” specifically citing the roots of these
values from Asian religious traditions: Buddhism, Confucianism, and Islam (2016).
Asō’s pillar of an Arc of Freedom and Prosperity and Abe’s Asian Democracy
speech illustrate a significant widening of Japan’s foreign policy which is an attempt to
fortify Japan’s role in Asia. Systematically, this can be explained largely by the
developments of the great powers in the region. The Western-led world order has come
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into question, particularly after the 2008 financial crisis and issues of domestic friction
within Western states and institutions, leaving Asian states to look elsewhere, and in
particular, at their own developed states as models instead (Pehlivantürk 2016, 3).
Meanwhile, Japan has been pressured by the U.S. since the first Gulf War to take a more
active role in diplomacy and collective security in Asia. Additionally, the rise of a nondemocratic China encourages Japan to seek strengthening relations with states along
China’s periphery, and democratic norms are a key strategy and useful narrative to do so
to counterbalance a rising China. Lastly, a heightened awareness of religious violence in
Asia inclines Japan to ‘securitize’ – to carry out urgent measures in response to potential
threats, thus politically elevating the imperativeness of the issue – for the sake of
maintaining order in the Asian community through the promotion of stability and
harmony – values key to Japan’s new foreign policy pillar.
Research Question
In practice, however, is Japan’s values-based diplomacy actually working? Is Japan
assisting and cultivating “budding democracies” along the Arc in its own image? If Asian
democracy is based on lovingkindness, benevolence, and harmony, from an Asian
épistème, does it resemble anything like Western democracy? How are conflicts in Asia
being securitized by Japan, while Tokyo grapples with reconceptualizing an Asia
inclusive of Dharmic, Confucian, and Muslim societies? This project theorizes that
normativity, via values-based diplomacy, is evident in Tokyo’s foreign policy with Asian
states in order to secure a leading role in Asia in light of a rising China, promote stability
across the continent, and meanwhile shore up its own economic and energy security
stature. A core component of this values-based diplomacy is Tokyo’s own conception of
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democracy, which encompasses a tripartite distinction of human rights, pacifism, and
economic development.
Emphasis in this project is placed on Tokyo’s foreign policy and security policy
with Muslim states along the Arc (hereafter, ‘Muslim Asia’) (see Map 1.1). Muslim Asia
includes societies from 27 countries in the Middle East, Post-Soviet Asia (Central Asia
and the Caucasus), South Asia, and Southeast Asia with Muslim-majority populations
(see Table 1.1), and also those with significant Muslim-minority populations such as
India, China, Russia, and the Philippines (see Table 1.2). Simpfendorfer describes Asia’s
Muslim population “like a spine running through the region” (2014: 52). In comparison
to the other Asian states along the Arc which have stronger Dharmic or Confucian
traditions shared with Japan, the attempt to conceptualize Asia inclusive of Muslim states
by Japan’s leaders is puzzling. This project explores this puzzle: How does Japan’s new
conceptualization of Asia reconcile with its securitization of Islam?
Among the predominant religious traditions which are foundations of the
multiplicity of Asian societies, Indian Dharmic traditions like Hinduism, Buddhism, and
Sikhism, and Chinese traditions like Confucianism and Taoism make up the essence of
‘Eastern Religions.’ Islam, however, is an Abrahamic religion, shared with Christianity
and Judaism, yet the latter two are understood as the religious foundations to Western
societies. Islam, as a principal religious tradition included in the composite of Asia, is a
‘stepchild’ among the other, more closely related religions, as its roots lie nearer to the
Western religious traditions. Yet, “[n]o other ethnicity or religious group – whether
Chinese or Indian, Buddhist or Hindu – has the same spread across the East” like Islam
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(Simpfendorfer 2014, 52). So where then does the opportunity emerge for uniquely
shared values with Japan and its own societal religious foundations?
The Muslim regions are examined as the most challenging cases to be
conceptualized as part of Asia, particularly given the simultaneous securitization of
Islam. Securitization theory serves as a foundational theoretical framework for this
project, as the securitization of Islam is most salient today in global politics. A key
element of the Copenhagen School of security studies, securitization is broadly defined
as:
the discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is
constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential
threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional
measures to deal with the threat (2003: 491).
Here, referent object denotes someone or something seen as having a legitimate claim to
survival, yet is being perceived as existentially threatened. One or more security sectors
are called upon to take action concerning the threat (not necessarily “against”), and the
securitizing actor is one who declares to an audience the threat to the referent object
through the use of a security speech act. In this project, while certainly not exclusively,
most ordinarily the referent object is Japan as a nation-state, the audience is Japanese
society, the threat is Islam, the security sectors comprise a variety including the Japan
Self-Defense Force, and the securitizing actors are Japanese political leaders who utter
the speech acts.
Securitization theory brings together speech act analysis with the framing of
issues on a scale from nonpoliticized, to politicized, to securitized: “‘Security’ is the
move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue
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either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a
more extreme version of politicization” (1998: 23). There exists an unescapable milieu in
the twenty-first century that links Islam together with language of threats and security in
conversation internally, regionally, and globally – what Buzan and Wæver would call
“macrosecuritization,” whereby “securitizations that speak to referent objects higher than
those at the middle level (for example, ‘universal’ religions or political ideologies)”
(2009: 257). In this macrosecuritization milieu, it is impossible to escape normative
conversations about Islam as a religion, and Muslims as people without thinking about
securitization. Therefore, how the great powers approach this is among the most salient
of topics. This meta-narrative usually focuses on Western, Russian, and Chinese
securitizations of Islam, yet little research is done on Japan’s approach.
There is depth to the ties between Japan and Muslim Asia. Muslim Asia
represents, economically, some of Japan’s most vital trade relations today, and thus, some
of the most vital regions for Japan. Nearly 90 percent of Japan’s crude oil imports come
through the Straits of Malacca (Burrett 2014, 164). Access to the shipping lanes through
the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca, bordered by Muslim-majority countries,
are essential for Japanese fossil fuel imports, but most significant are relations with the
states along the Persian Gulf (see Map 1.2). Eighty-one percent of Japan’s crude oil
imports passes through the Strait of Hormuz, with more than half coming from Saudi
Arabia and UAE alone (Hirose 2015). Increased consumption by China and India and the
decommissioning of domestic nuclear power plants after the 2011 Fukushima disaster
have only exacerbated the significance of these imports. Similarly, Muslim states
collectively make up a substantial market for Japanese exports. Simpfendorfer points out
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that “to ignore the Muslim world’s role in the East’s rise would be to overlook one of the
region’s more important commercial dynamics” (2014: 52). Both Indonesia and Malaysia
make up two of Japan’s top ten export markets (WITS 2017). Indonesia is additionally
among the top ten recipients of Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI), and the largest
of any developing country excluding China (JETRO 2014). There is the potential for a
stronger relationship as a larger middle-class continues to emerge in Muslim Asia.
Considering contemporary pressures on Tokyo, how does Japan securitize Islam?
Within Asia, layers of Orientalism are in effect, and Japanese are inclined to Orientalize
‘Other Asia’ just as much as to Occidentalize the West (Tanaka 1993, 12). Japanese
Islamic scholar, Itagaki Yūzō, warns of this:
In order to shift attention and critique Japanese society today, we cannot simply
reflect by borrowing the distorted glasses of Western Orientalism, but also, a
critique of ‘Japanese Orientalism’ is needed. Before Western Orientalism was
imported, Japanese Orientalism was carried over from Japanese society’s
continued questioning of how Self was different from China, or different from
India, and thought in terms of detachment from an objectified Asia (2004: 273).
Japanese conceptualizations of identity, of Self, and Other, have a primordial nature due
to its geography in relation to Asia. Japan’s identity in relation to Islam in particular,
however has long been filtered through other actors, albeit, different filters. The first
Japanese encounters with Islam came through the centuries of attaining theological,
philosophical, and philological teachings from China (Sakai 2010, 127). Islam was
learned, to the extent it was learned, as part of China as the Japanese understood it. It was
part of ‘the China package,’ and thus, it was the Other. Self was different.
Japan’s initial knowledge of Asia was a Sinocentric understanding, and seeing
Asia beyond China meant seeing it through the filter of China simply because that was
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the knowledge available. In fact, Japan gets its name from its positioning relative to
China; being to the east of China, Nihon is the ‘origin of the sun.’ Oddly enough,
geographical knowledge of the world was greatly expanded during the Sakoku (“closed
country”) period in Japan, when the Tokugawa Shogunate required Dutch traders to teach
the modern sciences, or rangaku (蘭学). Via rangaku, a Western schema of the
continents became prevalent in geographical conceptualizations starting in the 1700s, and
were commonplace a century later (Lewis and Wigen 1997, 32). With the changes that
transpired after the 1868 Meiji Restoration, Japanese begin to look at Asia through a new
perspective, and through internationalization, Japan built on rangaku, bringing in a
broader Western epistemological analysis to have a greater understanding of world
cultures and lands. Orientalist thinking was introduced. The Japanese term for ‘Orient,’
tōyō (東洋), became a “geocultural notion of territoriality” (Tanaka 1993, 4). Everything
that was not seiyō (西洋), or ‘the Occident/West,’ was conceptualized collectively as the
Orient. In the early twentieth century, Japan’s “Asia was the maximal Asia of Western
geography” (Lewis and Wigen 1997, 72). Since then, Western conceptualization of the
continents has still gained conventional acceptance in Japan (Lewis and Wigen 1997, 32).
There was a tendency at the time to look at what was newly identified as ‘Middle East’
and ‘West Asia,’ incorporate these within ‘Asia,’ and make sense out of it in terms of
Japan’s sense of identity towards Asia writ large.
After a period of general enthusiasm for Western models of civilization and
enlightenment which came to a peak in 1885 with intellectual Fukuzawa Yukichi’s famed
argument to “datsua” (脱亜), or “leave Asia,” during “the Meiji twenties (1887-96)”
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scholars and policymakers in Japan began to turn back to Asia, with a raw, naïve interest
in learning of Asia and learning how Japan fitted into this concept of ‘Asia’ (Tanaka
1993, 45). The Japanese were just beginning to learn they were Asians, and in fact,
embraced it with a different conceptualization of ‘Asia’ from how they had understood it
before. Japanese Asianist Okakura Tenshin captured the contemporary conceptualization
of Asia by embracing Orientalist notions with his seminal 1904 work Ideals of the East.
The book starts with the famous line, “Asia is one” (1904: 1). Okakura continues, “Arab
chivalry, Persian poetry, Chinese ethics, and Indian thought, all speak of a single ancient
Asiatic peace, in which there grew up a common life, bearing in different regions
different characteristic blossoms, but nowhere capable of a hard and fast dividing-line”
(1904: 2).
This was followed by the post-World War II period, when Asianism was “tainted
by its association with Japanese imperialism and aggression” both across Asia and in
Japan.1 In the new bipolar world order, Japan was now effectively part of the West on
account of its new close alliance with the U.S. Japan did not only learn through Western
approaches, but rather, understood itself as part of the West.
Japan sought membership with the West for much of the last 70 years, however in
the twenty-first century, changes in global politics are affecting this position. Asia has
emerged as the center of global economic activity and growth. Meanwhile, the U.S.
encourages Japan to take a more proactive role in affairs across Asia, as it entrusts Japan
to promulgate its own interests in the region. In the twenty-first century, Japan is soul-

1

Some conceptualization of Asia in the pan-Asianist standpoint persisted, but was largely constrained to
far-right and far-left scholars such as Tsukui Tatsuō and Takeuchi Yoshimi, respectively (Szpilman and
Saaler 2011, 20-22).
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searching for its role in Asia, exploring opportunities to strengthen relations with Muslim
states while securitizing Islam, and undoubtedly, a dearth exists in Japan regarding
common understandings of these states and societies.
There is continuity in Japan’s exploration to conceptualize Asia, however, and
today we see a turning back to reconsider Islam as part of Asia. This view relies upon a
path-dependency argument based upon the institutional sociological perspective.
According to institutional sociologists, institutions “provide cognitive templates that
affect identities and preferences” (Laursen 2010, 12). This accounts for continuity in
foreign policy by a given state which can at times deviate from seemingly rational or
objective assumptions. Institutional sociologists “pay attention to values, ideas and
identities” (Laursen 2010, 12). Learning of Islam, conceptualizing Asia, and securitizing
Others have gone through various filters in the past. Today, Japan explores these
questions again. In the institutional sociologists’ path dependency, “even when policy
makers set out to redesign institutions, they are constrained in what they can conceive of
by these embedded, cultural constraints” (Thelen 1999, 386). The removing and shifting
of exogenous barriers in the twenty-first century has resulted in an esoteric exploration of
Japan’s role and identity.
This historic experience of Japanese aggression constrained postwar Japan from
promoting a values-based diplomacy until the twenty-first century. Seventy years after
the War, is the new model of Asian democracy viable, coming from Japan? Is it
something more compatible with Islam than the model of Western liberal democracy?
This project takes Asō’s Arc, and analyzes Japan’s relations with Muslim Asia. The
regions that span Muslim Asia are generally regarded as distinguishable societies by
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Japanese and Muslims alike, with differing orthopraxies of Islam and degrees of
interaction with Japan. Lastly, they have also followed very different trajectories in postcolonial history and economic development.
Many in Muslim Asia notably challenge the Western-led world order, the Western
liberal democratic model, and the Westphalian concept of state, and are struggling to
reconcile modernization with their religio-social milieu. Tokyo has taken note. Combined
with this, there is illustrated in the aforementioned speeches a view of Japanese
exceptionalism in Asia, and the possibility of Tokyo leading Asian states (as “an ’escort
runner’”) towards the development of Asian democracies. In the early twentieth century,
Japan was referred to as a model for ‘modernization without Westernization’; in the early
twenty-first century, Japanese leaders are positioning themselves as a model in Asia for
‘democratization without Westernization.’ Combining this with the need for overseas
export markets and energy imports, and responding to the rise of China, Japan has added
the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity as a third pillar to its foreign policy. Japan is
leveraging its identity to Asia to bolster economic security, thus tying normativity to
material concerns.
Conceptualization of Outcome Variable
This project hypothesizes that disillusionment with Western-led world order in Asia, an
urge by Tokyo to securitize threats from Islam, assertiveness of regional power by China,
Japan’s views of its own exceptionalism in Asia, and an existential preoccupation with
economic and energy security collectively have resulted in this new pillar of Japan’s
foreign policy, the values-based Arc (see Figure 1.1). Although the Arc was presented in
2006 and the phraseology has since lost durability, the essence of the concept remains
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just as relevant, and through the foreign policy of Abe, has been more clearly refined.
The Arc is couched in consistent language by Japan’s political leaders on a unique Asian
geoculture, which it shares with peoples across Asia. Asianism, or ajia-shugi (アジア主
義), has been discouraged in post-War Japanese foreign policy, as Japan has sought to
“de-Asianize” because “Asia symbolized disillusionment and war guilt” (Koschmann
1997, 103). Seven decades after World War II, this is changing in reaction to the evolving
roles, influences, and identities throughout Asia. Japan’s political leaders are avoiding –
and will continue to avoid – use of ajia-shugi because of its loaded meaning, but there is
consistency with the early twentieth century in Japan seeing itself as an exceptional state,
which can lead Asia. Koschmann aptly argues that,
It is not only an implicit belief in Japan’s superiority that seems to connect
contemporary Asianism with its prewar predecessor but also certain worldhistorical pretensions, according to which Japan is destined in the twenty-first
century to transcend the modern era and move to the forefront of not only Asia
but the world (1997: 106).
If references to Asianism are to be avoided, how do Japan’s political leaders conjure
images of a unique Asian geoculture, with Japan at the helm, and how is this notion
conceptualized here? The remainder of this section conceptualizes this notion of
‘geoculture’ and how it can be applied to foreign policymaking. Asia as a geoculture is
necessary to conceptualize with precision as the outcome variable in this project.
The identification of existing shared norms, values, and practices is a tool which
can be revealed in crafting foreign policy between states, but where do these shared
attributes come from? If two actors accept that they share cultural characteristics, and this
is reason for cooperation, then they must also accept that commonality is a basis for
relations which differentiate from relations with those who do not share the same
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commonality. Historical experiences can shape these identified cultural characteristics,
but proximity increases the possibility of interaction, diffusion of ideas and peoples, and
the likelihood of constructing a geographic entity which anchors the shared identity.
Geoculture is a tool for foreign policymaking. Geoculture transcends state borders and is
a perceived history and geography of likeness. Yet, while in essence a constructed
concept, when used as a foreign policy tool, factual history and physical geography are
the necessary impetuses to constructing a geoculture.
Geoculture is defined here as a transnational identity formed through shared
norms, values, and practices, based upon shared historical experience and a mutual
geographic entity. The shared historical experiences form the culture. Because geoculture
is a constructed concept for foreign policymaking, cultural differences are overlooked, or
downplayed, in favor of the similarities. The mutual geographic entity is a physical
geographic feature such as a continent (pan-Asian geoculture), archipelago (West Indies
geoculture), sea (Mediterranean geoculture), or ocean (trans-Atlantic geoculture).2 This
physical geographic entity is acknowledged as shared, and anchors the identity to a base
locale in the international system. Edmund Burke observed “the sentimental attachment
to place is among the most elemental widespread and powerful of forces, both in humans
and in animals” (Deudney 1999, 201-02). This attachment to place, labeled “geopiety”3
by cognitive geographers, is exploited to shape the modern nation-state, but there is no
reason foreign policy scholars should assume it does not, or cannot, transcend arbitrary
state boundaries. Deudney defines geopiety as “an identity and loyalty based on the
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This list is by no means exhaustive: others can include a peninsula, island, isthmus, lake, gulf, et cetera.

3

Also known as “topophilia” (Tuan 1974).
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experience of and feeling of connectedness to a particular place or area” (1996: 131).
Indeed, the construction of ‘bonds’ based on these shared physical places is an important,
yet overlooked aspect of foreign policymaking.
In order to comprehend the concept of geoculture, it is imperative to develop
“contrast-space” in relation with more widely acknowledged concepts (Gerring 2012,
127), such as “civilizations” (Huntington 1996), “security complexes” (Buzan 1983,
1991: Buzan, et al. 1998: Buzan and Wæver 2003), “political communities” (Deutsch, et
al. 1957), and “security communities” (Adler and Barnett, eds. 1998). To address all
related terms at once, these tend to deal with global politics in general. In contrast,
geoculture should be thought of as a foreign policy tool – an attempt to bond states by
underlining commonalities. Unlike Huntington’s civilizations, there is no theory of an
inevitable “clash” between geocultures. In contrast to the variations of ‘security
complexes,’ regions are significant variables but regional security threats are of interest
in these approaches, while cultural identities, as applied in foreign policymaking, are
overlooked.
Adler and Barnett’s ‘security communities,’ which is a noteworthy revival of, and
revision to Deutsch’s 1957 notion of political communities, is perhaps the closest concept
among the abovementioned to geoculture, but varies in two key ways. Firstly, ‘region’ is
used in the most liberal sense possible, allowing for “imagined regions” which “are not
dependent on inhabiting the same geographic space” (Adler and Barnett 1998b, 33). The
examples Adler and Barnett give are the U.S.-Israeli relationship, or Australia and the
West (1998b: 33). Japan’s relation with the U.S. certainly suits this depiction as well.
This is acceptable as a “community,” which need not be anchored by a physical
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geographic entity, but not for a geoculture. Secondly, security communities are cemented
through communication processes and transaction flows (Adler and Barnett 1998a, 7).
Constructing a geoculture through foreign policymaking can lead to increased
communication processes and transaction flows, but a reversal cannot be achieved; a
geoculture refers back to a perceived shared historical experience which developed the
norms, values, and practices (such as communication process and transaction flows).
There is more fecundity to one’s identity in geoculture, via shared historical experience
and geopiety, than in one’s security community, via communication process, which are
increasingly global, and transaction flows, which are presumably current and short-lived.
Immanuel Wallerstein coined the term ‘geoculture’ “by analogy with geopolitics,”
and uses it as a key variable in his seminal World-Systems Theory (1991: 11). It is
imperative to clarify, however, the conceptualization of geoculture used here as an
outcome variable varies considerably from Wallerstein’s conceptualization. Wallerstein
argues that by the end of the nineteenth century, a modern world-system covered almost
all societies in the world. His world-system “is characterized by a system-wide axial
division of labor and system of stratification, multiple political centers which, over time,
take the form of nation states organized into a nation-state system and, in the nineteenth
century, a dominant culture or ‘geo-culture’” (Kennedy 2012, 902). In Geopolitics and
Geoculture, Wallerstein argues geoculture “represents the cultural framework within
which the world-system operates” (1991: 11). In World-Systems Analysis Wallerstein
further explains geoculture as “norms and modes of discourse that are widely accepted as
legitimate within the world-system” (2004: 93). He adds that “a geoculture does not come
into existence automatically with the onset of a world-system but rather has to be
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created” (2004: 93). Wallerstein’s modern world-system is predicated on a notion that
sovereignty vested in the people was “meant to include, [but] in practice excluded very
many” (2004: 60).
Wallerstein’s notion of geoculture differs primarily in three ways. First,
Wallerstein’s geoculture is used in the singular. While he does not deny other geocultures
could exist or have existed in the past, the modern world is a singular geoculture which
includes the core, the semi-periphery, and the periphery. Second, Wallerstein never
applies geoculture beyond the scope of his World-Systems Theory, and certainly not in
the context of foreign policy analysis. Last, Wallerstein’s geoculture is driven by his
epistemological understanding of the global political economy. Thus, the global
economic system necessitates a single geoculture. This is neither an endorsement nor
critique of Wallerstein’s conceptualization of geoculture, but it is important to clarify that
his notion has little in common with a second, and developing conceptualization of the
term, which is the pith of this project.
When geoculture is evoked in research on foreign policy analysis, it tends to
appear in a methodological tripartite symbiosis with geopolitics and geo-economics (see
Figure 1). In a groundbreaking work on the concept of geoculture, Vyacheslav Kuznetsov
writes
[a]s a methodology geoculture ensures continuity of geopolitics and geoeconomics. We have in view the movement from the balance of forces
(geopolitics) to the balance of interests (geo-economics), to the balance of trust
and cooperation on the basis of a respectful dialogue (geoculture) (2003: 590).
Others see interactions among the three variables working in all directions, and not
necessarily like Kuznetsov’s three-step transitional approach. Mesbahi applies the
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approach with the three variables working simultaneously on Russian, Turkish, and
Iranian foreign policy in Post-Soviet Asia. He argues the advantage of this symbiotic
approach is that it is a “multidimensional conceptual framework” within which complex
dynamics “can be situated and framed” (2010: 165). Rozov uses the approach on the
history of Russian foreign policy, concluding that the three “are all very tightly
connected,” however, “each of them is an autonomous dynamic sphere that cannot be
reduced to anything else, and has its own logical patterns” (2012: 25). Davutoğlu uses the
framework to assess the formation of Western Civilization:
[t]he historical emergence of a civilizational space has three preconditions: a
geopolitical zone suitable for the security and basis needs, geo-economic zone for
the integrity of economic activity, and geo-cultural milieu for the consistency and
continuity of cultural life (2014b: 88).
While Davutoğlu’s project differs from foreign policy analysis, it is appropriate that
Davutoğlu uses the term “milieu” here with geoculture, as it implies an internalized
interaction between the external social and physical environs.
Geoculture is a foreign policy tool leveraging basic realities of time and space;
‘nuggets’ of history and geography can be appropriated, and if eloquently and
convincingly presented, accepted to form a geoculture. Given geoculture is a portmanteau
of “geography” and “culture,” each is a necessary attribute. Geographic identity is clearly
represented in the term. This is not to indicate a shared topography (i.e., desert,
mountains, tundra, etc.); rather, a shared physical geographic entity (i.e., continent,
archipelago, sea, ocean, etc.). The shared historic experience is based on social narratives
of statehood, struggle, war and reconciliation, and the diffusion of populations,
knowledge and ideas. To what degree a Japanese foreign policymaker is convincing with

18

a construction of an Asian geoculture varies. What is conceptualized here is the material
plausibility of constructing a geoculture to apply into foreign policymaking. The material
plausibilities can only come from seed elements of factual historical experiences and
physical geographic entities which are recognized as mutual, and form the basis of coconstitutive shared norms, values, and practices.
This is not to advocate that ‘Asia’ is a reality outside of human construction.
Geographers have never been consistent with how they define continents. This project is
sympathetic to the work by Lewis and Wigen (1997) that debunks the reification of the
world’s continents, namely the partitioning of Europe and Asia (and Africa). The
defining characteristics of a continent have come to be prescribed, firstly, in the physical
geography as a discernable land mass and, secondly, the geology of a granitic crust plate.
Yet, with a 600-mile artificial line drawn along the Urals and the Caucasus, the
conventionally understood distinction between Europe and Asia is a glaring anomaly to
these rules (Lewis and Wigen 1997, 35). Nonetheless, what is relevant is how Japan
conceptualizes Asia.
Germane to Japan’s conceptualization of the continents, and Asia specifically, is
that there are two terms in Japanese which translate to “continent” in English, shū (州)
and tairiku (大陸). Shū (occasionally, taishū) implies parts in a system, whereas the riku
in tairiku implies land. Therefore, shū tends to take on the more (geo)cultural meaning
whereas tairiku tends to take on the more geophysical meaning. Moreover, tairiku is
usually used dichotomously with shima (島), or ‘island.’ Thus, Japan, itself is not part of
any tairiku. Yūrashia, or ‘Eurasia’ is the conventionally accepted tairiku, while ashū (亜
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州)/ajia (亜細亜) or ‘Asia,’ and ōshū (欧州)/yōroppa (欧羅巴) or ‘Europe,’ are
conventionally accepted taishū. Japan is near yūrashia, but not conceptualized as part of
it. It is, however, conceptualized as part of ashū/ajia. While the schema of continents in
Japan is just as problematic as the schema of continents in the West, this linguistic
division of shū from tairiku helps to free the geocultural from the geophysical definition,
and open it up even more so to ideational construction.
A constructed Asian geoculture is Tokyo’s foreign policy tool for its values-based
diplomacy. Sato and Asano argue, “[t]he end of the cold war and the ‘third wave of
democratization’ that followed offered a grand opportunity for Japan to place democratic
norms into the core of its aid policy” (2008: 112). In post-Soviet Asia, public
infrastructure is dilapidated; Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen are war-torn; most
people in South Asia live in poverty. All can benefit from the particular forms of aid at
which Tokyo excels, such as public infrastructure ‘yen loans,’ grant aid, and technical
assistance (Kawato 2008, 19). Moreover, Muslim Asia is Asia, and Asō’s and Abe’s
speeches illustrate a geocultural affinity Japan has towards fellow Asian states. Also,
while Japan has broadly shown normative interests in development across Asia, these
particular Asian states in the Middle East, South Asia, and Post-Soviet Asia were not
directly affected by Japanese expansionism and aggression in the early twentieth century,
and thus, do not carry the same degree of distrust or animosity seen in East and Southeast
Asia. The Middle East, South Asia, and Post-Soviet Asian states are ones which present a
fresh opportunity for Japan’s values-based diplomacy – places where Tokyo can easily
take the “escort runner” role Asō analogized, and assist with development and
democratization.

20

Contribution to the Literature
Existing literatures tend to treat the relationship between material and normative interests
in foreign policy differently than this project. Realists discount normativity in foreign
policy as either insignificant or underscoring some power-securing strategy, and while
neoliberals and Marxists certainly emphasize material interests, they also seek to
proselytize their own versions of normativity. This project seeks to combine the material
and normative interests, to account for a more exact picture of foreign policy. Given this
project is analyzing theory which fuses normativity with a state’s ontological security
concerns (perseverance and stability through economic and energy security), a
constructivist approach is utilized to grasp a collective identity; “language exhibits a
logical structure that enables meaning” (Howell 2013, 90). The language used by Japan’s
political leaders is the key material for analysis, and language alluding to an Asian
geoculture with Japan leading is language “product of our conceptualizations”
(Kratochwil 2008, 81). Thus, the constructivist approach is best suited to find these
conceptualizations of an Asian geoculture, and how it drives normative foreign policy
means towards material ends. Yet, while a constructivist approach is most apt to reveal
political change by emphasizing agency, as previously discussed, sociological
institutionalism and its path dependency structural constraints are also applied to reveal
the political consistency. Therefore, constructivism and sociological institutionalism can
work to complement each other in articulating a nuanced and accurate portrayal of
Japan’s foreign policy, providing fair consideration for agency and structure, as well as
consistency and change.
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Within the vein of geoculture, it is important to explore the related notions of
‘Asian democracy’ and ‘Asian values.’ Is it possible to find values common among all
Asian societies which can lay the groundwork for a model of democracy distinguishable
from the Western model, yet sufficiently akin to each other to be bestowed the title of
‘Asian democracy?’ Moreover, ‘Asian democracy,’ as a concept, directly contradicts the
theory of oriental despotism, proposed by Karl Marx, and expounded on a century later
by Karl Wittfogel. The theory of oriental despotism, however, is a classic example of
Orientalism that has never been supported with substantial evidence, but its notoriety has
contributed to an essentialized and misguided approach of binary thinking in academia:
Western is to democratic, as Asian is to despotic.
The notion of ‘Asian democracy’ based on ‘Asian values’ spawned a debate in the
early 1990s among certain Asian leaders. Prime Ministers Mahathir Mohammed of
Malaysia and Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore were among those who argued that Asia has
its own set of values which makes it incompatible with Western liberal democracy. Thus,
“Asian societies can be modernized (in an economic sense), without being Westernized
(in the political sense)” (Yung 2012, 268). Proponents argue “it was predominantly their
Islamic-Confucian cultural values that were acting as the driving force behind Asia’s
tremendous economic success during the 1990s” (Mukherjee 2010, 686). South Korea’s
future president Kim Dae Jung and Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi were among those
who contested the concept, arguing that liberal democratic values are universal values;
“popular participation and the justness of opposition to despotic rule are principles deeply
rooted in…Buddhist, Confucianist, Christian, and Muslim traditions” (Thompson 2015,
876). While much of this debate took place formally through published articles in
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Foreign Affairs and academic journals, most preeminent thinkers involved were
politicians. Bell makes the pertinent point that “political actors tend to be motivated by
considerations other than clear thinking, and it may not be fair to blame elderly Asian
politicians for the obfuscating discourse on Asian values” (2006: 53). If Japan’s political
leaders are discussing ‘Asian democracy’ and ‘Asian values,’ such as Abe’s 2016
comments presented in the opening of this chapter, they are to be analyzed as a
constructed geoculture, regardless of realities that root the concept.
Wood points out that in Asian traditions, “the claims of community (of which the
institution of the family is an integral part) are not secondary to those of the individual.
Indeed, it is often the other way around” (2004: 4). This is a common assertion regarding
Asian societies, if not a clichéd one. Morris-Suzuki argues that in Asia “the acceptance of
Western notions of democracy has also been accompanied by a tendency to write off predemocratic, pre-modern Asia as mired in stagnation. Today, therefore, a major task is to
rediscover the diversity of local values” (2009: 167). Yung makes the observations that
“many of the often cited ‘Asian values’ were once Western conservative values,” and that
“the so-called ‘Asian values’ in the present day, just like ‘the Protestant ethic’ of the
West in the past, will face similar challenges as Asia continues to embark on its course of
development” (2012: 271). Indeed, the notion of Asian democracy is still both nebulous
and contentious in the twenty-first century. What is vital in this project is how the notion
is being conceptualized as part of a geoculture by the actors, and what are the values
which emanate from this model. Does it have the potential for currency?
Wood adds that “Asian democracy may have antecedents that are different from
those of the West” (2004: 107). Undoubtedly, this is the case, and these antecedents are
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evident in values instilled via the moral and religious épistèmai that shape the societies.
References can easily be made establishing a relationship between ethical and religious
épistèmai and democratic values, but the quest remains for identifying how these are
shared among Asian societies, some of which have an ethical and religious épistème
based on Islam, others on Buddhism, Hinduism, and in the case of Japan, Shinto.
Mukherjee makes the point that “[b]ecause the proponents of the ‘Asian values’ debate
came from different cultural backgrounds, that is, Islamic, Buddhist, and Confucian, there
is no single simplistic definition of the term ‘Asian values’” (2010: 686). He adds, “[t]his
common concept of ‘Asian values’ could be used to strengthen a false sense of solidarity
amongst the culturally heterogeneous population and prevent centrifugal forces from
coming to the political forefront to keep the power of the state intact” (2010: 686). Bell
takes his critique of the concept to a higher level:
The assumption that Asia has its own cultural essence fundamentally different
from that of the West is, to say the least, dubious. In fact, as Tatsuo Inoue has
argued, the Asian values thesis ironically owes its roots to Western intellectual
imperialism, that is, “Orientalism,” the very force that was being criticized by
official Asian critics of human rights (2006: 52).
Undoubtedly, every society’s moral and religious foundations cultivate values in such a
way as to create a unique brand of democracy in practice. Questioning sufficient
commonalities across the wide scope of societies in Asia, however, is certainly
warranted, yet historical evidence exists that such narratives are effective, such as Japan’s
transformative role in defeating Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, and the effect it had
on Muslim populations to resist Western imperialism.4 Societies can see themselves
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Discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
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vicariously take a role in events through reactionary relations – a response to the Other’s
relations with a third party. Thus, if Japan presents a form of development and democracy
which an Asian society seeks to, and believes it can successfully emulate, ‘Asian
democracy’ via ‘Asian values’ can serve as the viable narrative to attempt such a path.
This project also contributes to the developing literature on the aforementioned
tripartite symbiosis framework for foreign policy analysis. By using this framework and
expounding upon its concept of ‘geoculture,’ this project contributes to an understanding
of the dynamics among the three variables, and can illustrate the strengths and
weaknesses of the framework approach. Every state’s foreign policy is a composite of the
three variables, and by deeper conceptualization of these variables and illustration of how
they interact, this project can improve the durability of the framework so later scholars
can utilize it for analysis in other milieus. It is hoped that this project can illustrate that
normativity found in the geoculture dynamic does not necessitate a contradiction with
material interests, or for that matter grand strategy, elicited from geopolitics or geoeconomics.
Lastly, this project contributes to a new range of foreign policy analysis which fits
in between the space of area studies and global studies. Japan’s foreign policy is usually
analyzed through its relations with neighboring states in East Asia, or with the U.S. This
project, however, contributes to literature on inter-regional relations, “security
constellations” (Buzan, et al. 1998, 201), “security supercomplexes” (Buzan and Wæver
2003, 60), and to thought on Asia, not simply as a continent, but as an ontological base
for identity construction (Katzenstein 1997, 9-12). This project is an excellent contender
to suit the space of interregional/pancontinental/subglobal study, on account of the
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consequential relationship between Japan and Muslim Asia, and the elements of the
tripartite framework (geopolitics, geo-economics, and geoculture) which have driven this
relationship.
Muslim Asia, especially so in Post-Soviet Asia, presents a unique ‘petri dish’ for
Japan’s new values-based diplomacy in Asia. Hickok makes the point that in crafting its
Eurasian Diplomacy policy in the 1990s directed towards the newly independent Central
Asian republics, “[t]he Japanese felt cultural and ethnic ties to those people who shared
Mongol/Northeast Asian heritage” (2000: 25). Uyama argues that with regard to Central
Asia, “[t]he image of Central Asia…evoked nostalgia and exoticism, sentiments that the
Japanese had traditionally projected to Asia in general” (2008: 108). Yet, interesting to
this question of an Asian geoculture is how Asian is Japan, itself? As an island-nation
which constrained itself from outside contact for long periods of history, overwhelmingly
homogeneous, industrialized well before any other part of Asia, and with a religious
tradition, Shinto, not practiced anywhere else in the world, can Japan, itself, relate to
Asia? In assessing the work of influential philosopher Fukuzawa Yukichi, who was
principal in the founding of modern Japan, Morris-Suzuki argues that the modern
understanding of ‘Asia’ in Japan is “not an entity of which Japan is an inextricable part,
but rather an environment which Japan can choose to leave or return to without doing
violence to its own national integrity” (2009: 164). Katzenstein explores this issue of
Japan’s identity in his seminal work on normativity in Japan’s foreign policy, Cultural
Norms and National Security. Katzenstein illustrates Japan’s isolation through
comparison with the U.S.:
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There remains an uneasy sense that too often Japan remains a stranger in the
international society of states. Unlike the United States, Japan lacks abroad what
it has at home: an ideology of law and a vision of the good society that motivates
political action (1996: 206).
Indeed, reconciling domestic norms and practices with observed and learned ones in the
international society is an ongoing challenge for Japan’s identity and significant for this
project, but Katzenstein’s assumption overlooked Japan’s political actions abroad at the
time his observation was made, and is hardly representative of the developments which
would ensue soon thereafter. Japan’s political action is motivated by an ideology of law
and a vision of the good society in order to make a world like itself through modeling, but
the measures to attain and inspire these are more opaque than in the American model.
Uyama argues that key to Japan’s post-War diplomacy is that “the Japanese
economy could play a unique role in the development of Asia” (2008: 109). Though
Katzenstein overlooks political actions abroad, he does astutely recognize that “Japan
prefers to spread its influence abroad through markets. It seeks to diffuse the economic
conditions and social practices that have made possible the rise of its dynamic and
productive society” (1996: 206). He adds, “Japan hopes eventually to make the
international society of states more recognizable to itself” (1996: 207). Nowhere is this
more evident than in Asia, but why Asia? Katzenstein adds that the Japanese “seek to
export to other states in Asia…institutionalized norms as well as technological
innovations” (1996: 207). Thus, the Japanese archipelago is not an isolated feature from
Asia; rather, it stands on the stage, as part of the whole, but something to inspire and
imitate. This idea of Japan on stage for Asia to see is not entirely different from Asianist
forerunner Okakura Tenshin’s idea of Japan as a “museum of Asiatic civilization; and yet
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more than a museum” (1904: 3). Describing Okakura’s approach, Tanaka explains:
“Japan’s genius lay in its ability to adapt creatively only those Asiatic characteristics that
were harmonious with its own nature; and Japan thus became the possessor of the best of
Asia” (1993: 13). He adds, “it was Japan’s destiny to revive Asia” (1993: 13).
Normativity is present, yet the practices of normativity in Japan’s foreign policy fly under
the radar for most observers.
Methodology
Is this diplomatic strategy viable in Muslim Asia? Despite vast distances, differing
religio-cultural practices, and limited interpersonal contacts, can Islam be securitized,
shared values be elevated through a constructed Asian geoculture, and institutions be
strengthened, and thus tying normativity with material concerns? For analysis, event
cases are selected among the Muslim-majority states in Asia.
The period of analysis generally spans the end of the Cold War to present, but
occasionally brings in earlier material in ‘Background’ sections to set context. In withincase analysis, process tracing is used to detect the presence of causal process
observations. In compiling data on individual cases and comparing the cases, it is
important to stress the nominal nature of the cases: Data on the explanatory factors and
outcome variable are to be measured qualitatively. Process-tracing “provides a check on
whether the explanations developed from typological comparisons are spurious” (George
and Bennett 2005, 254). Using the cases, process-tracing can potentially indicate
overlooked variables, which would necessitate a heuristic reformulation of the
explanatory variables in order to refine the theory.
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In order to carry out this analysis, the project will rely heavily on three types of
data sources: statements from political leaders, influential think tanks in Japan, and
leading Japanese scholars of Islam. Of particular worth among statements from political
leaders are the Prime Minister’s office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The
so-called “Iron Triangle” of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), business community,
and bureaucracy, which long dominated the political elite-class in Japan, has loosened
considerably in the last two decades. Prior to this, the bureaucracy could be thought of as
the singular ‘think tank.’ Today, several think tanks exist with varying degrees of
influence on policy. Most notable is the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA),
which is rated the most influential think tank in Asia and affiliated with MOFA.
For cross-case analysis, the project lends itself most appropriately to typological
theory, as the nuances to the explanatory variables in each case are to remain nominally
qualitative, and upon analysis, can be configured into ‘types.’ Through noting similarities
and “sharper distinctions between types,” the significance of the explanatory factors on
the outcome variable can be measured, and a clearer grasp of Tokyo’s values-based
diplomacy in practice can be assessed (George and Bennett 2005, 237). With this method,
the theory can be refined and tested further with the same cases, or other cases within the
scope of the study at the project proceeds. At the conclusion, cases are grouped together
based on similar outcomes in a typology. This streamlines the types and diagrams them
into a more precise theory (George and Bennett 2005, 260).
Outline
Milieu drives, in part, idea, and idea preempts foreign policy; strategy then follows.
Therefore, conceptually, this project focuses, first, on Japan’s idea, or conceptualization,
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of Asia. Conceptualization is the objective for chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 creates a
chronology of Japan’s encounters with Islam, discovery and knowledge of Islam,
evolving conceptualization of Islam, and particularly, how Islam as a religion and
lifestyle fits into its conceptualization of Asia. It discusses pertinent relations with
Muslim Asia in a historical and regional context, and thickens with detail toward the
present. How are the Japanese getting this idea of Islam? Are they arriving at this idea
independently from others, or are they following others? How does this idea affect
policy?
Chapter 3 sets the structural scene. Titled ‘International and Domestic Context,’ it
includes, first, a geopolitical framing of competing and complementary grand strategies
for Asia among the great powers, the U.S.’s ‘Pivot toward Asia,’ China’s ‘One-Belt OneRoad,’ and Russia’s ‘neo-Eurasianism,’ and how Japan’s strategy interacts with the other
three. This serves to frame the research results in the context of current power dynamics
in Asia, and resultantly, can shed light on Japan’s vision juxtaposed and interacting with
the visions of other great powers on the continent. What is the strategy as a result of this
idea, and this policy? This is then followed by clarifying the domestic political factors
which are undoubtedly affecting policy and strategy by pushing this new approach.
Chapters 2 and 3 search for the Japanese conceptualization of Asia, and how Islam fits
into this conceptualization via three facets that connect the structure to agency. Chapter 2
is the Japanese Self conceptualization within the structure of Asia inclusive of Islam.
How does the identity of Self, and perception of Other matter? Chapter 3 is the
contemporary structural variables coming from the great powers, which push and pull the
Japanese agency’s perceptions and strategies. How does the international milieu matter?
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Then, it includes the push-pull variables in the domestic political power structure in
Japan. Together, these inform how Japan proceeds with strategy in, and with Muslim
Asia.
Once a firm understanding of Asia as a package that includes Islam is established,
then the project proceeds to the latter half which focuses on the strategizing and
operationalizing vis-à-vis policy. The second half of the project, ‘Part II: Strategy,’
elucidates the factors identified as significant in strategy from the first half. ‘Part II:
Strategy’ includes ‘Chapter 4: Access to Energy,’ ‘Chapter 5: Access to Markets,’
‘Chapter 6: Development Aid,’ ‘Chapter 7: Human Rights Debate,’ ‘Chapter 8: Sanctions
and Interventions,’ and ‘Chapter 9: Conclusion.’ Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are rich with factual
detail with by Chapters 7 and 8, are intermingled with outcomes and observations.
Chapter 9 summarizes the findings, presents the typological theory outcome, frames the
results in a broader theoretical context, and discusses further research possibilities.
This project analyzes the viability of Japan’s first values-based pillar of foreign
policy in the post-War era. The ramifications of the Arc, an Asian geoculture, and the
notion of ‘Asian democracy’ are immense. This is in many ways a second attempt by
Japan to take a leadership role in Asia – the first being a twentieth-century model for
‘modernization without Westernization,’ and now ‘democratization without
Westernization.’ While this policy approach is in no regard an attempt at establishing
hegemony across Asia, it could be interpreted as a narrative to undermine the dominant
role China is taking, and Tokyo’s way to distance itself from the West, and further
explore its identity as part of Asia. The new policy, however, is hedging its bets on an
assumption that democracy, whether it is liberal, Asian, or without a descriptive
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adjective, but as presented, appeals to Asian societies today, and is something which can
serve as a cornerstone to shared identity.
The outcomes of this project can make a valuable contribution to understanding
Japan’s worldview, its construction of, and assumed role in Asia, and continuity and
change in Japan’s norms, values, and practices in foreign policy. Additionally, this
project uncovers the significance and implications of the Japan-Islam relationship, thus
contributing to the dearth of knowledge that exists in the dominant, Anglophonic medium
in academia. The path Japan takes globally in redefining itself in light of ongoing
economic stagnation, social ills, and demographic decline at home in the twenty-first
century will leave lessons to be learned by all states that will inevitably face similar
challenges at some point.
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Table 1.1: Muslim-Majority States in Asia
Muslim
Population (in
millions)
%
South Asia
Afghanistan
28.1
99.7
Bangladesh
145.3
89.6
Maldives
0.3
98.4
Pakistan
174.1
96.3
Southeast Asia
Brunei
0.27
67.2
Indonesia
202.9
88.2
Malaysia
16.6
60.4
Post-Soviet Asia
Azerbaijani
8.8
99.2
i
Kazakhstan
8.8
56.4
Kyrgyzstan
4.7
86.3
Tajikistan
5.8
84.1
Turkmenistan
4.8
93.1
Uzbekistan
26.5
96.3
i
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are
conventionally considered
transcontinental states. Here, both are
included in Muslim Asia due to shared
political, linguistic, historical, and cultural
attributes with other Muslim Asia states.
Moreover, in both cases, a significantly
smaller portion of territory and population
are on the European side.

Muslim
Population
(in millions)
%
Middle East
Bahrain
0.6
81.2
Iran
73.8
99.4
Iraq
30.4
99
Jordan
6.2
98.2
Kuwait
2.8
95
Lebanon
2.5
59.3
Oman
2.5
87.7
Palestine
4.2
98
Qatar
1.1
77.5
Saudi Arabia
25.0
97
Syria
20.2
92.2
ii
Turkey
73.6
98
UAE
3.5
76.2
Yemen
23.4
99.1
ii
The European portion of Turkey, the
East Thrace, makes up only three percent
of Turkey’s landmass and with the largest
city, Istanbul, 12 percent of the
population. The majority of Turkey’s
population and landmass, and its capital,
Ankara, however, are on the Asian side,
and thus it is considered part of Muslim
Asia for the purposes of this project.
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Table 1.2: Muslim-Minority Populations in Asia

India
China
Philippines
Thailand
(Asian) Russiai
Sri Lanka
Myanmar
Israel
Nepal
Singapore

Muslim
Population
176 million
25 million
5.1 million
3.8 million
2-3 million
2 million
1.9 million
1.4 million
1.4 million
730,000

%
14.4
1.8
5.5
5.5
6-9
9.8
4.0
18.6
4.6
14.3

.
.
.

.
.
.

.
.
.

Significant Sub-State
Regions
Kashmir
Xinjiang
Bangsamoro
Southern Border Provinces
Eastern Province
Rakhine
Northern District

Significant Ethnic
Groups
Hui, Uyghur
Moro
Malay
Tatar, Bashkir
Sri Lankan Moor
Rohingya
Arab, Palestinian
Malay

.
.
.

.
.
.

Japan
200,000
0.2
i
Muslims in Asian Russia (Siberia and Russian Far East), according to most
conventional geographical understandings of the continent’s boundaries, are limited to
those located east of the Ural Mountains and Ural River. It does not include the North
Caucasus region, Tatarstan, and nearly all but a sliver of eastern Bashkortostan.
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Figure 1.1: Research Hypothesis
IV1: disillusionment with the Western-led world order in Asia
+
IV2: Japan’s urge to securitize Islam
+
IV3: assertiveness of regional power by China
+
IV4: Japan’s views of its own exceptionalism in Asia
+
IV5: an existential preoccupation with economic and energy security
= ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------DV: the formulation and reiteration of an Asian geoculture in Japan’s foreign policy in
Asia
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Map 1.1: Muslim Asia

Muslim majority areas in Asia
rest of Asia

Map by author.
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Map 1.2: Shipping Lane from Persian Gulf to Japan

Map by author.

37

CHAPTER II
DISCOVERY AND IDENTITY
In January 2015, two Japanese nationals were kidnapped by ISIS and eventually
beheaded when the Japanese government refused to meet ransom demands by the
kidnappers. Beheadings by ISIS are shocking to Westerners and Muslims alike, who have
seen footage of their own symbolically dehumanized while recorded with the intention to
disseminate an extremist message. For the Japanese, the act was particularly acute, since
throughout the conflicts religious extremists presented against mainstream Muslims and
the West, the Japanese felt some sense of security in being neither here nor there – on the
periphery of the hotspots. The beheadings illustrated that while Japan is geographically
and culturally distanced from Islam, it was not immune to this crisis in Islam.
This chapter explores the ideational complexity of Japan’s relations with Islam
throughout time and space; it explores historic interaction between the two which formed
ideas of Self and Other, roles, and identities that persist. There is an abundance of
literature on Islam’s relations with the West, Russia, China, and other actors, but Islam’s
interaction with Japan has evaded substantial research. This chapter has two objectives:
firstly, it seeks to explain the influence of conceptualizations of Islam on Japan’s
positioning within the world order since initial contact; secondly, it seeks to reveal key
conceptual dynamics which shape Japan’s foreign and security policy with Muslimmajority states in Asia today. Attaining a grasp of both of these objectives is essential
prior to proceeding with this study. While some discussion of conceptualizations of Japan
by Muslims in Asia is relevant, this chapter (and project) concentrates on the Japanese
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interpretations and reflections, as seen through foreign and security policy, in response to
interactions with Islam. This chapter deepens the understanding of inter-civilizational,
interfaith, and transregional relations between Japan and Muslim Asia which have helped
to construct Japan’s identity and role in Asia, its conceptualization of Asia, and
particularly, how Islam as a religion and lifestyle for Asian societies fits into this
conceptualization.
In reference to Edward Said’s terminology, this seems to be a case of Orientalism
by the Orientalized. Said did not identify this as a case of Orientalism because he defined
the term as “a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient’s
special place in European Western experience,” but in fact, how Japan learned about
Islam since the nineteenth century is largely based on the European Western experience
(1979: 1).1 While Japan and the Muslim world are historically and geographically remote
from each other, both have constructed their identities to some extent in contrast to the
West, which at times in the past has been sufficient reason to attempt coalescing
identities. These coalescing attempts are in part due to Orientalized understandings, in
that Self and Other are both in contrast with the West, therefore, Self and Other have a
sameness. There is a rich history of interpretations of each other as the Other Orient
through interaction with the West, which manifested even in the ISIS beheadings of
Japanese nationals. For it was pointed out by ISIS militants that Japan joined with the
U.S. in the Iraq War in 2003, and thus was an ‘enemy state’ collaborating with the West.

Said does recognize, however, that Orientalism’s “influence has spread to ‘the Orient’ itself: the pages of
books and journals in Arabic (and doubtless in Japanese, various Indian dialects, and other Oriental
languages) are filled with second-order analyses by Arabs of ‘the Arab mind,’ ‘Islam,’ and other myths”
(1979: 322).
1
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At first glance, relations between ‘Japan’ and ‘Islam’ appear incommensurable.
Japan is a quintessential nation-state, and the most homogeneous of large and developed
countries, with 98.5 percent of its populace ethnic-Japanese. It is also an island nation, a
geography which has allowed it to remain isolated from globalization for centuries,
sample elements of other cultures, and adapt them over time. It is democratic,
polytheistic, and modern (if not post-modern). Islam is a monotheistic and universalist
religion spanning across the globe, though rooted with its holy cities at a tri-continental
pivot on the fossil fuel-abundant Arabian Peninsula. It has been in frequent interaction
with ‘foreigners’ since its beginnings, and struggles to reconcile with modernization are
evident today. On appearance, the two entities, Japan and Islam, are clearly not on the
same level of analysis, but there is more symmetry than meets the eye. Often defining ‘to
be Japanese’ hardly involves just a citizenship right, but is more often identified as
adherence to a series of annual, and in some cases, daily rituals based on the synchronism
of Shinto and Buddhism found only in Japan. Much of the work done by Ian Reader
demonstrates that these practices are not done as Shinto or as Buddhist, per se; rather,
they are done as Japanese (1991; 1998). Thus, observed from the perspective of
religiosity rather than nation-states or civilizations, symmetry can be achieved.
Symmetry at the level of analysis can be achieved, yet treating entities at this
level of analysis as agents remains challenging – particularly in the case of Islam. While
Japan is a religious milieu with rituals, practices, and an épistème, it is also a nation-state
with clear agency. Trying to construct Islam as agency, however, is challenging, as no
political entity can justifiably represent the collectivity of states, religious sects, and
ethno-societies (although there are many who would desire to do so) (Brown 2014, 56).
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This conundrum is not severely problematic, however, regarding the scope of this project
since Japan is the subject of inquiry and Islam is the object of inquiry. What is significant
here is how Japan, which can serve as a civilization, state, religious milieu, and agent,
conceptualizes and reacts to other conceptualizations of ‘Islam’ in the global order.
The framing of actors as ‘civilizations’ can come with unwanted baggage. In the
singular, the term implies a monolithic and ubiquitous standard of sophistication, usually
closely associated with development, globalization, or modernization (Davutoğlu 2014a,
vii). Yet even in the plural, it implies coexisting (or competing) normative social orders at
best in a “dialogue,” as advocated by the UN General Assembly in 1998 (Brown 2014,
57), or a “clash,” as theorized by Samuel P. Huntington. Huntington’s oft-cited book, The
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996) has contributed greatly to
the stigmatization of the concept, given its ad hoc arrangement of major contemporary
civilizations. While Huntington recognizes the permeability of civilizations, he
underplays this point in his work as he reified civilizations as agents, bound for
confrontation. In this project, more significant than the UN General Assembly’s notion,
or the Huntingtonian notion of ‘civilization’ is how the Japanese conceptualize Islam as a
foundation to a pivotal global civilization, and how this affects their framing of world
order. It also affects the approaches Tokyo utilizes in past and present foreign policy with
Muslim-majority states. To this point, it is useful to note there is no commonly
recognized distinction in the Japanese language between the terms ‘Islam,’ and ‘Muslim.’
A ‘Muslim’ in Japanese is Isuramu-kyōto (イスラム教徒) – a ‘believer of Islamic
teachings.’ Thus, attempts to distinguish a Muslim society or person from Islam, as a

41

creed, are linguistically challenging, but reinforces assumptions of civilizational
conformity.2
Dallmayr, et al. describe Davutoğlu’s conception of civilizations as “distinct
paradigms of human and social existence, comprising cognitive, normative, aesthetic, and
spiritual aspects” (2014: xv). The authors add “[c]ivilizations in this view develop
distinctive perceptions of time and space [italics added], and of the meaning and purpose
of human and social life” (2014: xv). This view, which bases civilization upon the
perception of the actor, is more aligned with how it is defined here. Within this
framework of relying on the actor to define the Self and the Other (or, the Self and OtherSelf), the inter-civilizational relations between Japan and Islam can be analyzed through
direct contacts, but indirect contacts are also valuable for conceptualizing their
positioning in the world order. In both time and space, other actors such as Russia, China,
a Hindu civilization (fundamentally represented by the Indian nation-state), and the West
(through the U.S., UK, EU, G7, et cetera) interacted with Japan on the world stage while
Muslims watched and reacted, and vice versa. Therefore, often the inter-civilizational
relations between Japan and Islam are simply not bilateral relations, but reactionary
relations–a response to the other’s relations with a third party, usually among the four
abovementioned entities (see Figure 2.1).
This chapter proceeds by applying a multidimensional conceptual framework
within which the inter-civilizational, and reactionary relations can be framed. The

Note this linguistic structure of applying the suffix ‘-kyōto’ (-教徒), or ‘believer of ____ teachings’
applies for most other major religions, such as Buddhist, ‘buk-kyōto’ (仏教徒), (believer of Buddha’s
teachings), Jewish ‘yudaya-kyōto’ (ユダヤ教徒), (believer of Jewish teachings), and Christian, ‘kirisutokyōto’ (キリスト教徒), (believer of Christ’s teachings).
2
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triangular symbiotic framework is applied, addressing geocultural, geo-economic and
geopolitical dynamics. Mesbahi elaborates that this framework is to be “embedded
geographically in a megaregional complex,” which is precisely the scope of this project
(2010: 167). Geoculture drove discovery and initial identity-formation between Japan and
Islam for centuries of early contacts, although not exclusively. Early twentieth-century
industrialization and militarization in Japan thrust geo-economics and geopolitics into the
forefront of Japan’s foreign policy with Muslim Asia; postwar, however, geoculture, and
to a lesser extent geopolitics, were tremendously muted. Geopolitics began its revival
during the 1970s oil shocks, and in the twenty-first century, with the announcement of a
values-based Arc and further systemic developments in global politics, geoculture is
increasingly attaining parity in Japan’s foreign policy with Muslim Asia. All three are
present in foreign policy at all times, and this chapter is not to be read as a comprehensive
sweep of the background that has shaped the relations between Japan and Islam today.
Rather, this chapter is seeking out perceptions of Self and Other from interactions, and
finds as the driver of foreign relations has shifted over time, so have the learning,
surmising, and perceptions. Of the three, ‘geoculture’ is analyzed here in substantial
detail because, firstly, it is the least clearly conceptualized and thus worthy of substantial
analysis; secondly, it was historically the first driver to situate discovery and identity,
which went on for centuries long before geo-economics and geopolitics took over; and
thirdly, it relates more closely to the problematic concept of ‘civilization.’
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Geographically, Islam has its Ummah, or supra-national community of Muslim
populations, and Japan is territorially a clearly defined3 nation-state on an archipelago
(see Map 2.1). While the geographies are distanced to some degree with no distinctive
border zone or conflicted territory,4 they serve as integral linchpins to the Eurasian
regional complex, one spanning across the southwest to southeast, and the other boxing it
in from the east. The significance of these areas on the Eurasia continent was apparent to
classical geopoliticians Mackinder and Spykman, but also keenly understood by policy
analysts in Washington and Moscow during the Cold War. The traditional geopolitical
approach is accepted in the analysis of this chapter, but confines the analysis. The
symbiotic framework, however, which includes geo-economics and geoculture in foreign
policy analysis, allows for examination of this inter-civilizational relationship beyond
spatial zones and geo-strategic interests, thus allowing for wider dimensions of
interaction through perceived geographies.
This chapter proceeds by starting with the geocultural dynamics. Extensive
analysis takes place here, as the term is conceptualized and analysis expands deep into
germane cases of historical interactions between Japan and Islam which construct and
contribute to the present image of Self and identity in Asia for the Japanese. Geoeconomics follows, emphasizing the often-overlooked significance of the Japan-Muslim
geo-economic relationship in the past and present, and how it bears on role and identity.
A discussion of the geopolitical dynamics completes the symbiotic triangle, and ties it

3

Save for island territorial disputes with neighboring states.

4

As discussed later in the chapter, however, there is a history of territorial and geocultural overlap between
these two entities that is significant in their relationship today.
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together with the geocultural and geo-economic dynamics. The chapter concludes with
thoughts on the variables which weigh most heavily on Tokyo’s foreign policy toward
Muslim Asia based on identity and conceptualization as extrapolated from the preceding
discussion, and reoccur in subsequent chapters.
Geoculture
Geoculture can potentially transcend societies, nations, and civilizations. The prefix
‘geo-’ emphasizes a spatiality to the term–a spatiality which is a cognitive geography of
sharing a physical geographic entity. The ‘culture’ in ‘geoculture’ adds even more
ambiguity. The very nature of ‘culture’ is vague and ever-changing. This looseness of the
term allows it to be manipulated, and easily constructed into narratives of shared norms,
values, and practices. Emphasized in foreign policy, this fleshes out an idea of shared
identity. Combined with the ‘geo-’ prefix, the concept illustrates how constructions of
place and proximity can shape understandings of culture and uniqueness. Whether
geoculture is utilized as a variable in foreign policy is the decision of the policymakers.
Whether it is accepted is the decision of the political leaders and populaces. The concept
thrives as long as a mass of the political leaders and populace accept the narratives of
shared norms, values, and practices based on shared historic experiences and a physical
geographic entity.
This section examines the historical record of attempted constructions of a shared
geoculture between Japan and Islam. Some of these constructions were made through
reactionary relations with other actors, yet still could serve as the impetus to constructing
a geoculture. These historical encounters between Japan and Islam are significant in the
construction of existing identities in the international system, as well as revealing latent
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possibilities of geoculture being applied to Tokyo’s current foreign policy toward states
in the Muslim world.
The archaic term for ‘Islam’ in Japanese, kaikyō, is written with the same Chinese
characters as the archaic Chinese term for “Islam,” huíjiào (回教). Literally, the term
means “Hui teaching,” as in the beliefs taught by Hui5 people of China, who are uniquely
characterized by their Islamic tradition, and not necessarily their language or ethnicity.
The Chinese were readily able to associate Islam with one of the ethnic groups
understood to make up the plurality of their own society, yet in Japan there was
historically neither a Hui population nor much knowledge of the Hui, and therefore, the
initial understanding of kaikyō6 was not associated as much with a tradition but more with
an ethnic group. It was, however, associated with China.
The direct contacts that did exist between Muslims and Japanese prior to the
nineteenth century, however, should not be overlooked, and in fact, more evidence of
these contacts continues to emerge. During the Nara Period (710-794), Nara served as the
eastern terminus of the Silk Road, as cultural products, artifacts, influences, and
knowledge poured in from the Asian mainland – particularly China, but also from Korea,
Central Asia, India, and Persia. In Nara, the Shōsōin has served as a storage facility for
treasures collected during this era, and has collections of glassware, medicines, and
musical instruments known today to have Middle Eastern origins (Enayat 1994, 99:

The root of the term ‘Hui’ was, in fact, likely referencing the modern Uyghur people, who were in earlier
times rendered as Hui (Gladney 2003, 453).
5

6

Following a common trend in the Japanese language, in the postwar era kaikyō has gradually been
replaced with the denizen-rooted Isuramu-kyō (イスラム教). The most significant impetus for this
particular linguistic transition was the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran (Sakai 2010, 127).
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Miyata 2017, 120). In 2016, a wooden artifact discovered in the 1960s in Nara was
analyzed with infrared imaging technology, revealing that a Persian was not only in Nara,
but was hired as lecturer, likely of mathematics, in an educational institute for
government ministers (Samuels 2016). Archeological pieces such as these have
corroborated a theory that there was direct trade and inter-personal relations between
Persians and Japan as early as 600AD. The Nara Period started a few decades after the
Arab conquest of Persia, yet Islamization of Persia was gradual and only a minority of
Persians were Muslims by the eighth century, so it is unclear if Persians in Nara were
Muslims themselves, or for that matter, even familiar with the religion spreading in their
homeland. It was not until the subsequent Heian Period (794-1192) when a broader (yet
still limited) knowledge of Islam entered Japan via China (Sakai 2010, 126). Yet, it was
still understood as part of China.
Japan’s connection to the Silk Road declined in the Heian Period (794-1185) as
relations with the Tang Dynasty (618-907) in China were cut off in the mid-ninth
century. Relations with China (and Korea) did pick up during China’s Song Dynasty
(960-1279), just as many Middle Eastern and Central Asian Muslims were migrating to
China as traders,7 but sea trade routes across the Indian Ocean were gradually replacing
the Silk Road. Relations were constrained once again on the mainland when the Mongols
invaded China in 1268, founded the Yuan Dynasty, and then in 1274 and 1281 attempted,
twice, to invade Japan. Relations would pick up some between China’s Ming Dynasty8

These ‘settlers’ are significant roots for formulating the identity of the modern Hui people in China,
although DNA evidence is mostly inconclusive.
7

8

Lan Yu, for example, was a fourteenth century Muslim Ming general who was known to be particularly
fond of Japanese swords, having 10,000 in his possession (Fan 2016, 94).
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(1368-1644) and Japan’s Muromachi Era (1336-1573), but were sporadic in the late
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as Japan was amid civil warfare. In 1592, and again in
1597, Japan attempted to invade Korea en route to invading China. This brought an influx
of Chinese and Korean prisoners of war into Japan, who unwillingly brought with them
cultural and technological knowledge, which may have included knowledge of Islam.
Near the same time, Europeans began arriving from the south, Portuguese Jesuits
proselytized Christianity in Japan, and a reorientation of the Japanese conceptualization
of the outside world was taking place.
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, much had changed in Japan. The
country was for the first time unified under a military dictator when Tokugawa Ieyasu
attained power in the 1600 Battle of Sekigahara, and three years later he established a
hereditary military government (a shogunate). Meanwhile, a new conduit of knowledge
of Islam opened through a new channel: the Namban Trade. During this time, entrepôts
were developing in Southeast Asian cities such as Thang-long in Vietnam, Ayutthaya in
Siam, Aceh on Sumatra, Bantam and Mataram on Java, Makassar in the Celebes. The
Japanese (and Chinese) were largely cut off from the vibrant maritime trade networks in
Southeast Asia for centuries due to the threat from wakō piracy, but once the powerful
daimyō, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, took measures to curb the piracy in the late sixteenth
century, it opened up the East China Sea and South China Sea to more trade vessels.
Upon assuming power in 1600, Tokugawa Ieyasu encouraged foreign trade as a way to
increase revenue for the state. The shuinsen, or “red-seal ships,” were Japanese trade
ships approved by the Tokugawa authority in the early seventeenth century to trade in
Southeast Asia ports, especially the Pattani Sultanate and Ayutthaya Kingdom in present-
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day southern Thailand, but also Java and the Maluku Islands in present-day Indonesia –
all with a significant Muslim presence among both locals and migrant traders – and
undoubtedly came in contact with the Muslims during this time.
Between 1600 and 1635, over 350 shuinsen sailed to Southeast Asia. “Japanese
merchants, warriors, [and] officials…for the first time frequently flowed toward
Southeast Asia,” and their presence “introduced not only economic exchange but also
cultural and political interaction with local population and administration” (Liem 2011,
1). According to Frank, “[t]he Japanese also established a merchant colony at the regional
entrepôt of Ayutthaya (near modern Bangkok) in Siam” (1998: 99), so large, he adds,
“[b]etween 1604 and 1635…the Japanese controlled the trade of Siam” (1998: 106).
Circumstantial evidence indicates that Japanese sailors on the shuinsen gained knowledge
of an Islam beyond the Hui variant in China, but there are two reasons why such
knowledge failed to return to Japan to shape discovery and identity via geocultural or
geo-economic means. Firstly, a large number of crewmembers on the shuinsen were not
Japanese; rather, they were hired Chinese, Portuguese, and Dutch crewmen. Secondly,
because many of the Japanese who did join the crews were rōnin samurai or Japanese
Christians escaping persecution, they chose to settle in Southeast Asia, and never
returned to Japan. The Namban Trade might be more appropriately considered here a
conduit of geo-economic foreign policy, and indeed it was, but in terms of impacting
Japanese discovery and identity regarding Islam, it did very little for the above reasons.
Moreover, it was short-lived; in 1632 the Japanese community in Ayutthaya was the
victim of an attack and many were massacred, and three years later the shuinsen policy
was abruptly stopped (Frank 1998, 99). Around the same time, Tokugawa became
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increasingly concerned with the spread of Christianity by Portuguese Jesuits in southern
Japan, and banned the religion from Japan. Both of these factors led to Tokugawa’s
decision to end Japan’s participation in the Namban Trade, and implement laws to close
Japan off from foreign contact. Maybe knowledge of Islam beyond the Chinese variant
was brought back to Japan during the Namban Trade, but if not, it was certainly
introduced in the period that followed.
The end of the Namban Trade ushered in the Sakoku (“closed country”) period
which lasted until the arrival of American Commodore Matthew Perry in 1853. During
this period, trade and interaction were limited to what was brought into Nagasaki Port by
the Dutch and Chinese. In the early decades of the Sakoku period, Persian merchants,
who were Muslims, are known to be among those who arrived in Nagasaki on Dutch and
Chinese trade ships (Samuels 2016), but activities in the port were strictly regulated by
Tokugawa authorities, thus limiting any momentous exchanges of religious knowledge
(Sakai 2010, 127). Much of the learning of the outside world (beyond China) came
through rangaku (Dutch learning). While rangaku was mostly Western knowledge in
subjects such as astronomy, botany, medicine, and geography, it is doubtful rangaku
included theology. This is because one of the key rationales behind the Sakoku policy
was to prevent the spread of Christianity in Japan. The Portuguese were banned from
sailing into Japanese ports, but among Western powers, only the Dutch were allowed
precisely because they did not attempt to proselytize Christianity. Aware of this privilege
allotted to them, Dutch teachers, and other foreigners engaged in the rangaku exchange
of knowledge which may have included Muslims, were unlikely to bring up Christianity,
Islam, or any other knowledge of religions. Nonetheless, rangaku is significant in setting
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a path in Japan for constructing a dominant epistemology based on the scientific
revolution occurring in Europe. A deeper knowledge of Islam and stronger contacts with
the non-Chinese Muslim world would not advance until after the 1854 ‘opening’ of
Japan.
Ironically, the modernization which occurred in Japan during the 1868 Meiji
Restoration brought about a revival of Shinto as the state religion. This was evident in the
term ‘restoration’ in lieu of ‘revolution’; changes would coincide with a renewal of the
spiritual source of the nation: the Emperor. “Indigenous religious tradition accompanied
modernization and the growth of a modern nation” (Cho and Katzenstein 2011, 175).
The theological underpinnings of the Meiji Restoration are, in fact, counter to understood
processes of modernization, and therefore bear similarities to the late 1970s Islamic
Revolution in Iran. Moreover, both events marked the overthrow of hereditary
authoritarian regimes by a force undergirded with religious undertones of righteous
governance, found in both Shinto and Shia Islam.
The Ottoman Empire was the first among Muslim-majority states to send a
diplomatic mission to Japan, yet the event resulted in a bizarre tragedy which would
serve as a catalyst in the development of Japanese-Muslim relations and identity to come.
In 1890, the delegation reached Tokyo and met with the Japanese Prime Minister and the
Meiji Emperor (Penn 2007, 35). During the trip, the diplomatic success of the Ottoman
mission was overshadowed by an acute outbreak of cholera among the sailors. The
Japanese responded by quarantining the Ottomans and their ship, the Ertuğrul, on a
minor island until the epidemic was declared eradicated. Rather than risk another
outbreak, however, the Ottoman delegation determined to return to Istanbul without
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continuing the diplomatic visit, and the Ertuğrul departed southbound along the coast of
Japan. Before reaching the coast of Kobe, the ship was destroyed by a violent typhoon
and sank, resulting in the death of over 500 men (Worringer 2014, 88). Locals cared for
the 69 survivors until the Japanese government arranged for a ship to return them to
Istanbul.
The Japanese were impressed that the Ottomans had traveled so far, despite the
challenges of illnesses and misfortune (Penn 2007, 43). The Ottomans were impressed by
the Japanese hospitality and humanitarian gestures (Penn 2007, 43). They were also
impressed by the Japanese Imperial Navy, which was able to retrieve submerged
equipment, recover nearly 300 bodies, and return survivors to Istanbul (Worringer 2014,
88-89). The Japanese came to understand the Ottoman Empire not as Europe, as was
believed by the Japanese elites at the time, but indeed, as part of Asia (Penn 2007, 44). If
Japanese and Ottomans could share sympathy, sorrow, and mutual admiration through
tragedy, they must share the same Asian worldview. Thus, the conception of panAsianism in Japan commenced, spanning from the Ottoman Empire in the west to the
Japanese Empire in the east.
At the turn of the twentieth century, emerging in the Muslim world was the idea
that Japan presented a model for modernization without Westernization. Meanwhile, in
Japan a notion of a pan-Asia society free of Western imperialism was simultaneously
materializing. The term “Eastern modernity” was being used by Muslims and Japanese
alike (Worringer 2007a, 1). In the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War, for the first time in
modern warfare an Asian state defeated a European state. Russia’s defeat exacerbated the
spiraling unpopularity of the Czar and ultimately led to his deposition and the end of the
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Empire. Muslims from Istanbul to Jakarta, but especially in Central Asia and the
Caucasus Region, observed these events with great interest. As Worringer describes,
Japan’s success resulted in it becoming “larger than life for observers on both sides of the
East-West binary” (2014: 54). It “became an exoticized nation, a country of mythical
capabilities, threatening for Western powers intent upon preserving their colonies, and a
model to be emulated for Asians who imagined their own self-directed destinies”
(Worringer 2014, 54). The question was asked: could Japan “be the ‘Savior of Islam’
against Western imperialism and colonialism” (Esenbel 2011, 1)?
Worringer argues that Meiji Japan provided “a creative and dynamic intermediary
step in the Middle East’s progression toward formulating an ‘alternative universalism’ to
that imposed upon it by the West” (2014: 26). The timing of Japan’s modernization was
crucial given the concurrent imperialism in the Middle East and philosophy of postEnlightenment European thought (Worringer 2014, 39). For many Muslim and nonMuslim Asians alike, amid this milieu Japan had attained the “highest state of moral
evolution possible, according to a set of standards defining national behavior that were
predicated upon Western intellectual thought” (Worringer 2014, 251). Ottoman writers
argued that “the Japanese had combined their indigenous moral values with imitation of
Western technical improvements, and thereby achieved their current power and status”
(Nezir Akmeşe 2007, 66). This was emulated through the rallying expression in Meiji Era
Japan: wakon yōsai (和魂洋才), “Japanese spirit and Western technique.” Russia was the
Ottomans’ enemy state, and “Japan was a perfect role model for the decaying Ottoman
Empire” (Nezir Akmeşe 2007, 66). Paradoxically, within the declining Ottoman Empire,
Japan served as a model for Arab populations who juxtaposed the modernized and
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powerful Japanese empire with the backwards and declining Ottoman Empire (Worringer
2007b, 92). This put the Ottomans in a dilemma. Sultans within the Empire especially
clung to the Japanese model, as it was viewed as a way to modernize and maintain their
custodial role as Sultan, based on the role of the Japanese Emperor (Worringer 2007b,
94).
Concerns over ‘Yellow Peril’ in the West were transformed in the Muslim world
into an equally sensationalized idea of an Asian liberator. While undoubtedly a common
Asian identity was formed in reflection of Western identity, how did Muslims and
Japanese reconcile their starkly different religious practices, customs, and cultural
milieu? After the Russo-Japanese War, Muslim students flocked to Japan to study
Western sciences without risking exposure to Westernized values (Eich 2007, 123).
Many among them had additionally set out to proselytize Islam in Japan. Indeed, if Japan
were to become a Muslim state, it would have tremendous geopolitical implications for
Eurasia. Consider that pre-World War I Japan was already occupying the Korean
Peninsula and Taiwan, and the process of Japanification had commenced in these
colonies culturally, linguistically, and religiously, Spkyman’s rimlands would have
manifested as an almost geographically contiguous Asian civilization under Islam.
From proselytizing Muslim students, the Japanese had found a way to learn about
Islam and usurp it into an emerging pan-Asian narrative. In the 40-year span between the
Russo-Japanese War and the end of World War II, there was a flurry of Japanese
academic and political interest on Islam. In 1920, Sakamoto Kenichi provided the first
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Japanese translation of the Qur’an (Krämer 2014, 621-22).9 In the 1930s, the first three
mosques in Japan were erected in Nagoya, Kobe, and Tokyo. Interestingly the funding
for the Tokyo mosque was provided by the Japanese government as well as prominent
companies such as Mitsubishi (Krämer 2014, 619). In 1933, nationalists in Japan were
already speaking of “making Japan the protector of Islam” (Benda 1958, 103), and by
1938 the Greater Japan Muslim League (Dai Nihon Kaikyō Kyōkai) was established with
government and military sponsorship as a research institute directly subordinate to the
Cabinet Planning Office (Krämer 2014, 619). By 1944, Tokyo hosted one of the largest
library collections of European-language books on Islam, particularly outside of the West
(Aydin 2011, 137-38). Undoubtedly, the government and military interests in Islam were
tied to the vision of a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, as well as subduing the
Muslim populations already under Japanese rule by the 1940s in China and Southeast
Asia.
Interest in Islam among many in Japan had indeed an ulterior motive, relating to
Japan’s vision of a pan-Asian society under its control, and while many Japanese
Muslims were deemed “bogus Muslims” after the War, there were also individuals who
either converted to Islam altogether, or had a genuine interest in incorporating elements
of the religion into the Japanese social épistѐme (Misawa 2011, 120). Krämer argues that

9

Interestingly, Sakamoto presents Allah as kami (神), the gods (plural) present originally in Shinto
(literally, shin-tō is written with the same character, 神道, meaning “the way of the gods”). Protestants in
Japan had already assumed kami to mean God in singular, and this was the accepted translation of the
Christian God in Japanese (Krämer 2014, 622). To the Japanese, however, kami is a plural term, and thus
the Christian ‘God’ and Islamic ‘Allah’ could be accepted by complementing the existing multiplicity of
Shinto kami. Sakamoto’s successors, perhaps cognizant of this gap in understanding of singular versus
plural, maintained the title ‘Allah’ in subsequent translations of the Qur’an (Krämer 2014, 622).
Comparatively, translations of Christian texts into Japanese today still maintain kami as the singular
Christian God.
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for many Japanese, “pan-Asianism was a reality that was part of their biography” (2014:
620-21). In 1904, Tanaka Ippei traveled to China and was impressed by the way the Hui
peoples integrated both Islam and Confucianism into their daily practices. This “Islamic
Confucianism”10 inspired Tanaka to syncretize Shinto and Islam. After his 1924
pilgrimage to Mecca, Tanaka wrote on his idea of the syncretism: Islam “contains a truth
equal to our truth of the way of kami” (1925: 2). He remarked elsewhere, “compared with
Christianity, Islam bears more resemblance to Confucianism11 and our old Shintoism. So,
the religion of Islam must syncretize with the Japanese people in the revival movement of
Asia” (1928: 2).
The occupation of the Dutch East Indies provides a historical case of rare overlap
of the Japanese Empire onto the Ummah. By the late 1930s, the Japanese were spreading
propaganda in the Dutch East Indies that the Emperor would eventually convert to the
Prophet’s religion, and an “Emperor-Caliph of Greater Japan” would soon emerge
(Benda 1958, 105). While Indonesians responded with mixed reactions, even more
complex were the Indonesian responses to the Japanese replacement of Dutch authority in
1942. The Japanese had a plan to demonstrate to the Indonesians their commitment to
Islam, dictating in messages that they shared the same “resentment against Christian
rule,” yet in practice the Japanese occupiers displayed less understanding of Islam, adat
law, and religious jurisdiction in Indonesia than the Dutch (Benda 1958, 109). It has been
alleged that Japanese military officials even once considered ‘moving’ Mecca to

10

Kaiju in Japanese, Huiru in Chinese (回儒).

Okakura Kakuzo also wrote that “Islam itself may be described as Confucianism on horseback, sword in
hand” (1904: 2).
11
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Singapore so that the center of Islam would be within Japanese control (Lewis and Wigen
1997, 72).
The Japanese were quick to rectify relations with Muslims in Indonesia and, in
fact, pandered to local Muslim interests in order to maintain a degree of legitimacy, yet
there were key religious aspects to administration which led to inevitable conflicts. The
Japanese insistence that their Emperor was divine clashed directly with the Islamic
beliefs. While the Japanese attempted to explain the similarities between Shinto and
Islam, Indonesians were skeptical. Benda sums up the incongruity:
Shinto and Islam do share certain similarities, since both are all-embracing creeds
in which little or no distinction is made between the realms of religion and
politics. But it was because of this very similarity that they were bound to clash as
soon as the adherents of one of these universalistic systems endeavored to
superimpose their beliefs and practices on those of the other (Benda 1958, 123).
It was in this occupation of a vast Muslim population that the Japanese began to realize
the limitations of their narratives of pan-Asianism, as it conflicted with simultaneous
nationalist narratives of Japanese authority over Asia. Japanese military leaders were
forced to remain silent as Indonesian Muslim leaders criticized the occupation. This
granted a certain degree of immunity for the Muslim communities, which were able to
rapidly network independence movements and institutions which were prepared to rebel
when the Dutch would return in late 1945. This Japanese yielding to Muslim leaders
during its occupation ironically led the populace to view many Muslim leaders as
collaborators with the Japanese. Partially because of this tainted image of Muslim leaders
as collaborators, the independence movement ultimately rejected the idea of an Islamic
state in favor of a secular one (Benda 1958, 187).
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In China, the experience of Muslim populations under Japanese occupation
garnered the greatest sympathy in the Muslim world against Japan, and remains a
significant stain on Japan’s image for Muslims, especially in postwar China. Among
other Chinese, the Hui suffered atrocities by the Japanese Army which included
executions, the destruction of mosques and cemeteries, and enslavement (Lei 2010/2012,
139). While most cases appear to have been indiscriminate atrocities that occurred among
all populations, certain deliberate humiliations occurred against Hui Muslims. Lei notes
cases where Hui were forced to slaughter hogs on request from Japanese Army soldiers
(2010/2012: 141). Seeking assistance, Hui sent messages to Muslims in the Middle East.
They attracted the attention of many Muslims, who disseminated their message further,
and garnered the support of Muslims the world over to oppose Japanese aggression in
China, to side with the Allies in the war, and reject their message of ‘liberators of Asia’
as propaganda.
The end of World War II brought about the end of Japanese occupation of Muslim
populations. Parts of the Ummah occupied by Japan – the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, and
North Borneo would soon thereafter gain their independence from the European empires.
The transformative role that Japan played among those in Muslim countries during the
post-War decolonization era was significant, yet the merging of Islam with Japanese
religions and the ideals of pan-Asianism were put to rest. During the Allied occupation of
Japan, many of the Islam institutes were disbanded, as they had developed into panAsianist and anti-West organizations during the War. In the early twentieth century,
Japan had indirectly inspired Islam via its victory over ‘the West’ in the Russo-Japanese
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War.12 Yet, it was the atomic bombing of Japan by ‘the West’ which evolved into the
anti-West narratives that emerged in the postwar Muslim world (Miyata 2013, 95). To
many Muslims, Japan was Orientalized (Sakai 2010, 143). The bombings of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki illustrated a lack of humanity by the West, and Oriental people were the
victims of this. During and after the Iranian Revolution, Ruhollah Khomeini made
frequent reference to the American bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Miyata 2013,
95-96). Since the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, Ramzi Yousef and Osama bin
Laden also made frequent references to Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Miyata 2013, 96). Yet,
this is not limited to the speech acts of extremists; it has served as a key exemplar of the
dehumanization of Orientals by the West, used by those who carry an anti-West
sentiment throughout the Muslim world (Miyata 2013, 110).
Much of the geocultural relationship between Islam and Japan can be traced to
inter-personal relations today. It is estimated there are 130,000 Muslims living in Japan13
– mostly foreign nationals from Muslim countries, and not Japanese converts (Tanada
2013, 31). Proportionately, this is much lower than in the West or other developed
countries. It is estimated that roughly 80 percent of Japanese who marry Muslims convert
to Islam, and number only 10,000 (usually Japanese women marrying Muslim men)
(Asahi Globe 2014: Tanada 2013, 32: Abedin 2010). Japanese Islamic scholar and
practicing Muslim, Hassan Ko Nakata estimated in 2010 that there were less than 100
“genuine converts” among Japanese, where marriage to a Muslim was not a factor in the

As an Orthodox Christian-state with the Czar family’s kinship to European royalty, the Russian Empire
was considered undoubtedly part of ‘the West’ at the time.
12

13

Because the Japanese census does not record religious affiliation, estimates are based on the population
of foreign nationals by country, divided by the percentage of Muslims in the given country.
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decision to convert (Abedin 2010). The overwhelmingly largest Muslim population in
Japan in 2017 are Indonesians (40,800), followed by Pakistanis (14,300), Filipinos
(13,800), Chinese (12,000) (including approximately 1,000 Uyghurs), and Bangladeshis
(11,700) (e-Stat 2018: Vandenbrink 2012) (see Table 2.1). A sizable minority of these
Muslims in Japan, particularly among the Pakistanis and Filipinos, are married to
Japanese (Fukuda 2015, 38: Tanada 2013, 36-37).
One program which has potential to significantly increase the interpersonal
contacts between Japanese and Muslims is a high-profile program started in 2008 to
allow Indonesian and Filipino nurses and caregivers to train for qualifications to work in
Japan. The program was high-profile because it was believed to be the start of relaxing
the immigration policy to allow in foreign workers to offset the population decline in
Japan. Moreover, these Indonesians and Filipinos would specifically fill the void in
nursing and hospice workers needed for the rapidly growing elderly population in Japan.
Estimates show the nursing industry will be short between 380,000 and 500,000 trained
nurses by 2025 (Emont 2017). Additionally, it is estimated that there will be 7.8 million
elderly citizens in need of nursing care, which is nearly a doubling of the number in the
matter of two decades (Kingston 2014, 193)! It has sparked much media attention in
Japan, as well as attention from academics and politicians as well. If the nurses and
caregivers can pass a Japanese qualification exam by the end of their temporary stay in
training, their stay can be extended with the potential for permanent residency and even
apply for citizenship. In reality, however, once the program was initiated, the passing rate
for qualifications has been extremely low with only a few dozen passing each year. As
Kingston argues, “[t]he basic problem is that this program is designed to fail and offers

60

little immediate relief to the existing acute shortages of nurses and caregivers in Japan
and also no long-term solution” (2014: 194). While high-profile, it represents a small
segment of the Indonesian and Filipino population in Japan, but it certainly ranks high in
the public consciousness among Japanese of these peoples relocating to their country.
Among Muslim-majority countries, the largest Japanese-national populations are
found in Southeast Asia: in Malaysia (67,019) and Indonesia (44,864) (MOFA 2017b).
The numbers drop considerably, however, in South Asia and the Middle East. While
there is a very large presence of Japanese nationals residing in China (306,678), statistics
provided by MOFA are unable to illustrate the amount of interaction between the
Japanese nationals and the 20 million Muslim Chinese. The same is true of the sizable
number of Japanese nationals in India and the Philippines. Nonetheless, it can be
assumed that in all three states personal interactions are present. In stark contrast, there
are estimated less than 11,000 Japanese-nationals residing in all of the Middle East region
(MOFA 2017b). While the inter-personal relations between Japanese nationals and
Muslims of Southeast and East Asia are strong, the inter-personal relations with Muslims
in South Asia, Central Asia, and especially the Middle East are extremely limited today.
There is, however, a significant geo-economic relationship which is discussed in the
following section.
Geo-economics
The geo-economic relationship between Japan and Islam has been, at least, in the
background of inter-civilizational relations consistently since the first encounters. A high
energy consuming nation-state with negligible fossil fuel resources, Japan is heavily
dependent on the resources available in Muslim states. As this chapter shows, the geo-
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economics in this relationship are intricately connected to the geopolitics and national
security. An acute example of this was seen in 1940, when the Japanese need for crude
oil was the catalyst for its expansion into the Ummah, inadvertently leading to American
involvement in World War II. When the Nazis invaded France, the Japanese responded
by laying claim to French Indochina in 1940. The U.S., in turn, responded by embargoing
scrap metal and crude oil exports to Japan. At the time, roughly four-fifths of Japan’s
crude oil came from U.S. exports. The Japanese estimated their only means to survival
was to seize the oil resources in the Dutch East Indies.
In the immediate postwar decades, geo-economics was almost the only facet of
relations between Japan and Muslim Asia, as interpersonal and diplomatic relations were
constrained by the U.S.-dominated postwar order in Asia. Meanwhile, Japanese
consumption steadily increased and fossil fuel imports shifted from the U.S. to Muslim
states in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. While much literature on the 1973 oil crisis
focuses on the impact it had on security and economic policy in the West, little mention
is made of the impact on Japan. In fact, Japan was adversely affected by the 1973 oil
shock more than any other consumer market in the world (Licklider 1988, 207). For
Japan, the oil crisis resulted in panic, surging prices, and a sudden scarcity of
manufactured goods depend on petroleum, starting with toilet paper, then detergent,
sugar, and kerosene (Sugiyama 2008, 4).
By early 1974, production had increased and the embargo was lifted, but the oil
crisis left its mark on Japan, and the world economy. An economic recession and soaring
inflation rates hit Western economies and Japan. In 1974, the inflation rate in Japan
exceeded 20 percent in what was called ‘kyōran bukka,’ or the ‘price frenzy,’ and the

62

economy shrank for the first time in the postwar era (Hosaka 2013/2014, 66). This
brought on an existential threat that harkened back to wartime. “The disruption
instantaneously transported them back to the bitter postwar years of deprivation and
shortages. Suddenly their economic achievements of the 1950s and 1960s seemed very
precarious” (Yergin 1992, 616). The evidence that energy security is existential security
was laid bare in Japan: “[t]he confidence that had been built up with strong economic
growth was suddenly shattered; all of the old fears about vulnerability rushed back”
(Yergin 1992, 616).
Ironically, however, through the lasting impact of the 1973 oil crisis on Japan’s
domestic economy, fossil fuel dependency was curbed with the advancements of the
nuclear power industry. Furthermore, automobile makers had already advanced in fuel
efficiency research and development (R&D), so that by the time the second oil crisis
occurred during the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, Japan had a buffer to the global
impact. With the West struggling to recover from the 1979 oil crisis, Japan was able to
take advantage of its production of cheap, fuel-efficient automobiles for export, and
therefore, become a stronger economic power globally in the 1980s. This geo-economic
interaction confirmed Japanese identity as a nation able to overcome the hardships and
threats presented in 1973, especially in comparison to the U.S. and other Western
economies.
Today, Japan remains vastly reliant upon crude oil and natural gas imports from
the Middle East as well as other Muslim states, and for much of the late twentieth
century, it served practically as the single tether which kept Islam within the purview of
Japanese foreign policymaking. Nearly 90 percent of Japan’s crude oil imports come
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through the Straits of Malacca, from the Middle East or Africa (Burrett 2014, 164). As
discussed in the previous chapter, access to the shipping lanes through the South China
Sea and the Straits of Malacca is essential for Japanese fossil fuel imports, and most
significant are petroleum imports from states on the Persian Gulf – notably Saudi Arabia
and U.A.E. The risks associated with transporting petroleum resource imports are
immense, and will not be alleviated in the foreseeable future. For natural gas, the reliance
is less severe yet still problematic. Twenty-nine percent of Japan’s natural gas imports
comes through the Strait of Hormuz, with 18 percent wrapped up in long-term LNG
contracts with Qatar (Hirose 2015). Considering that other significant sources of natural
gas are in Southeast Asian Muslim states Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia, and also subnational regions in Nigeria and Russia, it is plausible that two-thirds of Japan’s natural
gas comes from Muslim-majority regions and countries.
Similarly, Muslim states collectively make up a significant market for Japanese
exports, but this is a much more recent phenomenon. Nasr makes the point that an
“upwardly mobile class consumes Islam as much as practicing it, demanding the same
sorts of life-enhancing goods and services as middle classes everywhere” (2009: 14). He
adds, “A booming economic sector around the region is catering to this exploding
demand, and these rising Islamic consumers [sic] comprise as much as a sixth of
humanity, spread across a vast expanse from Morocco to Malaysia” (2009: 14-15). As
previously mentioned, Indonesia and Malaysia are two of Japan’s most significant
markets. Beyond these two, there is the potential for a stronger relationship as a larger
middle-class emerges in Muslim states.
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The geo-economics of relations between Islam and Japan are intrinsically
intertwined with the geopolitics in such a way it is difficult to detach analysis of one
without detaching the other. The following section picks up on the political elements of
the aforementioned economic relations. Underlying both the geo-economics and
geopolitics for Japan’s relations with Islam is the element of security. As illustrated,
fossil fuel dependency has drawn Japan to Muslim states since the early twentieth
century, and continues to do so. After the 1973 oil crisis, energy security was
incorporated into national security, as illustrated in Tokyo’s 1980 comprehensive security
policy. At different layers, however, security is a key variable in this relationship in the
post-9/11 era, and the Security Alliance with the U.S. has resulted in self-reflection on
obligatory commitments to operations in Muslim states versus self-defined values in
diplomacy.
Geopolitics
Japan’s identity is in many ways defined by its security alliance with the U.S.
Meanwhile, based on the export of high-technology and automobiles, Japan has the third
largest economy in the world, yet must rely on imports of fossil fuel resources to meet
almost all of its consumption demand. Indeed, the domestic demand for energy resources
is the leading (but not sole) impetus for Japan’s relations with Muslim states in Asia
today, shaping Japan’s ontological security and, thus, identity. Access to markets is
increasingly important, but still secondary. Geopolitical variables, however, are
increasingly relevant in Japan’s foreign policy with Muslim states. This section focuses
on the geopolitical interactions between Japan and Islam.
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Between the postwar occupation and the 1973 oil crisis, Japan’s relations with
Islam at all layers were confined, in large part due to the strong reliance on the U.S. for
security, trade, and even Anglo-American supermajors for access to Persian Gulf and
Southeast Asian fossil fuels. In this period, Japan’s primary means of indicating an
independently developed postwar policy towards Muslim Asia was within the UN
framework. While serving on the Security Council, Japan was among the very few
industrialized states that voted in favor of the General Assembly Resolution 2628 of
1970, which promoted the “respect for the rights of Palestinians” (Yoshitsu 1984, 1). Yet,
the Japanese leadership was “so quiet about its position that it seems to have reaped no
rewards from it in the Arab world” (Yoshitsu 1984, 1).
In October 1973, Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)
governments took action to pressure consumer economies to support the Arab position in
the Arab-Israeli War. Crude oil exports to the U.S. and the Netherlands were embargoed
on account of their military support for Israel, and in addition, global production was
slashed. By carrying out the second measure, OAPEC’s intention was for Japan and other
European consumer economies to pressure the U.S. to disengage with Israel (Licklider
1988, 206). In November, the Saudi and Kuwaiti governments declared Japan a
“nonfriendly” state (Licklider 1988, 214). After several ad hoc negotiations with
compromises on both sides and Japan taking measures to distance itself from the U.S. and
Israel, Japan was reclassified as a ‘friendly’ state and continued to move in a pro-Arab
direction within the institution of the UN in the years subsequent to the crisis. In 1981,
Japan became the first state in the developed world to have talks with the Palestine
Liberation Organization at the prime ministerial level (Licklider 1988, 215). In 1982,
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Stein noted in her research that Japan was the “most pro-Arab industrial country” in the
world (57-59).
While generally assumed to be diplomatically weak in the initial decades after
World War II, close examination reveals Japan displayed a strikingly different position
toward Muslim states than did the West. In 1959, Japanese politician Utsunomiya
Tokuma expressed his support for the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria, and
even established an FLN Far East diplomatic mission in Tokyo (Miyata 2013, 104).
Utsunomiya twice traveled to Algeria during the war, and while not officially
representing the Japanese government, “[o]nly a short time after losing World War II to
France, a Japanese political figure displayed a spirit which strengthened the
consciousness of Japan to the Algerians” (Miyata 2013, 104). While Japanese support
was in the consciousness of Algerians fighting for independence in the 1950s, the
relationship changed considerably in January 2013 when 17 Japanese hostages were
among those caught up in the Amenas hostage crisis, and eventually 10 of the 17 would
be killed. The militants were extremists linked to al-Qaeda and certainly not
representative of the Algerian government (who eventually sent special forces to attempt
to free the hostages), yet the event has put a damper on what was a limited, yet cordial
relationship between Japan and Algeria, and also resulted in a trend of a deteriorating
image of Islam among the Japanese public.14

14

In early 2013, leading Islam scholar from Japan, Osamu Miyata was poised to publish his new book
entitled Why Do Muslims Love Japan? When the Amenas hostage crisis broke out, the publishing company
requested Miyata to postpone publishing, and retitle his book Why Do Muslims Respect Japan? (Sankei
2013).
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Japan’s relationship with Pakistan has been difficult as well, yet it illustrates an
internal conflict of values and priorities and a key case of reactionary relations. When
Bangladesh declared its independence from Pakistan in 1971, Japan was the first
developed state to recognize its independence (Miyata 2013, 110). Subsequently, the lowpoint in Pakistani-Japanese relations was in 1998 when Pakistan conducted the Chagai-I
underground nuclear tests. Of all states, Japan imposed the harshest sanctions, recalled its
Ambassador from Pakistan, and suspended all of its foreign aid (the most of any foreign
government) – a clear illustration of the values-based diplomatic position Japan took with
regard to nuclear proliferation (Pattanaik 2008, 886). This decision was motivated by
both geopolitics and geoculture, insofar as nuclear nonproliferation is a key element in
Japan’s postwar identity. Under pressure from Washington, and based on geopolitical
interests, Tokyo resumed diplomatic relations with, and foreign aid to Pakistan after the
September 11 attacks. Today, Japan is again a significant source of foreign aid for
Pakistan, disbursing $6.7 billion from 2008 to 2012. Meanwhile, Japan’s strengthening
security cooperation with India as well as the sale of amphibious aircraft to India has
caused a new rift in relations with Pakistan (Mahr 2014).
Japan’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation in its diplomacy creates a clash
between geoculture and geopolitics, inciting debate in the early twenty-first century for
two reasons. Firstly, Japan has developed nuclear reprocessing plants which can produce
plutonium and a considerable amount of highly enriched uranium (Horner 2012: NTI
2014). Tokyo’s stockpiles accumulated since 2000 could be converted into military use
within a matter of weeks to months (Cirincione 2007, 105). Being only a ‘screwdriver’s
turn’ from producing a nuclear weapon, a non-nuclear values approach to foreign policy
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is palpably hypocritical.15 As long as Japan maintains such capability, it surrenders its
ability to champion such a cause globally, despite being the only state to experience the
horrors of nuclear weapons in warfare. Secondly, energy security (geo-economics) has
clearly taken priority with regard to Japan’s position on Iran’s nuclear energy program.
Tokyo maintained distance from the West regarding stringent sanctions imposed on Iran
due to its nuclear energy program in the first decade of the twenty-first century.
In the first Persian Gulf War of 1991, Tokyo was for the first time openly
pressured by Washington to dispatch Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) for overseas
military operations (Midford 2011, 68). This opened a chapter of tension between
Washington, and specifically, the Japanese public, who have distinctly different ways to
“view the utility of strategically offensive military force” (Midford 2011, 68). The idea of
dispatching the SDF generated suspicion among the Japanese public and “reminded many
Japanese of their state’s reputation for being incapable of controlling a military,
especially when deployed overseas” (Midford 2011, 68). After the 9/11 attacks on the
U.S., “the Japanese public’s distinctive world outlook was challenged as perhaps never
before” (Midford 2011, 110). An initial concern that a similar terrorist attack could occur
in Japan was expressed among the public and political leaders, however public resistance
to joining the U.S. to “combating terrorism” overseas endured (Midford 2011, 111).
Nonetheless, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō was quick to dispatch the SDF ships to
the Arabian Sea to provide rear-area logistical support for the U.S. military operations
against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. While the majority of the public
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In fact, attaining the materials and technology for a nuclear weapon, but refusing to develop it is even
known as ‘the Japan option.’
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supported “cooperation” with the U.S., less than half approved of Koizumi’s dispatch of
the SDF to the Arabian Sea (Midford 2011, 115).
From the beginning, the Japanese public, however, was overwhelmingly skeptical
of joining the U.S. in an attack on Iraq. The government remained uninvolved during the
early stages of the Iraq War and the 2004 fall of Baghdad, but in mid-April Koizumi’s
cabinet began speaking of “fear of abandonment” if they did not support the American
operation (Midford 2011, 131). Without deliberation in the National Diet, at the G8
summit Koizumi pledged SDF support for the U.S. military operations in Iraq (Miyata
2005, 265). In order to compromise domestic opposition16 and personal concerns for the
alliance with the U.S., Koizumi agreed to dispatch the SDF, but limit their operations to
noncombat zones (Midford 2011, 132).
Hosoya Yuichi describes Japan’s current policy in Asia as two layered policies
(2014: 154). The first policy is the East Asian Community (EAC), which is an ‘interestoriented’ form of diplomacy, and was articulated by Koizumi in 2002. The plan
encourages Asian states to “act together and advance together,” emphasizing cooperation
with countries sharing the values of freedom and democracy (Hosoya 2014, 150). As the
name suggests, however, it is limited to East Asia. The second is the Arc of Freedom and
Prosperity, discussed in detail in Chapter 1 and essential for this project. The Arc is much
broader in geographical scope and vision (while the EAC could be argued, has more
depth). While there is overlap in the visions, there are also key omissions: the EAC
includes China as a cornerstone; the Arc does not. Both of these policies signal a new

Interestingly, Koizumi’s LDP-coalition party, New Komeito, which is a conservative party backed by the
Sōka Gakkai sect of Buddhism, initially opposed the SDF dispatch to Iraq, but approved after adding
several conditions to the law, and received harsh criticism from its pacifist base (Métraux 2007, 162).
16
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brand of pan-Asianism based upon ‘Asian democratic values’ and economic
development. Here, geo-culture and geo-economics dovetail. Japan’s ‘Asia policy’ is
often construed as a means to counter the emergence of China as a regional hegemon. If
this is indeed the case, this is where geopolitics comes in, and the need for closer ties
between Japan and Muslim countries is particularly acute. At this point, the dormant preWar geoculture explorations and narratives could potentially be revived as the means to
link the geopolitical relationship between Japan and the Muslim world.
Conclusion
There are five primary factors which weigh heavily on Tokyo’s foreign policy toward
Muslim Asia. These are: first, the aforementioned fossil fuel dependency, which is
interpreted as an issue of national security, beyond the realms of geo-economics; next is
affiliation with the West, and obligations that come with alliance with the U.S., often
referred to as ‘gaiatsu’ (外圧), or “outside pressure,” in Japanese; third is a post-War
domestic non-interventionist tendency, particularly with regard to combat zones; fourth is
Japan’s own values exerted through diplomacy, namely its own distinguished version of
democracy and free markets, institutionalism, and strong (if not, hypocritical) nonnuclear values; last is the export markets and FDI potential in Muslim states. While
economic, these tie closely with political decisions in Japan, as big business has an
intricate relationship with the political class. All these factors weigh on the decisions
made in Tokyo regarding foreign policy with Muslim states.
Japan’s conceptualizations of Islam and its role in the world order are taking on a
new trajectory. After the beheadings of Japanese nationals in January 2015 by ISIS,
Japanese scholars of Islam such as Miyata Osamu agree that “the Iraq War had a
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tremendous influence on [extremists] viewing Japan as an enemy” (2015: 13). This
opinion has picked up dramatically in domestic politics. Miyata continues,
[a]mong Middle East Muslims there is a favorable opinion of Japan, but since the
Iraq War an image is emerging of a Japan which does whatever the U.S. tells it to
do. Rather [than working with the West], a better approach for Japan would be to
coordinate with Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait with regard to ISIS
(2015: 13).
This advocates for not only distancing from the West, but in fact, linking with Muslim
states in Western Asia.
Significant third-parties have made a tremendous impact on the intercivilizational relations between Japan and Islam. Termed reactionary relations in this
chapter, other actors such as Russia, Hindu India, China, and the West have interacted
with, or even served as the impetuses for interaction between Islam and Japan. This will
continue to be the case, particularly as the emergence of China will shake up the
interactions among all major actors within the Eurasian regional complex, including
Russia and the U.S. This dynamic of competing visions by the regional powers in Asia is
the central theme of the following chapter. How does Japan situate itself, and its own
vision among the others? The Arc is the clearest expression of Japan’s version of a vision
for Asia yet.
In the last decade, Japan has lost its place as the largest economy in Asia to China,
its population has been in decline, and incremental steps towards remilitarization are
taking place. These issues are discussed in more detail later, but in brief, they indeed
explain a Japan that is redefining itself, reassessing its position in world order, and in
particular, its influence, role, and identity in Asia. As Keiko Sakai poignantly puts it,
“[t]he transformation of the Japanese perception of Islam and the Middle East reflects the
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transformation of the perception of Japan’s own position in Asia” (2010: 143). If Japan
continues on a path to seek a pan-Asian identity with a role distinct from the emerging
giants, China and India, it will need to deepen relations with the Muslim world.
With extremists making headlines in Japan since 2001, there is the risk that the
impression of Islam will become tainted, resulting in mistrust and aversion among
Japanese. The January 2015 beheadings by ISIS have deeply contributed to this
trajectory. Miyata argues, “Japanese view of Muslims is not as cold as in the West. The
beheading incident will undoubtedly trigger a prejudice, but there is no sense of threat
that Muslims in Japan will commit terrorist acts” (2015: 13). If Japan can maintain a
relationship with Islam based on its own interpretations – separate from the influences of,
or obligations to other major actors, there is potential for transformative relations to
develop which would be significant to all of Asia.
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Figure 2.1: Reactionary Relations between Islam and Japan
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Map 2.1: Islamic Ummah and Japanese Archipelago in Asia

Map by author.
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Table 2.1: Population Estimate of Muslims in Japan by Nationality, 2017
1. Indonesia
40,800 (31.4%)
2. Pakistan

14,300 (11.0%)

3. Philippines

13,800 (10.6%)

4. China

12,000 (9.2%)

5. Bangladesh

11,700 (9.0%)

6. Japan

10,000 (7.7%)

7. Malaysia

5,600 (4.3%)

8. Turkey

5,100 (3.9%)

9. India

4,300 (3.3%)

10. Iran

4,000 (3.1%)

TOTAL

130,000 (100%)

Source: Adapted using data from e-Stat (2018).
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CHAPTER III
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC CONTEXT
Japan’s proclamation of the Arc of Freedom and Posperity in 2006, and the ongoing
references to values-based diplomacy occur in international and domestic contexts which
shape why, when, and how this proclamation took place. Japan’s political elites are
implored to consider shifts in the balance of power in Asia in the early twenty-first
century, and how they must react to these and maximize the benefits of its position.
Moreover, Japan has a vision for Asia, but it must consider how this vision competes and
complements visions by other great powers in Asia. The first part of this chapter explores
these competing visions for Asia among great powers. The second part then examines the
domestic political actors and processes that led to the announcements of a new valuesbased diplomacy. Of particular interest is the elite bureaucracy, and how the new pillar to
foreign policy passed through their competiting interests. With an understanding of why,
when, and how the announcement took place, this project has a better foundation to
proceed to the strategy.
Competing Visions for Asia
Japan is undoubtedly not alone with a vision for Asia, and when Japan’s vision is put into
policy, strategy, and definitive action, it contends with visions, policies, strategies, and
actions by great powers on the continent. This section lays out the backdrop for visions of
Asia in the twenty-first century. It examines the structural dynamics that Japan’s vision of
a values-based Arc has to contend with, but it also clarifies how this vision interacts with
other visions by great powers in terms of how they compete in both an ideational and
material competition, and also where they may complement each other. The great powers
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that have their own visions for Asia which interact most unmistakably with Japan’s own
vision are China, Russia, and the U.S. Each of these powers has its own pronounced
framework which encapsulates its vision: for China, it is the One Belt, One Road
Initiative (BRI); for Russia, it is the neo-Eurasianist school of thought; for the U.S., it is
the Pivot to Asia. Together with Japan’s values-based diplomacy, initially labeled the Arc
of Freedom and Prosperity by Asō Tarō in 2006, four frameworks for Asia provide
windows into each power’s vision for the continent. BRI is more clearly enunciated as a
development strategy; neo-Eurasianism is more akin to a prevailing purview held my
many in the Kremlin; consistency on the Pivot to Asia is questionable in the transition
from an Obama to a Trump administration. Nonetheless, juxtaposing these four
elucidates visions. How can Japan compete with these? What are its viable advantages
and disadvantages?
This section proceeds by briefly outlining the Chinese, Russian, and American
visions for Asia, respectively. The classical geopolitical framework for analysis is applied
since all four visions deal with ideational intepretations of the integral qualities of a
space, and power politics on this space. The chapter then juxtaposes each vision, making
comparisons to Japan’s values-based Arc. Through this juxtaposition, the dynamics of
twenty-first century Asia are better understood, the ideational competition among great
powers in Asia is better understood, and Tokyo’s maneuverability within this milieu for
strategy is clarified.
China: One Belt, One Road
Like the Westphalian system of nation-states, and the Islamic Ummah, China has
its own classical vision of world order: the suzerainty – an order of concentric circles,
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with the Emperor of China at the center of civilization. China’s order was both
“hierarchical and theoretically universal” (Kissinger 2014, x). Moving out next is China
proper, then the tributary states – smaller kingdoms which recognized the imperial
authority and in return for paying tribute, gained security. Outside of this system were the
barbarians – those who did not recognize the Emperor’s universal authority over “All
Under Heaven” (Kissinger 2014, x).
This is consistent with China’s worldview during the empire and today, even
though China’s worldview has gone through substantial transformations in the twentieth
century. While the emperor is no longer part of the system, Beijing is at the center
politically, and the concentric circles remain, exemplified in policy initiatives such as the
Silk Road Economic Belt, and the first island chain and second island chain military
doctrine – a two-step Monroe Doctrine of the Western Pacific. Beijing, and, to an extent,
Han China, is now at the center of the system; next is ‘greater China,’ which includes the
minority populations mostly found in peripheral provinces, special administrative
regions, and autonomous regions – all peoples and territories within the modern nationstate. Beijing’s struggles in these regions are labeled by Kaplan as “Irritable Border
Syndrome”; “Xinjiang and Tibet are the two principal areas within the Chinese state
whose inhabitants have resisted the pull of Chinese civilization. This makes them
imperial properties of Beijing, in a way” (2010: 22). Then, the modern version of
tributary states – those bandwagoning with the rising China, and thus, those adhering to
this new (revived) order. This varies, but it is where BRI comes into play. China is
attempting to (re)construct an order in Asia with itself at the center based on its long-held
model of a Chinese suzerainty.
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How is China reviving its suzerain system in an Asia of Westphalian nation-states
with concerns over development, poverty, energy resources, nuclear proliferation, and
religious violence? The impetus to BRI came in 2013, during the first few months of Xi
Jinping’s presidency. In September 2013, Xi first mentioned a ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’
while on visit in Kazakhstan for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit.
The idea was to develop transportation infrastructure projects which would facilitate an
“economic belt” that would link China to Central Asia, Russia, and on to Iran, Turkey,
and ultimately Germany and the Netherlands (Ferdinand 2016, 949-50). The one road
component was elicited a month later in the October 2013 Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) summit in Indonesia: a maritime linkage of southeast China with
Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and by great extension, Africa and Europe.
Both ideas were notably announced in Muslim Asian countries. By early 2015, the two
were merged into a broader framework: the name, One Belt, One Road, comes from the
Chinese shorthand, yīdài yīlù (一帯一路), that allows for discussion the two initiatives in
tandem (Summers 2015, 1630).
The framework is broad and has tremendous implications for Asia and China.
Ferdinand points out it “potentially involves over 60 countries with a combined
population of over 4 billion people, whose markets currently account for about one-third
of global GDP” (2016: 950). BRI, the Chinese government explains:
aims to promote the connectivity of Asian, European and African continents and
their adjacent seas, establish and strengthen partnerships among the countries
along the Bel and Road, set up all-dimensional, multitiered and composite
connectivity networks, and realize diversified, independent, balanced and
sustainable development in these countries (State Council 2015).
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Xi Jinping was quoted as saying “China welcomes all countries along the routes and in
Asia, as well as our friends and partners around the world to take an active part in these
endeavors” (Xinhua 2015). The language used by Chinese political leadership as well as
official documents presents a policy with objectives and geographic scope of BRI that is
so broad that it is immeasurable and boundless, which makes finding tangibility
challenging.
Actions have already been taken. China played a key role in setting up the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) – a financial institution which directly competes
with the Japan-U.S.-led Asian Development Bank (ADB). AIIB was created with the
specific intention so Beijing could circumvent constraints of the existing financial order
provided by the Japanese- and American-controlled ADB. China has committed $50
billion for the AIIB, and coupled with $40 billion for the Silk Road Economic Belt and
$25 billion for the Maritime Silk Road, it is showing a strong financial commitment to
modifying order in Asia. Shambaugh points out that “even during the Cold War, the
United States and the Soviet Union did not spend anywhere near as much as China is
spending today” (2015).
BRI and all that has come with it has at its heart a deeply rooted Sinocentric view
of Asia. Chinese discuss the period from 1839 to 1949 as the ‘Century of Humiliation.’
China was an empire, and at the center of a universal suzerainty, yet powers that came
from outside the suzerain system, Europeans, Americans, and Japanese, destroyed that
order. A country that viewed itself at the center of universal order was weakened,
occupied, and plundered by barbarians. Beijing’s vision of Asia is much like it was
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thousands of years ago – with Beijing at the center. BRI is a restoration of that universal
order held for millennia.
Russia: Neo-Eurasianism
While not as longstanding as China’s Sinocentric conceptualization of order in
Asia, Russia’s neo-Eurasianism also has deep roots that have persisted in Russian
thought. Like pan-Latin Americanism, Europeanism, or pan-Asianism, it is a geographic
ideology – a Weltanschauung, or more precisely a ‘Eurasienschauung.’ Naturally, as a
transcontinental state with territories in both Europe and Asia greater than any other
European or Asian state, Russia is at the center of this conceptualization. Russia is not in
the middle between Europe and Asia; rather, it is at the center of Eurasia. “Eurasianism
thus conflates the center and the middle” (Laruelle 2008, 1).
Russian Eurasianist thought originated in the late nineteenth century with a
movement among Slavophiles to reject European identity (Clover 1999, 9). A more
detailed manifestation of the concept would not emerge until the 1920s. At this time,
Soviets gave up on an imminent worldwide proletariat revolution subsequent to the
Bolshevik Revolution, and turned their discourses to Soviet distinctiveness – a discourse
that appealed to many in the Communist Party as well as dissidents in exile as well
(Laruelle 2008, 18). The Eurasianists tied Russian people to the Turkic-speaking peoples
of Central Asia, who, they claimed, originated in ancient Persia, and followed a more
collectivist political and economic model which contrasted with European individualism
(Foreign Affairs 2014). Unlike the Soviet communists, the Eurasianists emphasized the
positive role Orthodox Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism played in Eurasia, and in
Russia, specifically.
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The writings of Lev Gumilev and Aleksander Andreevich Prokhanov contributed
to a revival of Eurasianism in the 1980s, deemed ‘neo-Eurasianism,’ which calls for
Russia “to fulfill the crucial mission of connecting – and pacifying” both the East and
West (Merati 2017, 32). Japanese writer Sawabe Yūji describes Eurasian thought:
“Russia is considered a ‘hyper-nation-state,’ consisting not only of Slavic peoples, but
also Turkic, Iranian, Mongol, and several other peoples, and it is destined to become an
inevitable empire” (2017: 91). The ideology was quickly picked up among the political
elites in the early 1990s and came to dominate Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Bassin 2016, 218). Today, it is seen in the legislature, the Defense Ministry, and even
the “military elite have also caught Eurasian fever” (Clover 1999, 9). Former Prime
Minister Yevgeni Primakov put several neo-Eurasianist ideas into policy and strategy,
although he never commented on neo-Eurasianist thought, himself (Clover 1999, 9).
Prominent advocates today include veteran nationalist politician and LDPR leader
Vladimir Zhirinovski, and political scientist and author Aleksandr Dugin.
The degree to which neo-Eurasianist thought impacts Russian foreign policy is
difficult to ascertain. Certainly, elements of neo-Eurasianism appear in statements made
by Putin. In 2001, Putin stated, “Russia has always felt herself to be a Eurasian country.
Never have we forgotten that the greatest part of Russian territory is in Asia” (Laruelle
2008, 7). Neo-Eurasianists applauded when in 2005 Putin acknowledged that the collapse
of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century.
Putin has also publicly praised the work of Gumilev:
His scholarly works are a brilliant contribution not only to thinking about history
but also to the assertion of the centuries-old community and interrelation between
the peoples who inhabit the vast expanses of Eurasia, from the Baltics and the
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Carpathians to the Pacific Ocean. The instructive potential of Eurasianism is
especially significant today (quoted from Laruelle 2008, 10).
Undoubtedly, actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine illustrate the significance of
geopolitical calculations in the Kremlin’s policy and strategy. What is the Kremlin doing,
however, to viably expand its geopolitical sphere of influence across Eurasia?
Neo-Eurasianism is not inevitably a hard-lined outlook involving Russian ethnonationalism and geopolitical expansionism. The school of thought has come in various
incarnations from writers contradicting one another, particularly regarding Russia’s role,
and it can be interpreted in softer forms. Some formulate it with a rightwing, Orthodox
Christian worldview (Laruelle 2008: Wiederkehr 2007), while others have observed ties
developing between this rightwing movement in Russia and political Islam in Russia
(Merati 2017, 110). Consistent in all forms of neo-Eurasianism is the desire “to build a
larger geopolitical axis of allies – such as Germany, Iran, and Japan – to resist the
American influences” (Tsygankov 2013, 64). Mainstream political elites are more
attentive to this basic principle of neo-Eurasianism than to the more radical ancillary
points. Within this principle, however, lie the policies that can be seen over the last two
decades in the form of Eurasian integration.
Neo-Eurasianism presents a two-tier conceptualization of Eurasia: there are the
former Soviet republics which must be reintegrated first, then a broader Eurasia inclusive
of Turkey, Iran, China, and Japan. If Russia is content with a Eurasia where Moscow
exerts political influence over the former Soviet republics, yet Asia beyond the near
abroad works in tandem with Moscow to ensure a multipolar order in Asia, then this
vision of Asia is more palpable than Moscow exerting political influence across the vast
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continent. In greater Asia, Russia must cooperate with other powers, namely China, to
ensure the multipolar order it envisages. Yet, as Kotkin remarks, “China has openly and
vigorously been building its own Greater Eurasia, from the South China Sea through
inner Asia to Europe, at Russia’s expense and with its cooperation” (2016: 2). This
contestation inevitably takes on more intensity in Central Asia because it is both within
the Kremlin’s ‘near abroad’ and the first line of China’s Silk Road outside of its own
borders. Russia and China can agree to keep the U.S. out of greater Asia, but Central Asia
is a key overlapping zone of influence for Russia and China.
The United States: Pivot to Asia
In late 2011, the Obama Administration announced a ‘Pivot to Asia’ – a shift of
its grade strategy toward Asia.1 It was soon followed up with plans to increase the marine
presence in Australia, a slight increase in the number of U.S. troops in South Korea, the
basing of more military hardware in Singapore, and enhancing the defense alignment
with the Philippines. The U.S. also increased discussions of defense cooperation with
Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Malaysia, and has increased the number of joint
military exercises with Japan and India (Resnik 2015, 13). In economics, the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) would deepen interdependence among the U.S. and states
across the Asian-Pacific region.

After 2011, Obama administration officials chose to rebrand the new grand strategy as a ‘realignment’
rather than ‘pivot.’ Some have suggested that ‘pivot’ was “both inaccurate and misleading,” but in
actuality, it is more accurate and more truthful of the underlying vision that drove the announcement (Wu
Xinbo 2016, 849). ‘Realignment’ is evasive of directions and intentions. ‘Pivot’ is more enlightening. It
provides an honest window into the underlying strategy, and the attempt to rebrand it as a “realignment’
was too little too late.
1
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There are a number of issues with the Pivot strategy, many of which were
unforeseen at the time. A pivot motion necessitates shifting the direction faced, while
maintaining one’s point on the ground. This is consistent with the U.S. having maintained
its focus on the greater Middle East for the better part of four decades. After the oil
shocks of 1973 and 1979 and the Iranian hostage crisis, the 1980 Carter Doctrine was a
de facto ‘pivot to the Middle East.’ Subsequent military actions in Libya and Lebanon,
and full-scale wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iraq again solidified and justified this pivot,
as did the threats from religious terrorism originating from this region. So, from
Washington’s perspective, this is a pivot from its east to its west – a pivot from an
Atlantic view of Asia to a Pacific view. In fact, part of the 2011 Pivot announcements
included the plan to shift navy distribution from 50/50 capabilities in the Atlantic and
Pacific to 60 percent in the Pacific and 40 percent in the Atlantic by 2020 (Resnik 2015,
13).
The first problem that emerges with any ‘pivot’ is turning one’s head from what
had garnered attention before. Did the Middle East lose its imperativeness, or did Asia
simply become more pressing? Both are plausible factors in Washington’s thinking.
Americans elected Obama largely on account of war fatigue in the Middle East, and he
committed to ending combat operations in Iraq. Moreover, and even more relevant to the
long-term strategic goals of the Carter Doctrine, the shale energy revolution has resulted
in the U.S. becoming less dependent on oil exports from the Persian Gulf. American
allies like Japan remain dependent, but how long are Americans willing to secure the
supply of oil from the Persian Gulf, especially as this energy export is increasingly
making its way to China? Conflict remains in the Middle East, as do the ongoing
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perception of threats from Islamic terrorism, but Middle East war fatigue has settled deep
into Americans, and without seeing a direct benefit to securing energy supplies from the
Persian Gulf, Washington is becoming less concerned. In fact, one thing 2008 candidate
Obama and 2016 candidate Trump share is an indirect desire to keep the U.S. military out
of conflicts in the Middle East. A pivot always results in one’s previous focal point now
becoming either a blind spot or in the periphery.
The second problem with the Pivot is that there is unmistakably a panda in the
room. Beijing cannot help but sense that Washington’s pivot is a grand strategy precisely
aimed at taking advantage of China’s geostrategic insecurities. To Beijing, the pivot is “a
constraint on China’s growing power in the region” (Li and Shoon 2015, 44). This may
have been entirely the point. To be sure, the Obama administration continued to reiterate
that the pivot was “a key initiative to ensure sustainable growth and development for
countries in the Asia Pacific region” (Li and Shoon 2015, 44). Yet, the subsequent policy
announcements under the purview of the pivot were by and large military-based.
Moreover, the progress being made is among states along China’s periphery, many of
which have longstanding territorial disputes or ongoing animosity with China, such as
Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and India. If, indeed, the Pivot were for the purposes of
supporting sustainable economic growth, economic cooperation between Washington and
Beijing would be crucial, and, in fact, the point of departure for the grand strategy.
Moreover, Washington would put itself in the diplomatic position to intermediate a
reconciliation between China and Japan, and between China and India. Yet, outside of
defense cooperation initiatives, and in the economic realm, the only evidence of a Pivot
was the failed TPP.
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Competing and Complementing
Among the three aforementioned visions for Asia, as well as Tokyo’s valuesbased Arc, the geographic scopes of the visions vary as much as the ideational contents of
each. Russia’s neo-Eurasianism has a two-tiered approach to Asia (although, for their
intents and purposes, Eurasia). First, is Russia’s near abroad: the idea is to (re)integrate
the former Soviet republics, not as a resuscitation of the Soviet Union, per se, but as a
regional bloc not dissimilar to the EU. Second, is to integrate a broader Eurasia, inclusive
of partners such as Iran, Syria, and Serbia. China is included insomuch as objectives are
aligned, and those objectives tend to coalesce in a multipolarity to counter American
influence. Beijing and Moscow have a developing symbiotic trade relationship based on
the import of Russia’s vast resources into China. This was evident in the 30-year, $400
billion natural gas deal starting in 2018. With European natural gas consumers reluctant
to sustain their reliance on Russian gas, Russia and China both see a newfound benefit in
economic integration.
Beijing’s vision of Asia is long embedded in its strategic thinking – long before
the U.S. or even the Russian Empire was formed. The suzerain system is the Sinocentric
system, and it permeates BRI. What is to be the modern ‘tributary state,’ however, is
much broader than it has been ever before. It is inclusive of ‘new partners’ as far afield as
Kenya and Hungary. What is Beijing’s Asia? Overtly, it is whoever wants to be on board
with BRI; it is an initiative to develop and prosper together, but it is conspicuously
focused on infrastructure and development, and thus, conspicuously focused on the less
developed economies of Asia (and Africa) for its investment projects. It is, in a sense,
China championing itself as a leader of the developing world, and claiming to have the
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deep pockets to finance a mutually coinciding rise out of poverty. It is worth noting that
the Chinese-led AIIB, which can be interpreted as Beijing’s counter to ADB dominated
by Tokyo and Washington, is open to Japanese and American membership. While the
UK, Germany, Canada, Russia, South Korea, and Australia have all joined, Japan and the
U.S. remain noticeably indifferent to AIIB. Mogi argues that Washington and Tokyo are
both “suspecting China’s bubble economy will collapse in the future,” and thus the ABD
remains the more pragmatic option for both investors and borrowers (2017: 84). China
overwhelmingly holds the largest number of shares, and the bank is located in Beijing. It
is telling of who is more accommodating of the Sinocentric order in Asia, and who is not.
It would appear the U.S. cannot consider a geostrategic pivot without considering
the defense sector as the primary actor in implementation. Among Russia’s neoEurasianism, China’s BRI, and the U.S.’s Pivot, the American vision is the most
obfuscating. Pivot to Asia means what Asia? After all, the pre-Pivot focus was the Middle
East, yet Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Afghanistan are Asia, and this is understood in neoEurasianism, BRI, and even Tokyo’s Arc. It is a re-Oriented vision for Asia. Moscow has
been conceptualizing Asia for a very long time. Beijing has been conceptualizing it much
longer. The American vision is confused, and not really sure what are its objectives, or
how to achieve them. The Pivot is interpreting Asia as the traditional allies along the
Indo-Pacific regions, including Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia, and
nascent partners such as India, Indonesia, and Vietnam. It is mindful of China, if not
being the central purpose for the Pivot, but it is understood as part of Asia, nonetheless.
Thus, there is a good Asia and a bad Asia embedded in the vision of the Pivot.
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Tokyo’s Arc complements and competes with all three visions. It most obviously
complements the American Pivot. In fact, with a relatively sizable American military
force on its territory and a long-standing security alliance, Japan is a linchpin to the Pivot.
Moreover, the rise of China’s military is Tokyo’s greatest state-level security threat, and
indeed, what keeps it close to the U.S. Insomuch as the Arc and the Pivot are to counter a
Sinocentric Asia, the visions are aligned. Washington will continue to nudge Tokyo to
remilitarize, seeing it as a proxy for its own interests in Asia, but as appealing as ‘equal
partners’ sounds to Tokyo, remilitarization is very unpopular domestically. If the Pivot is
indeed focused on sustained economic growth in Asia, Tokyo’s Arc is also nicely aligned
with this objective as well. If we take the Pivot at face value, both visions seek economic
development and prosperity across Asia, and both countries believe they have an
important role in this vision. From both countries’ perspectives, they see that over the last
three decades the two of them have provided overwhelmingly the most official
development assistance (ODA) across Asia, they commit the most capital for ADB, and
their companies also provide by far the most FDI into China, as well as considerable FDI
across Asia for the last three decades. Interestingly, moreover, there is no sense of
competition between the two for their own roles within their own visions of Asia; rather,
their visions of Asia are complementary and assume mutual participation.
Tokyo’s Arc is not necessarily in absolute competition with Beijing’s BRI, either.
While the ADB and the AIIB may be in competition, it is important to note the China
retains a sizable share in ADB, as the third largest investor and the largest borrower. If it
were a direct Sino-Japanese competition, Beijing would have pulled out from ADB
investments long ago. Yet, symbolically, the competition of the two banks is revealing of
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Beijing and Tokyo’s visions for Asia. In the article “Two Asias: AIIB v ADB,” Malcolm
Cook argues that they “exemplify the very different understandings of Asia held in
Beijing and Tokyo and the very different views of Japan’s place within Asia expressed by
the ADB and China’s place in Asia expressed by the AIIB” (2015). He adds the
geopolitical framing of the two:
modern Japan, as an archipelagic power on the North Pacific periphery of the
Eurasian landmass, has a North-South maritime understanding of Asia. China, as
a vast land power with an inland capital, has an East-West continental
understanding of Asia…Post-war Japan’s Pacific nature and close relationship
with the US have led Japan to pay particular heed to the United States’ interest
and place in Asia (2015).
With ADB and AIIB, compatibilities of Beijing and Tokyo’s visions for Asia are
also evident. Both the Arc and BRI seek out development across a wide swath of the
Asian continent, inclusive of Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle
East. In Central Asia, for example, it has been observed that Tokyo and Beijing can serve
roles which are symbiotic. Badykova argues that “China helps generating cash from oil
and gas, while Japan helps [Central Asians] invest it in projects that can secure an
industrial base for Central Asian economies” (2016). Through BRI, China provides
flexible financial means to attain development; through the Arc, Japan provides the rules
framework which can maximize the societal gains from these projects. Moreover,
Tokyo’s activity in the region “fosters regionalism and industrialization, while China
promotes diversification of Central Asian exports and globalization” (2016).
It is in both China’s and Japan’s interest to see development and stability in Asia,
yet where they differ is the Sinocentric order in Asia. Moreover, Tokyo’s values-based
Arc did not include China, and Tokyo had differentiated itself by making the Arc a
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values-based pillar of foreign policy which is based on democratization. Whether and
how Tokyo has pressed this value is discussed further in Chapter 7, but its inclusion in
the policy outline, and a consistent reiteration of this value makes Tokyo’s Arc not only
distinct from Beijing’s BRI, but also exclusive of China, as a non-democratic state.
China’s growing predominance in Asia and global economic competition has made the
carrot and stick approach of democratization-measures-for-development-aid
unfashionable in Asia as well as elsewhere in the twenty-first century. If Tokyo is not
serious about encouraging democratization measures by using the purse, at least the
language of democratization embedded in the Arc is enough to make it a vision of Asia
exclusive of China.
It would be shortsighted to think, however, that Japan is unequivocally
determined to create its vision of Asia exclusive of China. China remains one of Japan’s
top destinations for ODA, and Japanese corporations’ top destination for FDI; moreover,
Sino-Japanese trade relations are the deepest of any two Asian states. Aside from
historical animosity, territorial disputes, and general distrust, the two countries are deeply
interconnected with each other’s economies. The previous chapter discusses the EAC,
elucidated by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō four years prior to the Arc. Like the Arc,
Koizumi’s EAC emphasized cooperation with countries sharing the values of democracy,
but he made it a point to include China in this vision. While there are similarities between
EAC and the Arc, and indeed the EAC can be seen as a nebulous precursor to the Arc, the
geographic visions are considerably different. The EAC was specifically delineated as the
integration of Japan, South Korea, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
members, Australia, and New Zealand, but also China. It used the ASEAN+3 framework
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for its geographical scope. In his EAC speech, Koizumi made clear, “I would like to
highly praise the active role China is willing to play in regional cooperation. With its
wealth of human resources and huge economic potential, China will surely make an
enormous contribution to regional development” (2002). The Arc spans like a belt, from
Southeast Asia to Turkey and Eastern Europe, but it is not inclusive of China.
Koizumi’s vision of Asia inclusive of China differs from his successors and
fellow LDP elites, who have tended to emphasize Tokyo’s alliance with Washington over
cooperation with Beijing. The main opposition party at the time, the Democratic Party of
Japan (DPJ), showed much more overt overtures towards Beijing. DPJ Prime Minister
Hatoyama Yukio, who only served less than a year, was clear about his intention to pivot
Tokyo’s foreign policy from the U.S. alliances to strengthening its partnership with
Beijing. Since stepping down in June 2010 due to failed policy initiatives and a high
unpopularity rating, Hatoyama has continued to advocate for strengthening relations with
Beijing and even acquiescing to a Sinocentric order in Asia.2
Hatoyama may not represent the broad interests of the Japanese populace, the
political elites, or even his own party, but his approach of acquiescing to Sinocentric
order in Asia does represent a long-persevering counterapproach to China in Japan.
While broadly speaking, China is perceived as the greatest state-level threat to Japan and
favorability polls show a deep distrust between the Chinese and Japanese, there is a
strand of thought that persists in Japan from pre-modern times that hitching itself to

2

Since leaving office, Hatoyama has issued an apology for Japanese war crimes in Nanjing, recommended
Tokyo recognize the existence of a territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Daioyu Islands, and to the chagrin
of many of his compatriots, he sits on the international advisory committee for the AIIB. It has been
pointed out that “[b]y appointing a former Japanese prime minister as an advisor to the AIIB, China may be
attempting to weaken the collaboration between Japan and the United States” (Japan Times 2016).
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China is ultimately in Japan’s best interests; “the Japanese, in distant history, have gone
through periods where they deferred to the Chinese, and it is possible they will one day
do so again, especially if they perceive China as a rising state and their nation as a
declining one” (Chang 2009). Currently, this is a view held mostly among those on the
political left, such as Hatoyama, but it can easily change on account of signals of
durability of Washington’s commitment to Japan and the region writ large. It is often
noted in Japanese modern history, “[i]f there is one lesson above all others that Japan
learned from the twentieth century, it was that alliance with the global superpower –
Great Britain in the first two decades of that century, and the US for the last five –
offered the best assurance of stability and prosperity” (McCormack 2007, 55). Indeed,
such a realist approach to statecraft could eventually dictate that between Washington and
Beijing, the latter is possibly interpreted as more committed to stability in Asia.
Moreover, the latter is more economically interconnected throughout the region than the
former. It is on Washington to prove that acquiescence to Sinocentric order in Asia is not
in Tokyo’s best interest.
Aleksandr Dugin and his works are well-known in Russia, and a discussion of
neo-Eurasianism would be remiss without mention of his thought and influence on this
doctrine. The direct influence Dugin has on the Kremlin is unclear, but the proliferation
of his thought through lectures, books, and television appearances, and his role as advisor
to members of the State Duma, the United Russia Party, unofficial advisor to Putin, and
the military indicate that his ideas must permeate Russian doctrine to a significant degree
(Laruelle 2008, 107-08). Dugin bases his philosophy of geopolitics on Mackinder’s
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heartland thesis, and places Russia at the “pivot” of world order (Dugin 2007: Dugin
2013).
It is in Dugin’s work where neo-Eurasianism does directly relate to Japan. Dugan
advocates that Russia seek out strategic alliances with key powers along its periphery. In
Europe, it is Germany with which Russia must ally; in the Muslim world, it is Iran; and in
East Asia, it is Japan, to which he credits its early twentieth century pan-Asianist
ideology (Laruelle 2008, 117). Thus, Dugan advocates for a quadruple alliance of RussiaGermany-Japan-Iran to dominate the Eurasian space, and defend against American
intervention. Moreover, there is a hierarchy in this alliance as Dugan theorizes Russia as
the global superpower, and Germany, Japan, and Iran are regional allies needed to
support Russia in this hierarchy.3 To this end, Dugan has proposed the Kremlin return the
Southern Kurile Islands to Japan and Kaliningrad to Germany in exchange for them
deepening an alliance with Russia and severing ties with the United States (Laruelle
2008, 241).
With regard to China, Dugin’s neo-Eurasianist vision is at odds with Moscow’s
gradual alignment with Beijing. He views Russia’s sphere of influence not constrained to
the borders of the former Soviet Union, but rather, inclusive of Manchuria, Xinjiang,
Tibet, and Mongolia (both the republic, and China’s autonomous region). This is
consistent with Sawabe’s thesis, that neo-Eurasianism, in general, represents an easterly
shift for Russia, to balance with China (2017: 88). Dugan makes clear he considers China

3

At other times, however, he has omitted Iran from this alliance he envisages, calling for a restoration of
“the mythical triangle between Germany, Russia, and Japan” (Laruelle 2008, 142).
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the primary state-level threat to Russia’s interests in Asia, along with the U.S. in the
Americas, the UK in Europe, and Turkey in the Muslim world (1997: 247).
To this end, indeed, the Kuril’s are key to a possible coalescing of neoEurasianism and Tokyo’s Arc. Dugan’s thought is not to be confused with Kremlin
policy, but his approach to Japan regarding the Kuriles is a viable option that it would
appear Putin has considered. More palatable to Putin would be a deal on the Kurile
Islands dispute in exchange for Tokyo weakening its security alliance with Washington,
or, at least, removal of American troops from Japanese soil. Russo-Japanese cooperation
is certainly plausible, and there is undoubtedly room for deepening cooperation. Both
visions share an emphasis on the post-socialist spaces. Despite the ongoing island
dispute, Japan was the first G7 member state to invite Putin for a bilateral summit after
the Crimean crisis. While Tokyo did join with Washington and other Western allies in
condemning Moscow’s actions, and also joined in the sanctions on Russia, domestically,
there has been intense debate in Japan whether intense condemnation against Moscow
over the Crimean Peninsula could be turned around in negotiations over a solution to the
Kuril Islands dispute. In any case, the Kremlin has shown some interest in settling the
territorial dispute with Japan, which is not characteristic of Russia when considering
territorial disputes with Ukraine and Georgia, for instance.
Both Moscow and Tokyo have Beijing in mind; both are seeking leverage in the
chance that relations with a rising China sour, and neither is comfortable being at best a
junior partner with Beijing, but at worst a bandwagoning ‘tributary’ state to the
Sinocentric order of Asia. Furthermore, Russia is looking for the inroad to weaken the
U.S.-Japan alliance, and Japan is looking for an insurance policy, in the case the U.S.
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decides the Pivot was Obama’s plan, and it like TPP, under Trump is dead. While not a
pressing geopolitical issue on either side, the island dispute is complex and is often
wrapped up in nationalism on both sides. Nevertheless, Moscow and Tokyo are
continuing a slow-dance entente, in which exogenous factors in the shape of China and
the U.S. are bringing them closer together.
This analysis reveals maneuverability in the international milieu. Visions of Asia
are conceptualized and interact with other visions in both the ideations and material
forms. This relates to the concept introduced in the previous chapter, reactionary
relations, and it also illustrates how reactionary relations can take place even within
conceptualization and policy, when nothing material has been carried out in terms of
strategy. Indeed, reactionary relations can even happen just in the realm of thoughts and
words put out into the international system. Tokyo reacts to notions and concepts
expressed in Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, and vise versa. The following section
turns in the opposite direction, by looking inward to reveal domestic political factors
which shape how Japan approaches the international milieu through its foreign
policymaking structure.
Domestic Political Factors to Values Diplomacy
The Arc was announced by Foreign Minister Asō Tarō in November 2006 while speaking
at JIIA, Japan’s largest and most influential thinktank founded by Asō’s grandfather and
preeminent postwar prime minister, Yoshida Shigeru. The prime minister at the time was
Abe Shinzō. Both Abe and Asō were out of office within a year, however, and did not
have extensive opportunity to carry out the new approach until December 2012, when
Abe was re-elected Prime Minister, he appointed Asō to be his Deputy Prime Minister
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and Minister of Finance. When Asō announced the Arc and Japan’s new values baseddiplomacy in 2006, Japan’s economy was double the size of China’s economy, its
population had just peaked, and for the first time since data has been made public,
China’s military budget had just surpassed Japan’s Self-Defense Force budget a year
before. Also, just weeks prior to the announcement, North Korea successfully detonated
its first nuclear device. To explain the action, it is prudent to examine the option of no
action versus action. No action, however, amounts to not codifying existing foreign
policy practices into overt language. Asō points out in his initial speech on the Arc, “this
new axis for our diplomacy…is really nothing new for Japan at all. It is in fact nothing
more than giving a name to the diplomatic achievements that Japan has built up…as well
as giving it a new positioning within our overall diplomacy” (2006b). Thus, no action
means continuation of foreign policy practices without the labeling of it as values-based
diplomacy.
This announcement established consistency between existing practices and
declarations of foreign policy. The choice was to retain Japan’s engagement activities
across Asia, yet keep them in in the backdrop as they had been, or intentionally highlight
them, making all observers, both international and domestic, cognizant of its meanings
and intentions. Tokyo chose to maximize its benefits from practices on the ground by
proclaiming it. So, how did this decision come about?
The Iron Triangle
From a cursory glance, Japan’s domestic political structure appears to be a case of
plus ça change: first, LDP is in power – just as it has been almost continuously since
1955; second, major corporations still have substantial clout in political policy; and third,
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so does the bureaucracy. There have been, however, significant powers shifts in the Iron
Triangle in the last quarter century. The announcement of the values-based Arc came
from this shifting power structure. First, aside from a brief period between 1993 and
1994, and again from 2009 to 2012, the LDP has retained control of government by
holding the majority of seats in the Diet House of Representatives, and therefore, the
Prime Minister’s office since 1955. The LDP has been instrumental in crafting Japan’s
foreign policy, and defining Japan’s role in international order. To many in Japan, the
political class is the LDP. While generally characterized as a center-right party with proAmerican inclinations, the LDP is a broadly defined party and is successful more
primarily due to its deep pockets and legacy of postwar peace and prosperity than due to
ideology. In fact, “[f]actionalism has shaped the fundamental structure of the LDP since
the beginning,” and these factions compete for leadership within the Party as viciously as
parties competing for leadership within other states’ governments (Ito 2012).
Second are the major corporations. Fahey argues, “[f]ew of Japan’s major
corporations are responsive to the demands of central government” (2017). To a certain
extent, major corporations do still respond to the central government, but the reverse is
still very much alive and well; major corporations – many of which are dependent on
exports – have significant investments and interests overseas, and thus maintain at least
one vertex of the Iran Triangle to be vibrant to this day. It is conceivable that major
corporations wanted to see a foreign policy proclamation like the Arc, which could open
up new opportunities for FDI and export markets. Major corporate interests are largely
represented by the Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) – Japan’s largest and
politically most influential business federation. Keidanren could be considered a
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powerful lobby, but it is actually more than just a lobby group; Keidanren often has
representation in the legislative councils and ‘deliberative councils,’ or shingikai (審議
会), within government ministries (Culpepper 2011, 124). With such ties to elected
officials, Keidanren is able to pursue its interests and occasionally bypass opposition
from the bureaucracy (Culpepper 2011, 124). This was evident by the effect of pro-TPP
Keidanren, which won over LDP lawmakers who had long been aligned with the antiTPP agriculture sector lobby (Keidanren 2012). Moreover, it was Keidanren’s
dissatisfaction with the DPJ’s post-Fukushima anti-nuclear power stance that perpetuated
the fall of the DPJ and the resurgence of the LDP in late 2012 (Ito 2012).
Third, the elite bureaucracy in national ministries has garnered tremendous clout
for many decades which allowed it power in the decision-making process. Bureaucratic
positions also garner substantial social prestige in Japanese society; “Japan has benefitted
from the fact that some of its most talented youth have elected to make governmental
service their careers, and corruption, the scourge of many Asian bureaucracies, has been
modest” (Scalapino 2002, 104). Another reason the elite bureaucracy has been able to
exercise exceptional power is that cabinet ministers tend to be career politicians “who are
moved quite frequently from post to post, often staying in one position less than a year”
(Theodoulou 2002, 67). Thus, they may have neither substantial knowledge about
ministry or agency functions, administration, or operation, nor are they highly capable of
gathering a support base among the career bureaucrats. The power of the bureaucracy,
however, started to wane when the Koizumi administration began adopting rules to
bypass the influence of the bureaucracy in 2001, and the DPJ attempted to further
emphasize these rules when they were in power from 2009 until 2012. The following
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section considers the inter-bureaucratic power dynamics within MOFA and among other
influential actors, and how the crafting of the Arc policy possibly took place.
Foreign Policymaking Structure
MOFA is the headquarters for foreign policymaking, but in some circumstances,
MOFA may, in fact, not be the most powerful actor in foreign policymaking since it
works together with a host of other actors. Moreover, MOFA is also not a black box;
rather, the power structures from within the ministry also dictate how policy is made.
There are five regional bureaus within MOFA, as well as several non-regional bureaus.
The five regional bureaus are the North American Affairs Bureau, the Asian and
Oceanian Affairs Bureau, the Latin American and Caribbean Affairs Bureau, the
European Affairs Bureau, and the Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau. An
ongoing power struggle endures among the regional bureaus within MOFA. Countries
along Asō’s Arc, and in Muslim Asia, are found in the Asian and Oceanian Affairs
Bureau, the European Affairs Bureau, and the Middle Eastern and African Affairs
Bureau, but not the North American Affairs Bureau, or the Latin American and
Caribbean Affairs Bureau. Bureaus also have regional and non-regional departments and
divisions within their own structure.
On account of the postwar occupation by U.S. forces, the Security Alliance, and
ongoing American military presence in Japan, the North American Affairs Bureau retains
a key position of power within the organization. The North American Affairs Bureau
oversees relations only with the U.S. and Canada, but has the capability to force out
policy recommendations that originate from bureaucrats in the other bureaus. This has
been the norm for most of the postwar era, but in recent years the Asian and Oceanian
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Affairs Bureau has emerged in significance with the rise of East and Southeast Asian
economies, and China in particular. Thus, within the organization a power competition is
emerging between the dominant North American Affairs Bureau and the emerging Asian
and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, which includes a large swathe of the Asian-Pacific region
including China, Southeast Asia, and India. The competition developing between the
dominant North American Affairs Bureau and the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau
could cause neglect to advancing policy of the remaining three regional bureaus,
insomuch as the other bureaus are not of interest to either the North American Affairs
Bureau or the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau. The competition among these regional
bureaus is naturally a competition for resources, but beyond this, many elite bureaucrats
are trained area and language specialists, and while job transfers are frequent, area
specialists tend to remain in positions associated only with that particular region. Thus, in
the competition for policy, bureaucrats become advocates for their respective regions,
and compete in the realm of ideas on conceptualizing what region needs the most
attention, resources, and elaborated policy.
Outside of MOFA, yet still within domestic policymaking, pressures can be
immense from other government ministries and agencies, as well as non-government
organizations. Pressures are particularly acute when the state or region has vital economic
or energy security interests for Japan. In these cases, METI (prior to 2001, MITI) has a
much stronger role in dictating foreign policy, working in tandum with MOFA.
Additionally, JETRO, Keidanren, and other business interests will apply pressure on
crafting the policy. If the region or state has a relatively high energy security interest for
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Japan, the Ministry of Defense, the National Security Council, the Natural Resource and
Energy Agency within METI, and energy businesses will also apply pressure.
With this understanding of the organizational structure of MOFA, and of the
domestic actors engaged in the foreign policymaking process, the values-based Arc
passed through a complex power-struggle process by the time it was announced. Within
MOFA, the North American Affairs Bureau deals with gaiatsu – the American insistence
that Japan increase both its leadership role in Asia and also its presence as a coalition
partner with the U.S. So, while the North American Affairs Bureau may not promote
values-based diplomacy in Asia and the Arc, it benefits by allowing the policy to proceed
and, thus, a sufficient response to Washington’s ongoing request is fulfilled. The Asian
and Oceanian Affairs Bureau also stands to gain, at least the semi-autonomous Southeast
and Southwest Asian Affairs Department within the Bureau. This department includes
ASEAN nations, but also India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. The strongest divisions with
the bureau, those in charge of Sino-Japanese relations, might have opposed the Arc
policy depending on how they interpreted this policy benefitting bilateral relations in the
long run. Other regional bureaus partially included along the Arc, such as the European
Affairs Bureau (Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, but not Western
Europe) and the Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau (the Middle East, but not
Africa) likely would have supported the policy, given that both bureaus are relatively
weak in the competitive structure, and would have esteemed the partial victory. Of the
regional bureaus, only the Latin American and Caribbean Affairs Bureau would not
directly have any gains from this foreign policy, but even then, perhaps the shift in
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foreign policy would be interpreted as a new flexibility that would eventually allow for a
future change to benefit the bureau.
Outside MOFA, other ministries, agencies, and non-governmental organizations
could benefit from such policy. In late 2006, Japan’s economy had been steadily growing
for nearly five years, but it was hardly recapturing the higher growth rates of the 1980s
and a recession was predicted for 2007. Therefore, METI would eager seek increasing
access to new markets, and encourage such policy, especially since the early 2000s
growth was predicated on capital investments and exports. The same would be true of
JETRO and Keidanren. With more emphasis on stability with a reassurance of alliance
with the U.S., the Ministry of Defense and National Security Council would also have
ample reason to support the policy.
Conclusion
Japan’s vision of Asia in the twenty-first century takes shape on account of both domestic
factors as well as opportunities and constraints in the international system. Japan’s vision
of Asia interacts with visions of Asia coming from Russia, China, and the U.S., but the
Arc, as a new pillar to foreign policy, had to pass through a domestic competing power
structure to come into existence.
The three visions for Asia examined in this chapter, as well as Japan’s Arc, are
conceptualizations with differing overlays over the eastern hemisphere (see Table 3.1).
BRI includes parts of Europe and Africa, neo-Eurasianism includes all of Asia and fades
into western Europe. The American Pivot to Asia is mostly formulated by the oceans –
Indian and Pacific. And, the Arc, as the name suggests, covers a swath from Southeast
Asia to Eastern Europe. All of these, however, have notable omissions. BRI does not
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mention Japan, and the Arc does not mention China and crowding out the U.S. NeoEurasianism marks Japan as a regional linchpin, but is vague regarding China. The Pivot
to Asia is predicated on American alliance with Japan, but seems deliberately intended on
containing China. All exemplify an exceptionalism of Self, and the security of Self
undergirds all four visions.
The four visions for Asia, and the strategy that undergirds each can be framed in
the order versus justice dichotomy, as presented by Hedley Bull (1977) in The Anarchical
Society. For the U.S. and to a lesser extent Japan, it is a vision for order, and from this
order strengthens security. Bull explains the “proponent of order takes up his position
partly because the existing order is, from his point of view, morally satisfactory, or not so
unsatisfactory as to warrant its disturbance” (1977: 93). For Russia, and to a lesser extent
China, it is a strategy for justice. For Russia, it is to remedy the greatest geopolitical
catastrophe of the twentieth century; for China, it is to restore the Sinocentric order
interrupted by the Century of Humiliation. Both are seeking in their respective
approaches to restore an order which currently does not exist due to ‘immoral’ causes,
but did once in the historical imagination. “[I]deas about justice belong to the class of
moral ideas, ideas which treat human actions as right in themselves and not merely as a
means to an end” (Bull 1977, 75). The order in these historical imaginations is right, and
because it is just. As for an outcome, Bull argues:
“[w]hen demands for justice are put forward in the absence of a consensus within
international society as to what justice involves, the prospect is opened up that the
consensus which does exist about order or minimum coexistence will be undone.
The question then has to be faced whether order or justice should have priority”
(1977: 92).
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Russia, China, and the U.S. all exemplify power in Asia with somewhat traditional means
– military power, a nuclear arsenal, and security alliances, coupled with their
distinguishable economic enticements.
Japan differs in some regards. Few would consider Japan as exuding the scope of
power seen from the former three in the twenty-first century, but in the absence of
military-based hard power, Japan projects attraction across Asia for its counter-model to
this. Countries across Asia are drawn to its ability to exert influence, particularly through
economics and culture, despite lacking military power projections. Indeed, Japan enjoys a
higher favorability rating than the U.S., China, or Russia across Asia, including Muslim
Asia (but not among Chinese or South Koreans). It separates itself from the U.S. by not
leading its engagements in Asia with its military sector, and also unlike the U.S., it is
Asian. It has more credibility than the U.S. to argue that what is in Japan’s best interest is
also in all of Asia’s best interest. It separates itself from Russia by lacking natural
resources and wielding them as strategic tools for geopolitical objectives of power
expansion. It separates itself from China by the perceived threat that comes with sheer
size and proximity, and by a perception of superior quality of its exports.
Japan benefits by being Asian, but being distant at the same time. Importantly,
unlike the U.S., Russia, and China, Japan also benefits by not having domestic conflicts
between its Muslim-minority and non-Muslim majority populations. The War on Terror
has aggravated domestic tensions for Muslim populations in the U.S., Russia, and China,
but not necessarily in Japan, where domestic Muslim populations do exist, but are
relatively few, and are not perceived as a security threat. This is a key understanding that
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drives the rest of this project, and is also the crux of Islamic studies scholar Miyata
Osamu’s 2017 work, Islam’s Only Hope: Japan.
Insofar as these visions for Asia are undergirded by security of state, it is a
manifestation of post-Cold War globalization and strengthening of regional security
complexes (RSCs) across Asia into not a security constellation, but a single, massive
security complex. In 2003, Buzan and Wæver argued that Southeast Asia has “merged
with Northeast Asia into a larger East Asian RSC,” but they then predict this RSC will be
“potentially including in the future also South Asia in a huge Asian RSC” (2003: 477). If
the America Pivot to Asia turns out to be a Pivot out of Asia, if Asians by and large reject
the American Pivot, or if its interpreted to be an Obama policy rather than a Trump
policy and therefore abandoned, it would have tremendous ramifications in Asia. “[I]t
would strengthen the possibility that the Asian supercomplex would evolve into a full
Asian RSC” (2003: 459). Buzan and Wæver add “it would expand the engagement of the
Eurasian great powers with the Middle East” (2003: 459). This intensification is already
seen, as Moscow’s neo-Eurasianism, Beijing’s BRI, and Tokyo’s Arc all view the Middle
East as a cornerstone of their visions. The unspoken part in the American Pivot, however,
is its turn away from the Middle East.
Japan has long recognized its geopolitical precariousness as a rather large, densely
populated island-nation with minimal natural resources, and has been able to offset this
deficiency with an export-based, yet often protectionist economy, and its security alliance
with the U.S. The domestic challenges of economic security, societal security, and energy
security all equate to existential security. It is Hobbesian in the sense scarcity underlies
the source of insecurity and can potentially lead to mistrust and conflict, but not in the
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sense that the viable solutions are to ‘restore’ its position as a dominant actor in global
economics. Domestic policymakering elites want to restore a previously attained security
stature, and are unsure of Washington’s long-term commitment, Moscow’s viability, and
Beijing’s intentions. Strengthening Asian identity and relations with a broader Asia is a
means to attain restoration of security, especially for a state that attained prosperity with
export-based economics.
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Table 3.1: Competing Visions for Asia
BRI
Neo-Eurasianism
Expanse

Asia, Europe,
Indian Ocean,
and Africa

(1) near abroad
(2) all of Asia
and eastern
Europe

Notable
exclusions/
inclusions

excludes Japan, Japan, Germany,
U.S.; includes
and Iran are
Russia
regional
linchpins

Declaration

2013

Declared
driving
facets

infrastructure,
development

Plausible
underlying
driving facet

resource
security,
restoration of
Sinocentric
order

N/A (but
emerged in
1990s)
multi-polarity; a
task to connect
(and pacify) East
and West
security, identity,
restoration of
Russian power
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Pivot to Asia
Indo-Pacific
regions
(includes
Japan,
Australia,
Indonesia,
India)
China is a
driving
motivation;
Russia is
excluded

Arc of Freedom
and Prosperity
Southeast Asia,
South Asia,
Central Asia,
Middle East,
and Eastern
Europe

2011

China and
Russia
excluded, but
other former
Soviet republics
are key
2006

sustainable
economic
development

infrastructure,
development,
democratization

Chinese
containment,
unipolarity

identity and
role, countering
Chinese
dominance

PART TWO: STRATEGY
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CHAPTER IV
ACCESS TO ENERGY
In July 2016, Koike Yuriko was elected as the first female governor of the Tokyo
Metropolis. Koike is a conservative politician who was a key ally in the Lower House of
Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō. She served briefly as the defense minister in Abe
Shintō’s first cabinet in 2007, and in 2008 ran as the first woman ever for the position of
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leadership. Koike is currently among the most popular
politicians in Japan, and many predict she has the potential to advance politically to
become the first female Japanese prime minister (Sakurai 2017). She is also an Arabist.
Koike’s father was an international trade magnate who persuaded his daughter that
relations with the oil rich countries in the Middle East were key for Japan’s economic
stability for decades to come. Koike studied Arabic at American University in Cairo, and
while working as a translator in Egypt interacted with leaders such as Yasser Arafat and
Muammar Gaddafi. When Saudi King Salman visited Japan in March 2017, Koike was
among the Japanese leaders who met with the King.
Koike is unique among the Japanese political class in her knowledge and
experience with the Muslim world. While it was Japan’s dependency on energy resources
that attracted her to Arab studies, she has expressed interest in strengthening Japan-Arab
relations beyond oil, and praised Saudi Arabia’s planning for a post-oil economy during
the King’s visit (Arab News 2016). Access to energy is the most acute impetus for Japan
to engage itself with Muslim Asia for over a half century. Today, oil-rich countries in
Muslim Asia such as Saudi Arabia and UAE are indirectly indicating their peak oil
moments have passed by planning for post-oil economies. Nevertheless, at present the
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petro-trade still dominates this relationship with Japan, and is still calculated
strategically, both in the short- and long-terms. This chapter focuses on how Japan relates
to Muslim Asia via access to energy. It is argued that the oil trade has served as a key
conduit for long-term relations between Japan and much of Muslim Asia in the postwar
era. Moreover, energy security is ontological security for Japan, thus the energy suppliers
in Muslim Asia must be secured at all costs to maintain the steady flow of energy
resources. At times, this calls for strategic pandering and overlooking democratic and
human rights issues, key to the Arc foreign policy, in the interest of ensuring energy
resource supply. Nevertheless, this form of relationship between Japan and the Muslim
Asia energy suppliers is very much temporary, as seen in the past, and illustrated by
energy initiatives for the future. Discussion of planning for the post-oil relations that
Koike alluded to are addressed in greater detail in the following chapter.
Which states are key energy suppliers for Japan in Muslim Asia, and which are
not? Which regions must be secured for the supply of energy, and in terms of Tokyo’s
geostrategy, how so? How did this dependency shape Japan’s values-based diplomacy
and the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity, and how does the Arc shape it? Utilizing
typological theory as a methodological tool for analysis, this chapter clarifies the role of
energy security in Japan’s foreign policy with Muslim Asia. Access to energy is a
variable which undergirds the relationship, and has kept Japan attentive to events in the
Middle East throughout the postwar era. While talk of the post-fossil fuel global economy
is not hopeless, reaction to the nuclear fallout at Fukushima in 2011 proved that fossil
fuel imports will continue to dominate Japan’s energy sector for the foreseeable future,
and remain the key factor in Japan-Muslim relations.
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Energy dependency has been the primary reason to maintain a direct and
meaningful linkage in the postwar era between Japan and Muslim Asia. Japan’s
overwhelming energy dependency, postwar pacifist norms, and even geographic
remoteness from energy suppliers have enabled Japan to distance itself from Western
states in the image constructed in Muslim Asia states – both resource exporters and
others. These same variables, however, are shifting, and thus, can shift the outcome of
relations. Much like the West, Japan avoids emphasizing values such as “democracy,
freedom, human rights, the rule of law, and the market economy” to resource-rich
exporters. By omitting this language with such states, Japan is at worst undermining its
true adherence to these norms, and at best demonstrating how its acute dependency on
resources from these states to undergird its own survival outweighs the values it
emphasizes in values-based diplomacy. Thus, these values apply foremost to Japan’s own
society, then, depending on energy resource endowments and export potential, they apply
to Muslim Asia insofar as they do not interfere with Japan’s resource dependency.
Background: A Symbiotic Relationship
Historically, Japan was able to rely upon its own coal supplies for energy, and even
export it to China and Southeast Asia, but Japan’s coal was generally of poor quality and
insufficient for a modern, industrialized empire. By the early twentieth century when the
modern nationstate was just taking form, an acute awareness of its own energy resource
deficiency would begin to define Japan’s sense of security and self in the international
system. Strategy follows this impasse; how to break the limitation? Without access to
abundant metals and fossil fuel resources, the modern, industrialized empire could not be
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created. To survive, Japan must emulate the West, but unlike the Western powers, Japan
lacked secured access to energy resources.
After consecutive victories in the First Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese
War, and World War I, Japan’s military growth took off, and resultantly, so did its need
for energy resources. Yet, there was a pervasive, naïve sense that was perpetuated by
hubris instilled from the trio of war victories that Japan would always have sufficient
energy supplies, despite military and industrial expansion (Nakajima 2015, 34). After all,
oil discoveries were taking place at the time in several different regions of the world.
Assuming supplies would also be discovered in Japan or in Japanese-controlled territories
was not irrational.
After World War I, Japan followed the lead of its alliance partner, Britain, in
switching all naval ships from coal power to diesel power. Domestic coal supplies were
sufficient for modernization until the 1920s, when Japan’s military had several new
warships, aircraft, and tanks – all running on petroleum, and not coal (DeWit 2017, 184).
“Coal helped motivate Japan’s fateful imperial adventures, but oil delivered a
catastrophic lesson in extreme energy dependence” (DeWit 2017, 184). It would not be
until the late 1920s, after extensive surveying and several domestic oil companies failing
that Japan began coming to terms with the realization that its domestic crude oil reserves
would never be sufficient, nor match that contemporaneously being found in the U.S., the
USSR, Latin America, the East Indies, or the Persian Gulf (Enayat 1994, 44). Thus,
foreign policy and geostrategy would thereafter be shaped by the irretractable need to
secure adequate supply of this key resource. Indeed, the institution to take interest in
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formulating a geostrategy to secure foreign crude oil supplies was the same sector that
consumed the most: the Imperial Navy.
The first Japanese drawn to the appeal of potential crude oil resources in the
Persian Gulf region was geographer Shiga Shigetaka. After traveling to India, Persia, and
overland from the Arabian Desert to Damascus, he argued in his 1926 book, The
Countries We Do Not Know, that the oil fields in the Iraq-Persian borderlands which he
identified as “Maidan-i-naften” contained reserves that were significantly greater than the
oil fields Tokyo had been focusing upon at the time in northern Sakhalin, and that “we
have to consider [Persia’s oil fields] essential to Japan’s petroleum strategy” (Nakajima
2015, 38-39). Nonetheless, despite the dominant position Persian Gulf states enjoy today
in oil production, they were relatively latecomers to the industry. At the time Shiga
predicted the significance of the Persian Gulf region to Japan’s energy security, oil
reserves were yet to be discovered in Bahrain, Kuwait, UAE, and even Saudi Arabia.
Shiga was a prolific writer who had an influence on many, but was before his time. “The
Japanese who desired petroleum looked off in a far distance, but to reach the Middle
East, first there was Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, China – and exploitation of petroleum
in Japan’s Northeast Asian region” (Nakajima 2015, 40).
Many of the smaller Persian Gulf sheikhdoms relied on the pearl industry for an
inflow of foreign capital prior to the discovery of crude oil, yet coincidently, it was a
Japanese inventor in the late 1920s who inadvertently destroyed the Persian Gulf pearling
industry by inventing marketable cultured pearls raised in pearl farms (Yergin 1992,
293). This, in turn, forced these sheikhdoms to accelerate oil exploration as a new
possible source of revenue (Yergin 1992, 293). As Persian Gulf oil reserves were being
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discovered in the 1930s, Japan made efforts to invest, but came across barriers usually
involving the enormous transport costs and requisite investment capital, not to mention
the dominance by British and American supermajors in the region (Nakajima 2015, 5661). While not productive economically, it turned out to be the beginning of relations
between Tokyo and many of the post-colonial states in the Gulf region.
By 1941, half of the crude oil consumed by Japan went to military use, and 60
percent of Japan’s crude oil was imported from the U.S. (LaFeber 1997, 200). The
awareness of this acute energy resource deficiency was undeniably a key factor in its
choice to expand militarily, and seek out energy resources in other territories in Asia.
Paradoxically, however, Japan soon discovered that the more it expanded into Asia, the
more resources it needed to militarily fortify its possessions. In 1939 Japan announced an
‘East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,’ which was to remove European colonial powers from
China and Southeast Asia. Behind the pan-Asianist message lay the imperative
geostrategy of securing ‘sovereign resources areas,’ which meant exploiting the crude oil
reserves in the Muslim-populated East Indies to sustain the war effort in China.
After the U.S. embargoed all crude oil exports to Japan, the Japanese carried out its attack
on the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor in December 1941 concurrently with an invasion
of the Dutch East Indies and British Malaya, which would allow Japan access to the
coveted crude oil reserves, what they began calling the ‘Southern Zone.’
Despite the Japanese initial success in invading the Dutch East Indies and British
Malaya, and securing their crude oil reserves, the strategy of fully exploiting these
resources so that they would adequately supply the war effort failed. Dutch and British
oil field workers successfully carried out extensive scorched earth policies to their own
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oil fields prior to retreat. Moreover, it should be noted most of these resources Japan was
relying upon were reserves – surveyed estimates, not yet producing and equipped for
immediate export. Without a strong existing oil industry in Japan itself a dearth existed in
technological know-how, sufficient supplies of machinery, and compliant and available
manpower. As quick as possible, Japan sent more than 70 percent of its petroleum
workers to ramp up production in these fields, but many lacked experience and expertise
(Yergin 2008, 338). Nonetheless, they were able to ramp up production from the
Southern Zone in a remarkably short amount of time.
Oil production in the Southern Zone under British or Dutch control is estimated at
65.1 million barrels in 1940, yet after one year of Japanese occupation of the same
territories, the Southern Zone produced 25.9 million barrels in 1942, and by 1943, 49.6
million barrels (Yergin 2008, 338). In the first quarter of 1943, Japan was importing 80
percent of the amount imported in 1941 prior to the embargo (Yergin 2008, 338). Once
Allied forces could reach the waters in the region, oil tankers from the Southern Zone up
to Japan became easy torpedo targets for submarines, rendering the target resource of the
initial war strategy useless. “By 1944, sinkings were far outrunning new tanker
construction” (Yergin 2008, 340). In the first quarter of 1944, crude oil imports were less
than half that of the first quarter of 1943; by 1945, crude oil imports were negligible
(Yergin 2008, 340). By late 1943, Tokyo was already attempting to find sufficient crude
oil supplies at home, or at least closer to home in Manchuria or Karafuto (Sakhalin)
(Enayat 1994, 53).
Japan’s strategy to attain a sovereign resources area resulted in war and defeat.
The “modern, industrialized empire” was demolished, but replaced with a “modern,

117

industrialized state,” which necessitated securing access to abundant energy resources
through a different strategy. By this time, the key resource had long been crude oil, and
not coal. Japan was devoid of significant crude oil deposits, and its coal mines were
rapidly being exhausted. Densely populated with urbanized youth, Japan needed access to
energy resources essential to rebuild, re-industrialize, and avert mass poverty and
domestic conflict. Crude oil, and specifically Persian Gulf oil, served as the materiel
underpinning for the rise of postwar Japan.
By the late 1940s, Anglo-American supermajors viewed Japan as a prime location
for refineries of the flow of crude oil just recently starting to develop in the Persian Gulf.
While the distance between the Gulf and Japan is immense, its domestic market was
expected to skyrocket with demand. Additionally, while still under American occupation,
Japan was the most stable country in the region, and could serve as a regional hub for
Persian Gulf oil refineries (Enayat 1994, 67). While this did open up a new avenue of
contact between Japan and Muslim Asia, it was greatly constrained. Again, Japan was
still an occupied state, and Anglo-American supermajors facilitated this crude oil
transport strategy. For the supermajors, it was a strategy that would ensure that they
controlled upstream operations, and never have to deal with competition offered from
Japanese oil companies, which would focus purely on downstream operations. By the
early 1950s, oil refining was among Japan’s most technologically advanced industries
due to the access to capital and technology transfer gained from the supermajors in Japan
(Enayat 1994, 69).
Branching off from its success in the refining industry, after the American
occupation ended in 1952 Japan promoted petrochemicals as a national policy industry in
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1955, thus reaffirming that the new economy of Japan would be an oil-based one (Enayat
1994, 76). During this period, Japan would spearhead the development and
industrialization of petrochemical technologies, namely utilizing petroleum naphtha
rather than coal, as the primary feedstock (Enayat 1994, 258). By 1957, there were four
naphtha cracking centers across Japan (Enayat 1994, 267).
In 1958, concerned with Japan’s security of oil supplies and deep dependency on
the U.S., entrepreneur Yamashita Tarō sought oil fields in the Persian Gulf region for
investment. Contrary to the expectations of the Japanese government and the
supermajors, Yamashita succeeded in making an agreement with the Saudis and Kuwaitis
to explore the Neutral Zone between their countries, discovered oil in the Khafji field,
and established the Arabian Oil Company (AOC) in 1958 (Enayat 1994, 80). Yamashita’s
profit-sharing arrangement pushed the limit at the time. When half of all profits on oil
production was the most a country could expect at the time, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
gained 57 and 56 percent of all profits, respectively (Enayat 1994, 80). On account of his
activity on the Arabian Peninsula, Yamashita was given the nickname “Arabia Taro.”
Between 1948 and 1972, Japan’s crude oil consumption increased an astounding
137 times (DeWit 2017, 186)! Access to energy became not only an issue simply of
economic security, or energy security, but also, it became an issue of national security.
Japan’s existence is predicated on solving its energy resource deficiency, and how it both
secures access to foreign energy resources, and compensates for this deficiency via its
own human capital. Without a steady supply of energy resources from abroad, there is no
Japan.
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Through the 1960s, Japan’s energy use pivoted from coal to oil – and specifically,
Persian Gulf oil. In 1960, coal made up 41 percent of Japan’s energy supply while oil
made up 38 percent (EDMC 2016, 38, 316). By 1970, coal was just 21 percent while oil
was 70 percent (EDMC 2016, 38, 316). In the same period, energy self-sufficiency
dropped from 58 percent in 1960 to 15 percent in 1970 as the volume of energy imports
rapidly accelerated (METI 2015, 110). During the decade, oil from the Middle East would
rise to 90 percent of the total oil imports (Enayat 1994, 83). Yet, despite the shift, it still
represented Japan’s constrained interaction with the world via the U.S. “Cheap, abundant,
and seemingly risk-free oil supplies for Japan were delivered largely from a Mideast
region dominated by the United States, through an industry largely controlled by US
firms, and over sea lanes patrolled by US warships” (DeWit 2017, 186). In Japan, the
biggest beneficiaries of this emerging dependency was Japan’s refineries and
petrochemical industry.
This chapter continues by examining two cases of crisis: the Iran Japan
Petrochemical Company (IJPC), and the 1973 oil shock. Both of these had lasting effects
on Japan’s perception of energy security, and acutely, how Islam relates to Japan’s access
to energy. The chapter continues by examining the liquified-natural gas (LNG) market,
and Japan’s pivotal role in this trade, and concludes by framing these research results into
a typology.
IJPC
Japan was the largest importer of Iranian oil throughout the 1960s and early 1970s,
purchasing nearly half of Iran’s oil exports (Enayat 1994, 323). In 1971, Mitsui & Co., in
consortium with four other Japanese companies, entered into a joint venture with Iran’s
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National Petrochemical Company to develop the Lorestan oil field in western Iran, and
construct a petrochemical complex. The consortium was named Iran Japan Petrochemical
Company (IJPC). By the late 1960s, rapid industrialization took its toll and due to
environmental concerns, Japan was already attempting to encourage companies to expand
petrochemical plants overseas, and then import their products to Japan rather than
produce domestically. By this point, the petrochemical industry was very vibrant in
Japan.1 Iran had cheap raw materials, and a surplus of petroleum feedstocks which
otherwise were not going into industrial use. The plant was designed to become the
largest petrochemical complex in the world (Enayat 1994, 357). IJPC, however, turned
out to be a disaster for both Japan and Iran, and would be noted in history as the
“tragically unfinished project,” leaving Japanese hesitant to invest in Iran thereafter
(Kubota 2009, 234).
The venture was scheduled to start in 1973, but construction did not commence
until 1976, then was interrupted two years later by the Iranian Revolution. By 1978, the
estimated costs for the project had ballooned sevenfold in the matter of seven years due
to the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 and the rapid depreciation of the U.S. dollar
relative to the Japanese yen over the 1970s. Loans to IJPC were overwhelmingly in yen,
while expected revenues were to be in dollars (for exports) or rials (for domestic) (Enayat
1994, 371). Meanwhile, in 1977 Mobil Oil informed Mitsui & Co. that after multiple
digs, Lorestan was devoid of marketable supplies of proven crude oil reserves. In
September 1978, Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo visited Iran, and inspected the

The Russian term “kombinat” had become a loan word in Japanese, meaning specifically a petrochemical
or refinery complex, and the prewar Soviet model was adopted for maximum efficiency.
1
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plant construction site in progress, but just three weeks later Iranian workers joined the
strikes around the country against the Shah’s rule. By January 1979, most Japanese
involved with IJPC had taken the advice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and
departed Iran as the Islamic Revolution heated up. At this point the plant was 85 percent
complete (Kubota 2009, 235). In February, Ruhollah Khomeini returned to Iran and
established a revolutionary government in the absence of the Shah who had left the
country. The Islamic Revolution in Iran would double global oil prices once again,
causing even more swelling of the remaining project construction costs.
The new government in Iran was generally hostile toward Western powers and
their direct investment in Iran. Unsurprisingly, this concerned the Japanese government
as well as the IJPC partners. Yet, the new government in Tehran refrained from including
Japan in its antagonistic posture to the West, as its conceptualization of ‘the West’ was
primarily defined by the powers whose imperialism stretched into in the Middle East, or,
at least, meddled in the affairs of Iran in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Rather,
Japan, was praised for its preservation of its culture despite its modernization, economic
development, and endurance of American occupation. Moreover, the atomic bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were specifically cited by Khomeini on numerous occasions as
cases of ‘inhumane acts’ by the United States. Thus, despite Japan’s FDI project that
created the IJPC, and despite the favorable relations Japan enjoyed with the Shah’s
government,2 Japan was able to retain favorable relations through the transition of Iranian

The Shah’s eldest daughter, Shahnaz Pahlavi, was an investor in Honda motorcycle and bicycle assembly
plants in Iran, and his nephew, Prince Shahram Pahlavinia, was a business agent representing Japan Air
Lines in Iran (The Leader-Post 1979, 41).
2
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governments both before and after the revolution. To illustrate its commitment to
relations with Japan, the first crude oil export carried out in post-revolution Iran was to
Japan in March 1979 (Enayat 1994, 376).
Confident the new government in Iran was committed to the IJPC, plans were
made to proceed with the plant construction on 11 November 1979. These plans were
thwarted just one week earlier when the American embassy in Tehran was invaded and
its employees were taken hostage by the invading student radicals. The Japanese were
stuck in a challenging diplomatic position. On one hand, there was enormous sunk cost in
the IJPC construction project, which was Japan’s largest FDI project at the time, and the
need to ensure the steady supply of Iranian oil exports, which were roughly 12 percent of
Japan’s total imports (Enayat 1994, 378). On the other hand, there was genuine sympathy
for the American hostages, Japan had its security alliance with the U.S. to consider, and
was acutely concerned about the safety of its own nationals in Iran. Amid the hostage
crisis, in January 1980 the U.S. was asking its allies, including Japan, to impose
economic sanctions against Iran.3 Fortunately for Japan, European countries were also
not enthusiastic about harsh economic sanctions against Iran, and Tokyo was able to get
away with minor, insignificant sanction measures similar to what many European
countries did. Tokyo made conscientious efforts to keep the IJPC project outside of any
economic sanctions.
In 1980, negotiations were conducted to continue with the IJPC construction
project with new management appointed from the new Iranian government, and in spite
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Sanctions are discussed in detail in Ch. 8.
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of the American hostage crisis. Japanese workers had just arrived on site to recommence
construction in September of that year when Iraq invaded the Khuzestan Province in
southwestern Iran, where the IJPC site was located. Within two days of the invasion, the
Iraqi Air Force had bombed the plant site. By November, Mitsui & Co. wanted to pull out
of the project, and was hoping to collect insurance indemnity to cover some of its losses,
but the Japanese government, and specifically the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI), would not allow Mitsui & Co. to collect on insurance indemnity, and
persuaded the company to remain invested in the project (Enayat 1994, 393). For the
Japanese government, too much was at stake for Mitsui & Co. to let it go. Firstly, it was
the largest FDI project Tokyo was engaged in at the time. Secondly, the Soviet Union had
just invaded Afghanistan less than a year earlier, and Tokyo was concerned that the
Soviets might eventually gain access to and control of Iran’s oil reserves. If Mitsui & Co.
pulled out, Tokyo was concerned the Iranians might allow the Soviets to fill the void on
the project.
On October 14, Japan withdrew its government personnel from Iran due to the
war. Iraq warned Japan that it would continue to bomb the site if construction continued,
so Japan left with the commitment to Iran that construction would recommence after the
war was over. While Japan never did recommence construction during the war, Iraq, in
fact, continued to bomb the construction site up to 42 times, as it was within 100 miles of
the Iraqi border and was a key target with significance to Iranian economic development
(Enayat 1994, 414). After the war ended in 1988, the Japanese inspected the site to assess
a cost estimate to continue the plant project. On account of corrosion and bomb damage
on the mostly-completed facility, they estimated it would cost over $6.5 billion – more
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than ten times the original estimates (Enayat 1994, 418). While the Iranians disputed this
estimate, they could not stop the Japanese investors from giving up on the project. In
1989, both sides entered the ‘Friendly Separation’ talks. Fortunately for Japan, Iran’s
newly elected President Hashemi Rafsanjani was strongly in favor of deepening ties with
Japan, and was of the opinion that petty disputes with Japan on the IJPC plant project
would prevent the Japanese from joining other projects in Iran, and be detrimental in the
long run (Enayat 1994, 420). This is precisely how the Iranians spun the outcome, when
the final ‘Friendly Separation Agreement’ was signed in October 1989: “this would pave
the way to building a new relationship between the two countries” (Enayat 1994, 421).
Upon the Japanese departure, IJPC was renamed Bandar Imam Petrochemical Company
(BIPC), and in a joint venture with several European companies, it was completed in
1994 as the largest petrochemical plant in Iran. The IJPC experience indeed paved the
way for a “new relationship,” but one where the Japanese lost interest in FDI in Iran.
1970s Oil Crises
On 6 October 1973 Syria and Egypt initiated a surprise attack on Israel, posing the
greatest existential threat to the state since its inception in 1948. Within a week, U.S.
Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger began an aerial bridge
strategy to supply armaments to Israel, which allowed Israel to quickly turn the tide in the
short-lived war. On 17 October, oil ministers from the Organization of Arab Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OAPEC) agreed to implement two measures: first, successive
production cuts globally; second, a crude oil embargo against the U.S. and the
Netherlands (which granted runways for stopovers in the U.S. aerial bridge). The former
measure was intended for U.S. allies, including Japan, to place additional pressure on
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Washington to stop supporting Israel in the war. The production cuts went in stages, first
ten percent, and then another of 15 percent. By November, global production was cut
over a quarter of the previous month, fueling a massive price surge.
In December, the OAPEC measures were met with delight from non-OAPEC
members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), such as Iran,
which welcomed the OAPEC politicizing of crude oil. Prices increased from $2.50 per
barrel to over $12 per barrel within just a few weeks (Chalabi 2010, 113). Demand was
so high, in December the Iranian National Oil Company quietly put up some quantity of
crude oil outside of OPEC-controlled prices into an international auction to test the
market, where Japanese companies paid $18 per barrel for the oil (Chalabi 2010, 111).
When the 1973 oil shock hit, over 75 percent of Japan’s energy was coming from
crude oil, and nearly 80 percent of that crude oil came from the Middle East (Hosaka
2013/2014, 67). Three-fifths of Japan’s primary energy came from the Middle East
(Hosaka 2013/2014, 67). If Japan were to risk being labeled a supporter of Israel and hit
with an embargo on par with that against the U.S. and Netherlands, nearly all this energy
would be lost, returning the postwar economic miracle essentially to the stone age.
Along with implementing domestic ad hoc conservation measures, diplomacy
directly with Persian Gulf suppliers was necessary. The first step was to establish clarity
regarding the suppliers’ objective with Japan. Clear overtures had to be made so that
Japan could avoid the embargo status placed on the U.S. and Netherlands, and at least
keep itself positioned similarly to the UK or France (Hosaka 2013/2014, 67-68). Deputy
Prime Minister Miki Takeo was immediately dispatched to OAPEC states prepared to
increase economic aid packages in exchange for reinstating crude supplies to Japan. Of
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the 3 trillion yen in long-term economic assistance pledged in this quick ad hoc trip by
Miki, a third of it was directly to Iraq,4 the OAPEC member that showed both the greatest
need for economic assistance and hesitancy regarding the supply disruption policy
(Miyata 2017, 61). In return, Iraq guaranteed 90 million tons of crude to Japan over ten
years, despite cut-back commitments to OAPEC (Miyata 2017, 62).
To be labeled an ‘unfriendly’ nation was a great shock to the Japanese, who
concern themselves deeply with the impression of their country around the world
(Hosaka 2013/2014, 68). The Japanese could not grasp how they could be considered a
friend of Israel, rather than the Arabs. “Setting aside the energy issue, the relationship
between Japan and the Middle East is not necessarily deep; rather, one could say issues of
politics, history, ethnicity, and religion in the Arab-Israeli conflict have essentially no
relation to the Japanese” (Hosaka 2013/2014, 68). Moreover, Japan had been a
tremendous source of aid for the Palestinians, even surpassing the amount provided by
Saudi Arabia in monetary aid (Hosaka 2013/2014, 68).
The oil shock strengthened the political posture of MITI, which seemed to have
more power in dictating foreign policy than MOFA. After the Deputy Prime Minister,
MITI’s top diplomat (and future prime minister), Nakasone Yasuhiro, was dispatched to
the Middle East to renegotiate bilateral relations. He touted a concept new to Japan’s
foreign policy, “resource diplomacy,” which advocated for distancing its own foreign
policy from that of the U.S. (Yergin 1992, 599). He clarified that with ‘resource
diplomacy,’ Japan must be “standing on the side of the oil producing countries” (Yergin
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1992, 599). MITI also developed a new national energy policy which called for the
increased utilization of nuclear energy, and a wider diversification of crude oil suppliers,
including China from which imports increased 100-fold in the matter of two years
(LaFeber 1997, 362)!
Japan had not seen such vulnerability to resource supply disruptions since the
U.S. crude oil embargo in 1941. Yet, similar to 1941, it was a matrix of international
alliances that perpetuated the supply disruption. Unlike 1941, however, religion played a
major role in the 1973 oil crisis. It also had another impact on Japan, which was not an
outcome seen in the U.S. or Western Europe; MITI employed a program to transition the
energy-consuming heavy industries such as steel and textiles into services and hightechnology industries such as electronics (LaFeber 1997, 362). Meanwhile, Japanese
automobile manufacturers began designing smaller vehicles, that maximized fuelefficiency. The ramifications of the 1973 oil shock were so great in Japan, even in
comparison to Western countries, that it spurred a radical response from MITI that would
not only buffer Japan from the effects of the second oil shock in 1979, but also allowed it
to rapidly transition to an economy less dependent on oil imports, and cultivated an
investment environment that encouraged the development of small, fuel-efficient
automobiles that coincidently were of great demand overseas. From the first oil shock
until 1986, Japan’s energy consumption grew only 7 percent, yet during the same period
its GNP surged by 50 percent (LaFeber 1997, 362). The 1973 oil shock inadvertently
contributed to the Japan miracle of the latter 1970s and 1980s.
Diplomatically, it had a great impact on Japan’s relations with crude oil suppliers
in Muslim Asia, including the Persian Gulf states as well as Southeast Asia. Japan had to
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craft a new foreign policy posthaste which maintained the security alliance and close ties
with the U.S., yet somehow attaining the ‘friendly nation’ status by OPEC members
(Sugiyama 2008, 8). On December 12, Miki visited the Saudi King and was assured
friendly nation status, and on December 25 it was officially announced that OPEC had
accepted Japan’s status as a friendly nation, and would restore its crude supply to the
September standard for supply (Sugiyama 2008, 8-9). While this was a diplomatic
success in restoring supply, it could not improve what would be a new standard in price.
Market price would now be substantially higher than consumers were used to, and the
crisis transformed from a crisis of supply to a crisis of price (Sugiyama 2008, 9).
The 1973 oil shock affected all developed economies that were highly dependent
on crude oil from OAPEC suppliers, but due to Japan’s extraordinary high dependency
on Persian Gulf oil which far surpassed American or European dependency, Japan was
hit the hardest by the oil supply disruptions. By the time Islamist revolutionaries
overthrew the Shah of Iran in 1979 perpetuating the second oil crisis, MITI’s strategy
was successful in buffering Japan from supply disruptions in the Middle East, albeit not
entirely.
It was these disruptions in energy security, and thus Japan’s economy that
contributed to the creation of a comprehensive security policy in 1980, quite innovative
for the time as a national security policy. Grasping that American hegemony across
Eurasia had reached a critical peak after the 1973 retreat from Vietnam, the gradual but
deliberate reduction of troops in South Korea, and the failure to sustain the Shah in power
in Iran, coupled with Japan’s increasingly role as the most dominate purchaser in the
global oil market, policymakers and academics were selected for a research group to
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design a new national security policy (Barber 2016). In 1980, the new national security
policy was outlined, based on an innovative concept of ‘comprehensive security,’ which
was conceptualized as an integration of elements, creating a synergy by working together,
such as the military, economic, and societal security sectors working in tandem against
threats. In short, comprehensive security is “multiple security sectors…collaborating in a
network to collectively improve and ensure the security of the referent objects” (Barber
2016). With the new comprehensive security policy of 1980 came a deliberate push to
increase Japan’s electricity generation from nuclear energy. With regard to the
dependence on crude oil imports, the Anglo-American supermajors that had dominated
exports of Persian Gulf oil to Japan, had lost their grip on the industry. Tokyo would at
last have to learn direct-diplomacy with leaders of nationalized oil companies (NOCs).
Energy security had been elevated to high-politics once again.
These events also forced Japan’s policymakers to take a fresh look at the Middle
East, and expand knowledge on the region into order to develop a coherent energy
security strategy. Part of this was retaining Japan’s alliance with the U.S., and supporting
the Carter Doctrine, so that U.S. military would ensure the transport of crude oil and
LNG from the Persian Gulf region, through the Strait of Hormuz and on to Japan. The
other part was to keep Japan in a moderate position as to avoid being considered an
enemy state by energy-resource suppliers in the region. Japan had to learn how to benefit
from the American security umbrella, but at the same time, keep its distance from the
U.S. in the view of those in the Middle East. To that extent, Japan’s balancing act has
succeeded supremely.
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LNG
On account of its population, level of industrialization, and status as an island-nation,
Japan has been a major consumer, if not, the major consumer of liquified natural gas
(LNG) for the last half century. Given the very low level of density of natural gas, storage
and deliverability are the biggest challenges for the natural gas trade, especially in
comparison to fossil fuels in solid and liquid forms. Coal and crude oil, as solids and
liquids, can be easily transported overland or overseas, and stored in silos or tanks,
respectively. As a vapor, natural gas escapes easily. The cheapest and simplest option to
transport and store natural gas is via pipelines which run overland, and at times overseas
if for short distances and in shallow waters. Pipelined natural gas makes up 74 percent of
the global trade (Tolwer 2014, 98). The only other option is LNG. When natural gas is
cooled to -259ºF (-165ºC) at atmospheric pressure, it is liquified and contracts to one sixhundredth the volume of its gaseous state. The LNG is transported on specially-designed
trucks, railroad cars, or open-sea tankers with insulated walls and auto-refrigeration.
Once it arrives at its destination port, the LNG is re-vaporized at LNG import terminals,
then stored in pipelines or shipped for consumption.
In the 1960s, Japan was using mostly crude oil for home electricity. In the interest
of improving environmental conditions, by the end of the decade power companies began
transitioning to natural gas, but on the condition the government would subsidize the high
cost. In 1970, Japanese energy companies participated, for the first time, in a project to
import LNG from the British protectorate, Brunei. The joint venture resulted in the first
LNG complex in the Western Pacific, the largest LNG complex to date, and the entrance
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of Brunei into the global LNG market. It also provided Japan with a 20-year contract to
import LNG.
After the 1973 oil crisis, Japan sought to diversify its electricity fuel sources even
more. It played a pivotal role in introducing two more Southeast Asian majority-Muslim
states into the LNG market, while deepening ties with them. Japanese companies invested
in the construction of LNG export complexes in Indonesia, which began supplying
Japanese electricity generators by 1977. Throughout the decade of the 1980s, Japan’s
LNG imports surged, and Japanese companies also invested in the construction of the
first export complex in Malaysia. In 1984, Japan was purchasing 72 percent of global
LNG sales (Petroleum Economist 2004). This ratio dropped to 66 percent in 1999, 48
percent in 2002, and 34 percent in 2015, but Japan was still the world’s single greatest
purchaser by a wide margin (Petroleum Economist 2004: Tolwer 2014, 98).
Observing the model set by the Southeast Asian Muslim states, Qatari Emir
Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani set out with a plan for Qatar to join the LNG market. A
latecomer, Qatar did not export LNG until 1997 when the Qatargas 1 complex was
completed. Only Russia and Iran have greater proven natural gas reserves, but Qatar has
been able to present itself as a much safer, more stable investment environment when
compared to the other two suppliers, and by 2014 it occupied nearly a third of global
LNG sales (Reed 2015, B1).
Japan has 23 LNG import terminals and an LNG tanker docks in the country
every 20 hours (Montgomery 2010, 87). While there are greater consumers of natural gas,
those countries tend to rely on domestic supplies (the U.S., Russia, and Iran) or benefit
mostly from natural gas delivered via transnational pipelines (China). Japan dominates
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the LNG consumer market because it is one of the largest energy consumers in the world,
it is the most highly-populated island-nation second to Indonesia (which has sufficient
natural gas supplies for domestic consumption), and being at its nearest 120 miles from
continental landmass, it lacks the availability of natural gas via pipelines.
There is, however, a pipeline opportunity from a neighboring Russian island:
Sakhalin. Russia has talked for decades of a potential pipeline project from the natural
gas fields in Sakhalin to Hokkaido. Indeed, Japan imports significant quantities of LNG
from Sakhalin, but despite the appeal of significantly cheaper pipelined natural gas from
Sakhalin, Japanese investors are wary due to past experiences. A pipeline project from
Sakhalin is estimated to cost $6 billion, and could potentially lower electricity costs in
Japan as much as 30 to 40 percent, but Japanese energy companies have already invested
tremendous amounts of money in LNG import terminals over several decades, and show
little interest in diversifying to invest in a pipeline from what is considered an unreliable
supplier (Tanaka 2017). Noteworthy as well is the territorial dispute between Russia and
Japan over the Southern Kurile Islands, which “acts as a constraint on enhanced energy
and economic cooperation” (Koyama 2013, 286). Expensive, yet reliable energy supplies
trump more affordable, yet unreliable supplies. Despite Sakhalin’s proximity – less than
30 miles from Hokkaido’s northern coast – and the potential for a pipeline, Japan
continues to rely on its ‘traditional’ suppliers of LNG, Australia, Qatar, Malaysia, and
Indonesia, because they have exhibited greater reliability.5

5

Risk of supply disruptions from Qatar was elevated in 2017 when it was ostracized in the Sunni Muslim
world and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Japan had to make efforts to remain on the sidelines of the
inter-GCC conflict because any indication of ‘taking sides’ would have jeopardized crude oil supplies,
LNG supplies, or at worst, both.
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Japan’s ‘Essential Suppliers’
Given that energy security undergirds existential security for a state like Japan which is
deeply dependent on foreign energy resources both in aggregate quantities and
proportionally, certain essential suppliers of energy resources are assumed to get a pass
from values-based foreign policy. Talk of democratization and human rights, as pillars of
the values-based Arc foreign policy, is expected to be absent in bilateral relations with
essential energy suppliers. Yet, who are these suppliers in Muslim Asia?
‘Essential suppliers’ are conceptualized here as the states that provide key energy
resources to Japan which sustain its economic, political, and social identity. These energy
resources are specifically the fossil fuel resources – natural gas (in the LNG form), crude
oil, and coal. Japan is the world’s oldest and largest importer of LNG, and will continue
to play a dominant role as a consumer in the LNG market, especially after
decommissioning dozens of nuclear reactors in the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi
incident. It is the fourth largest importer of crude oil – after the U.S., China, and India –
yet these three have substantial domestic reserves they can tap into, which Japan does
not. Japan is the world’s third largest importer of coal, after China and India – yet again,
unlike these two, it long ago exhausted domestic supplies. These three resources, alone,
make up over a quarter of Japan’s total imports in cost, and without consistent LNG,
crude oil, or coal supplies, the essential functions of the state and society would not
sustain. To start, which states in Muslim Asia supply Japan with crude oil, LNG, and
coal?
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Coal
While still significant, coal is the least essential resource of the three, making up
less than three percent of Japan’s total imports. Only one Muslim Asian state is an
essential supplier of coal for Japan, and only one is a potential essential supplier. In 2015,
Japan imported 192 million tons (Mt) of coal. The vast majority of which came from
Australia (124.6Mt), Indonesia (35.7Mt), Russia (14.2Mt), Canada (8.3Mt), and
insignificant quantities from others including the U.S. (IEA 2016, 71). Supplying Japan
with nearly a quarter of its coal imports, Indonesia is the only essential supplier of coal to
Japan in Muslim Asia (see Table 4.1). It is common for Japanese companies to obtain
excavation rights, and control their own coal mining operations overseas, with the help of
the government in Tokyo. Most operations in Indonesia are controlled by Japanese
companies (IEA 2016, 71). While secondary to Australia, Indonesia has supplied Japan
with coal since the late 1980s, and is integral to its strategy to retain reliable supplies of
coal, and diversify its sources (IEA 2016, 72).
Kazakhstan is the only potential essential supplier. Japan does receive negligible
quantities of coal from Kazakhstan, yet Kazakhstan is a significant producer and exporter
of coal. Moreover, Kazakhstan has over 33 billion tons in proven reserves of coal. While
domestic consumption of coal is relatively high, this is one of the largest proven reserves
in the world, and given Kazakhstan’s relatively small population, can be exported at a
greater rate. The greatest challenge for Japan is intense competition from emerging and
energy-starved economies in China and India – both benefitting from relative proximity
to Kazakhstan. Another immutable barrier which cannot change is geographical –
Kazakhstan is landlocked, and transporting coal (or any resource product) to Japan would
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require traversing borders, and switching the cargo from overland to overseas. It would
make this market possible, but not likely.
LNG
Early LNG suppliers from Muslim Asia were the ones nearest to Japan – the
southeast Asian states, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei, which were among the first to
receive heavy investment from Japan to acquire LNG export complexes in the 1970s and
early 1980s (see Table 4.2). While Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei have continued to
provide Japan was substantial LNG supplies over several decades, changes are expected
soon (see Table 4.3). Brunei has long passed its peak natural gas moment, and since the
initial two export complexes were constructed by the Brunei government, Shell, and
Mitsubishi in 1973 and 1974, no other complexes have been constructed, and no new
ones are planned (IGU 2017, 65-68). The two LNG export facilities are in need of
upkeep, and Brunei is finding itself more dependent on Japan than vice-versa.
Malaysia and Indonesia are newly industrialized economies, and experiencing
tremendous growth in domestic demand for energy resources. Particularly in Indonesia,
LNG exports to Japan have fallen from nearly half of Japan’s imports in 1995 to less than
ten percent in 2015. Indonesia’s global LNG exports have also fallen a third from 2005 to
2015. Indonesia is unique among LNG suppliers in that while it is still expanding
capacity, increasingly sales of LNG are taking place domestically from island to island,
within the archipelago, which is constraining its LNG export volume in the international
market (Hertzmark 2016, 1). Malaysia, however, has remained as a significant supplier of
LNG, providing nearly a fifth of Japan’s LNG in 2015 – second only to Australia.
Malaysia’s production of LNG has continued to increase over the last two decades,
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retaining over a tenth of the global market, and it is still expanding its export capacity
with more export complexes currently under construction. Malaysia will remain an
essential supplier of LNG for the next decade, but Indonesia and Brunei have dropped
from this position.
From the Persian Gulf, Qatar has emerged as an essential supplier, providing
Japan with 15.6 percent of its LNG in 2015, and eagerly seeking to strengthen the
relationship. Qatar controls nearly a third of the LNG global market, and has the third
largest proven natural gas reserves in the world. Iran is not a supplier of LNG, but its first
LNG export complex is under construction and scheduled to operate by 2019. This
presents enormous potential. Iran has the second largest proven natural gas reserves in the
world, surpassed only by Russia, but it has yet to partake in the LNG market. Because of
this, Iran is a ‘potential essential supplier’ because of its imminent potential as a supplier,
and not because of its current output. U.S.-led sanctions put this potential in question. For
different reasons, another potential essential supplier is Turkmenistan. It has larger
proven natural gas reserves than Saudi Arabia, yet landlocked and underdeveloped,
exporting its product via LNG tanker rather than pipeline is challenging, though not
impossible. Saudi Arabia is also a potential essential supplier for unique reasons. The
dominant global crude oil supplier, Saudi Arabia has proven natural gas reserves that
surpass those of the U.S., and associated natural gas attained during crude extraction is
used almost exclusively for domestic consumption. Yet, Saudi Arabia does not actively
take part in the export of natural gas, either by pipeline or LNG tankers (it does not have
any LNG export complexes). Nonetheless, if Saudi Arabia were to open up to this
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market, it could provide essential LNG to Japan, given the quantities of proven reserves it
has.
UAE has a unique position as a global LNG supplier, albeit a minor one, yet as a
major consumer of natural gas, it is simultaneously an importer of pipeline natural gas
(exclusively from Qatar) (World Energy Council 2017). Its LNG exports, specifically
from Abu Dhabi, are almost exclusively to Japan, but are underdeveloped and can
potentially be ramped up. UAE was the first Persian Gulf state to export LNG, when its
first export facility (with Mitsui holding the largest ownership stake among foreign
investors) was completed in 1977 (IGU 2017, 65). UAE is thus an essential supplier with
deep ties and the foundation for a long-term relationship with Japan.
Other LNG suppliers to Japan in Muslim Asia include Oman and Yemen, both
have fewer proven reserves and indicators show they have both passed their peak natural
gas moments. Oman supplies no more than three percent of Japan’s LNG imports, and
Yemen has never produced more than a fraction of a percent. Oman maintains high
domestic natural gas consumption, which prevents it from obtaining a larger presence on
the global market. It has already announced its intentions to withdraw from the LNG
market completely by 2025 (IGU 2017, 23). Yemen was a newcomer to the LNG export
market when its two export complexes were completed in 2009 and 2010, yet investors
declared force majeure and took them offline in 2015 on account of the civil war. Neither
can be considered an essential supplier or a potential essential supplier.
Crude Oil
Two essential suppliers of crude oil easy to identify are Saudi Arabia and UAE
(see Table 4.4). Together, these two account for nearly 60 percent of Japan’s crude
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imports in 2015. Globally, they account for 16.9 of production, but a significant
percentage higher in exports. They also have among the highest proven reserves and
reserve life remaining. While remaining essential suppliers, albeit at a lower threshold,
are Qatar and Kuwait, each of which has supplied Japan with nearly a tenth of its crude
imports for the last two decades. Their proven reserves are smaller, but both are
significant suppliers to Japan with decent reserve lives. Indonesia was once a major
supplier to Japan, but on account of increased domestic consumption as well as
dilapidation of the oil industry infrastructure, exports to Japan have fallen to insignificant
quantities.
Iran and Iraq are both potential essential suppliers. Each has proven oil reserves
that surpass 100 billion barrels, ranking them second and third, respectively, in all of
Eurasia, with extensive reserve life capacities, yet both have seen constrained production
on account of economic sanctions and lack of foreign investments. Japan has long taken
interest in strengthening ties with each of these countries and access to their energy
resources, but has been met with disappointment. Stability and order in Iraq will increase
the needed investments to develop its oil industry, especially for the risk-adverse. In Iran,
development of the oil industry is predicated on the possible expiration of U.S.-led
economic sanctions and adherence of all parties to the Iranian Nuclear Agreement, not to
mention the Saudi-Iranian geopolitical rivalry.
Within Muslim Asia, Kazakhstan is also a significant supplier of crude oil
creating great interest among major consumers. Kazakhstan has substantial crude oil
reserves which surpass Qatar, but as with coal, the constraints of transporting the product
from a landlocked state to an island-nation are immense, and for now preclude it from
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becoming an essential supplier. The solution may be oil swaps, most likely with Iran
serving at the intermediary.
It is important here to note a typology of Japan’s current essential suppliers and
potential essential suppliers for the future, because energy security is a significant factor
in Japan’s strategy in Asia. Considering the themes of the next four chapters, a country’s
status as an essential supplier or potential essential supplier of energy resources, namely
crude oil, LNG, and coal, will affect the other factors in relations with Japan. Table 4.5
shows the essential suppliers and potential essential suppliers of energy resource
identified in this section.
Conclusion: Where is Islam?
This balance of being a key ally in American eyes, yet distant from the U.S. in Muslim
eyes had worked for Japan since the 1973 oil shock, but Japan was challenged once again
in 2011. The 11 March 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami happened during the Arab
Spring and ongoing sanctioning of Iran. The triple disasters and subsequent aversion to
nuclear power in Japan necessitated more fossil fuel imports – much of it from the
Middle East. The concurrent Arab Spring raised prices on oil, and due to the Japan
Customs Clearing pricing structure, LNG as well.6 The ongoing sanctioning of Iran due
to its nuclear crisis reflected a degree of irony, given Japan’s experience at Fukushima,
but also limited the supply of crude oil to Japan, and thus, increased the price as well.

Labeled the ‘Asian premium,’ the LNG pricing index used in Asia is usually linked to the Japanese
Customs Clearing (JCC) (often derided as the ‘Japanese Crude Cocktail’) price for crude oil (Jensen 2004,
26), which directly pegs the price of LNG to the market price of oil (Koyama 2013, 284: Weems and
Howell 2014, 4). This became acutely evident to the Japanese when the Arab Spring drove up prices of
both oil and LNG on the JCC pricing index, but market-based LNG prices on the Henry Hub index, used in
North America, were relatively low at the time (Koyama 2013, 284).
6
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Also, simultaneously occurring was the planned American withdrawal from Iraq to be
completed by the end of that year. It put into question American commitment to the
region and to the Carter Doctrine. The events of 2011 forced Japan to take an even
greater interest in the Middle East so that it could refine its strategy to retain stability of
energy supplies from the region.
Stability of supply is paramount for Japan, but remains challenging to assure.
Japan attempts to remain unbiased in regional geopolitical contestations, but finds itself
wrapped up in these contestations nonetheless. In one example, in 2016 Idemitsu was set
to merge with a competitor, Showa Shell Sekiyu, yet the merger was fraught with an
unexpected geopolitical challenge in the Muslim world: Idemitsu was a key importer
from Iran, and Showa Shell was partially owned by Saudi Aramco. In 2017, several Gulf
states, led by Saudi Arabia, severed diplomatic relations with Qatar out of concern it was
supporting terrorist groups. With Qatar as a key supplier of LNG for Japan, it was a
contestation between essential crude oil suppliers versus the key LNG supplier. Any
indication of taking sides would sacrifice the supply of either crude oil or LNG to Japan.
Japan’s Saudi crude imports are much more significant in quantity and value than its
Qatari LNG imports, but no more crucial. Less crude supply drives up costs for factories
and drivers most: less LNG supply could cause blackouts (Fickling 2017). In both these
recent cases, religion was at the core of the conflict, and Tokyo was compelled to take
interest.
Access to energy has dominated Japanese thinking in foreign policy, as it
undergirds the existence of the state. Access to energy has also drawn Japan to relations
with Islam, because it draws Japan into transactions with Muslim peoples. Some may
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claim there is no ‘Islam,’ and there is no securitization of Islam in the straightforwardness
of energy business transactions, but this claim is greatly erroneous. Japanese businesses
are notorious for their cautiousness in FDI projects. At any given time and place, in the
mind of energy geo-strategists, projects and potential projects oscillate from ‘easy oil’ to
‘tough oil’ to ‘risky oil.’ These terms are specific to the oil industry, but are just as
applicable to other energy resources, like natural gas, coal, and uranium. Tough oil is
‘tough’ due to geology and technology. The questions asked are, “Is it hard to reach?”
and “If so, how much does that increase production costs?” Risky oil is political. Easy oil
can turn risky on a whim due to political developments. Investors want to avoid these
locations as much as possible, but at times when demand is high, they have to venture
into risky oil. Japanese businesses value long-term relationships, and have an inclination
to negotiate for these when a strong rapport has been developed with a supplier. For
cautious investors, it is a confidence-building measure.
In the postwar era, the biggest disruptions to the supply of energy to Japan have
been on account of conflicts within Islam. To argue Islam is not present in business
negotiations, or it is not securitized by the Japanese is to ignore the events of the near
past. The 1973 oil shock was not just ethnic-Arabs reacting to Jews in Palestine; lest it is
forgotten that it was Iran, a non-Arab state, that enthusiastically widened the embargos
and cut-backs. The Islamic Revolution in Iran interfered with Japanese investment and
access to energy. This, too, was religious, and for better or worse, taught the Japanese
more about Islam than they had ever known. The subsequent Iran-Iraq War continued to
interfere with supply and investment; it, too, was predicated on the Sunni-Shi’ite split in
Islam and the effects it had on the apparatus of the state. Whether Japanese energy geo-
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strategists consider Iranian oil risky, or Qatari LNG easy, or Kazakhstani coal tough is
wrapped up in securitizing threats to their energy supply from Islam based on the
historical record.
The source must be secured, yet that says little about the transportation route.
Roundtrip voyages for fuel tankers from the Persian Gulf to holding facilities in Tokyo
Bay take 45 days (Sudō 2014, 32). These tankers follow a long maritime highway
tantamount to an umbilical cord for Japan; disruption on this highway cuts Japan off from
its fundamental security. There is much to be secured, and building long-term
relationships with suppliers, where both parties gain a sense of satisfaction from the
positive-sum transactions, is a key strategy in ensuring both sides react similarly to
disruptions in this linkage. In this sense, Japan is obliged to coexist with Islam, for its
own existence.
Toward a Post-Oil Era
There is much talk of moving beyond the age of fossil fuels both among consumers and
suppliers, and indeed, technological advances in alternative energy sources are curtailing
fossil fuel consumption in many parts of the world. Unlike the U.S., where many are
motivated to curb fossil fuel dependency from the Persian Gulf because of how the
petrodollars may be used against American interests (“buying oil from people who hate
us”), Japan is more concerned with (re)attaining some practical amount of energy selfsufficiency. Japan is among the consumers who are pressing forward with technological
advances to curtail fossil fuel consumption. The Fukushima incident and subsequent
aversion to nuclear energy in Japan set back the initiatives to curtail fossil fuel
consumption, but it has also spurred interest in renewable, domestic sources of energy. In
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2012, Japan introduced feed-in tariffs (FITs) on account of the efforts by Prime Minister
Kan Naoto who pushed the legislation through the Diet, and Softbank CEO Son
Masayoshi who began investing in a solar power network (DeWit 2014, 127). By 2013,
Japan’s FITs were the highest in the world, yet the overall price of solar power continued
to decline (DeWit 2014, 127). Solar panels, once a rare sight prior to Fukushima, are now
seen throughout the countryside in Japan.
Nonetheless, this solar revolution in Japan has done little to bring down fossil fuel
dependency, let alone to fill the gap left by dozens of decommissioned nuclear power
plants. Since the arrival of Americans in 1853, Japan has had an acute sense of inferiority
in the international system, and this is not by any means a societal inferiority, but purely
one of resources. This deep dependency on certain Muslim Asian states for its energy
resources, however, will not last long into the future. Indonesia has already passed its
peak oil moment, and its coal supplies are not extensive. Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan,
UAE, and Brunei are all planning for post-oil economies. In the short- and medium-term,
retaining supplies of fossil fuels is essential for Japan, but for the long-term, a
relationship with these nations that is based on the fossil fuel trade will dissipate. If
anything, supposing the age of fossil fuels continues through the twenty-first century and
technological advances continue to make unconventional resources less unconventional,
Japan might eventually come across that domestic reserve they were hoping for in the
1920s.
With an extensive exclusive economic zone around the archipelago, Japan is
already known to have some of the most extensive deposits of methane hydrates in the
world. Known as “burning water” (Sawabe 2017, 218), methane hydrates are crystals of
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methane in ice strewn across the ocean floor at the edge of continental shelfs in large
quantities (Braun and Glidden 2014, 90). While currently not marketable, Japanese
engineers are at the forefront of pursuing techniques to make them a viable source of
natural gas (Montgomery 2010, 91). Moreover, there is a rush to capture this potential
source of energy, because as ocean temperatures rise, methane hydrates are naturally
released, and thus, lost as a potential resource (Montgomery 2010, 91). In his message to
the public on Marine Day (a national holiday), Abe made specific mention of the
potential from methane hydrates:
The plentiful resources provided by [Japan’s] vast seas hold great potential. In
recent years, there have been mounting expectations towards the development of
ocean energy and mineral resources in the waters of Japan that will lead to the
creation of new marine industries, including development efforts towards the
commercialization of methane hydrates (2017c).
It might not solve the fossil fuel emissions concerns, but it would relieve Japan from its
dependency on energy imports, fill the gap left by decommissioned nuclear energy, buy
time to accelerate technologies in renewables, stabilize trade imbalances with energy
resource supplier states, and have a profound impact on the long-held resource inferiority
deeply embedded since 1853.
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Table 4.1: Japan’s Coal Suppliers, 1995 – 2015
(in million tonnes)
1995
2000
2005
2010
127.1
150.8
180.8
184.6
1 Australia
Australia
Australia
Australia
65.3 (51.4%)
90.2 (59.8%)
103.7 (57.4%) 117.5 (63.7%)
2 Canada
China
Indonesia
Indonesia
18.2 (14.3%)
19.3 (12.8%)
29.4 (16.3%)
33.8 (18.3%)
3 U.S.A.
Indonesia
China
Russia
10.8 (8.5%)
14.6 (9.7%)
24.0 (13.3%)
10.7 (5.8%)
4 China
Canada
Russia
Canada
10.1 (7.9%)
13.6 (9.0%)
10.7 (5.9%)
10.5 (5.7%)
5 Indonesia
Russia
Canada
China
9.5 (7.5%)
5.4 (3.6%)
7.4 (4.1%)
6.3 (3.4%)
6 South Africa
U.S.A.
Vietnam
U.S.A.
5.7 (4.5%)
3.7 (2.4%)
2.4 (1.3%)
3.1 (1.7%)
7 Russia
South Africa
U.S.A.
Vietnam
5.0 (4.0%)
1.6 (1.0%)
2.1 (1.2%)
1.7 (0.9%)
8 other
other
other
other
2.5 (1.9%)
2.4 (1.6%)
1.2 (0.7%)
1.0 (0.5%)
Sources: Adapted using data from RIST (2004) and JOGMEC (2016).
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2015
190.6
Australia
124.0 (65.0%)
Indonesia
32.6 (17.1%)
Russia
16.8 (8.8%)
Canada
8.2 (4.3%)
U.S.A.
5.9 (3.1%)
China
1.6 (0.8%)
Vietnam
0.5 (0.2%)
other
1.0 (0.5%)

Table 4.2: Initial LNG Export Capability
(year)
1 U.S.A. (Alaska)
1969
2 Libya
1970
3 Brunei*
1973
4 UAE*
1977
5 Algeria
1978
6 Indonesia
1983
7 Malaysia*
1983
8 Australia*
1989
9 Qatar*
1997
10 Trinidad
1999
11 Nigeria
2000
12 Oman*
2000
13 Egypt
2005
14 Eq. Guinea*
2007
15 Norway
2008
16 Russia (Sakhalin)*
2009
17 Yemen
2009
18 Peru*
2010
19 Algeria
2013
20 Angola
2014
21 PNG*
2014
22 Cameroon
2017
* Included Japanese corporate owners.
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Table 4.3: Japan’s LNG Suppliers, 1995 – 2015
(in billions of yen)
1995
2000
2005
2010
¥753
¥1,498
¥2,166
¥3,549
1 Indonesia
Indonesia
Indonesia
Malaysia
¥312 (41.4%) ¥541 (36.1%) ¥604 (27.9%) ¥781 (22.0%)
2 Malaysia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Australia
¥144 (19.1%) ¥290 (19.4%) ¥456 (21.1%) ¥705 (19.9%)
3 Australia
Australia
Australia
Indonesia
¥121 (16.1%) ¥192 (12.8%) ¥357 (16.5%) ¥574 (16.2%)
4 Brunei
Qatar
Qatar
Qatar
¥93 (12.3%)
¥166 (11.1%) ¥240 (11.1%) ¥436 (12.3%)
5 UAE
Brunei
Brunei
Brunei
¥62 (8.3%)
¥147 (9.8%)
¥204 (9.4%)
¥338 (9.5%)
6 U.S.A.
UAE
UAE
UAE
¥21 (2.8%)
¥127 (8.5%)
¥185 (8.5%)
¥272 (7.6%)
7
U.S.A.
Oman
Russia
¥32 (2.1%)
¥57 (2.7%)
¥239 (6.7%)
8
Oman
U.S.A.
Oman
¥4 (0.2%)
¥43 (2.0%)
¥86 (2.4%)
9
Egypt
Egypt
¥10 (0.4%)
¥33 (0.9%)
10
Trinidad
U.S.A.
¥7 (0.3%)
¥31 (0.9%)
Source: Japan Customs (2017).
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2015
¥4,545
Australia
¥1,047 (23.0%)

Malaysia
¥840 (18.5%)
Qatar
¥711 (15.6%)
Russia
¥378 (8.3%)
Indonesia
¥374 (8.2%)
UAE
¥294 (6.5%)
Brunei
¥238 (5.2%)
PNG
¥220 (4.8%)
Nigeria
¥204 (4.5%)
Oman
¥122 (2.7%)

Table 4.4: Japan’s Crude Oil Suppliers, 1995 – 2015
(in billions of yen)
1995
2000
2005
2010
¥2,902
¥4,931
¥9,989
¥9,756
UAE
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
1 UAE
¥791 (27.2%) ¥1,275 (25.8%) ¥3,067 (30.7%) ¥3,035 (31.1%)
UAE
UAE
2 Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia
¥669 (23.1%) ¥1,253 (25.4%) ¥2,554 (25.6%) ¥2,045 (21.0%)
Iran
Qatar
3 Iran
Iran
¥251 (8.6%)
¥555 (11.3%) ¥1,224 (12.2%) ¥1,119 (11.5%)
4 Indonesia
Qatar
Qatar
Iran
¥235 (8.1%)
¥474 (9.6%)
¥948 (9.5%)
¥949 (9.7%)
5 Qatar
Kuwait
Kuwait
Russia
¥185 (6.4%)
¥411 (8.3%)
¥695 (7.0%)
¥698 (7.2%)
6 Oman
Indonesia
Indonesia
Kuwait
¥177 (6.1%)
¥247 (5.0%)
¥295 (3.0%)
¥668 (6.9%)
7 Kuwait
Oman
Sudan
Iraq
¥165 (5.7%)
¥210 (4.3%)
¥279 (2.8%)
¥303 (3.1%)
8 China
China
Oman
Oman
¥146 (5.0%)
¥111 (2.3%)
¥256 (2.6%)
¥265 (2.7%)
9 Malaysia
Australia
Australia
Indonesia
¥65 (2.2%)
¥79 (1.6%)
¥103 (1.0%)
¥234 (2.4%)
10 Vietnam
Iraq
Nigeria
Sudan
¥58 (2.0%)
¥76 (1.5%)
¥85 (0.9%)
¥120 (1.2%)
Source: Japan Customs (2017).

149

2015
¥7,368
Saudi Arabia
¥2,489 (33.8%)
UAE
¥1,917 (26.0%)

Russia
¥639 (8.7%)
Qatar
¥596 (8.1%)
Kuwait
¥534 (7.2%)
Iran
¥340 (4.6%)
Indonesia
¥168 (2.3%)
Mexico
¥111 (1.5%)
Iraq
¥102 (1.4%)
Vietnam
¥62 (0.8%)

Indonesia
Malaysia
Kazakhstan
Turkmenistan
Iran
Iraq
Kuwait
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
UAE

Table 4.5: Supplier Relationship with Japan
Coal
LNG
Crude Oil
Current Potential
Current
Potential
Current
Potential
Essential Essential Essential Essential Essential Essential
Supplier Supplier Supplier Supplier Supplier
Supplier
Southeast Asia
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
Post-Soviet Asia
N
Y
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
Y
N
N
Middle East
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
N
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CHAPTER V
ACCESS TO MARKETS
In the 2015 work The Risk Pivot, Jones and Steven divide the world into three groups
based on access to energy. The first group is about 1.3 billion people in rural Africa and
rural Asia. This group is unlikely to see much change in their impoverished lifestyles in
the twenty-first century. On the other end, another 1.3 billion live in Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. These would be the “core,”
as defined by Immanuel Wallerstein in The Modern World System (1974): the developed
world. Surplus income exists for sizable middle classes, as does easy and affordable
access to energy, food, potable water, healthcare, education, and technology. This group
is mostly in North America, Western Europe, and East Asia, including Japan. The group
that lies in between is roughly five billion people. “They live in the rapidly growing cities
of the world’s poor and middle-income countries” (Jones and Steven 2015, 58). They are
urbanizing, communicating, and have high expectations for changes. The mass
consumption that comes with a developed country lifestyle is seemingly within their
grasp. Moreover, many of these same countries are amid a population explosion.
This group is what will define the twenty-first century. It includes mass
populations in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and China, but importantly, it
includes populations throughout Muslim Asia. The average age in majority Muslim
countries in Asia is 25 years, while it is 30 in Asia’s other countries (Simpfendorfer 2014,
52-53). Young and urban populations informed through the propagation of smartphones
are growing throughout these regions. Simpfendorfer points out that “over half of
Malaysia’s population has a Facebook account, as do one-third of Indonesians and one-
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fifth of Saudi Arabians,” and it is certainly more by now (2014: 71). While many of these
states are experiencing rapid economic development, shifting into the category of ‘newly
industrializing economy’ (NIE), one of the biggest challenges for these states is meetings
the needs of these citizens.
For Japan, there is tremendous potential to actively engage with these markets in
Muslim Asia. In a 2015 survey of Japanese investors in Indonesia, the overwhelming
reason they chose to locate their operation in Indonesia was the future growth potential of
the local market (83.4 percent response) (Ma 2016, 2). What Japan lacks in energy
resources, it must make up elsewhere, and historically this has been its human resources,
first, then its technology. This has garnered Japan a reputation for quality hightechnology throughout much of the world, but it increasingly faces intense competition
notably from American, Chinese, and South Korean companies. With low domestic
economic growth, low interest rates, and population decline, Japanese firms must look for
growth opportunities overseas. Simpfendorfer estimates consumer spending in Muslim
Asia to be around $2.5 trillion in 2013, and growing (2014: 71). These markets in Muslim
Asia are crucial for Japan to retain not just its economic positioning in the world, but also
the inflow of capital needed to sustain the purchase of energy resources imports and
retain the state and society’s ontological security. “It is natural for Japan…to leave no
stone unturned in its quest to win orders for infrastructure projects in the Middle East.
However, doing so will require an accurate grasp of the needs of the region” (Yamauchi
2010).
This chapter proceeds with a background view of Japan’s export relations with
Muslim Asia which frames the fluidity of market-access strategy as it relates to temporal
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factors both domestic and international. This understanding of Japan’s strategy to access
markets in Muslim Asia is to be considered in tandem with its strategy for access to
energy, from the previous chapter. The chapter continues by introducing the Flying Geese
Theory, which helps unpack Tokyo’s conceptualization and strategy for access to markets
in Muslim Asia. It then examines several key industries for FDI and export which reveal
the current outcomes of Tokyo’s access to markets strategy. The chapter concludes by
discerning how and where Islam is considered, and securitized, from the evidence of the
reviewed cases.
Background
After Japan abruptly withdrew from the Namban Trade and the closed-country policy
(Sakoku) started in 1635, Japanese products still made their way to Muslim Asia, but
were limited to shipment on Dutch or Chinese ships out of Nagasaki. The Dutch ships,
specifically, would inevitably leave Nagasaki and stop at Batavia in the Dutch East
Indies, populated with Muslim consumers of the Japanese products, and products would
occasionally make their way to the Indian subcontinent and Arabian ports. During the
Sakoku period, direct economic relations were deliberately constrained by the Tokugawa
shogunate, but it is incorrect to believe Japan was not engaged in trade in Asia, and with
Muslims during the Sakoku period; Japan took advantage of the transition from Ming to
Qing dynasties in the mid- to late seventeenth century which temporarily placed China’s
export industries in distress, and ramped up much market share for ceramics – becoming
a significant exporter to the Persian Gulf region via third-party ships (Frank 1998, 105).
South Asia was also a destination for Japanese exports. Ruled by the Mughal Empire, the
Mughals opened the subcontinent up to existing maritime trade linkages among Arabs
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and Persians. Frank notes that “the vast bulk of this trade was in Muslim Indian hands
and on Indian-built shipping, although some was also in Arab and Southeast Asian – also
Muslim – hands” (1998: 88). Bengal was the most productive region within the Mughal
Empire, with cotton and silk exports making their way into Japan via southeast Asia,
despite the Sakoku policy.
The 1868 Meiji Restoration and rapid modernization of Japan in the late
nineteenth century opened it up to export destinations, but by then Muslim Asia was
largely restricted by colonialism. In fact, throughout Japan’s Meiji Period (1868-1912),
nearly all Muslim Asia was a colony of some empire to the west, namely wide swaths of
Central Asia and the Caucasus controlled by the Russians, Arabia and the Levant
controlled by the Ottomans, Indonesia controlled by the Dutch, and South Asia as well as
all other regions by the British to some degree. Markets were not open, and therefore
were of little interest for the Japanese. Nonetheless, some small-scale investment projects
took place first in China, then Japanese also began investing in rubber plantations in the
Dutch East Indies and British Malaya soon thereafter.
Cotton textiles were a key export industry for Meiji Japan; while the abundance of
raw cotton that came from South Asia was monopolized by the cotton manufacturers in
the UK, Japan imported its raw cotton mainly from the U.S. By 1900, the British opened
up the exports of raw cotton from the Raj to Japan, and the subcontinent soon became
Japan’s main supplier. By the 1930s, Japan became the largest cotton textile exporter in
the world (Conlon 2010). Osaka was called ‘the Manchester of Asia,’ with dozens of
mills throughout the city. Prior to the age of petroleum transforming Japan’s economic
relations with the Middle East, Japan was actually a net exporter to the Middle East rather
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than importer; cotton textile manufacturers were among the first in Japan seeking markets
in the Middle East after the fall of the Ottoman Empire (Enayat 1994, 101). After cotton
textiles, small quantities of Japanese goods such as porcelains, lacquer ware, and silk also
made their way into Middle Eastern markets in the 1920s. Since Japan was importing
hardly anything from the region, it benefitted from a large trade surplus which was used
to attain raw materials elsewhere, including South and Southeast Asia.
A highly competitive market in the Middle East during the 1920s was processed
cotton imports, dominated by Russian, British, and Indian cotton. In 1931, Japan
abandoned the gold standard, and throughout the 1930s was able to obtain a respectable
market share by undercutting other suppliers’ prices with a depreciated yen (Enayat 1994,
108). By 1933, Japan was the second-greatest exporter of merchandise to Persia after the
Soviet Union (Enayat 1994, 108). Japan’s cotton exports to Iran remained vibrant
throughout the decade, supplying nearly three-quarters of all cotton imports until 1941
when Anglo-Soviet forces invaded Iran and ordered it to cut relations with Japan (Enayat
1994, 110).
At the outbreak of World War II, the cotton textile industry came to a halt. Japan
was cut-off from South Asia and the Middle East altogether. Direct relations with South
Asian states were not established until 1952, after India and Pakistan gained
independence from the British Raj, and Japan’s sovereignty was restored. In the 1950s,
once again, it was cotton that served as Japan’s key export commodity, although Japan’s
raw cotton imports increasingly came from the U.S., which had provided special loans to
Japan for raw cotton. By the 1960s, iron replaced the prewar reimport model with South
Asia, as Japan imported Indian iron ore, and exported metal machinery to India made
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from the iron ore. While the Middle East remained a minor export destination globally,
quantities of exports to the region increased steadily until the 1970s (Enayat 1994, 119).
By then, petrodollars where creating a market for Japanese exports, but were
overshadowed by Japan’s growing thirst for crude oil.
Postwar, there was a distinct hesitancy in how Southeast Asian Muslims reacted
to reestablishing economic relations with Japan, versus Muslims in the Middle East and
South Asia. In South Asia and the Middle East, Japan had no legacy of imperialism or
aggression, and its rapid development – both prior to the war, and again, after – were
seen as admirable. Postwar, Muslim populations in Southeast Asia had reason to be
suspicious of Japan’s intentions. Initial Japanese FDI projects in the 1950s included
minor projects to develop copper mines in Malaya and the Philippines, but these were
small-scale enterprises (Mason 1999, 30). The Japanese were able to gradually build trust
in Southeast Asia through war reparations agreements, but these came with the deliberate
intention to gain access to the markets.1
By the late 1960s Japan was becoming a major foreign direct investor, and
Muslim Southeast Asia would become a key export market and FDI destination for
Japanese companies, particularly Japan’s textile manufacturers who began moving
operations outside of Japan to Southeast Asia where labor was cheaper and abundant, but
not without tension. In January 1974, a student-led anti-Japanese demonstration took
place in Jakarta to coincide with the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei,
resulting in the deaths of 11 people, and the looting of (among other establishments) a

1

Discussed further in the following chapter.
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Toyota dealership. Known as the Malari Incident, undoubtedly what sparked the
demonstrations was what protesters call “economic invasion” by Japanese firms, but
reflections on the incident show the crux of the grievances was more broad and complex
(Ogawa 2016, 183). For one reason, establishments owned by Chinese Indonesians were
targeted in the looting. Demonstrators mentioned corruption in Suharto’s government,
price increases, and a wealth gap between overseas Chinese and native Indonesians
among their grievances, which had little to do with Japan. Moreover, it is suspected that
Suharto’s government was tacitly supporting the demonstrations, as there were concerns
also among political elites regarding Japanese business approaches in Indonesia (Ogawa
2016, 185).
For the long-term, the Malari Incident did not slow down Japan’s exports and FDI
in Southeast Asia, but it did point out the need for better consideration of local
conditions, and while not directly related, also led to a more public sense of atonement
for the wartime occupation which mobilized the development assistance strategies
(Hoshiro 2007).2 On his flight back home, Tanaka remarked that “economic bias has
caused Japanese in Indonesia to lack understanding of the local culture, and thus, we
invited this criticism of Japan” (Ogawa 2016, 187). The Malari Incident was a pivotal
moment for Japanese to reevaluate how they operated in overseas environments.
After the postwar occupation, the Japanese government controlled outflows of
FDI so that exports of ‘made-in-Japan’ manufactured goods could most easily find
markets, and so that FDI would facilitate for the imports of essential energy resources

2

Discussed further in the following chapter.
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(Mason 1999, 29). The expansion of Japan’s FDI projects in the late 1960s coincided
with Mao’s rule in China and Kim Il Sung’s rule in North Korea. Meanwhile, South
Korea did not allow Japanese FDI until after formal diplomatic relations were established
in 1965. Thus, three of Japan’s nearest neighbors had blocked their entire markets from
the inflow of Japanese FDI. Obstruction of these nearby markets forced Japan to look
elsewhere for FDI destinations in Asia, and build ties with several countries in Muslim
Asia. In 1969 the government revised its stance on constraining FDI, and in contrast,
sought to deliberately liberalize FDI outflows (Mason 1999, 31). The Four Asian Tigers
stood out as springboards to destinations in Asia farther afield. These are where Japanese
firms experimented with FDI projects, learned, and moved on as these small states
industrialized. Throughout the 1970s, Japanese textile manufacturers, electronics
manufacturers, and automobile firms moved operations into Asia in increasing numbers
(Mason 1999, 31).
The biggest surge of FDI into Muslim Asia happened in the 1990s, as the Four
Asian Tigers had industrialized and attained developed-state attributes. Destinations for
FDI broadened, yet Muslim Southeast Asia remained a favorite due to resource
abundance, plentiful, cheap labor, proximity to Japan, and a favorable political and social
environment (Enayat 1994, 143). The timing coincided, however, with the immediate
post-bubble economic downturn, and overall Japanese corporations were investing less
overseas while the breadth of destinations widened. FDI in developed countries tended to
decrease in aggregate numbers since the late 1980s while FDI into developing countries
tended to increase during the same period of time (Lakhera 2008, 35). Much of this was
due to the fall of the yen relative to the U.S. dollar, as most FDI in the developed
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countries was in the U.S., but simultaneously the fall of the Soviet Union opened the
Central Asian republics, which had been sealed off from Japan as an export market for
over a century, to FDI as well.
Flying Geese Theory
To reveal Tokyo’s strategy with Islam and Muslim Asia, and how it navigated
securitization of these while solidifying and broadening its access to economic markets,
Flying Geese Theory (FGT) stands out as both a relevant and suitable theoretical
framework. It is relevant because the theorist who developed it was Japanese and had
Japan’s political-economic relations in mind. It is suitable because the content of the
theory may be erroneous and worthy of criticism, but it appears to be emulated in the
Arc, and in subsequent language used by Japanese political elites on economic relations
in Muslim Asia. It provides a window into Japanese identity, role, and normative purpose
in Asia.
FGT is an economic development theory proposed by economist Akamatsu
Kaname in the 1930s who observed how Japan had stood out among Asian states in terms
of industrialization. Japan was the first Asian state to export manufactured goods, and the
first to import machinery and raw materials. This particularity was a source of pride in
Japan, and its academic world as well. As seen in Figure 5.1, the first dimension to FGT
is the transitional progression of Japan’s economy from an agrarian, to textile
manufacturing, to machinery-based, as firms increasingly collect profits and find means
to relocate manufacturing to cheaper labor while retaining sections such as research and
development (R&D) at home that push to develop more advanced, less replicable
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products (Sun 2017, 26). The process is then repeated in a new, more advanced sector of
the economy.
The second dimension is the relationship with other Asian economies, which is
not vertical, such as the suzerain and the colony, and is not horizontal, as in trade among
European states. Rather, as seen in Figure 5.2, the lower-stage sector base would be
‘passed on,’ or relocated to the next country, and as this state industrializes, it moves on
once again to another country, and thus all states in a region would progress together in
the V-form like flying geese. As explained by Lakhera:
Following shortly after the Japanese economy’s decade of rapid economic
development during the 1970s and 1980s, the Asian economies…have emerged
from the pack of developing countries to what one may call the ‘miracle’ of
economic growth. The Japanese MNEs, in particular, implemented the transfer of
their technologies to the host countries through FDI. This generated an FDI-led
sequential process of economic development also referred to as ‘staged
development’ or ‘tandem growth’ paradigm and so forth. Greatly facilitated by
Japanese FDI, changes in the industrial restructuring and trade flows, has enabled
the countries of this region to move upward on the ladder of industrialization
while maintaining international division of labor (2008: xiii – xiv).
There is some evidence to support FGT: “an analysis of 148 countries shows that as GDP
rises, manufacturers within each country predictably move toward making ever more
complicated products” (Sun 2017, 26). Encarnation agrees, but also notes the side effect
of post-development domestically in Japan:
By weaving…FDI, trade, and technology flows into cross-border networks,
Japanese multinationals have fundamentally reorganized production across Asia.
Thus, they have been linked both to the “hollowing out” back home of the
Japanese economy, and to the “economic miracle” visible in those Asian
economies hosting Japanese FDI (1999: 3).
The theory was largely forgotten during World War II when Japan was
constructing vertical, suzerain-style relationships in colonies and not the FGT model, but
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just as Japan has reindustrialized and surpassed the development achieved prior to the
war, FGT was revived in academic circles in Japan in the 1960s. Raymond Vernon
introduced it to the Anglophone world in 1966 when he developed a comparable theory,
the Product Life-Cycle Theory. FGT received recognition once again in 1985 when
economist and politician Ōkita Saburō argued that the second stage of the theory was
actively taking place in Asia, with the rise of the Four Asian Tiger economies. By this
point, Japan had high-technological electronics and automobiles. The Four Asian Tigers
were transitioning from textiles to machinery, and were just making inroads into
electronics. Indeed, by the 1990s the pattern of development in Asia could be said to have
followed along Akamatsu’s FGT, as Lakhera describes, “Japan is seen as the first-tier
industrial power, with the NIEs as the second tier and the ASEAN countries of Thailand,
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Philippines as the third tier” (2008: 47).
FGT has undoubtedly received criticisms. As presented by Akamatsu, it has little
to offer in terms of why technology transfer is assumed to occur, or how so. It does not
account for the fact Japan allowed (and continues to allow) substantially little FDI in its
own economy, especially in comparison to subsequent developing states in the model. It
also quickly loses its luster when contemporary conditions do not suit the theory, such as
during World War II or the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Nevertheless, an argument can be
made that the theory has played out beyond what Akamatsu initially modeled. Japan
passed through the stages, followed next by the Four Asian Tigers, then the Tiger Cub
economies in Southeast Asia which are still in the catch-up period, and China, although
the sheer size of China’s economy makes it more challenging to fit into the model
(Lakhera 2008, xiii). Beyond these are the ‘Latecomers’ and ‘Latest Comers’ in South
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Asia (minus Afghanistan) as well as Central Asia – still dependent on raw materials as
the key industries, although like China, the sheer size of India’s economy makes it more
challenging to classify. The terms used here, Four Asian Tigers, Tiger Cubs, Latecomers,
and Latest Comers are not from Akamatsu, but rather more recent terms to categorize
countries as they progress through the model. Akamatsu did account for a period of
decline, which one could argue is the position of Japan now, where domestic
manufacturing declines, domestic market retracts, and imports decline as well.
Throughout the Edo Period and most of the Meiji Period up to the twentieth
century, Japan’s trade was exporting raw materials, namely copper, silver, coal, raw silk,
and tea, and importing manufactured goods, such as textiles, iron, and rails, and
increasingly machinery was also imported. Japan’s comparative advantage was natural
resource-intensive commodities and its disadvantage was capital-intensive
technologically advanced commodities. After the military victories in the First SinoJapanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, as well as vast population growth and
increases in living standards at the start of the twentieth century, strains on Japan’s
natural resources were already being felt and the government took a more active role in
transitioning the export industries. By 1930, the trade structure had flipped, with most
exports being manufactured goods such as cotton and silk textiles, processed sugar, wheat
flour and pottery, and most imports being natural resource commodities, such as raw
cotton, sugarcane, lumber, crude oil and coal. This is precisely when Akamatsu identified
Japan being in stage one of FGT model.
From this point, driven by military interests, Japan transitioned its economy once
again to the development of heavy machinery industries, but not for export.
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Inadvertently, this would transition Japan to the following stage in an incomplete and
unsustainable manner. Trade deteriorated, as did domestic supplies of natural resources,
which fed into the need to appropriate the natural resources in territories abroad. In the
immediate postwar era, the government attempted to utilize the technological know-how
attained from the heavy machinery industry during the war and shift it to a key export
industry. It was the textile industries which initially picked up with postwar exports,
mostly to destinations in Asia, but the transition to the next stage was already being
planned (Yamawaki 2007, 12). Despite the initial shortages in capital, exports of iron and
steel, shipbuilding, transportation machinery, and chemical fertilizers grew rapidly, fed
by the desire for such products in the U.S. and the outbreak of the Korean War. Japan’s
main export market shifted from Asia to the U.S. (Yamawaki 2007, 12). Increased
domestic affluence in the 1960s and 1970s created a demand for appliances and
electronics, and the industrial transition took place toward monochrome televisions,
washing machines, and refrigerators. The transition also illustrated a shift from cheap,
unskilled labor-intensive products to high-technological, capital-intensive products. The
fertilizer chemical industry also transitioned to a petro-chemical and fine chemical
industry. Meanwhile, increased affluence meant higher wages, which contracted the size
of the labor-intensive textile industries. These industries were being picked up by the
Four Asian Tigers. When product quality and international competitiveness improved,
Japanese industry transitioned once again to color televisions, air-conditioners, office
machines, instruments, and automobiles.
The experiences of development, resource endowments, social and cultural
makeup, as well as exogenous demand for exports vary for all states. For example, Japan
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could not have transitioned so quickly in the immediate postwar era from textiles to
machinery without the demand for such products by American civilian consumers and the
U.S. military in Korea, nor would Japan have been able to do so without the wartime
knowhow that was attained due to militarization. The Four Asian Tigers undoubtedly
learned from the Japanese experience, and indeed, South Korea and Taiwan deliberately
emulated the model in many respects, but time, natural and human resource endowments,
business culture, and international demand and competitiveness were all significant
variables in the successful development experience. The Four Asian Tigers did, however,
undoubtedly benefit from Japanese investment, as explained by the FGT (Lakhera 2008,
xiii).
Akamatsu’s theorizing has a tremendous impact on Japan’s thinking of Asia
today.3 Portions of the model were played out prophetically, which garnered recognition.
More importantly, however, it provides an academic justification for underlying
nationalistic tendencies in Japanese society, and supports a key hypothesis of this project,
that Japan’s self-perceived role in Asia is one of being on stage, and not among the
crowd. On the other hand, however, it relates Japan to Asia, as the ‘escort-runner’ Asō
Tarō analogized. FGT is dynamic in ways vertical or horizontal economic relations
cannot be, and therefore, allows for modeling, cooperating, and collective sense of
development. This can be seen as the basis of how Japan views economic relations with
Asia, and germane here, Muslim Asia.

It also raises the question of whether China’s current “win-win” development claims are modeled on or
echo Japan’s FGT.
3
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Overseas Markets for Key Industries
There is tremendous potential for Japanese exports into Muslim Asia, mostly as a result
of FDI, but some by direct exports as well. Malaysia and Indonesia both imported over
$11 billion in 2016, followed by UAE at nearly $8 billion, and Saudi Arabia at $5 billion
(see Tables 5.1 and 5.2). Globally, Japan’s biggest exports are automobiles (22 percent of
total), machinery (19.2 percent), electrical machinery (15.2 percent). In notable decline in
recent years is shipbuilding, which fell 42.4 percent from 2012 to 2016. This section
reviews Japan’s key export product groups to Muslim Asia in order to develop a typology
of product trends and export markets. Product groups examined include automobiles
(new and used), which remains the cornerstone of Japan’s export economy; consumer
electronics and shipbuilding, both of which have been very important to Japan’s export
economy; high-speed rail and nuclear energy technology, both of which are relatively
new export industries and ones with steep competition; and lastly, the broader services
sector which may be the trend in future years.
New Automobiles (and Automotive Parts)
Indonesia is the most vibrant automobile market in Muslim Asia. Not only does it
have the second largest number of sales of new vehicles in 2016 in Muslim Asia
surpassing 1 million vehicles, but sales in 2016 were over three times those in 2006 (see
Table 5.3). Moreover, the market share of just five Japanese brands comprises over 90
percent of all sales in Indonesia (Nikkei 2017). Called “the backyard of Japanese carmakers,” Japanese auto makers have deeply cornered a burgeoning market, with several
factories and distributors throughout the country. In Malaysia, which is the fifth-largest
market in Muslim Asia, Japanese brand vehicles have long dominated the market since
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the late 1960s, although through long-term government planning, technology transfer
allowed for the designing, engineering, and manufacturing of Proton and Perodua
automobiles in Malaysia. These two national auto brands control 48 percent of the market
share in Malaysia, but collectively Japanese brands occupy 42 percent of the market,
leaving very little room for other foreign brands (Tan 2017).
Japanese brands dominating market share is hardly the scenario in Muslim Asia’s
largest automobile market: Iran. Iran had a history of a vibrant auto manufacturing
industry prior to the Islamic Revolution, but it has been set back for two decades. By the
twenty-first century, it has revived, albeit, with inconsistent unit production growth on
account of U.S.-led economic sanctions (Financial Tribune 2016). Today, auto
production is the second-biggest sector in the economy after oil and gas production
(Financial Tribune 2016). In 2016, nearly a million and a half new automobiles were sold
in Iran, and most of these were produced domestically by Iran Khodro or SAIPA – two
state-owned auto manufactures that hold 90 percent of the market share (Financial
Tribune 2016: OICA 2018). Tehran aims to increase auto production to 3 million vehicles
by 2025, producing enough to supply a growing domestic demand as well as supply
growing demand in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan as well (Financial Tribune 2016).
To do this, joint ventures are necessary, and Iran Khodro, SAIPA, as well as
Iran’s smaller private auto manufacturers have worked together with Japanese auto
makers in the past. Bahman, for example, is a private auto maker that worked together
with Mazda as early as 1959, and tends to seek joint ventures specifically with Japanese
auto makers (Financial Tribune 2016). After the Iran Nuclear Accord was signed,
Japanese auto makers have been slow to reinvest in Iran, with European companies
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jumping to take up joint venture opportunities. “Japanese automakers seem to be slow in
responding, due partly to such factors as lingering uncertainty over domestic politics and
US financial sanctions still being in place” (Financial Tribune 2016). JETRO officials
note that Iran has the demographic makeup and bedrock know-how of the automobile
industry to serve as a regional springboard for Japanese auto models, much as Indonesia
does in Southeast Asia, yet it is losing out as time progresses (Financial Tribune 2016).
Among completed auto imports, Japanese brands made up less than a fifth of what arrives
in Iran.
Muslim Asia’s third largest market by new auto sales is Turkey, where in 2016
over a million units were sold (OICA 2018). The Marmara region in Turkey has emerged
as a significant auto manufacturing region, yet burgeoning domestic demand as well as
proximity to Europe has resulted in nearly three quarters of Turkey’s new automobile
sales being imported finished products in 2015, notably all Volkswagen units, and nearly
half of the Ford and Renault units (Bufton 2016). Japanese brands differ from this trend.
With such proximity to both a growing market in a newly industrialized economy, and
sustained demand in Europe, competition among auto manufacturers has been intense in
Turkey, resulting in Japanese brands holding a relatively modest, consistent portion of the
market share, yet a much higher proportion of domestically produced vehicles. In 1994,
Toyota was the first Asian auto manufacturer to open a plant in Turkey, and exports from
Turkey to neighboring regions started in 2002 (Roberts 2014). Collectively, Japanese
auto manufacturers occupy no more than a tenth of the market share in Turkey for 2013
(Tuzmen 2013). Toyota, in particular, has sought to strengthen its domestic
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manufacturing, which accounts for nearly a third of all automobiles produced in Turkey,
and is second only to the Turkish brand, TOFAŞ (Daily Sabah 2016).
Several other major automobile markets exist in Muslim Asia, but more
importantly, demand for automobiles is expanding. Saudi Arabia is the fourth largest
market in Muslim Asia in new car sales with 655,500 units sold in 2016 (down from
830,100 in 2015). When in October 2017 King Salman decreed women would be allowed
to drive, Toyota responded by tweeting an advertisement of a woman in an abaya smiling
just as she is entering the driver’s seat of a blue Toyota (Parasie and Stancati 2017).
Toyota and Nissan control nearly 40 percent of the market in Saudi Arabia, and have
much to gain with women now driving (Parasie and Stancati 2017).
Japanese automobile makers first gained a foothold in the Middle East market in
the late 1970s with the Toyota Land Cruiser, nicknamed “alam n japonais” (‘the
Japanese camel’). Particularly 1980s models were noted for their affordability and a
reliable engine in desert and off-road environments, Land Cruisers have been “integrated
into the cultural logic” and “attain an importance that goes beyond their daily work”
(Scholze 2010, 184). The market for Toyota Land Cruisers as well as the Hilux, another
Toyota truck, in the Middle East never received much global notoriety until 2014 when
media disseminated images of ISIS from Syria and Iraq. Conspicuous in these images
were the multitude of ever-present Toyota trucks being driven by ISIS members. “In
nearly every ISIS video, they show a fleet – a convey of Toyota vehicles” (Wallace
2015). The Toyota trucks, including the Land Cruiser and the Hilux, were so pervasive,
the U.S. asked the Toyota Corporation in 2015 to investigate. In fact, Toyota trucks have
been so common with extremist groups, they have been called “the vehicular equivalent
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of the AK-47” (Finlan 2015). From Japan, the head office of Toyota stated “[i]t is
impossible for any automaker to control indirect or illegal channels through which our
vehicles could be misappropriated, stolen or resold,” adding “Toyota has a strict policy to
not sell vehicles to potential purchasers who may use or modify them for paramilitary or
terrorist activities” (Greimel 2015). ISIS and other militants likely gain access to most of
their Toyota trucks smuggled by middlemen into the country, and paid for by
sympathizers (Engel 2015: Greimel 2015).
Used Automobiles (and Automotive Parts)
Fukuda and Asazuma (2011) build on a concept proposed by Togawa (1998)
whereby Japan’s auto manufacturing industry works as an “artery” while the used car
market is a “vein,” in which “each can never be thought of detached from the other”
(2011: 163). Alongside the ‘artery’ – the new Japanese brand automobiles sold
throughout Muslim Asia, there is also a ‘vein’ – a vibrant market for used Japanese brand
automobiles exported directly from Japan to Muslim Asian countries. Beyond
automobiles being a key cornerstone to Japan’s export economy, Japan could also be
considered “the world-leading major power of used car exports” (Fukuda and Asazuma
2011, 163). There are notable push-pull factors. The push is the biannual vehicle
inspection, or shaken, required for all full-sized automobiles in Japan beginning with the
auto’s third year. As vehicles age, shaken becomes increasingly expensive, often in the
range of $1,000 to $2,500 each time, incentivizing Japanese drivers to replace their aging
vehicles, despite that fact most vehicles are still capable of performing for another
100,000 miles or more. Many of these vehicles are exported. The stringent inspection
system is to ensure a high quality of vehicles on the roads and to curtail carbon emissions
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at a reliable rate, but it also supports the domestic sales of new Japanese brand
automobiles (Brooks 2011, 4).
The pull factor is that in several Muslim Asian countries, Japanese vehicles are
well reputed, but without a domestic assembly plant or sufficient plants to satisfy
domestic demand, they remain unattainably expensive as complete-unit imports (Fukuda
and Asazuma 2011, 188). Thus, a vibrant gray market exists that ties Japan to Muslim
Asia. It is not unusual for imported used autos from Japan to retain the markings of the
previous owner. In remote parts of Pakistan or Afghanistan the name of a previous
owner’s establishment can be seen on the vehicle door, written in Japanese. According to
Miyata, “That has become a status symbol for them” (2016: 55).
Muslim Asia countries in Southeast Asia and South Asia are important
destinations for used Japanese cars not only because of proximity, which lowers shipping
costs, but also because, like Japan, all countries in these regions use left-hand traffic
vehicles. There are no more than 15,000 Pakistanis in Japan, but many have been
involved in the used automobile export market since the 1980s (Rahman and Lian 2011,
265: Brooks 2011, 4). Initially, Pakistanis were only interested in exporting used
automobiles to Pakistan, as demand for Japanese brand vehicles in Pakistan was very
high, and sharing left-hand traffic, Japanese used vehicles were road-ready in Pakistan
with few alterations. Islamabad has since applied import restrictions (Brooks 2011, 4),
but Pakistanis in Japan’s used auto export market shifted to exporting elsewhere and
retained their ‘ethnic business’ niche in the domestic economy (Fukuda and Asauma
2011, 164). Rahman and Lian point out that for Pakistanis in Japan,
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One advantage to getting into the used car business is that only minimum venture
capital is required so long as the right buyer from the other country is found.
Furthermore, the whole official procedure from buying to shipment in Japan can
be completed online. What is necessary to run this business is to be familiar with
the formalities involved in the online transaction (2011: 264).
Brooks notes that Pakistanis in Japan “are longstanding clients of Japanese car merchants
who have used their specialist skills and knowledge to link Japanese exports” all around
the Indian Ocean rim (2011: 4). Many of these Pakistani residents in Japan marry
Japanese spouses, and raise children, which is the source of how many Japanese nationals
who are Muslims came to the religion (Fukuda 2015, 45). More recently, more
Bangladeshi residents in Japan have also joined in the used auto export market (Rahman
and Lian 2011, 265).
Meanwhile, the UAE has also emerged as the key entrepôt in this trade network.
To avoid the import restrictions on autos from Japan in countries such as Pakistan, used
autos are often reexported through UAE (Fukuda and Asauma 2011, 164). Japan-resident
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis often use family networks in UAE to sell used automobiles
imported from Japan (Fukuda 2015, 38). In the last three decades, tens of thousands of
used busses, commercial trucks, and automobiles from Japan have entered UAE annually,
where many are sold in low-income countries in Africa and Central Asia (Fukuda and
Asauma 2011, 169).
Consumer Electronics
Japan once had the largest consumer electronics industry in the world, yet for the
last two decades the market share of Japanese brands in consumer electronics has fallen
sharply. Part of this is due to increased competition from American, South Korean, and
Chinese makers, but secondly, it has been due to a technological shift in consumer
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electronics from electrical machines, such as televisions, radios, and VCRs (mechanical
devices with electronic components), to digital devices, such as mp3 players,
smartphones, and smart-TVs. While initially Japanese electronics manufacturing was
strictly conducted at home, FDI gradually opened up first to the U.S. in the 1980s, then
shifting to Southeast Asia. Today, several Japanese brands have consolidated and/or shed
their consumer electronics divisions to focus on more profitable core sectors, such as
heavy engineering, optical instruments, and robotics.
Japanese-brand mobile phones had the more advanced technology throughout the
1990s and early 2000s, but catered directly to a robust domestic market. According to
Pesek, “brisk sales at home fed complacency” (2014: 128). In 2007 when Apple released
its first iPhone, Japanese producers had no response. Today in Japan there are more
mobile phones in use than there are people in the country, and the domestic mobile phone
market is shrinking together with population decline, but the market share occupied by
Apple and Samsung surges on the home turf of Japanese electronics producers. Even
Sony, the company that introduced the transistor radio, the Trinitron TV, and the
Walkman, and led Japan’s postwar economic miracle, has not made a serious attempt to
compete with a revolutionary innovation in the last two decades. In recent years, Sony
has been making more profit from its life insurance policy sales than electronics sales,
but after years of net losses, in 2018 Sony was able to regain substantial profits by
focusing on its motion picture unit, game software, and supplying image sensors for
Apple’s iPhones (Mochizuki 2018, B2). It is also looking to regrow by joining in the
development of autonomous driving vehicle technologies (Mochizuki 2018, B2).
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This transition of Japan’s electronics industry has been difficult, but it also opens
up a new path for export markets in Muslim Asia. Japan is to be a “brain country” (BBC
2013). Nakanishi Hiroaki, president of Hitachi Corporation, made the unusual decision to
sell off consumer electronics divisions of the company, and focus on heavy engineering –
specifically, turbines, nuclear power plants, and high-speed rail (Economist 2015, 53).
Nakanishi notes on the market in the developing world: “In developing countries they
don’t have specific planning and construction know-how [for big infrastructure projects],
but we have,” adding, “[i]t is not simply a case of selling machinery, but also the
engineering, planning, even sometimes the financing of a project. That total process, that
is our most important advantage” (BBC 2013).
Most consumer electronics including mobile phones, PCs, and TVs purchased in
Muslim Asia are not Japanese brands. The famous Japanese consumer electronics brands,
however, like Hitachi, Sony, Panasonic, Toshiba, Fujitsu, and Sharp (now majorityowned by Taiwanese Foxconn) are all shifting operational focus by dropping units that
develop consumer-direct products and directly compete with Apple, Samsung, and
Huawei, and reinforcing technological advances in home energy-efficiency, electric and
hybrid vehicle batteries, heavy-industries, and even agrotechnology. They are also
diversifying from each other, thus loosening a clogged competitive market. This
diminishes the widespread brand-name recognition, but this is insignificant considering
that the consumer electronics market is currently so competitive that brand-name
recognition is hardly enough to justify high profit margins (Economist 2014, 57). Given
that smartphone sales have stagnated at around 6.5 billion units in recent years, with over
90 percent of global sales being replacements, there is practically no room for growth.
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The growth in electronics is in other, specialized units, namely automotive electronic
components (Hoshi 2017). There is tremendous opportunity in Muslim Asia with the
refocus by these Japanese brands. Panasonic’s CEO, Tsuga Kazuhiro, has outlined a plan
for the company to “serve emerging Asian markets better” (Economist 2014, 57).
Shipbuilding
Japan has dominated the shipbuilding industry since the 1960s, but began losing
significant market share to China and South Korea in the last decade. Since 2016, the
competitive shipbuilding industry has seen a sharp decline in orders and a glut of
suppliers primarily in China, South Korea, and Japan. Chinese companies are gaining
market share, even if losing profit, by undercutting production costs in South Korea and
Japan. South Korea allowed one of its largest shipbuilders, STX Offshore &
Shipbuilding, to collapse in 2016, but another shipbuilder, Hyundai Heavy Industries has
been able to pick up and retain substantial market share (Willumsen and Tutturen 2014).
Iran has two shipping giants, IRISL and NITC, but both have sought contracts
with China’s shipbuilders to expand their fleets, as well as with Chinese banks to finance
the projects (Paris 2015). For the Iranians, China is the safest option among the three East
Asia shipbuilding suppliers that can operate outside of U.S.-led sanctions, and South
Korea is second to that. An adviser to the China Development Bank points out, “Chinese
banks never stopped doing business with Iran and Iranian orders can be the next big thing
for Chinese yards” (Paris 2015). IRISL has increased orders from Hyundai Heavy
Industries (Shaw-Smith 2016). In Saudi Arabia, the oil tanker fleet had long been entirely
made up of Toyota ships (Miyata 2016, 56), but in 2015 Aramco’s exclusive shipper,
Bahri, placed an order of five tankers also from Hyundai Heavy Industries (Reuters
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2015). Japanese shipbuilders are clearly losing out on shipbuilding contracts in Asia, but
this is partially because they are more focused on supplying their own domestic market
certainly more than South Korea, and somewhat more than China. Japan is one of the
largest ship-owning countries in the world, and maritime transport companies like Mitsui
O.S.K. Lines, Nippon Yusen, and K Line are the essential clients for Japanese
shipbuilders today, as is the Maritime Self-Defense Force – according to many, the most
well equipped ‘navy’ in Asia (Mizokami 2016).
In Japan, shipbuilding companies have gone through mergers and are attempting
to survive through R&D of lower fuel efficiency ships, and technologically-advanced
vessels equipped for utilizing new sea routes such as the Arctic. In August 2016, Japan’s
four largest shipbuilders announced operational cooperation to create an ‘Eco Ship’
corner to the market. In 2013, the International Maritime Organization announced a
mandatory Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) for all vessels, which requires all
ships built in 2025 to be 30 percent more fuel efficient than those built a decade prior.
This is a major opportunity for Japan’s shipbuilders, which were in decline in both
market share and total profits over the last quarter century. Japan also has already
dominated with shipbuilding R&D, technologically-advanced ships, and the construction
of floating production storage and offloading (FPSO) vessels and LNG tanker technology
(Willumsen and Tutturen 2014). It also gives Japan’s shipbuilders an opportunity to
divert from the acute competition with China and South Korea for low-margin bulk
carriers.
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High-Speed Rail
Japan has been engaging in an intense competition with China to sell its highspeed rail (HSR) technology abroad. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime
Minister Abe have campaigned on behalf of their HSR technology on visits across Asia.
Japan’s HSR model, the shinkansen, was a breakthrough in transportation technology in
the 1960s. In 1964, the shinkansen was the first HSR line open to passenger transport. An
extensive network of shinkansen tracks has been laid across the country, and despite its
proliferation, the shinkansen has an impeccable safety record, with not a single fatal
accident, as well as notoriety for their punctuality. Japan retained the highest annual
passenger ridership of HSR until 2011, when China’s HSR network surpassed Japan’s in
ridership. China unleashed its first passenger HSR line only in 2008, yet it took just three
years before the first fatal accident, when in July 2011, 30 passengers died and nearly 300
were injured (Wendy Wu 2016). In spite of the fatal accident, China continues to expand
its HSR network and refine its technology to a standard which can be replicable and sold
to foreign markets.
The first overseas sale of Japan’s shinkansen technology was in December 1999,
when Kawasaki Heavy Industries was selected by the Taiwanese government for its HSR
project after controversy arose over the initial selection, a French-German Eurotrain
design. The second export of Japan’s shinkansen technology was, ironically enough, to
China Railways in October 2004 for the CRH2 project, constructed by Kawasaki Heavy
Industries, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, and Hitachi. While China’s clear intentions
with creating the joint venture was for technology transfer, many in Japan and affiliated
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with Japan’s HSR industry have lamented the technology “has now been effectively
copied by the Chinese” (Herman 2015).
In Indonesia, Japan and China engaged in a high-key bidding war that mirrored
the geopolitical rivalry between the two countries. Noting similarities between Honshu
and Java in size, topography, seismology, and population density, Japan had been
attempting to sell its shinkansen technology to Indonesia since 2008. Moreover,
Indonesia had long been using Japanese second-hand conventional railroad cars, and in
2013 made a large purchase of 180 used railroad cars in an onerous transfer (Miyata
2014a, 63), and remains the top destination for exports of used Japanese railcars (Miyata
2017, 117). In 2009 Japan carried out, and funded its own feasibility study for HSR, and
the 150-kilometer project spanning Java seemed to be a shoe-in, but in April 2015 China
came in with a counteroffer. In September, Jakarta drew attention when it, first,
announced the planned project was cancelled, then just over a week later, announced it
had selected China’s $5.5 billion bid. Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary, Suga Yoshihide
lamented that “large infrastructure projects should be implemented fairly and
transparently, taking feasibility into account” (Obe 2015). According to Indonesian
officials, China’s bid was selected over Japan’s because it did not require loan guarantees
from Indonesia. Beijing was more willing to accept financial risks associated with the
project than Tokyo, or for that matter, Jakarta, itself.
It is estimated China can undercut Japanese and German HSR technology by as
much as a third, and can construct lines in half the time (Wendy Wu 2016). A researcher
at the Center for China and Globalization opinions that “Japan is more cautious and cares
more about the profitability of overseas high-speed railway projects. China, sometimes, is
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willing to tolerate a certain amount of economic losses on projects that have symbolic
significance” (Wendy Wu 2016). According to economist Ohno Kenichi, in head-to-head
bids Japan will almost always be undercut by China in costs, and he in fact recommends
“Japan should shift away from building plants and railways, and toward building human
capital such as through education” (Obe 2015).
In December 2015, Japan made up for its loss in Java by landing a $17 billion
shinkansen deal with India to construct a 508-kilometer line from Mumbai to
Ahmedabad. India has several hundred kilometers of other lines planned for the next
decade, and Japanese and Chinese companies are eager to supply these. The next
battleground between China and Japan is a proposed 350-kilometer transnational line
from Kuala Lumpur to Singapore. Bids are estimated to be in the range of $12.5 to $16.2
billion (Jaipragas 2017).
Bangladesh is also proposing a 200-kilometer, $4 billion line. In October 2016,
the Japanese Ambassador to Bangladesh indicated that Japan was interested in investing
in the project, but a year later China proposed a government-to-government agreement to
supply the HSR line (Mamun 2017). An official from the Central Bank of Bangladesh
stated, “[i]n a developing country like Bangladesh, we often prefer buying Japanese
products and durables” (Wendy Wu 2016). He added, “The most pressing reason is
Japan’s high-quality control and constant pursuit of excellence” (Wendy Wu 2016).
Another advantage Japan has is experience working in mountainous topographics, and
thus building bridges and tunnels essential for line completion. A Chinese locomotive
manufacturer supports this: “China is a country with vast land, so we can always find a
suitable place to build railways” (Huang 2017). Huang points out that “Not blessed with
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enough flatlands, countries like mountainous Southeast Asian nations struggle to do so
(Huang 2017). Japan has acquired more civil-engineering experience managing this
terrain, while China has often taken advantage of the option to route around it.
Further afield in Muslim Asia, more states are seeking HSR investment and
technology. Qatar proposed a line linking it to Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in time for the
2022 FIFA World Cup. UAE is also seeking to connect Dubai and Abu Dhabi.
Kazakhstan is seeking to link its capital city, Astana, to its largest city and economic
core, Almaty, over a thousand kilometers away. Iran has already contracted with China to
construct its first line from Tehran to Isfahan, but more lines are planned. Turkey’s first
line, also a China project, linking Ankara to Istanbul, is already in operation.
Nuclear Energy Technology
Demand for nuclear power plants is surging across Muslim Asia, and it coincides
with a new desire by the Japanese government and corporations to export nuclear energy
technology. In December 2009, Japan lost a bid to sell nuclear power reactors to the UAE
to a South Korean consortium (Yamauchi 2010). While likely not the clincher in the deal,
South Korea (as well as France) added a peripheral package in their bid of arms exports
and military cooperation, which was something Japan could not offer due to the
constraints of a normatively-motivated arms exports ban (Yamauchi 2010).4 “The UAE
apparently favored South Korea because of its willingness to provide military technology
and training programs as well as unmanned aerial vehicles and electromagnetic pulse
bombs under a bilateral military cooperation agreement” (Yamauchi 2010).

4

The arms exports ban was eventually lifted in April 2014.
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Japan was able to wrestle back in Turkey. In March 2010, a Korean company
negotiated for a contract to build four reactors at a plant on the Black Sea coast in Sinop,
but was not able to come to an agreement. In December, Toshiba and Tepco stepped in to
carry out the project, yet talks were suspended three months later when the disaster at
Tepco’s plant in Fukushima occurred. In October 2013, after Abe came to power and
actively assisted in negotiations, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Itochu acquired the
contract in consortium with French Areva. The deal, worth $22 billion, was the first
achieved after the Fukushima incident. When completed, it will be Turkey’s second
nuclear power plant added to the grid (WNA 2018). Interestingly, Turkish leaders cited
shared seismic vulnerability with Japan as a factor why they chose to contract with
Japanese companies (Corben 2017). For this reason, the project carries great risks, among
them Japan’s reputation in nuclear technology in the post-Fukushima era.
After the two hydrogen explosions at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in
March 2011, Japan initially decommissioned all of its nuclear power plants, and less than
a handful of the plants are currently operating. Yet, amid a strong anti-nuclear power
movement at home, Abe has taken the lead in promoting Japanese nuclear infrastructure
and technology exports abroad, particularly in Muslim Asia. As if oblivious to the irony,
in May 2013 Abe stated at King Abdulaziz University in Saudi Arabia, “Japan can
provide renewable energy and the world’s safest technology to generate nuclear power”
(Kyodo News International 2013). Cultivating the geocultural bonds, Abe added that
Japanese technicians in Saudi Arabia will “learn a lot from Islam’s spirit of tolerance”
(Kyodo News International 2013). Despite losing the deal with UAE to South Korea, Abe
still pressed for cooperation with UAE in further nuclear power developments.
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The irony in pushing nuclear infrastructure and technology exports in the postFukushima era cannot be lost on Abe and his administration. Tanami points this out:
“Assuming the day comes where not even one nuclear power plant is operating in Japan,
and Japanese firms maintain nuclear energy technology by building their market
overseas, then it is not a true abandoning of nuclear energy” (2011: 99). Japan was,
indeed, a leader in nuclear energy technology, but with most reactors decommissioned,
and no prospects of new reactors, and a public deeply resistant to nuclear power, there is
no means to advance a competitive edge in nuclear energy technology. Nonetheless, for
the time being, domestic nuclear energy manufacturers have substantial investments in
nuclear energy technology, and now must look overseas for survival (Japan News 2016,
3). The Abe administration has taken upon itself to promote its nuclear technology for
export, focusing on Turkey, India, Kazakhstan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and UAE, yet it
faces intense competition from firms in South Korea, France, China, and Russia.
In Kazakhstan, the government has been considering using one of two locations
as possible sites for the first nuclear power plant to be built since the Soviet plant at
Aktau (Shevchenko) closed in 1999. The first was Kurchatov, near the Soviet Nuclear
Test Site at Semipalatinsk, and the second at Ulken, on the bank of Lake Balkhash.
Russia’s Rosatom has offered to construct a VBER plant at Kurchatov. Meanwhile,
Westinghouse’s AP1000 plant was designed by Toshiba for Ulken. In January 2015,
Kazakhstan agreed to the Rosatom VBER plant at Kurchatov, but also indicated it was
still interested in the AP1000 at Ulken as a second plant.
Westinghouse was owned by Japanese firms Toshiba (87 percent) and IHI
Corporation (three percent), and the Kazakhstani firm, Kazatomprom (10 percent). In
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2015, Toshiba was hit with a scandal where it was revealed profits had been overstated,
particularly with its holdings in Westinghouse. Toshiba had been hoping that the link
with Kazatomprom would strengthen its opportunity to supply nuclear technology and
infrastructure into Kazakhstan (WNA 2018). With this link, Toshiba set up a R&D facility
in the northeastern town of Kurchatov together with the assistance of Toyota and
Marubeni (WNA 2018). After the accounting scandal hit Toshiba, in March 2017
Westinghouse filed for bankruptcy, and in 2017 Kazatomprom required Toshiba to buy
out its share of Westinghouse for $522 million (WNA 2018). In January 2018
Westinghouse was sold to Canadian firm, Brookfield, for $4.6 billion (Mattioli, et al.
2018, B1).
Japanese companies remain active in the nuclear industry in Kazakhstan –
through uranium mining, processing, and R&D, but these activities are more for building
access to energy, and not for access to markets. Moreover, if the nuclear-energy age is
over for Japan, what is the use in securing access to uranium? As for access to markets,
the prospects as supplying nuclear energy technology and infrastructure are deeply
diminished by Westingthouse’s bankruptcy and sale, and Toshiba’s accounting scandal
and subsequent stripping of assets including Westinghouse. Kazakhstan is a long-shot
market for Japanese companies. Toshiba and Westinghouse have tainted their images,
and competition is fierce among Russian and Chinese firms for the market. In Central
Asia, “Japan is ill-equipped to compete with Russia and China when in direct competition
for reasons both cultural and regional” (Barber 2018, 30).
India and Japan signed a full nuclear cooperation agreement in November 2016,
which allows India to import Japanese nuclear technology, despite being a non-signatory
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to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and grants India Japan’s support for it to join the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). To date, India has not committed to receiving
technology and infrastructure from any Japanese supplier. This agreement is discussed
further in Chapter 7, but for the purposes of this chapter, there is potential for nuclear
technology exports by Japan. India is showing potential to import. Saudi Arabia is
showing potential to import, as are UAE, Jordan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and even
Kazakhstan. Assuming Japan does not restart is nuclear reactors, and proceeds as a postnuclear energy society, the technology will move along and its firms will gradually
disappear from the global market, which is growing in spite of Fukushima, the ‘nuclear
allergy’ that has emerged in Japan, and plans from other developed countries, like
Germany, to forgo nuclear energy in the future. The Abe administration may have known
this, and thus the plan to make nuclear power technology a key export was a short-term
solution for economic growth.
Services Sector
Japan is often referred to as a ‘manufacturing state,’ but the services sector
occupies an increasing portion of Japan’s GDP (Morikawa 2016, 33). It is also the fastest
growing type of exports globally, so it is natural that Tokyo pursues this, as its
cornerstone manufacturing industry is slipping among competition. Unemployment
figures are very low in Japan; in fact, there are more jobs available than there are job
seekers (Sternberg 2018, A15). Businesses suffer from labor shortages, yet economic
growth remains mostly stagnant. These long-term conditions indicate that “the Japanese
economy is near the ceiling of its supply capacity; the economy is not bad but the
economic growth rate is weak” (Morikawa 2016, 32).
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With this in mind, the services sector must increase exports in order to increase
economic growth. Services make up three-quarters of Japan’s total GDP, yet even after a
decade of increases, just over one-quarter of Japan’s exports (Nakata 2015, 1). That pales
in comparison to other developed economies like the U.S., the largest service exporter,
where 52 percent of its total exports are from the services sector, and the UK, where a
substantial 82 percent of its exports are from the services sector (CIA World Factbook
2018). In 2014, Japan’s services sector exports total 17.3 trillion yen, with 4.2 trillion
yen, or nearly a quarter of all services sector exports, in the form of transport services
(Nakata 2015, 1). Intellectual property rights and license fees made up 3.9 trillion yen, or
22.5 percent, although this is mostly exported to North America (Nakata 2015, 1). Travel
made up 2 trillion yen (11.6 percent), and construction, 1.2 trillion yen (6.9 percent)
(Nakata 2015, 1). Within the services sector, the financial services and tourism industries
are noteworthy in how they relate to Muslim Asia.
The thriving financial services wings of the old zaibatsu, Mitsubishi UFJ,
Sumitomo Mitsui, and Mizuho, are some of the largest financial service providers in the
world. As lenders, these firms are allowed to provide Islamic financial products via
overseas subsidiaries, yet they have a tendency to avoid investing in certain Muslim
countries due to Islamic banking practices. This avoidance is mostly due to the lack of
understanding and risk associated with venturing into an environment with unfamiliar
laws and practices. Japanese financial services firms are, however, attempting to revise
banking laws and regulations in Japan to encourage Islamic financing (Tsukioka 2017:
Tahara 2009, 189). Moreover, the Japan Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC) has
been allowed to offer shari’a-compliant financial products (Tsukioka 2017).
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Islamic banking institutions appeared in the mid-twentieth century amid concern
over the morality of the capitalist system developing in the Muslim world (Tripp 2006,
51-56). Contrary to conventional expectations, Islamic banking got its earliest start not in
the Middle East, but in Southeast Asia – especially, Malaysia, Brunei, and Singapore.
Japan indirectly interacted with this early Islamic banking, when in 1980 Malaysians
used Islamic financial tools to promote domestic ownership of the automobile
manufacturing industry that was dominated by Japanese at the time (JBIC 2007, 3). As
petrodollars accumulated in the oil-rich Gulf region during the 1970s and 1980s, more
Middle Eastern markets also opened to Islamic banking. Malaysia and Brunei are two of
the largest centers for the Islamic financial market (JBIC 2007, 3). Islamic banking is
rapidly growing globally, and provides an opportunity to engage with a broad network of
clients, including many ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia who are not necessarily
Muslim, but prefer the approach to conventional finance (Al-Maraj 2009, 1-2: Tahara
2009, 192).5 There is a push among many in the Islamic financial services industry to
promote ‘interfaith banks’ which target segments of societies which desire moral-based
banking based on their respective religious traditions (Simpfendorfer 2014, 68). These
efforts are mostly found in Southeast Asia and Western Europe, but there is also
tremendous potential in Japan as well.
It is likely the Japanese government will allow the necessary revisions to the
banking laws and regulations, as it is imperative to boost infrastructure investment and
general exports from the financial services industry (Tsukioka 2017: JBIC 2007, 3).

5

It is estimated Chinese-Malays make up 40 percent of the sales at Islamic financial institutions in
Malaysia (Simpfendorfer 2014, 69).
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Meanwhile, it would encourage more Muslim engagement in Japan’s bond market – the
largest bond market in Asia (Wada and Vizcaino 2015). Bonds in Islamic banking are
different than in conventional banking, in that bonds, or sukuk, are tradable, and “the
coupon payments on them represent profits on real economic activities rather than the
payment of interest” (Al-Maraj 2009, 1). Overseas, however, the engagement with
Islamic banking has been timid. Mitsubishi UFJ was the first Japanese firm to issue
sukuk, or Islamic bonds, through a subsidiary in Malaysia (Wada and Vizcaino 2015).
Sumitomo Mitsui is also offering Islamic banking in Malaysia, with an in-house shari’a
advisory board (Wada and Vizcaino 2015).
The second services-sector industry to note is the tourism industry, which is
categorized as services export. Much attention is given to annual increase in the number
of foreign visitors to Japan, and even though it makes a minor contribution to total
services sector exports, it greatly raises consciousness of Muslim peoples and Islamic
practices among Japanese because it increases human-to-human contact, exchange, and
transactions. The number of Muslim tourists from Asia has increased dramatically in the
last decade, particularly from East and Southeast Asia (see Table 5.4). Tourists from
Indonesia are among the fastest growing nationality of tourists, increasing as much as 30
percent annually over the last five years. Indonesians also make up the largest nationality
of Muslim tourists in Japan, with about 239,000 Indonesian Muslims visiting Japan in
2016. As a food culture, with deep interests in health and diets, there is a curiosity
regarding the halal diet in Japan. Moreover, there is an eagerness among many
restaurateurs and food-way suppliers to accommodate Muslims in Japan who follow a
halal diet (Miyata 2017, 240). Several hotels and restaurants are applying to be halal
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certified, and list with Japan Muslim Guide, an online travel website that lists hotels,
restaurants, and mosques for Muslims visiting, or living in Japan. As of the last decade,
major airports and train stations have also added prayer rooms to accommodate Muslim
visitors (Miyata 2017, 241).
While relatively small, the tourism industry does have room to expand for Muslim
Asians. Along with the accommodations made by restaurants, hotels, airports, and train
stations, Miyata promotes expanding the market for Muslim visitors to Japan to include
medical tourism: “since we have halal restaurants and halal hotels, we should also have
halal hospitals” (2016: 54). For example, Miyata suggests “female patients can seek
arrangements such as being seen by a female physician. Muslim people have historically
trusted Japanese technological skill, so in healthcare, too, trust could be cultivated”
(2016: 54). Elsewhere, he argues “as a country renowned for the longevity of its people,
Japan could be an attractive destination for medical tourism and Muslims in general who
are health-minded” (2017: 245).
Japan is the fourth largest exporter in the world, but ranks seventh in services
sector exports (Morikawa 2016, 33). Japan’s services sector exports only make up 3.2
percent of global services sector exports in 2014, while its services sector makes up just
over 7 percent of the world’s services product (Nakata 2015, 10: CIA World Factbook
2018). Japan’s services industries are undoubtedly geared to the domestic market that is
high-consuming and aging. Yet, there is tremendous potential to export industries in the
services sector. Japan has some of the largest services sector corporations in the world,
such as telecommunications giant SoftBank, Rakuten in ecommerce, and Dentsu in
advertising. Services sector exports tend to face different challenges than product-based
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exports. Language barriers can be significant, as can knowledge of legalities, regulations,
and customs. Distance barriers are a more significant variable than with product-based
exports. These constrain services sector exports to only the largest corporations which are
better-equipped for such challenges.
Constructing Post-Oil Relations
This chapter shows that Japan was once a net importer from Muslim Asian countries. In
the age of petroleum, Japan’s dependency on fossil fuel resources from certain Muslim
Asian countries has acutely tilted the trade balance whereby a tremendous outflow of
capital from Japan to the petrostates is not being matched by Japanese exports. Yet,
nascent indicators of an, at most, post-oil relationship, and, at least, economically
multifaceted relationship between Japan and Muslim Asia is taking form. Yamauchi
argues that the Middle East “has multifaceted plans to develop eco-friendly industrial
infrastructure using low-cost fuels, function as an international logistics hub by taking
advantage of its geographical location and expand international financial services centers
managing oil revenues” (2010). With this in mind, there is ample room for a state like
Japan to engage with the region in a new way. This section looks at two possibilities of
budding post-oil relations between Muslim Asia and Japan into the twenty-first century:
the Saudi-Japan Vision 2030, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) sans the U.S. Both,
however, have geopolitical problems with which Tokyo will have to contend.
Saudi-Japan Vision 2030
In April 2016, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman of Saudi Arabia announced
a government plan he called ‘Saudi Vision 2030.’ In this, he outlined a plan, albeit
vaguely, for Saudi Arabia to shift from dependency on the petroleum export industry to a
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comprehensively developed economy. Nearly a year later, in March 2017 King Salman
bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia visited Japan, the first time the Saudi King had visited
Japan in nearly half a century. He and Abe announced the Saudi-Japan Vision 2030,’
which was to accompany the ‘Saudi Vision 2030’ announced the previous year. Both
sides noted a “synergy” between their societies and their economies that, if strengthened,
would benefit both sides. Within this synergy, Riyadh hoped to gain from Japan
strategies to diversify its economy, reform its economy, and apply “soft value” –
“strengthening the social and cultural foundations to stimulate the economy” (MOFA
2017a). To incentivize business development, the plan called for special economic zones
in Saudi Arabia, and in the meeting Abe pressed for negotiating a free-trade arrangement
with the GCC. The plan detailed 31 potential projects to strengthen Saudi-Japanese
relations, and build on this synergy identified. The CEO of SoftBank, Son Masayoshi,
also met with the Saudi King, where they drafted plans for the ‘Softbank Vision Fund,’
which would combine 2.5 trillion yen from Softbank and 4.7 trillion yen from the Saudi
sovereign wealth fund, the Public Investment Fund, for technology investments
(Takeyama, et al. 2017).
The projects include among them, Tokyo’s suggestion for Riyadh to list Aramco
on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. As part of Saudi Arabia’s reforms, Riyadh announced in
early 2016 the NOC Aramco would list five percent of its value publicly. In 2018, the
initial public offering was postponed to no earlier than 2021, adding more time for
markets to compete. Aramco has been solely owned by the King of Saudi Arabia since
1980. It is expected to be the biggest IPO in history, possibly up to $100 billion (Lee, et
al. 2017: Asahi Shimbun 2017). New York, London, and Hong Kong are also vying to
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have Aramco list with their markets. Meanwhile, Chinese oil companies PetroChina and
Sinopec offered to directly purchase the five percent of Aramco, which would prevent it
from appearing on any market (Asahi Shimbun 2017). If it does appear on the market,
Japan has, among others, a sovereign wealth fund ready to acquire stakes in the company
(Asahi Shimbun 2017).
Geopolitical considerations abounded with the Saudi-Japan Vision 2030. Many
overlooked it, since the King’s visit to Japan was subsequent to visits to Indonesia,
Malaysia, and China, where he signed deals worth $65 billion. The synergy between
Saudi Arabia and Japan may be palpable, but Tokyo will be challenged and undercut by
Chinese competition in many faucets of cooperation with Riyadh. China is closer, larger,
less expensive, and much more flexible and daring regarding FDI projects. For Saudi
Arabia, this was a shift in preparing to become a post-petro state, but Riyadh also had
Iran in mind, which is something Tokyo must cautiously take into consideration. Corben
argues the initiative “could be interpreted as a double standard given the international
community’s efforts to constrain Iran’s own nuclear aspirations, and could complicate
Tokyo’s attempts to rejuvenate its economic relationship with Tehran and diversify its
own energy portfolio” (2017). Japan, or China for that matter, cannot avoid entanglement
in geopolitical confrontations in the Persian Gulf region if they choose to strengthen
relations with Saudi Arabia or Iran.
CPTPP
After the U.S. formally withdrew from TPP in January 2017, there was initial
skepticism in Tokyo regarding the future of the pact. It was a daunting political challenge
for Abe to get the original TPP agreement ratified in the Diet, and he faced immense

190

opposition even from within his own party and among key constituents. So, when U.S.
President Trump took office and, as promised during his campaign, withdrew the U.S.
from TPP within his first week in office, it was a tremendous blow to Abe who had
invested so much to have the agreement ratified in his own country, and even jeopardized
his political capital in order to get the bill passed. Abe initially declared TPP as
“meaningless” without U.S. participation, yet perhaps because of the time and effort
invested in ratifying TPP, weeks later Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Asō
Tarō announced Japan would proceed with TPP together with the remaining ten memberstates, insisting “there will be no renegotiation on the TPP’s current framework” (Miller
2017). By 2018, all remaining member states indicated enthusiasm to proceed with the
bloc, and it was rebranded into a more cumbersome, Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).
If CPTPP can withstand the American departure, Japan is poised to assume a
leadership role in the bloc. Without the U.S. or China in the regional economic bloc,
Japan is poised to assume a role similar to Germany’s central role in the European Union
– except Japan’s economy is substantially larger than Germany’s in relation to the other
states in their respective economic blocs, and the 11-member states of CPTPP make up a
market of half a billion people – larger than the EU market. Japan’s nominal GDP is
nearly as large as the other ten CPTPP member-states combined, and it provides a
significant platform to access Muslim consumers in Southeast Asia. Some of Japan’s
biggest Muslim markets already are in Malaysia and Singapore, which are both party to
CPTPP, as is the wealthy Islamic sultanate, Brunei. Moreover, Japan’s biggest Muslim
trading partner, Indonesia, has indicated its intention to join CPTPP as well.
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There are geopolitics at play here too; China is notably not party to CPTPP, and is
instead promoting the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), along
with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and One-Belt, One-Road Initiative.
As CPTPP rules are currently constructed, China would have to make substantial reforms
in order to be considered for membership, such as de-subsidizing its multitude of stateowned enterprises, strengthening transparency on bribery, and increasing enforcement of
intellectual property rights. Also, the U.S. may reenter the agreement later, albeit not
easily. If the U.S. successfully reenters CPTPP, or if China can either squelch CPTPP
with its own trade initiatives, or join, it affects Japan’s current leadership role in
salvaging the trade bloc. Regardless if CPTPP proceeds, or RCEP, or both, it opens up
the opportunity to strengthen “the efficient operation of a regional production network”
that further links Muslims in Asia to Japanese exports (Shiroishi 2017, 30).
Conclusion: Where is Islam?
This chapter examines several facets of contact between Japan and Muslim Asia to
consider Japan’s strategy to access markets in Muslim Asia for exports and FDI. Table
5.5 shows a typology of states in Muslim Asia significant as either current essential
markets, or potential essential markets for future planning in the auto industry, HSR
industry, and services sector. Moving forward, this typology is taken into consideration
together with energy suppliers in the last chapter, and further facets of contact in the next
three chapters.
Considering this typology and other findings, five conclusions come from this
review. First, there are sorts of markets within Muslim Asia. Notable NIEs in Muslim
Asia are namely Malaysia and Indonesia, but also Turkey and Kazakhstan. These four are
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turning into key consumer market destinations for exporters. Beyond these, there are two
other types of consumer markets in Muslim Asia. First are the oil-rich states, flush with
petrodollars and targets for luxury item exports. These include Qatar – the most affluent
population in Muslim Asia, UAE – with its largest city, Dubai, as the business and
tourism hub of the Middle East, Saudi Arabia – with the most millionaires in Muslim
Asia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman. Yamauchi argues “[i]t certainly makes perfect sense
for people – regardless of whether or not they are Muslim – to seek making themselves
rich by dealing with the six wealthy Gulf Cooperation Council states” (2010). The most
influential thinktank in Japan, the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), argues:
In the Gulf States, infrastructure maintained since modernization in the 1970s and
1980s is now dilapidated, and coupled with rapid population growth infrastructure
improvements are imperative. Also, from water desalination for home use, to
electrification (especially renewable energy), to rising living standards and aging
societies with high expectations in the medical field, investment demands are
expanding. Gulf States have great expectations from Japan for high-technology,
but on the other hand, it is necessary Japan works hard to avoid failing in business
project bids when there is competition (JIIA 2017: 6).
The list should also include Brunei – with the Sultan often considered the wealthiest
individual in the world. While some of these petro-states illustrate tremendous economic
inequalities, there is also mass consumerism, and they serve as magnets for trade wealth
opportunities. The rich in these states spend enormous amounts, and are key markets for
an exporting state like Japan, with its emphasis on the distinctive quality of its products.
The final group are populations in Muslim Asia that not necessarily from the
NIEs, yet rapid population growth, urbanization, and rapidly improved literacy rates and
internet connectivity indicate these locations will be significant markets in the near future
(Roser and Ortiz-Ospina 2017). This is the case for a band of states from the Levant
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(Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine), to Iraq, Iran, and across South Asia (Pakistan, Muslim
populations in India, and Bangladesh). Globally, Muslim Asia’s youthful population is
second only to that of Sub-Saharan Africa as a percentage of its society. Demographics
dictate that the center of Islam will shift to South Asia over the course of the twenty-first
century. Meanwhile, the core of global commerce has also shifted east, and South Asia is
a key part of this as well.
Second, of all facets of contact between Japan and Muslim Asia examined in this
project, access to markets is seemingly the most remote from threats, security, and
strategy. Many of the actors strategizing export markets and FDI are corporations, but as
noted in this chapter, Tokyo, does so as well on these corporations’ behalf.
Geoeconomics is seemingly at the heart of accessing markets, and geopolitics and geoculture are seemingly insignificant. This view, however, is lacking a clear understanding
of how these variables interplay. Hayes points out “[m]any Japanese companies are
opening overseas factories in order to gain a better political relationship with the host
country, in addition to economic advantages such as cheap labor” (2018: 213). The body
of this chapter (as well as chapters 4 and 5) illustrates the tight relationship between big
business and political elites in Tokyo. Abe has promoted his country’s business on trips
across Muslim Asia, and as seen in Chapter 3, these businesses have a strong influence
on policy in Tokyo. The partitioning of state and non-state actors, seen in much of
international relations literature, is misleading as the dynamics between these two take on
unique characteristics and can proxy for each other’s interest as composite parts of each
state-system, including Japan’s.
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Moreover, geo-culture is evident in these decisions. Values-based diplomacy is at
hand in export markets and FDI decisions. Miyata (2014b) makes this case by citing Uni
Charm, a Japanese hygienic products company that has FDI factories employing
thousands of women in Indonesia, India, and Saudi Arabia. Miyata argues that Japanese
corporate investment, like that of Uni Charm, has the potential to “reduce poverty in the
Muslim Middle East, and elevate the social status of women, thereby having the effects
of bringing down the birth rates and controlling population growth” (2014b: 229-30). He
further adds “[t]he result of this could be useful in decreasing the violence and conflict in
the Muslim Middle East” (2014b: 230). Miyata identifies this business model as an
“asset” that is available for Japan, which can cultivate a more positive relation with
Muslim societies in Asia (2014b: 230).
Third, much as securing access to energy is deeply rooted in Japan’s fundamental
security, as established in the last chapter, securing access to export markets is also
deeply rooted in Japan’s security. Political economy observers as well as trade
competitors have derided this as neo-mercantilism, and protectionism. Since the opening
of Japan in the mid-nineteenth century, overcoming innate inferiorities in order to survive
has been deeply imbedded in the national identity. The root of this inferiority complex is
partially because the Japanese have tended to compare themselves with resourceabundant U.S., China, and Russia, and with European powers with a robust horizontal
trade network among them. This partially explains the attempts to mimic, and seek
peerage with the West during the Meiji Restoration, to expand and colonize territories in
Asia, and to secure the supply of oil in the postwar era.
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Securing consumer markets overseas is essential for bringing in capital. As certain
industries surveyed above indicate, Japan is being undercut by China and South Korea for
cheaper products, but they could be an indicator of the aforementioned FGT. Thus, Japan
must move on to the next stage of development – whatever that is. FGT is undoubtedly
present in Japan’s thinking of itself and Asia. So much so, it is a source of pride, since
Japan views itself as the goose at the tip of the formation. Yet, there is a looming problem
with FGT, in that Akamatsu did not indicate, or prescribe where to go next. In fact, when
the last manufacturing industry declines, as Akamatsu predicted, where does the
economy go? There is no mention of a services sector in the 1930s model, although we
presume that is the next phase to emerge.
Fourth, as a grey market, the used auto market is a side effect of Japan’s stringent
road safety standards and the centrality of domestic sales to maintain a robust automobile
industry. It is an ‘ethnic business,’ and operated largely by Pakistani and Bangladeshi
residents in Japan and UAE. This hand-me-down model is neither condoned nor
discouraged by the Japanese government, but it plays a very important role in spreading a
positive reputation for the quality of made-in-Japan products across the Indian Ocean,
elevating the status of these products, making them more accessible to wide swaths of
Muslims in Asia who otherwise would not have access to these vehicles. As discussed, a
young consumer class is burgeoning in Muslim Asia, and many are purchasing branded
products for the first time. Serendipitously, the used auto market is an excellent means
“to build brand loyalty, rather than having to convince consumers to switch later in life,
unlike in older and more mature markets such as America and Europe and even
increasingly in China” (Simpfendorfer 2014, 71-72).
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Lastly, Japanese overseas investment and exports have an additional challenge to
the previously mentioned, known in Japan as the ‘Galapagos syndrome.’ In many
regards, Japan leads the world in several heavy machinery and high-technology fields,
but products are usually designed to cater to a high-consuming domestic market
accustomed to a distinguishable quality (Yamauchi 2010). Thus, the technology evolves
to meet specific domestic demands, and thereby overlooks emerging demands overseas.
Countries with similar economic structures, like Germany and South Korea, are better
catered to a more global market, and thus, better equipped to operate in foreign markets.
The Japanese automobile industry obviously has averted the Galapagos syndrome, and
has considerable overseas autonomy and R&D that has allowed it to remain competitive
and even dominate certain markets, but other industries – notably consumer electronics –
have suffered by not adequately preparing for the global demands for digital technology
like the smartphones. The services sector may face similar challenges as it turns outward
in the following years.
Where is Islam? Where are the Muslims? In trade economics, it may be easy to
overlook this. The research shows Indonesia is of paramount importance for Japan’s
access to markets, and more than half of Indonesia’s population is located on Java. On
Java, alone, can you find over 130 million Muslims residing in a 50,000-square mile area
(although Bangladesh would be a close second). Jakarta, a city of over 27 million
Muslims, has more Muslims than any other urban area in the world. The significance of
Indonesia’s Muslims is often overlooked – even by Muslims elsewhere in the world.
These people are essential consumers of Japan’s exports, and Japan’s economic outlook
for the twenty-first century must facilitate increasing access to the Muslim Asia markets,
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which are expanding in both wealth and population. Therefore, securitization relates
insofar as Japanese choose to enthusiastically engage with these markets, or avoid them
despite the economic opportunities they provide. This chapter reveals that both are
happening simultaneously. Indonesia, for example, is a key export market; there is clear
tepidness, however, observed with Iran.
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Table 5.1: Japan Export Markets, 2015
(in millions of USD)
U.S.
$126,387 (20.2%)
China
$109,278 (17.5%)
South Korea
$44,019 (7.0%)
Hong Kong
$35,006 (5.6%)
Thailand
$27,984 (4.5%)
Singapore
$19,855 (3.2%)
Germany
$16,237 (2.6%)
Australia
$12,850 (2.1%)
Vietnam
$12,531 (2.0%)
Malaysia
$12,004 (1.9%)
Netherlands
$11,598 (1.9%)
Indonesia
$11,539 (1.8%)
UK
$10,740 (1.7%)
Mexico
$10,475 (1.7%)
Philippines
$9,488 (1.5%)
UAE
$8,695 (1.4%)
India
$8,110 (1.3%)
Canada
$7,736 (1.2%)
Saudi Arabia
$6,826 (1.1%)
France
$5,261 (0.8%)
TOTAL
624,874 (100%)

Source: WITS (2017).
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Table 5.2: Largest Trade Partners in Muslim Asia, 2016
(in millions of USD)
Total
Japanese Exports
Japanese Imports
1

Indonesia

$29,542

2

Malaysia

$29,474

3

UAE

$25,295

4

Saudi Arabia

$24,600

5

Qatar

$12,420

6

Kuwait

$5,938

7

Oman

$4,311

8

Iran

$3,912

9

Turkey

$3,424

10

Bangladesh

$2,799

$11,328
Capital goods, machinery
& electronics,
intermediate goods
$12,139
Capital goods, machinery
& electronics,
intermediate goods
$7,997
Transportation, consumer
goods, capital goods
$5,030
Transportation, consumer
goods, capital goods
$1,539
Transportation, consumer
goods, capital goods
$1,697
Transportation, consumer
goods
$2,552
Transportation, consumer
goods, capital goods
$582
Capital goods,
transportation, machinery
& electronics
$2,861
Capital goods, machinery
& electronics,
intermediate goods
$1,583
Intermediate goods,
metals, capital goods

*Excludes trade with Muslim-minority states in Asia
Source: WITS (2017).
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$18,215
Fuels, raw materials,
consumer goods
$17,334
Consumer goods,
fuels, machinery &
electronics
$17,299
Fuels, raw materials,
consumer goods
$19,570
Fuels, raw materials

Trade
Balance
($6,887)

($5,195)

($9,302)

($14,540)

$10,880
Fuels, consumer
goods, raw materials
$4,241
Fuels, raw materials

($9,341)

$1,759
Fuels, raw materials,
consumer goods
$1,759
Fuels, raw materials

$793

$563
Consumer goods,
textiles & clothing,
raw materials
$1,216
Consumer goods,
textiles & clothing,
footwear

($2,545)

($2,749)

$2,298

$367

Table 5.3: Largest New Auto Sales in Muslim Asia Markets

1
2
3
4
5

Iran
Indonesia
Turkey
Saudi Arabia
Malaysia
Global TOTAL

2006
total units
971,000
318,904
617,838
556,100
490,748
68,353,376

2016
total units
1,448,500
1,048,134
1,007,857
655,500
580,124
93,856,388

ten-year
growth
49%
229%
63%
18%
18%
37%

Source: Adapted from OICA (2018).
Table 5.4: Muslim Tourists to Japan by Nationality, 2016
1. Indonesia
239,000 (up 32.1% from 2015)
2. Malaysia

238,100 (29.1%)

3. China

114,000 (27.6%)

4. Hong Kong

75,400 (20.7%)

5. Singapore

51,700 (17.2%)

6. Thailand

49,600 (13.2%)

7. France

22,200 (18.3%)

8. Philippines

19,000 (29.6%)

9. Turkey

17,800 (5.1%)

10. UK

17,500 (13.1%)

Source: Adapted using data from JNTO (2017).
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Table 5.5: Market Significance for Japan
Autos
Current
Essential
Market

HSR

Potential
Essential
Market

Current
Essential
Market

Services

Potential
Essential
Market

Current
Essential
Market

Potential
Essential
Market

Southeast Asia
Indonesia

Y

N

N

Y

N

Y

Malaysia

N

N

N

Y

N

Y

Singapore

N

N

N

Y

N

N

Y

N

N

Post-Soviet Asia
Kazakhstan

N

N

N
South Asia

Bangladesh

N

N

N

Y

N

N

India

N

N

Y

Y

N

N

Pakistan

N

Y

N

N

N

N

Middle East
Iran

N

Y

N

Y

N

N

Qatar

N

N

N

Y

N

N

Saudi Arabia

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

Turkey

Y

N

N

Y

N

N

UAE

N

Y

Y

Y

N

N
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Figure 5.1: Flying Geese Theory Model: Transition of Dominant Economy Sector

Competitiveness

textiles

basic
heavy
steel,
shipbuilding machinery electronics

Time
Source: Adapted from Sun (2017, 27).
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advanced
electronics

Figure 5.2: Flying Geese Theory Model: Transition of State Competitiveness in
Individual Sector
4 Asian
Tigers

Tiger Cubs

Latecomers Latest Comers

Competitiveness

Japan

Time
4 Asian Tigers: Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan
Tiger Cubs*: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand
Latecomers: India, Vietnam, others
Latest Comers: Bangladesh, Pakistan, others
* Could include Turkey, as an NIE, but would probably fall beyond geographic
scope.
Note: China defies the model, but would suitably fit somewhere between 4 Asian
Tigers and Tiger Cubs.
Note: Petrostates do not fit the model, and thus are left out.
Source: Adapted from Sun (2017, 27).
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CHAPTER VI
DEVELOPMENT AND AID
Japan has played a pivotal role in development assistance programs for many states in the
last half-century, and remains one of the primary sources of official development
assistance (ODA) for many countries. Yet, the underlying rationale behind Japan’s
development assistance policy over the decades is a rich source to illuminate norms,
strategy, and its own perceived role in the world, but specifically, in Asia. As discussed
in Chapter 3, when Japanese Foreign Minister Asō Tarō announced the ‘Arc of Freedom
and Prosperity,’ it made Japan’s values in foreign policy more overt, and the speech
contained unambiguous language of “economic prosperity,” and references to Japan’s
role “[i]n assisting countries as they take…steps forward,” and serving “as an ‘escort
runner’ to support these countries” (2006b). These, however, were not new, just explicit
values.
Development assistance is a tool of Japan’s foreign policy which has been a
primary conduit in the postwar era for efforts to strengthen relations with other states, and
their societies around the world. The significance of development assistance as a tool for
foreign policy is partially due to Japan’s constrained military spending, which has
resulted in more emphasis on the carrot than on the stick in terms of strategy. This carrotbased strategy has ramifications, some intended and some not. What are the intended
objectives to this strategy? What are the unintended outcomes? Asō clearly indicated this
linkage, but how does it interact with a simultaneous securitization of Islam? While many
developing states around the world receive development assistance from Japan, Asian
states receive overwhelmingly the most, which should come as no surprise. Moreover,
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Muslim Asian states are also large recipients of Japan’s development assistance. How
does this interact with the grand strategy, foreign policy, and security?
To parse the norms, strategy, role, objectives, and of course, formulate how
securitization is operating in Tokyo’s foreign policy with Muslim Asia, the triangular
symbiotic framework is a suitable analytical framework. All three facets of foreign
policy, geoculture, geo-economics, and geopolitics, are evident in Tokyo’s development
assistance policy vis-à-vis Muslim Asia states. This chapter examines Japan’s
development assistance programs in Muslim Asia, as it relates to the Arc, and to
securitization of Islam. In securitization theory, the urgency of a perceived threat has a
saliency sufficient to deem it necessary to circumvent ordinarily prescribed rules, and,
thus, can have substantial political outcomes. The chapter proceeds by first providing a
brief background of Japan’s postwar development assistance policy, then analyzes the
three development assistance charters which provide a nuanced understanding of Tokyo’s
norms, strategy, role, and objectives with the foreign policy tool, which also evolves
through each version. The following section considers the morality of loan assistance,
and how this is conceptualized in Japanese and Islamic thought. Lastly, the chapter
proceeds by examining contemporary cases and challenges which allow for comparisons
of securitization.
Background
Before becoming an aid-donor nation, postwar Japan was first an aid-recipient nation.
Much of the urban infrastructure, capital stock, and assets that built a modern empire
during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century were destroyed during the war,
banks were drained of capital, and businesses were bankrupt. Yet, during the postwar
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occupation, serendipitously, U.S. forces found it strategically necessary to ‘prop up’
Japan and make it “a model of economic success that displayed the vitality and
possibilities of embracing the democratic capitalistic system” (Feasel 2015, 11). U.S.
President Eisenhower told congressional leaders in 1954, “If we don’t assist Japan,
gentlemen, Japan is going Communist” (LaFeber 1997, 306). A strong, democratic Japan
was essential for the U.S. strategy to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War, so
Washington offered substantial development assistance to Japan in order to revitalize its
destroyed manufacturing industry, and also opened up a massive and affluent market of
American consumers where Japan could export these products. From 1946 until 1951,
Japan was the recipient of nearly $2 billion in aid from the U.S. After Japan’s sovereignty
was restored in 1952, Japan joined the World Bank, which provided Japan with nearly $1
billion in aid from 1953 to 1966. While this aid was used for many revitalization projects,
emphasis was placed primarily on infrastructure development (Feasel 2015, 11-13). From
1956 until 1970 the U.S. Export-Import Bank also provided nearly $1 billion in long-term
loans (Feasel 2015, 13).
In 1954, while Japan was still a recipient of development aid, it began venturing
into the role of offering economic assistance on a limited scale by contributing $50,000 to
the Colombo Plan (Söderberg 2017, 5). At the time, only ten states were party to the
Colombo Plan, including the U.S., Indonesia, Pakistan, and India. It was a small step, but
one which helped reintroduce Japan into participation in regional organizations
(Yanagihara and Emig 1991, 37). Around the same time, Japan began war reparations
negotiations with Burma, the Philippines, and Indonesia. While the reparations were
intended to provide compensation for infrastructure damage incurred during the war,
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Japan had crafted the reparations with a dual purpose so they were also directly tied to the
export of Japanese products; “although it was labeled war compensation, it was also a
way for the Japanese government to rebuild its own industry through promotion of
exports” (Söderberg 2015, 152). The money paid in “reparations” went into financing
Japanese investments and exports to these nations (LaFeber 1997, 310). As Feasel argues,
“[w]hat Japan soon realized is that rather than being an economic burden the reparation
payments opened up the markets in these countries to its own exports, something the
countries would have been highly resistant to given the recent history of the war at the
time” (2015: 48). This would have tremendous outcomes beyond seeking justice for the
wartime invasions. This move opened markets in Southeast Asia to Japanese
manufactured exports long-term, and also started the concentration of Japan’s
development assistance (although they were not calling it that at the time) on Asia
(Yanagihara and Emig 1991, 37).
The first yen loan within the rules of the World Bank was offered to India in
1958, and a similar yen loan was provided to Pakistan in 1960 (Yanagihara and Emig
1991, 38: Feasel 2015, 50). In 1960 Japan was a founding member of the OECD
Development Assistance Group (later Committee) (DAC), and was admitted into the
OECD itself three years later. Japan had also just joined the IMF a few years prior, and
membership in these institutions both fortified its postwar role among the “rich donors’
club” and forced its development assistance to meet a set of international standards
(Söderberg 2017, 1). There were no misgivings about the nature of these loans; the
Japanese preferred to call them “economic cooperation” rather than “aid,” and they were
clearly laying groundwork for Japanese exports, and later FDI, into the markets
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(Yanagihara and Emig 1991, 38). By the late 1960s, most of Japan’s ODA was no longer
in the form of reparations, and together with the U.S., Japan founded the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) in 1966, with each country putting up $200 million (Feasel
2015, 49).
Throughout the 1960s, Japan’s development assistance was exclusively to east
and southeast Asian states, serving the dual purpose of assisting in development, but also
opening up export markets, but this would soon change with the new decade. The 1973
oil crisis forced Japan to broaden its geographic scope of aid recipients to include Arab
states, and illustrated a shift in the utilization of the aid tool from export promotion to
resource security (Yanagihara and Emig 1991, 41). The use of development assistance as
a foreign policy tool had veered from geo-economic interests to geopolitical interests.
Geoculture, while always imbedded in foreign aid decisions, would not overtly appear
until 1978, when humanitarianism was first mentioned as a purpose for development aid
(Söderberg 2017, 5). After the 1973 oil crisis, Japan adopted a loose, unofficial policy to
distribute its ODA at 70:10:10:10, with 70 being 70 percent to Asia, and 10 percent to
Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, respectively (Söderberg 1996, 34-5).
In 1974, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) was created as the
principal agency that oversees dispersal of ODA, and has facilitated more technical
assistance and training in addition to the yen loans that seemed to dominate the Japanese
style of development assistance. ODA grants have also increased, albeit, still much lower
than yen loans. The total volume of ODA expanded tremendously with the economic
growth and appreciated yen in the late 1970s and 1980s. Between 1973 and 1978, net
disbursements doubled; between 1978 and 1980, they doubled again (Yanagihara and
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Emig 1991, 41). During the decade of the 1980s, Japan’s ODA nearly tripled, and
continued to increase until it peaked in 1995 at nearly $14.5 billion in net disbursement.
In that year, Japan’s net total ODA was nearly double that of the second-largest donor
nation, France, at $8,439 (in USD value) (MOFA 1997). While Japan’s net total ODA
disbursements have remained among the highest in the DAC, it was surpassed in annual
net disbursement by the U.S. in 2001, and more recently by the UK and Germany. It
should be noted that all comparative figures are given in U.S. dollars, and thus subject to
exchange rates at the time, but this too, is reflected in the ODA disbursement decisions in
each year.
Characteristics of Japan’s ODA
Some have criticized Japan’s ODA activity as being the outcome of pressure from
Washington: “[t]hat there has been Japanese cooperation is more a reflection of Tokyo’s
desire to mollify the U.S. than any effort to pursue an expanded foreign policy agenda”
(Hayes 2018, 207). While U.S. pressure, often called ‘gaiatsu’ (外圧) in Japanese, is
indirectly a factor which brought Japan into the role as a donor-nation, the above
statement is an exaggeration of American influence. In fact, Japan’s ODA policy has
done much to strengthen its soft power stature around the world, and Japan has benefitted
for years from “the appearance of a responsible country with a strong social conscience”
(Söderberg 2017, 5). While true, Japan’s development assistance has actually hovered
well below the DAC average when considered as a percentage of gross national income
(Söderberg 2017, 6). Moreover, its aid programs have never been particularly supported
or even well understood by the domestic public (Söderberg 2017, 6).
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There are some characteristics of Japan’s form of development assistance which
distinguish it from other donor-nations. First, to make yen loan arrangements transparent,
recipient states must request aid for a specific project (Feasel 2015, 19).1 Because of this
practice for requests, most of Japan’s ODA is provided bilaterally, much more so than the
average of donor states (see Table 6.1 for bilateral ODA dispersements) (Donor Tracker
2018). Moreover, Japan tends to focus on infrastructure development projects for its yen
loans – usually, this is transport infrastructure such as roads, railways, ports and power
plants, and communications infrastructure (Söderberg 2017, 6: Yanagihara and Emig
1991, 46).
Secondly, there is a notably heavy reliance on loans for ODA, rather than grants.2
Fifty-eight percent of Japan’s bilateral ODA in 2015 was in loans, while the DAC
average was just ten percent (Donor Tracker 2018). Japanese ODA policymakers call this
“help to self-help” (enjo kara, jijo e), because a recipient should be able to use the aid by
investing in something which contributes to economic growth, and thus, should have the
capacity to pay off the loan and continue benefitting from the investment long-term.
Ideally, countries are expected to ‘graduate’ from ODA-recipients to dynamic trade
partners. While the emphasis on loans has garnered criticism from other donor-states, and
naturally grants are preferred over loans by recipients, some scholars of ODA have noted
that loan aid “helps the recipients foster a credit culture, moral principles and discipline
as borrowers” (Takahashi and Owa 2017, 26). To be clear, yen loans tend to have

1

In reality, requests by recipient states often come from suggestions made by JICA staff, but this is often
out of procedural knowledge, and does not necessarily interfere with the need for transparency (Feasel
2015, 79).
2

See Table 6.2 for bilateral grant recipients as of 2015.
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comparably low interest rates and extended grace periods, but there is a striking
distinctiveness regarding this expectation of repayments by Tokyo that is not seen to the
same degree by other donor nations (Donor Tracker 2018).
Feasel makes the point that Japan’s self-help perspective and high utilization of
yen loans for development aid is partially rooted in its own postwar experiences, but it is
also rooted in the fact “Japan does not have the Judeo-Christian tradition or the
missionary history where aid and charity for less developed nations or less fortunate
individuals has strong historical precedents” (2015: 38). This might be a superficial
understanding of the norms and values of a donor state, but Sawamura argues poignantly
“the Japanese people believe that most other bilateral donors have a tradition of Christian
beliefs,” and with that understanding they seek to base their ODA philosophy on their
own unique experiences (2004: 29). To that end, Japanese political elites frequently speak
of Japan’s rapid modernization during the Meiji Period, especially in recipient states, as a
model for development based on “help to self-help.”
Despite garnering occasional criticisms, Japanese ODA practice follows along
with the Japanese cultural practice of okaeshi (お返し), which is the etiquette of giving
whereby reciprocation by the receiver is understood as obligatory, but in due time. It also
relates to the concept of on (恩), which is a favor, but also implies an indebtedness, not
exclusively a financial indebtedness, but one of a karmic sense.3 The two terms can be
combined to form ongaeshi (恩返し), or the return of a favor out of gratitude. It carries
an emotive nuance that is absent in okaeshi. Many learn of the concept from a popular

It is also expressed as hōon (報恩), a term more widely known as Boeun, a key tenant of the Jeungism
religious movement in Korea.
3
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folklore tale with Shinto undertones, Tsuru no Ongaeshi (The Crane’s Return of Favor).
After the March 2011 earthquake in Eastern Japan, the Iraqi government offered $10
million in disaster relief aid (Miyata 2017, 79). When asked about the substantial
contribution from a country struggling with its own war-torn reconstruction, a member of
the Iraqi federal parliament noted that “this is a return of gratitude for what Japan has
done for us up to now,” clarifying that it was an act of appreciation for what Japan did in
terms of reconstruction assistance after the Iraq War (Miyata 2017, 79). The statement
was translated in Japanese as ongaeshi. This illustrates a difference in understanding in
the value of charitable giving between the West and Japan, but also, and more
importantly for this project, it relates to Japan’s understanding of development aid, and
the Islamic practice of prohibiting riba, or usury, which is discussed in the following
section.
A third characteristic of Japan’s ODA is a characteristic that was evident from the
very beginning yet persists: ODA is often set up contractually in a way as to enable
private sector engagement. Thus, ODA is deliberately designed to open doors for FDI
and an export market. Japanese development aid has a category separate from ODA
called Other Official Flows (OOF), which are credits below market price. Then, private
investment tends to come in after this (Söderberg 2017, 3). The OOF and private
investment tend to be included in Japan’s development aid data, but not used
internationally, although DAC’s revision to their definition of development assistance has
allowed for some of these to be taken into consideration in their figures as well
(Söderberg 2017, 3).
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Development Assistance Charters
In 1992, an ODA Charter was announced by then Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki.
The charter put geoculture at the forefront of Japan’s ODA initiatives. The principles of
the Charter were listed as follows:
1. Environmental conservation and development should be pursued in tandem.
2. Any use of ODA for military purposes or for the aggravation of international
conflicts should be avoided.
3. Full attention should be paid to trends in recipient countries’ military
expenditures, their development and production of weapons of mass destruction
and missiles, their export and import of arms, et cetera, so as to maintain and
strengthen international peace and stability, and from the viewpoint that
developing countries should place appropriate priorities in the allocation of their
resources in their own economic and social development.
4. Full attention should be paid to efforts for promoting democratization and the
introduction of a market-oriented economy, and the situation regarding securing
basic human rights and freedoms in the recipient countries (MOFA 1992).
With regard to regions, the Charter states:
Historically, geographically, politically and economically, Asia is a region close
to Japan. East Asian countries, especially member countries of ASEAN,
constitute one of the most economically dynamic regions in the world, and it is
important…to sustain and promote the economic development of these countries.
There are, however, some Asian countries where large segments of the population
still suffer from poverty. Asia, therefore, will continue to be a priority region for
Japan’s ODA (MOFA 1992).
The Charter coincided with the end of the Cold War, and the creation of new post-Soviet
states in Asia, as well as with the end of the Gulf War. It also, however, coincided with
the post-bubble economy in Japan. While the malaise persists today, it is important to
bear in mind that in 1992 it was widely assumed to be a short-term lapse in economic
growth, and this ‘optimism’ is reflected in the language found in this document. In light
of the persisting new economic uncertainty, the Japanese public became less interested in
its role as a major global aid donor during the 1990s (Söderberg 2017, 6). Nonetheless,
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Japan would remain the largest single source of ODA in the world from 1989 until 2001
(Hayes 2018, 207-08).
In 2003, Japan revised its Charter to emphasize peace-building. It states “[t]he
objectives of Japan’s ODA are to contribute to peace and development of the
international community, and thereby to help ensure Japan’s own security and prosperity
[italics added]” (MOFA 2003). In other words, something is overtly expected in return
(okaeshi) for the ODA contributions. There may have never been any pretenses to
altruism, but here the point is clear a positive sum outcome is expected, and what Japan
gets out of the outcome is articulated.
Reflective of the change in times since 1992, another noteworthy point about the
revised Charter is the utterance of a particular word six times which was never mentioned
in the 1992 version: terror. It states:
conflicts and terrorism are occurring more frequently and they are becoming even
more serious issues. Preventing conflicts and terrorism [italics added], and efforts
to build peace, as well as efforts to foster democratization, and to protect human
rights and the dignity of individuals have become major issues inherent to the
stability and development of the international community. Japan, as one of the
world’s leading nations, is determined to make best use of ODA to take the
initiative in addressing these issues (MOFA 2003).
The four principles remain mostly the same at the 1992 Charter, but notably, in the third
principle, “including the prevention of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction” is added in the list of conditions to be considered for recipient states (MOFA
2003). The revised Charter also mentions an objective not mentioned in the initial one:
“assuring Japan’s security and prosperity,” an unmistakable enunciation linking security
of the state to development assistance abroad (MOFA 2003). The revised charter is also
much more detailed than the first, and calls for broad participation by Japanese citizens,
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as if offering to deploy them as part of a securitizing sector, which is not mentioned in the
initial Charter. The revised Charter starts with almost a self-congratulatory tone: “Taking
advantage of Japan’s experience as the first nation in Asia to become a developed
country,” and “Japan has significantly contributed to the economic and social
development of developing countries, especially in East Asia” (MOFA 2003). It reiterates
Japan’s regional emphasis on Asia, but addresses a need to broaden its target region from
Southeast Asia: “Also, Japan will give due consideration to the large population of
impoverished people in South Asia. With respect to Central Asia and the Caucasus
region, assistance will be provided to promote democratization and transition to market
economies” (MOFA 2003).
In February 2015, Tokyo announced a third Charter which removes references to
ODA altogether and instead uses “development cooperation.” This indicates movement
back to the original language of “economic cooperation” used in the late 1950s when
development assistance first began (Söderberg 2017, 9). It also deliberately indicates a
desire to “cooperate” with Japanese non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in an
attempt to blur the lines between state-level assistance and that which comes from private
organizations in Japan. Private Japanese NGOs have become increasingly dynamic since
the 1995 Kobe earthquake and 1998, when a law was passed in the Diet that relaxed the
regulations for volunteer organizations to incorporate. Since then, Japanese NGOs have
become a major force in disaster relief after natural disasters overseas and the 2011
Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami, and humanitarian aid during and after the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan. A major Japanese NGO active in Muslim Asia is the Japan International
Volunteer Center, with community health and education projects in Gaza, Kirkuk, Phang
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Nga Province (a Muslim-majority area in southern Thailand), and several locations in
Afghanistan. Another is the Japan Iraq Medical Network, which provides medical
assistance for children in Iraq and Syria. Despite being non-governmental, the
government tends to be a significant funding source for NGOs, primarily through grants
and subsidies by MOFA, JICA, and prefectural and local governments.
The third charter states that “Japan will provide more focused cooperation in a
strategic, effective and agile manner,” which indicates a sort of justification for making
ODA more selective and austere amid the domestic economic and societal concerns. It
adds “Japan will extend necessary cooperation to countries based on their actual
development needs and affordability” (MOFA 2015b). Regionally, the Charter reiterates
that Asia maintains the geographic focus, stating “Asia is a region that has a close
relationship with Japan and high relevance to its security and prosperity” (MOFA 2015b).
While more detail is added to the regions in the 2015 Charter, there is nothing to reflect a
change in priority. As with the 2003 Charter, Southeast Asia is listed as the first region
(and most detailed), followed by South Asia, Central Asia and the Caucasus. The Middle
East is discussed after Africa in both charters. Mention of “terror” is decreased to only
three times in the third Charter, while the utterance of “environment” went up from seven
times in 2003 to 15 in 2015. From the 1991 Charter, to 2003, to 2015, gradually ODA is
becoming linked to values, such as democratization, human rights, and regional stability
(see Table 6.3).
The evolution of making ODA a foreign policy tool has been met with some
resistance in Japan. Horie warns that politicizing humanitarian assistance is very risky,
given Japan’s contribution in this field is not all that substantial, and can only result in
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animosity (2016: 151). In a sense, the risk is understood, but this is a misinterpretation. It
is nothing new that ODA is being tied to Japan’s national interests, but these national
interests are shifting to link ODA not only to geoeconomics, but also geopolitics, and
more firmly (overtly) to geo-culture. One should not assume that advocating
democratization and human rights is for geopolitical interests. It may be done to appease
Washington, but it appears as if the Trump administration cares little about these issues in
Asia. It may also be to distinguish Japan from China, but it is hardly a carrot to consider
for potential aid recipients when China is offering so much more in its AIIB and One
Belt, One Road Initiative (BRI). The application of these values in strategy is discussed
further in the following chapter.
ODA decisions, nonetheless, are undoubtedly connected to domestic politics in
Japan, as they are also connected to exogenous variables of the time. In Japan, MOFA is
in charge of designing policy, but it does not have the authority, however, to offer any
loans without cooperation with the Ministry of Finance, currently headed by Deputy
Prime Minister (and architect of the Arc), Asō Tarō. The Ministry of Finance, however,
cannot issue all loans, but rather, must receive approval from the Diet for all budgetary
matters. Both MOFA and the Ministry of Finance have LDP politicians at the top, and
bureaucrats who control the bulk of operations. Any ODA decision is delegated for
implementation by JICA. This includes loans, grants, and technical cooperation. For
technical cooperation, JICA often dispatches Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers
(JOCV) to developing countries, in programs that mirror the Peace Corps in the U.S.
Increasingly, JICA collaborates with Japan-based NGOs, as implied in the 2015 charter.
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Riba, Yen Loans, Morality, and Normativity
Islamic banking is based on the principle of profit and loss sharing. Thus, rather than
charge interest on loans, Islamic banks participate in the yield that results from loans,
together with the borrowers. Thereby, a partnership is formed. The main justification for
Islamic banking is the moral prohibition of riba, as cited in the Qur’an. In conventional
banking, riba is associated with drawing interest, in thus, usury. This idea of money
breeding money is long-held as an immoral offense found in the writings of a wide range
of classical jurists (Tripp 2006, 66). There remains ambiguity, however, regarding the
extent to which ‘interest’ directly translates to riba, as some notable Muslims have
argued a reasonable application of interest is acceptable within moral limitations while
others condemn all forms.
The morality in both Islamic banking and Japan’s yen loans has also interacted
with another method of moral-based banking that originates in Muslim Asia:
microfinance. Bangladeshi economist Muhamad Yunus founded the Grameen Bank of
Bangladesh in 1976 based on the principals of microfinance, which earned him the Nobel
Peace Prize in 2006. Microfinance differs from conventional banking because it aims to
provide loans to the poor, who have no collateral or credit. With loans no more than
$120, the poor in Bangladesh are able to make a practical investment which would draw a
larger return. For example, someone could use the loan to purchase a sewing machine to
start a textiles trade, or a cow for milking, or a cellular phone. Loans are overwhelmingly
given to women, who repay their loans in person, together with other borrowers, which
creates an accountability system. While there are characteristics of Yunus’s microfinance
concept which are shared with both Japanese yen loan practices and Islamic banking, it
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has also received considerable criticism from the latter. Bangladesh is a Muslim-majority
country, and Yunus is a practicing Muslim, but Grameen Bank is not shari’a-compliant
since it charges interest on loans and pays interest on deposits (albeit, simple interest and
not compounded interest). The normative basis for Japanese yen loan distributions based
on ‘help to self-help’ are also seen in microfinance, where Yunus argues that charity to
the poor only leads to dependency and lack of inducement (Abdul Rahman 2007, 39).
Moreover, both intend to offer loans designed for revenue-generating ventures. Yunus is
familiar with Japanese business practices, and even joined the Grameen Bank together
with Japanese clothing retailer, Uniqlo, in 2011 for a joint venture textile company in
Bangladesh called Grameen JV (Pesek 2014, 130).
What microfinance shares with Islamic banking is firstly, their shared criticism
that conventional banking is immoral, as both emphasize the borrower as the poor, and an
obligation to protect and assist the poor. Secondly, there are effective, yet differing
accountability mechanisms in both systems. In microfinance, an accountability
mechanism is created in the communal responsibility of the recipient group. If one
member of the recipient group cannot follow through with repayment, she must surrender
membership to the bank, as does everyone in the group. Thus, there is a strong incentive
program for individuals to not let down their group peers, and if they do, there is an
incentive for the group peers to fill in and repay on behalf of the delinquent individual
(although they are not explicitly required to do so). In Islamic banking, the accountability
mechanism is created between the lender and borrower in profit and loss sharing
arrangements, which incentivizes each to be fair with the other and pragmatic with the
decision for the loan to take place.
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As noted in the previous chapter, Islamic banking practices have appealed to nonMuslims in Southeast Asia, such as ethnic-Chinese. In many ways, the moral values
emanated through Islamic banking share much with the moral values which dictate the
“help, to self-help” approach to development aid. As mentioned earlier, Japanese yen
loans do charge interest, but with relatively generous conditions. For the least developed
countries, according to the most recent terms and conditions, yen loans can be as little as
0.1 percent interest at a fixed rate, with a maximum ten-year grace period, for forty years
of repayment. Terms and conditions are stricter with countries categorized as more
developed, but rarely does the interest rate exceed one percent (JICA 2017). Points of
concern exist, however; Japan could conceivably draw exorbitantly more interest if, over
time, the yen appreciates to the local currency, which would be seen as highly immoral.
Moreover, Japan often works in a clause to its yen loan contracts that 30 to 50 percent of
investment contracts must be awarded to Japanese companies, as it is viewed as the start
of a long-term relationship between the two.
Japan’s approach to its yen loans is based on its values system predicated on
ongaeshi in giving, and this is reinforced by its own historic experience as a loan
recipient who transitioned successfully from ‘help, to self-help.’ Thus, the normative
implication is that recipients of Japan’s yen loans are both capable of, and responsible for
achieving development as Japan had done. Islam teaches differently regarding giving, but
there is a clear compatibility between the two views. Both yen loans and Islamic banking
induce the lender to maintain a vested interest in the actual achievement progress of the
borrower, and thus, both can facilitate for strengthening long-term ties through the
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lending transaction. The following section explores the longest of those ties, between
Japan and Muslim Southeast Asia.
Southeast Asia: The First Recipients
Postwar, Muslim populations in Southeast Asia were, with reason, hesitant to reestablish
economic relations and deepen trade ties with Japan. As mentioned in the previous
chapter, this was something the Japanese have been able to gradually overcome with
more success than in Northeast Asia. One possible reason is because the Southeast Asian
experience of Japanese colonization was much briefer than the Northeast Asian
experience, making up no more than four years in any given part of Southeast Asia. Thus,
in China and Korea, there is a longer record of invasion, occupation, and subservience in
the historical memory. Moreover, there is an understanding that Japan’s invasion and
short occupation of Southeast Asian territories was an inadvertent critical juncture in their
histories by displacing Western powers, and thereby perpetuated the causal chain of
events that singled out national heroes, and led to national independence for these states.
In the case of Indonesia, after Japan’s surrender in August 1945 thousands of Japanese
soldiers trained or even joined local forces to fight the Dutch when they inevitably
returned (Tjandraningsih 2009).4
Thus, in the immediate postwar years, there was naturally a suspicion regarding
Japan’s potential and hegemonic ambitions in the region, but it did not persist as it does

4

Another reason amends could progress easily with Indonesia was on account of a quasi-diplomatic
marriage. Just after diplomatic relations were established in 1958 between Indonesia and Japan, in 1959
Indonesian President Sukarno wed a 21-year old Japanese actress, Nemoto Naoko. Nemoto changed her
name to Ratna Sari Dewi, took Indonesian citizenship, converted to Islam, and with her popularity played a
significant role in restoring a positive image of Japan for Indonesians, and convincing Sukarno to develop a
trusting relationship with Japan. Even as Sukarno became more autocratic and distanced himself from the
U.S. in the early 1960s, he was simultaneously building closer relations with Japan.
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today in Northeast Asia. As argued by Hayes, “[r]eparations were paid to some
[Southeast Asian] countries…while agreements were reached with other countries under
which they would receive quantities of capital goods,” thereby “[t]hese agreements
helped smooth the way to the opening and development of markets in south-east Asia”
(2018: 196). It has not been entirely smooth, however. The previous chapter discussed the
1974 Malari Incident, sparked by concerns in Jakarta over multiple grievances including
Japanese ‘economic imperialism’ and insensitivities to local needs. Yet, ODA has served
as a specific tool to placate such complaints.
Indicators show a tremendous change since the Malari Incident. Indonesia has
been the single largest recipient of Japanese ODA (Feasel 2015, 50). Between 1960 and
2011, Indonesia received $36 billion from Japan in aid, far surpassing the second greatest
donor, the U.S., at $7 billion, total (Feasel 2015, 55). Singapore and Brunei were also
once recipients of Japan’s ODA, but have since ‘graduated’ from the program. In 1982,
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad launched the ‘Look East Policy,’ which
called for the emulation of Japan’s economy and attracting Japanese capital to Malaysia.
Japan eagerly welcomed the policy, increasing its ODA to, and FDI in Malaysia. In 1986,
Mohamad brought in Japanese advisors to the Malaysian government for implementing
an industrialization plan, much as Japan had done with Western advisors in the late
nineteenth century.5 The policy received renewed vigor when Vision 2020 was
announced by Mohamad in 1991. There are inevitable trade issues, and increasingly so as

5

Skilled advisors from Europe and the U.S. called oyatoi gaikokujin (お雇い外国人) were hired by the
Meiji government for technology transfer in order to speed up the modernization process in Japan.
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both countries are leading the effort to persevere with the CPTPP, but an openness to
deepen economic and cultural relations is seen on both sides.
The previous chapter shows Indonesia and Malaysia are Japan’s two biggest
Muslim export markets, and both are significant destinations for Japanese FDI today.
Favorability surveys conducted in 2015 showed 71 percent of Indonesian respondents
had a favorable view of Japan while 13 percent had an unfavorable view (Stokes 2015,
14). In Malaysia, 84 percent had a favorable view while 9 percent had an unfavorable
view (Stokes 2015, 14). In fact, the Malaysian view of Japan was even higher than the
Japanese view of themselves in the same survey, as Japanese showed an 82 percent
favorable view and 15 percent unfavorable view of their own country (Stokes 2015, 14)!
Insofar as soft power and export markets are objectives of Japan’s ODA, Southeast Asia
is a success story. On top of this, if making amends with wartime occupation was an
additional objective unique to Northeast and Southeast Asia, the objective was mostly
achieved in the latter while hardly so with the former.
Central Asia: A ‘New Asia’
The end of the Soviet Union and subsequent creation of independent republics in Central
Asia have offered Japan an opportunity to explore its role in Asia as a state that offers
development aid. Once glasnost-based policies in the Soviet Union allowed for greater
freedom of information in the late 1980s, Japanese scholars had more opportunity to
conduct research in Central Asia, which was met by romanticized notions of the Silk
Road by the public. Learning of the Silk Road transmission of Buddhism through Central
Asia, people were drawn to Orientalized notions of the region, but rather than draw
distinctions, they found ways to connect with it. Scholars and pseudo-scholars touted
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cultural similarities, and highlighted a plausible, but not well supported linguistic theory
that the Japanese language belongs to the same Altaic language family as the Turkic
languages spoken throughout Central Asia, except Tajikistan, and in Azerbaijan, Turkey,
and among Russian Tatars. The linguistic theory is mostly discredited today, yet it
provides a geocultural narrative for Japan’s curiosity about Central Asia, as a ‘new Asia,’
where Japan can assume itself a ‘role model,’ and do so without the historical baggage it
carries in Northeast and Southeast Asia. Moreover, it interestingly provides the Japanese
with a geocultural tool to unite with a broader segment of Asia, yet a fraternity that is
exclusive of Han Chinese, according to the ethnolinguistic theory. Another interesting
point about constructing a geocultural relationship with Central Asia is how it conflicts
with a simultaneous narrative in Japan known as Nihonjinron, which emphasizes
Japanese exceptionalism and uniqueness. Rather, in this case, Japan is straining to relate
itself to a new Asia.
Over a quarter century after independence, ODA remains the only robust
connection between the Central Asian republics and Japan. The republics have remained
a fraction of a percent of Japan’s global exports markets and FDI destinations, the muchtouted energy resources in Central Asia hardly make their way to Japan, and interpersonal
relations are constrained by lack of transactional opportunities (Barber 2018, 34-35).
ODA, however, has been consistent, and a revealing facet to Japan’s ODA strategy as it
relates to conceptualization of Asia, Islam, and its own role.
In 2006, Asō explained the motivation behind Japan’s involvement in Central
Asia:
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if you think of a chain, you can realize that if a single link is weak, it doesn’t
matter if the rest of the chain is sturdily constructed. It is the strength – or, more
accurately, the weakness – of that single link that determines the strength of the
entire chain, and this is essentially how Japan perceives this issue (2006a).
He adds:
The countries of Central Asia have historically had a large number of secular
Muslims. However, in recent years we have repeatedly been made aware of
Islamic extremism permeating into the area from the south and the west. In the
battle to prevent terrorism, which uproots world order and stability, there is
simply no way around the task of patiently going about strengthening weakest
links (2006a).
Obviously, Asō makes a distinction within the realm of “Islam”: “secular Muslims”
(sezokutekina isuramu-kyōto) and “Islamic extremism” (isuramu kagekishugi). Also
interesting is the securitization framing: the ‘Islamic extremism’ is an invasive threat,
“from the south and the west.” This is a securitization speech act, with Asō, the
securitizing actor, Islamic extremism from the south and the west the threat, and Central
Asia is the referent object, as the “weakest link.” This characterization by Asō creates a
clear image of multiple zones of Islam across Asia and incorporated into the Arc.
Moreover, it is also revealing of Japan’s strategy for this security threat: strengthen the
weakest link of the chain by aiding Central Asia with development.
Japan Centers
Japan Centers are ODA hubs specifically located in countries transitioning from
planned economies to market economies. Started in 2000, Japan Centers are located in
nine countries in former Soviet republics, mainland Southeast Asia, and Mongolia. In
Central Asia, there is a Japan Center in Bishkek, Tashkent, and Almaty (with a branch
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office in Astana).6 The Japan Centers are managed by JICA, and adhere to its ODA
Charter. Japan Centers “offer training that focuses on management know-how and
knowledge that are traditional strengths of Japanese business” (JICA 2012). The Japan
Center boasts in its own literature that their trainees include “executives who used
Japanese production management techniques to expand their businesses and
entrepreneurs who relied on Japan Center’s training to develop their business model”
(JICA 2012). A normativity is clear in this approach which exemplifies Japan’s view of
how development is to take place, and beyond this, it relates directly to access to markets
and democratization. It is a display of liberal normativity usually associated with the
West, and an example of Japan defying its own proclivity toward an identity based upon
uniqueness, and thus defying Nihonjinron. Japan is admitting its model is replicable –
and of all places, replicable in landlocked, resource-rich, sparsely-populated societies of
Muslims. Cultural, geographical, historical, and developmental indicators all show great
differences with Japan, yet perceptions highlight the similarities.
ODA and Securitization of Islam
Japan’s decisions in ODA disbursement are always tied to the geocultural, geo-economic,
and geopolitical motivations for foreign policy engagement, but certain events in Muslim

6

Japan Centers differ from the locations of the Japan Foundation, which is a state-sponsored, autonomous
cultural promotion organization similar to China’s Confucius Institute and the UK’s British Council. The
Japan Foundation has 23 locations abroad, but among the ten in Asia, only Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur are
cities (and countries) with Muslim majorities. There is a clear dearth of Japan Foundation locations in
Muslim Asia. Nagasawa and Nukii (2015) of JIIA argue in comparison to the West, Russia and China,
“Japan’s strategies to publicize its culture are clearly inferior”; therefore, “more Japan Foundation offices
should be established, to supplement its sole regional office in Cairo as a way to cultivate pro-Japanese
opinion leaders and improve Japan’s image in the Middle East” (236). They go on to suggest locating new
offices in Dubai, Tehran, and Istanbul (236). Japan Foundation focuses on the dissemination of a cultural
message, and the deliberate crafting of soft power by means of attracting interest in language, culture, and
the arts. Japan Centers, on the other hand, have a more practical application that relates to development and
Japanese norms of business and market operations.
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Asia have resulted in Japan withdrawing its planned ODA disbursement due to perceived
security threats from religious terrorism. Paradoxically, it is often precisely these states
where the security threats emerge which are most in need of Japan’s ODA. Three cases,
the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in the Philippines, Syria, and Bangladesh are
selected here because all were sites of ISIS terrorist events that occurred in a span of less
than three years, yet the three cases resulted in very different policy decisions by Tokyo.
Through examining the three, a better understanding of how Islam is securitized by
Tokyo is attained.
Bangsamoro
In the Philippines, Japan’s ODA has been particularly active in the Muslim
Mindanao region. While Muslims make up less than six percent of the population in the
Philippines, Muslims have lived in the western parts of the southern island, Mindanao,
since before the arrival of the Spanish in the sixteenth century. The Spanish called the
Muslim Filipinos ‘Moors,’ from which their current name, ‘Moro,’ is derived. There has
been an ongoing negotiation for the creation of an autonomous region in western
(Muslim) Mindanao to be called Bangsamoro, but has been stalled due to resistance from
independence movements among some Moros, attempts at a federal arrangement by
President Rodrigo Duterte, and violence from pro-ISIS militants.
Muslim Mindanao is the most impoverished region in the Philippines. During his
first stint as Prime Minister, Abe announced the ‘Japan-Bangsamoro Initiatives for
Reconstruction and Development’ (J-BIRD) in 2006, which launched Japanese
engagement in the region. Under J-BIRD, Japan made stability and peace in Mindanao
one of its three key objectives for ODA to the Philippines. In 2013, JICA negotiated for a

228

Comprehensive Development Project with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front’s
Bangsamoro Development Agency, notwithstanding the fact the political entity had not
officially come into existence yet. While the implementation of Bangsamoro as an
autonomous region has been stalled, Tokyo’s decision to proceed with the
Comprehensive Development Project with a political entity in-waiting is a remarkable
and uncharacteristic engagement by Tokyo in an issue that is both politicized and
securitized within domestic politics in the Philippines. Subsequently, Japan focused
disproportionately a significant amount of its ODA activities in the Philippines – the
second greatest recipient of Japanese ODA – on the Muslim Mindanao region. On
MOFA’s Japanese-version website, it explains that it seeks to provide aid at various
levels so the new autonomous government “will build trust from the populace” (MOFA
2015a).
Violence by pro-ISIS militants in Muslim Mindanao has stalled the
implementation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, and stalled opportunities for
economic development. In 2017, there was a five-month-long conflict between a pro-ISIS
militant group and the Filipino military in the city of Marawai, resulting in over a
thousand dead, including 87 civilians. Yet interestingly, there is no indication of
securitization by Japan. Japan has remained focused on its aid program in Muslim
Mindanao, and still dispatches JICA employees and contractors to the region. Progress
has stalled, yet Japan’s role as a primary ODA donor to the region has remained constant.
Syria
In late January 2015, two Japanese men were separately kidnapped in Syria and
offered for a $200 million ransom by ISIS. The ransom video was addressed directly to
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Abe: “You have proudly donated $100 million to kill our women and children, to destroy
the homes of the Muslims…and in an attempt to stop the expansion of the Islamic State,
you have also donated another $100 million to train the apostates” (Sugawara 2015, 45).
When the Japanese government refused to pay the ransom, the two were executed. ISIS
linked this occasion with Japan’s aid. Just two days prior to the ransom message being
broadcast, Abe was in Egypt where he announced,
In order to help reduce the threat ISIL poses, we will offer our support to Turkey
and Lebanon and also provide aid to the refugees and displaced persons of Iraq
and Syria. To those nations battling with ISIL, we pledge a total of $200 million
[italics added] to aid in the development of human resources and infrastructure
(Sugawara 2015, 46).
The $200 million value is conspicuously the same as the ISIS hostage takers’ ransom
request. One could assume Japan was not so much a target, but rather, a timely
opportunity for extortion fell into the hands of ISIS, and not true enmity specifically
towards Japan.7 During the execution of the second hostage, the ISIS member made an
ominous threat, “let the nightmare for Japan begin!” Interestingly, however, the Japanese
public responded to the event and its outcome by blaming the victims for causing distress
to the country, and unwisely placing themselves in danger (Spitzer 2015). In fact, the
number of non-Muslim Japanese visiting mosques in Japan simply out of curiosity
increased after the incident (Yamagata 2017, 13). This clearly illustrates a case of Islam
not being securitized, at least among the public, since people wanted to learn more about
the religion as it came to the forefront of social consciousness.

One of the hostages, Gotō Kenji, was a Japanese Christian, but there is no evidence this was apparent to
the ISIS kidnappers, or whether it would have had any bearing on their decisions.
7
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There was, however, the inevitable securitizing carried out by the political elites.
Abe’s financial pledge notwithstanding, the event highlighted the awkwardness of
Japan’s Middle East foreign policy. Just weeks after the murder of the second Japanese
hostage (and one week after the announcement of the revised Charter for Development
Aid), Foreign Affairs Minister Kishida Fumio announced a new three-pillar response in
regard to the executions: (1) strengthen counter-terrorism measures; (2) enhance
diplomacy toward stability and prosperity in the Middle East; and (3) assist in creating
societies that do not give rise to radicalization (Kishida 2015). The announcement
included $15.5 million in assistance to building counter-terrorism capacity in the Middle
East region, in addition to raising Abe’s declared $200 million in humanitarian assistance
to an unspecified larger amount (Kishida 2015). Moreover, Kishida included the goal to
expand interpersonal exchanges “including inviting religious leaders” (Kishida 2015).
The goal of adding religious leaders clearly illustrates the understanding of the terrorism
problem as a religious problem, and it is very unlike Japanese diplomats to even utter
“religious” in foreign policy statements. The linkage of religion is reinforced in the
statement by recommending a “coordination with ASEAN” to “promote moderation”
(Kishida 2015). In other words, ASEAN has the model Muslims, who with Japan’s
decades of development assistance, have proven successful.
Bangladesh
In July 2016, a hostage crisis took place in Dhaka, Bangladesh when five men
took over a busy cafe targeting non-Muslim foreigners. The 22 civilians who were killed
included seven Japanese nationals – all of whom were JICA consultants conducting a
survey of potential development assistance projects for urban transport in Dhaka. Less
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than a year prior to this incident, an elderly Japanese citizen working on an agricultural
assistance project was shot in northern Bangladesh, with the Islamic State claiming
responsibility. Bangladesh has been a key destination for JICA activities since 1973, and
is the third largest recipient of JOCV, although after the October 2015 shooting, MOFA
determined Japanese nationals were being targeted by terrorist groups in Bangladesh and
ordered the return of all JOCVs.
The killing of the JICA consultants in Dhaka reinforced MOFA’s stance, and no
JOCV have been dispatched to Bangladesh since. The two incidents escalated the
securitization of Islam through development aid activities, and ruined development
assistance programs for people in need. In the aftermath of the hostage crisis in Dhaka,
one of the individuals wanted for masterminding the event was Muhammad Saifullah
Ozaki. To the shock of many in Japan, Ozaki was a Bangladeshi who went to university
at Ritsumeikan Asia-Pacific University on a scholarship, earned his bachelors, masters,
and doctoral degrees, obtained Japanese citizenship through marriage to a Japanese
national, and was hired as an assistant professor of economics at Ritsumeikan University
in Kyoto (Sasaki 2016). He came from a conservative Hindu family in Bangladesh, but
converted to fundamentalist Islamic thought while living in Japan (Sasaki 2016). Ozaki,
suddenly disappeared together with his wife and four children in January 2016 without
word to his employer (Sasaki 2016). To date, Ozaki and his family have not been located.
The killings and the Ozaki case raised concerns in Japan about how close it really is to
ISIS threats, and elevated calls for action.
There are two poignant angles of securitization here. First is the perception that
Japanese nationals – who were in Bangladesh for the purposes of development assistance
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– are targets. Precisely because these individuals were in the country for the purposes of
development assistance, and they were targeted, according to MOFA, elevated the need
for securitization. Secondly, however, it brought in a subversive domestic element, that a
possible mastermind of the attack was a long-time resident of Japan, a representative of
Japan as a passport holder, a respected member of his community as a teacher, and
someone who was radicalized in Japan heightened awareness of terrorism significantly.
Adopting the Buzan et al. definition of securitization, “the issue is presented as an
existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal
bounds of political procedure” (1998: 23-24), one has to question a relationship between
this case and the introduction of an anti-conspiracy law (kyōbōzai) by the Japanese Diet
in December of that year. The anti-conspiracy law was passed in June 2017, and has
garnered international criticism from many who claim it violates rights to privacy and it
legalizes mass surveillance. The specified rationalization for the law mentioned by Abe
was “to prevent terrorism before it happens” (Alberti 2017). While no public statement
directly links kyōbōzai to the Ozaki search, the timing is noteworthy. Buzan et al. note
the criteria for securitization: “[i]f by means of an argument about the priority and
urgency of an existential threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of
procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of
securitization” (1998: 25). Legislation such as kyōbōzai had been attempted multiple
times for years in the Diet, but failed. This one passed after 17 hours of debate (Alberti
2017).
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Conclusion
An examination of the distribution of Japan’s ODA indicates the undeniable emphasis on
Asia. The top nine recipients of Japan’s ODA in 2015 were all Asian states, and five of
the nine are Muslim-majority Asian states (see Table 6.1). Six Muslim Asian states have
‘graduated’ from being ODA recipients and no longer receive ODA from Japan.8 Others
such as Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Malaysia may also ‘graduate’ soon, as well. A
distinction can be noted regarding the dispatch of JOCV, however, between Muslim-Asia
and what could be called Dharmic-Asia. While the dispatch numbers of JOCV are
relatively few, as the key state-level representatives of Japan’s development aid strategy,
political calculations are an inevitable variable that determines the number of JOCV
various countries receive. JOCVs in 2015 were dispatched to 20 countries total, and 18 of
the 20 countries were in Asia. Only six of those 18 were Muslim-majority countries in
Asia.
An Egyptian organizer for the first Japan-Arab Intellectual Exchange in 2006
stated, “Arabs must learn from Japan’s successes, and Japan can learn from Arabs’
mistakes” (Yamauchi 2006, 2). In response to this comment, Yamauchi fairly points out
that “Arabs have not failed at everything, and Japan is not always an example of success”
(2006: 2). Yet, the statement speaks of a certain reputation that has been cultivated. ODA
has served as a tool for Japan’s reputation, which is an essential part of the soft power
Japan garners from these Muslim societies in Asia.

8

These include UAE, Oman, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Brunei. Qatar never was a recipient of
Japan’s ODA.
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ODA is inevitably tied to soft power objectives, and donors clearly want the
recipient societies to know where the ODA originates. Japan is certainly no exception to
this, and JICA and MOFA pay special attention to attitudes in ODA recipient countries
toward Japan via periodic surveys. This is especially important in the pattern Japan has
followed whereby ODA opens a door to FDI, which then opens a door to trade markets.
Using a comparative statistical analysis on the correlation between ODA and recipient
country sentiments toward donor countries, Feasel finds that overall “higher levels of
ODA lead to higher sentiment levels toward the foreign governments” (2015: 153). He
adds specific to the case of Japan, “the fact that it was the largest donor for most of the
1990s the good sentiment return from its relatively larger investment of ODA surely paid
off dividends in helping to improve its reputation and standing in the world” (2015: 156).
Indeed, there was a period of nearly two decades where Japan was the largest provider of
development aid across Muslim Asia. The U.S. has surpassed Japan’s development aid in
Muslim Asia, but coupled with its hard power activities in the same regions, it has not
garnered the same positive reputation as Japan. Sustaining this reputation will be
challenging as Japan is shifting its ODA strategy from geo-economic interests to
geocultural and geopolitical interests. The use of ODA in a carrot-and-stick approach
could tarnish the reputation garnered.
Additionally, losing its position as a top donor will have its ramifications. Japan
can continue to be a significant donor state, but its dominance as the primary donor in
Asia is rapidly being overshadowed, not only by ODA from other DAC members (at
times even including South Korea), but also from China. Beijing’s BRI, and the AIIB
appear destined to eclipse Japan’s ODA activities in Muslim Asia. China can be easier
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than Japan to work with; it is less nitpicky about transparency, increasingly able to offer
huge sums in loans, willing to take greater risks, and equally important, shares with
recipients an identity as part of the developing world. Paradoxically, China is still a
recipient of ODA from Japan. Japan does enjoy higher favorability rating than China in
wide swaths of Asia, but as Feasel’s research shows, these attitudes can change based on
perceptions in recipient countries.
It was no surprise when in 2015, Prime Minister Abe announced Japan together
with ADB would offer $110 billion to finance a development assistance initiative called
the Partnership for Quality Infrastructure. Adding “quality” to the title is a deliberate
linguistic jab to distinguish Japan’s capabilities from China’s. “Quality,” in fact, was
mentioned six times in the February 2015 Development Assistance Charter, usually in the
form of “quality growth,” yet it was mentioned only once among the previous two
charters. Since 2015, “quality” has become the self-defining slogan of Japan’s
development assistance policy. Abe has reiterated the words “quality infrastructure”
(shitsu no takai infura) in Asia on multiple occasions, emphasizing something Japan can
offer in a leadership role, which (presumably) China cannot. In June 2017, Abe made the
contrast clear. As soon as he finished expressing doubts about BRI’s economic viability,
and the risk for debtor-nations, he stated, “We Japanese are very particular about some
aspects of infrastructure. It must be safe and it must be environmentally friendly” (Abe
2017a).
Japan’s development assistance has done much for its soft power in Muslim Asia,
but the dynamics of the continent are rapidly changing, as are the facets of foreign policy
that control Japan’s development assistance. The reputation garnered by Japan is a
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foreign policy asset that is not in the possession of the Chinese, not to mention the
Americans or Russians. Yet, reputation is fragile, and if Japan makes its development
assistance decisions hinging primarily on geopolitical interests, it risks resentment and
disillusionment. If it develops its hard power capabilities and is seen in militarized
interventions alongside the U.S., decades of hard work in cultivating a positive soft
power image can be destroyed in a very short order.
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Table 6.1: Largest Recipients of Total Japanese ODA, 2015
(in million USD)
1. India
$1,538 (15.7%)
2. Vietnam
$1,419 (14.4%)
3. Philippines
$542 (5.5%)
4. Indonesia
$479 (4.9%)
5. Bangladesh
$465 (4.7%)
6. Myanmar
351 (3.6%)
7. Iraq
335 (3.4%)
8. Afghanistan
317 (3.2%)
9. Jordan
254 (2.6%)
10. Kenya
224 (2.3%)
TOTAL
9,820 (100%)
Source: Adapted using data from MOFA (2016).
Table 6.2: Largest Recipients of Japanese Bilateral Grant Aid, 2015
(in million USD)
1. Afghanistan
$283 (14.4%)
2. Myanmar
$202 (10.3%)
3. South Sudan
$81 (4.1%)
4. Iraq
$64 (3.2%)
5. Palestine
$59 (3.0%)
6. Laos
$52 (2.6%)
7. Cambodia
$50 (2.5%)
8. Philippines
$46 (2.3%)
9. Pakistan
$45 (2.3%)
10. Jordan
$44 (2.2%)
TOTAL
$1,971 (100%)
Source: Adapted using data from MOFA (2016).
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Table 6.3: Japan’s ODA Charters Word Frequency (percentage)
word
1992
2003
2015
0
5
3
テロ- (tero-)
(0.00)
(0.13)
(0.04)
“terror-”
環境- (kankyō-)
“environment-”

6
(0.34)

6
(0.16)

18
(0.22)

民主- (minshu-)
“democra-”

2
(0.11)

5
(0.13)

10
(0.12)

人間安全保障
(ningen anzen hoshō)
“human security”

0
(0.00)

2
(0.18)

4
(0.17)

人権 (jinken)
“human rights”

2
(0.11)

4
(0.10)

8
(0.10)

繁栄 (han’ei)
“prosperity”

3
(0.17)

3
(0.08)

18
(0.22)

インフラ (infura)
“infrastructure”

3
(0.17)

0
(0.00)

9
(0.22)

平和- (heiwa-)
“peace-”

5
(0.28)

11
(0.31)

43
(0.54)

安定 (antei)
“stable/stability”

2
(0.11)

8
(0.21)

36
(0.45)

法の支配
(hō no shihai)
“rule of law”

0
(0.00)

0
(0.00)

9
(0.22)

質の高い
(shitsu no takai)
“(high) quality”

0
(0.00)

1
(0.05)

6
(0.16)
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CHAPTER VII
DEMOCRATIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Japan’s Arc, as values-based diplomacy, is an overt statement that values are included in
its foreign policy thinking. Values, however, are always present in every state’s foreign
policy, including Japan’s. Overt or not, any foreign policy action has meaning, and
constitutes an expression of some value to the actor. Japan’s version of foreign policy
was previously deemed “mercantilist power,” and values were known to be seeded
mostly by economic interests (Fouse 2007). The Arc opens this up linguistically, and
transparently includes values beyond economic interests which may have always been
present, but not expressed. What are these values to watch for in Japan’s foreign policy
with Muslim Asia? How does Japan go about expressing them? How do these values
factor into strategy, particularly regarding securitization?
Asō’s Arc speech centered around two familiar concepts: democratization and
human rights. When Abe regained the prime minister’s office in December 2012, he
carried out values-based diplomacy centered on these same concepts. These two concepts
tend to be at the core of the values-based criticisms Western powers wage against the
administrations of certain non-Western states, and thereby make decisions for assistance,
partnership, economic sanctions, or even interventions. To champion democratization and
human rights is something new for Japan, at least as part of its foreign policymaking.
This is not to say Japan cannot make a strong case for democratization and human rights;
it is a success story of sorts, in terms of the postwar U.S. forces imposing democratic
institutions of governance, a constitution that provides a litany of rights to the citizenry,
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and legal, industrial, and agricultural reforms that provided a nebulous basis for a free
market. These were essential in facilitating the postwar miracle.
Contemporary indicators often show Japan as a relatively well functioning
democracy with a human rights record that surpasses much of the rest of the world.
Indeed, Japan is often the exemplar of a non-Western state embracing a ‘universal
standard’ for democratization and human rights, and achieving success through it. Yet,
unlike the West (or Muslim societies), Japan is not a society predicated on universalistic
religious truths that lay the foundation to its worldview, nor is there a historical proclivity
to proselytizing a beliefs system or way of life. On the contrary, as a religious foundation
to Japanese social milieu, Shinto actually teaches relativism of truths based on context in
the present, and emphasizes natural uniqueness rather than universality (Yamakage 2006,
40; Kamata 2009, 34). Therefore, Japanese society tends to identify itself by uniqueness
far more than commonality with others, be it the West or Asia. This chapter explores how
Japan has gone about perpetuating its values of democracy and human rights in Muslim
Asia.
In January 2016, Abe expounded on these values at the Shared Values and
Democracy in Asia Symposium in Tokyo:
[b]e it lovingkindness, benevolence, fraternity, or harmony, I believe that in Asia,
there extends an underground rootstock of thinking that supports democracy and
values freedom and human rights. From there, a beautiful and large-bloomed lotus
flower is now coming into bloom. Coupled with increasingly flourishing trade and
investment, it is bringing peace and prosperity to Asia. If this is not something for
us to rejoice about, then I must ask, what on earth is (Abe 2016)?1

1

This is the official English translation available from the Office of the Prime Minister. Jihi (慈悲) is
translated into “lovingkindness,” but is perhaps more appropriately “mercy.”
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He also used the opportunity to emphasize these shared values specifically with Muslim
Asia: “[t]hose of you from Indonesia, Malaysia, or Pakistan will, I believe, say that you
find a morality identical to lovingkindness and benevolence within the teachings of Islam
as well” (Abe 2016). By mapping out Abe’s statement in Figure 7.1, the values-based
construction of an Asian geoculture is clear, but how has Japan arrived at promulgating
democracy and human rights, and at an understanding that these values are shared with
Muslims in Asia?
This chapter proceeds by first considering the historical developments which lay
the groundwork for the contemporary conceptualization of democracy and human rights
in Japan. It then considers how these ideas have seeped into foreign policy, via the
concept of human security. Next, a content analysis is carried out to reveal how political
actors are linguistically framing democracy and human rights in Japan’s foreign policy
today. Lastly, the chapter looks at specific cases of dialogues and humanitarian crises
whereby Japan is promulgating democracy and human rights, as it conceptualizes, and
fits this into a larger strategy, being mindful of how it relates to securitization.
Development of Democracy and Human Rights in Japan
As mentioned above, cross-national comparisons tend to show Japan as a robust
democracy. Some observers, however, tend to be more skeptical, particularly with regard
to the representative political institutions. Hayes calls the Diet “nothing more than a
rubber-stamp agency to legitimize decisions made by a self-perpetuating economic and
political elite” (2018: 238). Woodall argues “six and a half decades after establishing a
parliamentary system in form, Japan has yet to establish parliamentary government in
practice” (2014: 221). Bowen makes the case, “[b]y reelecting corrupt politicians and by
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remaining silent when insiders and not the parliament decide who will control the
government, Japanese voters are effectively abandoning moral standards (tatamae [sic])
and are yielding to realpolitik (honne)” (2003: 115). Pesek points out that “Japan’s
government…is one run mostly by nameless, faceless career bureaucrats building their
own fiefdoms and power structures” (2014: 165).
These criticisms are aimed at the functionality of the Diet, as a representative
institution, but criticisms are much broader. One political party, LDP, has been in power
with only two brief interruptions since 1955. In both of these brief interruptions,
opposing parties gained power, yet fail to function efficiently because ‘the 1955 system’
is so deeply institutionalized; the LDP inevitably returns to power. Corruption and
bribery scandals are not unusual among the political elites and often (but not always)
tolerated by the public. Only certain media outlets monopolize access to political elites
via the kisha club system, and tend to be complicit with the political elites in what they
report. Laws to prevent conspiring to carry out crimes, including 1996 amendments to the
Religious Juridical Persons Law, and the 2017 anti-conspiracy law (kyōbōzai), allow for
legal surveillance in certain cases, and possibly violate constitutional rights to freedom of
religion and free assembly. Various forms of discrimination against ethnic minorities and
foreigners persist. Criminal suspects can be detained for weeks without bail or a lawyer
present during interrogations – which almost always produces a confession to a crime.
These are all credible critiques of Japan’s democracy and human rights, but
provide a selective understanding. Interestingly, survey data shows Japanese believe they
have more influence on their government than most Westerners. A 1999 survey asked
whether respondents agreed with the statement: “People like me don’t have any say about
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what the government does.” A surprising 54 percent of Japanese “strongly disagreed”
with the statement (ISSP 1999, v47). Among Americans, however, it was nine percent;
among Brits, two percent (ISSP 1999, v47). Nearly two decades later, a 2017 Pew survey
asks: “How satisfied are you with the way democracy is working in [your] country?” To
this, 23 percent of Americans and 16 percent of Brits were “not at all satisfied,” but only
nine percent of Japanese responded this way (Wike, et al. 2017, 37). In the same survey,
Japanese expressed more trust in their government than Americans, Brits, Italians,
French, and other Western proponents of democratic values (Wike, et al. 2017, 36).2
In national politics, civil society appears muted in Japan in comparison to other
democracies, but, in fact, at the local level it is more dynamic. Haddad argues that the
exclusivity of national politics has actually “translated into high participation rates in
civic organizations” (2012: 192). Moreover, “Japanese explain their participation as
performing a civic duty, a way of fulfilling a community responsibility, rather than as an
individual choice about whether to participate” (2012: 192-93). Critics who claim “[a]
spiritual commitment [to democracy] is lacking” are not looking in the right places
(Hayes 2018, 238). Kuroda contends that “Japanese democracy seems to be void of
individualism, for consensus making is paramount, not majority rule” (2005: 204).
Therefore, the outcome of decision-making is more likely to represent a compromise of
all voices, rather than just the view of the majority. This applies to the view of political
elites as well as the society, writ large.

2

Japanese indicated less trust in their government, however, than Germans and Canadians (Wike, et al.
2017, 36).
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It is perhaps easy to overlook the things which Japan’s approach to democracy
and human rights does get right: industrial quality is among the highest in world, crime
rates are among the lowest, the wealth gap is among the narrowest, average life
expectancy is among the longest, student attainments in math and sciences are among the
highest, universal literacy, a highly-regarded healthcare system, a strong and improving
environmental record with a broad societal consciousness toward recycling and
conservation, and despite the occasional alarmism, an enduring commitment to global
peace that surpasses any other great power today. These are characteristics of democracy
and human rights most Western states cannot claim, and characteristics many envy. To
what extent these characteristics are concomitant with democracy would depend on the
conceptualization of the elusive term. They are certainly characteristics, however, of a
state meeting basic human rights, and thus, shape Japan’s conceptualization of human
rights, which it endorses internationally.
Modern Democracy
Democracy, as the term is understood today, was introduced to Japan no earlier
than the mid-nineteenth century. The contemporary Japanese term for ‘democracy,’
minshu (民主), has origins in Chinese classical texts that literally means a ruler (nushi)
(主) over the people (tami) (民), but was appropriated by Japanese translators to imply a
contrary meaning – something to translate the English ‘democracy,’ French ‘démocratie,’
and the list of other European cognates they were rapidly encountering at the time (Chen
2011, 10). The earliest known use of the term ‘minshu’ as an ideological movement was
first applied in Japanese in 1888, in the expression “minshu no seishin” (democratic
spirit), after popular-elected assemblies introduced in the prefectures and swelling rural
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unrest incited greater public representation (Chen 2011, 28). From there, the term
‘minshu-shugi,’ or ‘democracy (as ideology)’ was formed.
As the Western notion of the concept was more widely learned during the Meiji
Restoration, minshu generally carried a negative connotation, and was considered
unsuitable for Japan. Meiji reformers studied and applied many Western concepts as a
means to strengthen the legitimacy of the state, but in what could be called “permissive
effects,” inadvertently introduced institutions that formed the impetuses to Japan’s
contemporary notions of democracy and human rights (Tannenwald 1999, 437). Early
twentieth century political scientist Yoshino Sakuzō grappled with this very question of
reconciling the Western concepts as they were applied to Japan’s state and society.
Yoshino made the argument that Japanese society was compatible with the English term
‘democracy,’ but not with the Japanese notion of minshu-shugi. To Yoshino, mishu-shugi
implied, “sovereignty resides in the people due to legal principle,” and is thus,
incompatible with the reality of Japanese society (Chen 2011, 28). Yoshino resolves this
issue by introducing minpon-shugi (民本主義),3 which implies “the base objective to a
sovereign’s actions must reside in the people, politically” (Chen 2011, 28). Yoshino
argues, “minpon-shugi is a government for the ‘gains and happiness of all peoples,’ and
policymaking is established on ‘general will of the people’” (Chen 2011, 28). Yoshino’s
term never gained currency as a conventional term, but it serves as a useful academic
distinction that provides insight into how democracy could reconcile with an existing
socio-cultural milieu, and the distinction preempts language that would be seen later in

Minpon is a compound of tami, or ‘people,’ and moto, or ‘base,’ and has been translated into the
cumbersome ‘people-based-ism.’
3
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Japan’s postwar constitution, as well as its conceptualization of human security,
democracy, and human rights today.
Postwar Democracy
The postwar U.S. occupation of Japan is a critical juncture in Japan’s
conceptualization of democracy and human rights, but also of Self. American democracy
was imposed on Japan in the most authoritarian of ways, yet it is arguably the most
successful imposition of democracy in world history. In fact, the case of American
occupation and democratization of Japan from 1945 to 1952 was an oft-cited exemplar
for supporters of U.S.-led democratization in both Afghanistan and Iraq in the early
2000s. After these efforts in the early twenty-first century, many questioned why it did
not work in these cases, and yet the question in reverse is just as pertinent: Why did it
work in Japan?
Among a multitude of sweeping democratization reforms, U.S. General Douglas
MacArthur commissioned the drafting of a new constitution for Japan. In May 1947, a
final document was completed after several revisions by the selected Japanese drafters
and American advisors. While the responsible parties for the specific contents of the
document remain vague, the dominant narrative today is that Japanese politicians wrote
the constitution with guidance by American advisors. The truth is murky, but for
whatever role American advisors had in the document, the Constitution has become
accepted and embraced as a normative base for Japan in the twenty-first century.
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Today, it is considered the ‘Peace Constitution’ because of the renowned Article
IX, which renounces the right to war.4 The constitution was written in a remarkable
manner for its time regarding both democracy and human rights. MacArthur is known to
have remarked that the document was “the most liberal constitution in history” (1964:
301). Pyle notes, “[i]t guaranteed many more human rights (including gender equality)
than the U.S. constitution,” and it commanded a “redesign of the education system to
teach liberal values of democracy, individualism, internationalism, and peace” (2018:
73). The preface states, “[w]e recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live
in peace, free from fear and want” (Japan Const.). It is a remarkable statement expressing
a Kantian world order. It builds on this view, adding, “laws of political morality are
universal” (Japan Const. Preface). A following set of articles preempt the concept of
human security, a neologism not yet coined, and yet reverberate Yoshino’s concept of
minpon-shugi. Beyond basic democratic rights such as freedoms of speech, movement,
assembly, ‘unconventional’ rights are also asserted, such as the right to “maintain the
minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living” (art. XXV, § 1), the right to
“equal education” (art. XXVI), and a declaration that “the State shall use its endeavors
for the promotion and extension of social welfare and security, and of public health” (art.
XXV, § 2).
The American imposition of liberal democracy worked in Japan for five reasons.
First, it was in the context of the Cold War. The Japanese viewed the Soviet Union as a
threat, and this was exacerbated when Soviet-ally North Korea invaded South Korea in

4

This is discussed further in the following chapter.
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1950. Secondly, Japan was decimated from war, much of the population was still
overseas in former colonies, and a significant portion of the young male population had
been erased from the workforce. American aid came with strings attached in terms of
democratization, but it was little to ask of a country where the economy, infrastructure,
and society were in shambles. Thirdly, while brief, Japan had experience with democracy
in the 1920s, known at Taisho Democracy. The notion was not entirely unfamiliar to
them. Fourth, Japan sensed nothing but animosity from its neighboring states in East Asia
– the experience of Japanese invasion and occupation was fresh in their minds. From
Japan’s perspective, oddly enough there seemed to be only one friendly state particularly
in their region, but by extension in the world – the U.S.
Lastly, Japanese acquiesced, as a defeated nation. As recognized by Ruth
Benedict in The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, it is the quintessential shame culture. In
the shame of defeat, there is no escaping this existence from an international society. For
an individual, taking responsibility for the shame of defeat was done, at least, by
resignation of post, and, at most, an honor suicide, and, indeed, several Japanese military
and political elites did one or the other to accept responsibility for the war defeat. The
state and society, however, did not have that option to escape the shame of defeat.
Therefore, as a defeated nation, its only option was to acquiesce firstly to its victor, but
secondly to the international society in which it remains. Thus, the closest thing to
maintaining dignity was to follow what the victor demands. All of these conditions make
nation building a very different enterprise in Japan of the 1940s than Afghanistan or Iraq
of the early twenty-first century.
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To many Japanese the democratic institutions, including the new constitution,
were misguided and unsuitable at the time, but Japanese acquiesced as it was something
to be endured (gaman) as a conquered nation. After the occupation ended in 1952, the
democratic institutions left served as a substratum for societal construction of a new
Japan, by incorporating values and norms from these institutions, regardless of how they
entered the state and societal structure. Yet, at the same time, in order for democracy to
survive, it needed to be shaped and cultivated into the new state identity.
The one policymaker who stands out as successfully carrying out that vision
happens to also be Asō Tarō’s grandfather, Yoshida Shigeru. Yoshida’s method of
statecraft, deemed the ‘Yoshida Doctrine,’ would shape Japan’s norms and values in both
domestic and foreign policy for decades to come. The Yoshida Doctrine had two key
principles: firstly, rely on the U.S. for national security so that Japan could retain
adherence to Article IX in the Constitution; secondly, without military capabilities,
Japan’s foreign policy must focus squarely on economic interests to recapture a major
power status in global politics. Therefore, bandwagoning security with the U.S. was a
means to retain and ensconce an Article IX-based non-militarization norm, and it was
through wholehearted focus on geo-economics, that Japan’s geopolitical stature could be
regained.
Human Security, as a Foreign Policy Value
Both prewar and postwar norms and values constructed intentionally and inadvertently,
by both Japanese and Americans, formed contemporary notions of democracy and human
rights in Japan. Reflecting on its postwar economic miracle, the values emanating from
its Peace Constitution and maturing postwar identity, and the Yoshida Doctrine, in the
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last two decades of the twentieth century Japan began actively advocating for a reframing
of security at the international level, beyond national security, against traditional foreign
military threats. Against the backdrop of declining American hegemony in Asia and
attainment of higher national affluence in Japan, re-conceptualizations of security started
with the comprehensive security policy in 1980. In the milieu of the post-Cold War,
Japan began promoting its conceptualization of human security internationally in the
1990s.
Japan’s 2015 Development Cooperation Charter defines human security as “a
concept that pursues the right of individuals to live happily and in dignity, free from fear
and want, through their protection and empowerment” (MOFA 2015b). The expression
“free from fear and want” is directly replicated from the preface of the Peace
Constitution, and indirectly relates to the concept of minpon-shugi that preceded it. They
are also two of the Four Freedoms articulated by U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt in
January 1941. In 1994, the UN Development Program announced its adherence to the
concept of human security, in an attempt to shift the perpetual referent object from the
state to the people. “This implied a radical widening of the types of threats and sectors to
which security was applicable to food, health, the environment, population growth,
disparities in economic opportunities, migration, drug trafficking and terrorism” (Buzan
and Hansen 2009, 203). Japanese Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi was one of the
first world leaders to endorse the concept for the UN (Edström 2011, 9). This UN
Development Program application of human security would not have been possible
without the simultaneous promotion of such a concept by Japan, Norway, and Canada –
all three states notable for affluency and economic power, but constrained military power.
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Edström argues that “Japan was searching for an international role commensurate with its
considerable economic power and the Japanese government had begun to take measures
to strengthen Japan’s ‘international contribution’” (2011: 9).
Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō made human security a central theme of his foreign
policy in 1998, and introduced the Trust Fund for Human Security for the UN, with a
donation by the Japanese government of 500 million yen (Edström 2011, 12). In 2000,
Japanese diplomat to the UN, Takasu Yukio explained Tokyo’s approach:
There are two basic aspects to human security – freedom from fear and freedom
from want. Some countries seem to focus solely on the first aspect. For these
countries, human security provides a conceptual basis for taking actions to
preserve the life and dignity of individuals in conflict situations…In Japan's view,
however, human security is a much broader concept. We believe that freedom
from want is no less critical than freedom from fear. So long as its objectives are
to ensure the survival and dignity of individuals as human beings, it is necessary
to go beyond thinking of human security solely in terms of protecting human life
in conflict situations (Takasu 2000).
The mention of “objectives…to ensure the survival and dignity of individuals as human
beings” relates to the ‘people-base’ in minpon-shugi. Additionally, the expression,
“freedom from fear and freedom from want” is applied yet again, but this time in the
context of defining a new, international concept, thus promulgating domestic democratic
values to the international system. Takasu added, “I believe that Japan's experience since
the end of the Second World War in promoting prosperity and the well-being of its
people through economic and social development makes it particularly well-prepared to
advocate such a broad concept of human security” (Takasu 2000). Thus, the Japanese
conceptualization of human security directly ties to the postwar experience of rapid
prosperity and the values expressed in the Peace Constitution.
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In December 2001, three months after the 9/11 attacks on the U.S., Prime
Minister Koizumi Junichiro shifted the language on human security:
To eradicate terrorism, it is necessary to tackle not only terrorism itself but also
other diverse threats to individuals. This means that we have to build and sustain a
society where individual human beings can fully realize their possibilities. This is
what "human security" aims at, and this is what Japan's foreign policy has
attached importance (Koizumi 2001).
In the twenty-first century, human security was applied to address terrorism in addition to
the other issues already stated. The language Koizumi used addressed human security as
an effective securitizing sector against a terrorism threat; the strategy is the same, yet the
challenge (threat) has changed.
By 2004, however, Japanese diplomats began relegating references to human
security exclusively as a part of ODA policy, rather than the broader foreign policy. In
the 2003 ODA charter, human security debuted as a “perspective” for ODA objectives,
but in the 2015 version, this was enhanced to “promoting human security,” stating that
human security “is the guiding principle that lies at the foundation of Japan’s
development cooperation” (MOFA 2015b). It elaborates, Japan will “focus its
development cooperation on individuals…and provide cooperation for their protection
and empowerment so as to realize human security” (MOFA 2015b). Importantly, it adds,
“Japan will make efforts so that this basic policy will be understood and accepted widely
among its partner countries, thereby mainstreaming the concept even further in the
international community” (MOFA 2015c).
Making the concept “understood” and “accepted” in order to “mainstream” it is a
clear expression of proselytizing values via diplomacy, but left ambiguous is how Japan
“will make efforts” to do so. In this way, the standards for human security, determined by
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Japan, are either objectives of ODA policy, or a checklist recipient states must follow
before obtaining permission to receive ODA (Edström 2011, 56-57). The relegation to
ODA reflects a downgrading of the prominence of the concept to Tokyo’s foreign policy,
but keenly so in strategy. Japanese diplomats were no longer attempting to champion the
concept in the UN. Edström suggests this is likely a result of Japan’s failed attempt to
garner a permanent seat in the Security Council in 2005 (2011: 52). It is also possible
Japan chose to end championing human security in the UN after 9/11 and subsequent
changes in international politics stole the focus from such initiatives. Nonetheless, the
values expressed in Japan’s foreign policy would soon widen.
Contemporary Values Conceptualizations in Foreign Policy
A good indicator of how democracy and human rights are conceptualized today in Japan
is the string of words frequently uttered together with these terms by political elites.
Moreover, considering the audiences where ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’ are
discussed (and not discussed) in dialogues, speeches, bulletins, et cetera, indicates where
these values are most important for Japan. In his 2006 speech introducing the Arc of
Freedom and Prosperity as a new pillar to Japan’s foreign policy based on values, Asō
framed democracy and human rights together with “freedom,” rule of law,” and “the
market economy” as “universal values” (Asō 2006b). These words consistently appear
together as a fuzzy-set string in statements by Asō during his brief tenures as foreign
minister and prime minister, but also by Abe and other political elites commenting on
foreign policy.
When the ‘old guard’ of experienced LDP former prime ministers, Abe and Asō,
returned to power in December 2012, the language from the 2006 Arc speech also
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reappeared with greater consistency. By analyzing the speeches, responses in interviews
and press conferences, and newspaper columns provided by the Prime Minister and two
foreign ministers since December 2012, notable trends are evident. Unlike the brief
tenures of previous prime ministers and foreign ministers between 2006 and 2014, Abe’s
current tenure has the longevity to create enough momentum in foreign policy so that
even if he or Deputy Prime Minister Asō were to leave office in the near future, the their
policies are firmly set in place, particularly among the bureaucracy which likely shares
responsibility for formulating and carrying out the policies just as much as Abe and Asō
themselves (Pyle 2018, 90).
A notable change between Asō circa 2006 and Abe circa 2013 is the use of
‘universal values’ (fuhenteki kachi) to describe the string. Abe and other political elites
use this term rather freely while speaking in Japan, to both Japanese and international
audiences, yet if overseas in Asia, including Muslim Asia, they replace it more often than
not with “basic/fundamental values” (kihonteki kachi).5 The same fuzzy set string of
terms are used, ‘democracy,’ ‘freedom,’ ‘human rights,’ and ‘rule of law’ (see Tables 7.1,
7.2, and 7.3), yet Japanese political elites are choosing to bind these together as ‘basic,’
or ‘fundamental values’ in Muslim Asia and ‘universal values’ in Japan. The only
identified cases where ‘universal values’ was used in Muslim Asia to describe these was
a speech given by Abe in 2013 and a newspaper interview with Abe in 2017, both in
Indonesia. Moreover, while ‘basic values’ is used to describe these terms multiple times
in other locations, it only occurs in Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, and Indonesia (again) – three

Both ‘basic’ and ‘fundamental’ are used interchangeably in official English translations of kihonteki (基本
的).
5
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of the most democratic states in Muslim Asia. In the collection of statements in 16 other
Muslim Asian countries, ‘basic/fundamental values’ was either never mentioned or used
in an irrelevant context. Thus, the less democratic the state in Muslim Asia, the less likely
‘basic/fundamental values’ was uttered by Japanese political leaders.
The remarkable consistency between Asō 2006 and Abe 2013 is the string of four
terms: democracy, human rights, freedom, and rule of law, as a package, although none
of the four terms, on its own, is a necessary condition. Notably, ‘market economy’ has
become omitted more often than not from the fuzzy set string of descriptors of universal
values. Economic aspects continue to be discussed in detail, but ‘market economy’
appears consciously removed from the list of ‘universal values.’ Aspects of market
economy still tend to appear elsewhere in their statements, but the term, itself, has
markedly disappeared from utterances of the string of terms while in Muslim Asia since
2013. These terms associated with democracy and human rights are worthy of discussion,
as they are obviously the values intended in the naming, values-based diplomacy.
First, and just as pervasive as ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’ is ‘freedom.’
Official translations by MOFA and the Prime Minister’s office apply “freedom” to mean
jiyū (自由), but like most languages, Japanese does not have a distinction between
“freedom” and “liberty.” Changing the text to “liberty” would not necessarily be
considered problematic when presented as a “universal value,” but framing the term as
qualifier of democracy would then make it “liberal,” as in “liberal democracy.” Together
with rule of law, what is striking about these terms is how they form key components of
how most would define Western liberal democracy. Francis Fukuyama defines liberal
democracy as such:
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The liberal part, which is a rule of law, meaning generally accepted rules that put
clear limits on the way that the state can exercise power. Then the second is
democracy [italics added], like elections to guarantee that the state represents the
interest of as much of the population as possible and not just the elites that are
running the state (2017).
Japan’s values-based diplomacy is predicated on values widely associated with a model
of governance that originates in the West, and currently faces its most immense image
challenge in the last half century. Yet, is the propagator of liberal democracy in Asia
Japan?
While neither Abe, nor Asō, or any other Japanese political elite has uttered the
words jiyū-minshu-shugi (‘liberal democracy’) in that order, as a “universal value,” the
terms are consistently used together in the fuzzy set to describe universal values or
basic/fundamental values, and the listener can easily assume its implication. In several
instances including the Arc speech in 2006, both Asō and Abe join “jiyū” to
“minshushugi” with an ‘and’ conjunction, “liberty and democracy,” among other
“universal values.” In a press conference in Singapore in 2013, an interview with the Star
newspaper in Malaysia in 2015, at the Asian Values and Democracy Symposium in 2016,
and in Kompas newspaper in Indonesia, Abe delineates the two multiple times with a
comma: “jiyū, minshu-shugi,” which could just as easily be interpreted “liberal
democracy” just as well as “liberty [comma] democracy,” and again, as “universal
values.” Notions of liberal democracy, as opposed to democracy itself, are presumed as a
Western model, and are questioned globally today not as a solution to problems, but the
problem itself. Yet, relying on its historical experiences, Japan stays close to the
conventional conceptualization of liberal democracy in this time. In February 2018, while
in Munich, Foreign Minister Kōno Tarō stated:
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I believe Japan and Europe share the view that, to date, the liberal international
order has been an important part of the development of the postwar global
economy. In particular, until now, there has been the opinion that economic
growth leads to democratization, but considering recent models of economic
growth, especially economic growth due to state capitalism, it has not always led
to democratization. Even so, I like knowing that we share the view with Europe
that free and open capitalism is important, and it leads to democratization, the rule
of law, and basic human rights (Kōno 2018).
Second, ‘rule of law’ is the enforcing mechanism of the equality principle in
liberalism, but just how universal is rule of law? How compatible is it with a Confucianist
society where the leader’s behavior is predicated on principles of benevolence rather than
constraints of law? The values system of a Confucian society conduces it to become a
functional system as it moves away from rule of law (Qin 2008, 74). Rather than rule of
law, the ideal Confucianist society is rule of man – a benevolent man. “Under the rule of
man, law is just as the sword in man’s hand, whereas, under the rule of law, law is the
sword suspending over man’s head” (Qin 2008, 73). To complete the analogy, from the
Islamic tradition, it is ‘rule of God,’ or ‘Divine Law,’ as it relates to shari’a and more
specifically, fiqh, or jurisprudence. Nasr has likened shari’a to a firmly rooted tree with
branches: “[t]he Shari’ah has developed in many different cultural and political climates
over the centuries. It has harbored many differences of interpretation” (2002: 124). Like
the Western legalistic rule of law and Confucian rule of man, the notion leaves much for
interpretation, and is equally carried out in a multiplicity of ways in practice. Unlike the
Western rule of law, the Confucian and Islamic systems share a predication on moralistic
principles for social order, including the behavior of the political leadership.
Simply because rule of law has a Western legalistic origin, however, is not to
suggest it is neither compatible nor desired by Japanese or Muslims. To say so is to
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support claims of a ‘Clash of Civilizations’ based on primordial value systems. Learning
takes place; sampling takes place. Many Japanese and Muslims rely on rule of law, and
have positive views of it. In the case here, however, the true meaning of the repeated
utterances does not indicate an advancement of rule of law as it is a priority for Japanese
political elites speaking in Muslim Asia; at least not the conventional notion of rule of
law.
The very mention of rule of law by Japanese political elites, however, appears to
have a specific intention, and one that applies to international rather than domestic law.
That threat is China, and its active expansion into the South China Sea potentially
disrupting the flow of energy resources from the Persian Gulf to Japan. Occasionally, this
implication is clearer when political elites also speak of the UN Convention of the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS), stability, order, a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific,’ and emphasizing the
use of peaceful means to settle disputes. This assumption is evident in the context when
‘rule of law’ is uttered outside the typical fuzzy set string of terms – it is almost always in
reference to international maritime law, if not to the South China Sea, specifically. An
example to illustrate this argument is an exchange between a reporter and Kōno at a press
conference in February 2018 in Munich. The reporter asked, “Did you reach any
conclusions [at this Munich Security Conference] as a result of the discussion about
China?” To this, Kōno responded, “I think that China achieving sound economic
development based on the rule of law within the international order [italics added] is
extremely beneficial for the world economy” (Kōno 2018).
Third, market economy has been broken down into its components and is not
uttered in the string together with the others in Muslim Asia. It is, however, occasionally
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still uttered together in this string of terms multiple times in the annual Diplomatic
Bluebooks (see Table 7.4). Instead, frequently uttered words in Muslim Asia are
“development,” “growth,” “prosperity,” “investments,” and “infrastructure.” In fact, a
comprehensive sweep of statements made in Muslim Asia by Japanese policymakers
between 2013 and 2018 shows that these words were uttered considerably more than
“democracy” or “human rights” (see Table 7.5). The economic language harkens back to
the Yoshida Doctrine, as it was Japan’s postwar experience that a foreign policy leading
with market-based economic interests leads to peace and stability – other terms
occasionally associated with these concepts.
The fuzzy set string of terms, leading with democracy or human rights, plus any
combination of rule of law, freedom/liberty, or market economy appears in the 2015,
2016, and 2017 Diplomatic Bluebooks over 20 times each (see Table 7.4). The opening
sentence in the 2017 edition states:
In order for Japan to ensure its national interests in the political, security, and
economic domain, and to continue to maintain and develop an international order
desirable for Japan based on universal values such as freedom, democracy, rule of
law, and human rights, it is essential to conduct strategic diplomacy, while
rationally grasping changes in the international situation and responding to those
changes (MOFA 2017c, 1).
The conceptualization of democracy and human rights is couched in this series of terms,
and the consistency indicates it is deliberate. The political elites reinforce the
conceptualization of democracy and human rights through repetition.
None of these concepts would necessarily indicate views of democracy and
human rights differing from the West, although a fourth concept which is occasionally
uttered with the aforementioned is not as likely to come from a Western political elite:
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‘harmony’ (wa). References to ‘harmony’ in society are very deeply seeded in Japan’s
conceptualization of Self, and therefore, it is no surprise it is incorporated into their
unique conceptualization of democracy. Placing harmony at the center of social order
goes back to the 17-Article Constitution written in the early seventh century by Prince
Shōtoku (coincidently, less than two decades prior to the Prophet Muhammad writing the
Constitution of Medina). Often considered one of the first ‘constitutions’ in history, the
17-article document standardizes Buddhist and Confucian precepts in Japanese society,
and thereby serves as a very early set of values and moral injunctions to unify the state.
What is most remarkable about Prince Shōtoku’s document is how it emphasizes
harmony as the bedrock to Japan’s values system, and this point was actually made by
Asō in his Arc speech: “[t]here is some lively discussion about what we should consider
the proper start line [of Japanese democracy] to be, such as the Seventeen Article
Constitution that existed some 1400 years ago” (Asō 2006b). Therefore, harmony is the
base of values in ‘values-based diplomacy.’
The document synergizes religious and philosophical teachings, but most
significantly, it places harmony (wa) at the center of society. Article I says “[h]armony
should be valued and quarrels should be avoided.” Article XV states “if a man is
influenced by private motives, he will be resentful, and if he is influenced by resentment
he will fail to act harmoniously with others. If he fails to act harmoniously with others,
the public interest will suffer.” A century and a half later, Japanese scribes began
applying the character for ‘harmony’ (和), to serve as shorthand reference to Japan, itself
– a practice that continues today. Over a millennium before democracy as a concept was
ever introduced to Japan, harmony was entrenched at the core center of social order that
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would eventually mesh with, and contort, the imported modern concept of democracy
into the Japanese variant known today.
While harmony is used to describe, in certain circumstances, the Japanese brand
of democracy, it is also used by Japan’s political elites to emphasize a broader Asian
brand of democracy as well. This is significant in that Japanese view harmony as a key
characteristic of Self, yet at the same time, they present it as a value conducive to a
broader Asian society, and contrasting to Western societies. Thus, Japan is the model for
the value of social harmony, or one could say, “Japan is wa”; it is attainable in Asia, but
not particularly elsewhere. In any case, it also clashes with the references made to
“universal values,” which may account for the use of “basic/fundamental values” instead.
Japanese international relations scholar Takahashi Kazuo aptly argues that
framing Japan’s values-based diplomacy on “universal” values is ill-advised: “If Japan
parrots the same assertions as the U.S., no one will take interest” (2013: 4). Rather than
“universal values,” Takahashi recommends adding “Japanese flavor” to the values (2013:
4). This “Japanese flavor” can manifest in strategy in two ways: first, “have an example
which others can emulate”; second, “pursue ‘harmony’ (wa)” (Takahashi 2013, 7). He
adds, “wa is the most comprehended key word across the world in the twenty-first
century,” and Japan should be at the center of this in its values-based diplomacy
(Takahashi 2013, 7). One could easily find cases to counter this assertion with a cursory
scan of daily news headlines in Japan, and point out the ‘unharmonious’ that exists in
Japanese society, politics, and business on a daily basis, but it would be somewhat
regardless of the point. Japan is just as harmonious as the U.S. is free; wa is to Japan
what liberté, égalité, fraternité are to France. What does harmony entail, as a
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promulgated value? How do you implement it? Though challenging to conceptualize, but
in fact, it is no more nebulous of a concept than democracy, itself. The reality of the
concept within the state and society, while significant, plays a much smaller role than the
constructed image projected internationally. To many in Muslim Asia, attaining societal
harmony would penetrate nearer to the core of real security far more than democracy,
liberal democracy, rule of law, or any of these other values. In the milieu of the early
twenty-first century, with rising nationalism, populism, and narratives on the clash of
civilizations, it is indeed a very attractive notion.
Japan, Muslim Asia, and the Value of Harmony
Advocacy groups for democracy and human rights frequently rank states in
Muslim Asia among the lowest levels in the world. While comprehensive, these rankings
undoubtedly overlook the qualitative variations within each state, and may contain some
biases, but they do provide some degree of understanding of the dearth of democracy and
human values in wide swaths of Muslim Asia. In general, democracy and human rights
indexes show higher levels in Muslim Southeast Asia (6.47),6 while the worst performing
region is Post-Soviet Asia (2.74). Using the Democracy Index for 2017, the 27 Muslimmajority states in Asia average a score of 3.48 of 10 (EIU 2018, 5-9).7 There are large
variations within Muslim Asia, yet the average is lower than any region of the world
specific by EIU, including Middle East and North Africa (3.54), and Sub-Saharan Africa
(4.35) (EIU 2018, 16-17).

6

Includes only Indonesia (6.39) and Malaysia (6.54); Brunei is not included in the survey.

7

This is figured by averaging state-level data across Muslim Asia from EIU.
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Despite the outcomes of these comparative indexes, it is not to indicate that
political Islam is incommensurable with democracy. Even Huntington points out this lack
of correlation: “Islamic doctrine…contains elements that may be both congenial and
uncongenial to democracy” (1991: 307). Kubicek suggests that like all religions, Islam is
“‘multivocal,’ with concepts that could be both harmful and beneficial to democracy”
(2015: 8). Nasr aptly points out the vagueness of the concept, itself:
If democracy is understood as the rule of the will of the people, then there were
mechanisms in traditional Islamic society where the will of the people was
reflected to the ruling class, including the caliph or sultan, and it definitely played
a role in those governments that were successful and that endured. If it means the
particular institutions developed during the past few centuries in the West, then
there is no parallel for them in premodern Islamic history, no more than there is
for them in premodern Japan, China, or India (2002: 150).
Across Asia, the relationship between Islamism and democracy shows little
correlation. Muslim-majority secular states tend to lack democratic institutions just as
much, if not more so, than Islamic states. Malaysia is often ranked among the most
democratic in Muslim Asia, yet Islam is the official religion and multiple Sunni sultans
reign. Meanwhile, some of the least democratic states in Muslim Asia are conspicuously
under the authority of secular administrations, such as Assad’s Syria, Azerbaijan, and the
Central Asian republics. Moreover, two of the highest ranked Asian states in democratic
institutions, Israel (7.79) and Sri Lanka (6.48), are known to have ongoing discrimination
issues against Muslim-minority peoples. Additionally, just as Myanmar has made great
strides toward democratization in recent years, the military carries out attacks on the
Rohingya Muslim population. These cases certainly complicate the case that
democratization would enhance the lives of Muslims in Asia.
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Yet, Japan views its historical experiences as evidence that democratization
works. Muslim societies grapple with democracy as part of the modernization package,
and this is the same process Japan went through in relation to its religious and
philosophical traditions in the nineteenth century, and then in the postwar era. Therefore,
it is intuitive of Japanese to expect Muslim societies to progress through democratization
in a manner similar to what they experienced, and similar to Huntington’s “waves” of
democratization based on empirical experiences (1991: 315).
What does this mean for Japan? How does Japan promote democratization and
human rights in Muslim Asia? If democratization and human rights are the key values in
the values-based foreign policy, how are these values broached? If there is anything
Japan has been clear about, it does not want to ask hard questions on democratization and
human rights, as the West does. In 1991, MOFA issued the following statement on how
aid is handled regarding democratization and human rights:
Japan’s approach differs considerably from that of the United States, which
regards freedom and democracy as universal values and has made the promotion
of these ideas a basic component of its aid activities. There is also a sharp contrast
between Japan’s position and the emphasis that France places on the promotion of
the French language and culture through its aid. As much as possible, Japan
strives to avoid the imposition of its own political values or attitudes toward
economic development on its aid activities. Instead it has sought to discover,
through a process of dialogue based on requests from recipient countries, the best
approach to development for each individual country (19).
Japan has clearly shifted to where it now shares the American view that freedom and
democracy are universal values, yet it still differs on the strategy of imposition of values,
and points out uniqueness (“best approach…for each individual country”). In 2015, Abe
reiterated this sentiment: “Japanese do not impose ourselves on others. We take a longterm view, cultivating firm roots in a country. We think together, and more forward
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together, with the local people. This is how Japan operates” (Abe 2015e). If you do not
“impose” values, yet values are overtly considerations of your foreign policy, how are
they operationalized? Why express them, yet of course, not impose them? Where and
when are they expressed, and where and when are they not expressed? The answers to
these questions reveal how and when Islam is being securitized.
What language expresses values, and induces or, in Joseph Nye’s language,
“coopts” these values (2004: 5)? It seems nearly impossible to have a values-based
diplomacy, yet not seek to impose them. How to coopt, without imposing?8 Suggesting?
Modeling? This is illustrated in a key policy concept uttered by Japanese political elites
while visiting the Middle East. In January 2015, Abe introduced a concept of “the best
way is to go in the middle,” while on a visit in Egypt. Foreign Affairs Minister Kishida
Fumio reiterated this concept a month later, after the beheading of two Japanese nationals
by ISIS militants. Abe has, himself, indicated that he consistently reiterates this concept
“at every opportunity” he has to meet with leaders of Muslim countries (Abe 2017b). In
2015, 2016, and 2017, he made it the cornerstone of his Iftar banquet addresses in Tokyo
for the Islamic Diplomatic Corps of Japan (Abe 2017b). It has been echoed in MOFA
literature and by ambassadors abroad. In June 2015, he linked the language together with
‘harmony’: “[t]his spirit of Islam, which avoids extreme positions and aims for harmony
with those with different views, resonates with the Japanese spirit of aiming for
coexistence with others through the spirit of ‘wa’ or harmony” (Abe 2015c). The
expression used in Japanese is a rather awkward “chūyō ga saizen.” “Chūyō” (中庸) is a

8

Perhaps the U.S. Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union during World War II could be considered a case of
coopting without imposing.
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term drawn from the doctrine of moderation from Confucianism. An emphasis on
‘middle’ also emphasizes the region as the geographical tri-continental crossroads, as
“chūyō” is not dissimilar from “chūtō” (中東), ‘Middle East,’ and “chūdō” (中道),
‘middle road.’
There is a deliberate intention to focus on the middle for two reasons, both of which
relate to securitization. Firstly, the idea to promote moderation, and to ‘remind’ Muslims
of this important tradition in their religion is a strategy to root out extremism that is
straightforward from this message. This reminder is Abe acting as the securitizing actor.
Secondly, as the securitizing actor and partner to the Muslim world, this is the
construction of Japan as a unique power – unique in how it operates in comparison to the
West, Russia, and China. It is, in essence, Japan ‘testing’ its values-based diplomacy.
Yet, while slogans indicate meanings, how can it translate into outcomes? Does Japan
even wield enough power to achieve its outcomes? This question was addressed in
December 2017 by Kōno, while speaking in Bahrain:
Some of you may wonder…”Can Japan actually make any contribution in this
complicated Middle East?” As the Foreign Minister of Japan, I would proudly
like to respond to such questions, with “There are things only Japan can do.”
Japan is unique because we have remained neutral religiously and ethnically, and
we have not left any negative footprint historically in the Middle East. Japan has
always remained as a peaceful nation for over 70 years after World War II,
continually practicing peace diplomacy with so-called soft power, without
exercising coercion or force. It is my belief that Japan can make further
contributions to stability in the Middle East in a way that only Japan can do
(Kōno 2017).
Japanese Islamic studies scholar Miyata Osamu writes in his 2017 work, Islam’s Only
Hope: Japan:
President Trump is calling to “Make America Great Again,” and President Putin
is aiming for a “Revival of a Strong Russia.” In Europe, there is an appeal
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towards nationalism, as far-right political parties that advocate for EU
secessionism and expulsion of immigrants are on the rise (2017: 246-47).
Yet, he offers that while the world’s great powers are pursuing strategies to build “strong
nations,” in contrast, “Japan can lead the world by building a ‘wise nation’” (Miyata
2017, 248). The term ‘wise nation’ (kashikoi kuni) is referencing an idea proffered by the
late author Nada Inada, who argued that in the twenty-first century, it is not a ‘strong
nation’ that societies desire, but a ‘wise nation’ (Miyata 2017, 246). Is this – a wise
nation – what Japan can promulgate in Muslim Asia? Moreover, the strategy is
distinguishing itself from other powers, and modeling its behavior. An interesting case of
this is the suggestion offered by Kōno in 2017 when speaking on combating violent
extremism: “Unlike the United States or Europe, nobody has guns in Japan, and we know
the importance of guns and weapons control” (2017). The statement distinguishes Japan’s
power from the West’s, and presents it as a desirable (violence-free, harmonious,
minpon-shugi) model – one whereby human security has been attained, thus coopting the
listeners to these values. Does it effectively appeal to Muslim populations? A comment
by 2011 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate and Yemeni journalist Tawakkol Karman provides a
powerful response:
There are a lot of lessons we can learn from Japan as a country that overcame
war, poverty, and natural disasters to become a peaceful country…The Yemeni
people often look to Japan, rather than the United States or Europe, as a model to
emulate when it comes to peace in particular, as well as economics and public
safety (2014).
Conduit for Dialogue and Leadership
This section examines Japan’s expressions of democratization and human rights in
diplomatic initiatives in Muslim Asia. The two clearest cases are Corridor to Peace and
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Prosperity Initiative, and the Central Asia Plus Japan Dialogue. The Corridor to Peace
and Prosperity Initiative seeks to build peace in Palestine by building confidence-building
measures through multilateral collaboration and economic development. In the second
case, the republics in Central Asia collectively represent some of the lowest levels of
democratization and human rights in the world, yet Japan has had no qualms about
cooperating with these states in a multilateral forum, the Central Asia Plus Japan
Dialogue. Other political dialogues are also considered in the Middle East.
Japan and Palestinian Human Rights
Japan’s position on the Israel-Palestinian Conflict has often been overlooked, but
this has likely been the result of a decades-long deliberate strategy to keep a low profile
in the midst of the conflict. When Israel declared its independence in 1948 and the first
Arab-Israeli War broke out, Japan was still amid postwar occupation, was neither a
sovereign nation, nor a UN member, and in no position to respond. Upon the end of
postwar occupation, Japan established diplomatic relations with Israel in 1952 – the first
of any Asian state to establish relations with Israel. The Israelis viewed this as a major
victory, so that they could start making inroads to recognition and diplomacy in Asia, yet
it did not turn out that way. In 1955, as a result of a “powerful plea” by Pakistan to have
stronger anti-communist representation, Japan was member to the Bandung Conference
of Asian and African states while Israel was banned from attending (Miyagi 2018, 1213). Japan supported the conference resolution stating:
[i]n view of existing tension in the Middle East, caused by the situation in
Palestine and the danger of that tension to world peace, the Asian-African
Conference declared its support of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine and
called for the implementation of the United Nations Resolution on Palestine and
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the achievement of the peaceful settlement of the Palestine question (MOFA
Indonesia 1955, 168).
For Japan, the Bandung Conference was an opportunity to showcase to Asian states that
it had shed its colonial past, and stood in solidary with them as anti-colonialists.9 Thus,
the plight of Palestinians was increasingly interpreted in Japan as rights of a people (de
Boer 2005, 7). The following year, Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula during the Suez
Crisis, and Japan began distancing itself from Israel. In 1967, Japan was among the 99
states which favored UN General Assembly Resolution 2253 that condemned Israel’s
capture of East Jerusalem during the Six-Day War (the U.S. abstained).
Israel’s military conquests garnered it a bellicose reputation in postwar Japan
where pacifist norms were rapidly strengthening, but this reputation was turned upside
down in May 1972 when a Japanese militant leftist group called the Japanese Red Army
carried out a massacre at Lod Airport near Tel Aviv, killing 26 and injuring 78 (Kihara
2009, 218).10 The Japanese Red Army had been based in Lebanon after fleeing Japan,
and allied with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a leftist
Palestinian independence group. While Marxist in ideology, the Japanese Red Army was
sucked into the Palestinian liberation conflict in the Middle East as a “means of survival”
(Kihara 2009, 219). Japanese leaders and the public were in disbelief that three Japanese
nationals carried out such an attack. Israel was understood as warring; Japan was
understood as peaceful. While not directly responsible, the Japanese government issued a

Sixty years later at the same place, Abe reiterated this objective for Japan: “Japan…resolved [in 1955]
that among Asian and African countries seeking peace and prosperity under the Bandung principles, we
should stand at the forefront” (2015b).
9
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Among the dead was Aharon Katzir, President of the Israeli National Academy of Sciences.
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public apology to the government of Israel, and offered $1 million in retribution to the
victims (most of whom were Puerto Rican) (Kihara 2009, 218). Shame led to Japan
reassessing its view of Israel, and, to distance itself from the Japanese Red Army and
PFLP, it distanced itself from the Palestinians. In January 1974, the Japanese Red Army
and PFLP jointly sabotaged an oil refinery and then hijacked a ferryboat in Singapore,
taking the crewmembers hostage. Days later Palestinian supporters of the Japanese Red
Army and PFLP occupied the Japanese embassy in Kuwait City, taking the ambassador
and staff hostage, to pressure Tokyo to obey the hostage takers’ demands in Singapore
for safe passage to South Yemen. Both hostage events were resolved without loss of life,
but dampened empathy for the Palestinian cause among Japanese.
Concurrently, however, in 1973 Japan was forced to reaffirm its commitment to
Palestinian self-rule amid the first oil shock. In a statement named after the Chief Cabinet
Secretary, Nikaidō Susumu, the Nikaidō statement explained that Japan supported, “[t]he
withdrawal of Israeli forces from all territories occupied in the 1967 war,” and “[t]he
recognition of and respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people” (Halloran
1973, 17). At the time, the Nikaidō statement was lauded because it “represented Japan’s
first major split on foreign policy with the United States in the postwar era” (Yergin
1993, 629), and it “marked Japan’s most positive effort to take a pro-Arab stance on the
Middle East,” but both of these observations overlooked the fact the statement was the
result of oil coercion, which clouded Japan’s true outlook on Palestinian human rights
(Halloran 1973, 17).
After the first oil shock, Japan’s Israel-Palestine policy was based on a struggle of
image, to maintain a positioning between, first, its alliance with the U.S., and, second, the
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appearance of neutrality from the perspective of Arab states. There is some precedence,
however, of Japan supporting the Palestinians between the 1955 Bandung Conference
and 1973. In 15 UN General Assembly, Security Council, and UNESCO resolutions
relevant to the Israel-Palestine conflict from 1967 until 2017, Japan voted with the
majority nine times and abstained six times, yet never cast the same vote as the U.S. As
seen in Table 7.6, Japan has generally tended to abstain on resolutions regarding
Palestinian statehood (although it did support granting Palestine UN-observer status in
2012), yet at the same time, it has tended to favor resolutions that condemn human rights
abuses (although it did abstain on the 2009 Goldstone Report on human rights abuses in
Gaza).
Despite the tendency to abstain on resolutions regarding Palestinian statehood, in
May 2004 Japan clarified its support of the two-state solution, and has since then more
clearly staked out its own position on the Israel-Palestine conflict (McGlynn 2009, 2-3).
It remains restrained to the extent that it never has urged a reexamination of UN 242,
even when it served on the Security Council, and tends to call on both sides as equal
parties to work towards peaceful negotiations, at times seemingly oblivious to the level of
enmity that has festered between the two sides. Observing only at this level, Japan
appears to show limited direct engagement, but this easily overlooks the role Japan has
played on the ground via ODA and dialogues.
Japan was admitted to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East (UNRWA) Advisory Commission in 1973, and would become a major
donor to the program in the following decades. In July 2006, Prime Minister Koizumi
introduced the Corridor for Peace and Prosperity as a strategy to combat the humanitarian
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crisis in Palestine, and facilitate an opportunity for regional peace through mutual
prosperity. Initiated a few months prior to the declaration of the values-based Arc, the
Corridor would serve as a cornerstone of Japan’s new form of engagement in Asia.
Beyond Koizumi, Asō, and Abe, several subsequent political elites continue to promote
the Corridor initiative. The Corridor seeks to bring together four parties, Japan, Israel,
Jordan, and Palestine, to collaborate on an agro-industrial park in the Jericho Governorate
of the West Bank, and a transportation network from the West Bank through Jordan to
the Gulf States. From the start, Japan has been prepared to finance the bulk of the
initiative investment costs through ODA. In the fall of 2017, the first phase of the agroindustrial park was completed, with two more phases scheduled.
In 2009, together initially with Indonesia and Malaysia, Japan developed the
Conference on Cooperation among East Asian Countries for Palestinian Development
(CEAPAD), which has facilitated agricultural, industrial, and commercial training of
Palestinians. At the 2013 conference in Tokyo, CEAPAD expanded to include Brunei,
South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, the League of Arab States, Islamic
Development Bank, UN, UNRWA, and World Bank. In the 2014 conference in Jakarta, it
expanded to include 22 countries, including China. Through CEAPAD, Japan has more
clearly articulated its support for a two-state solution. MOFA’s website explains that
CEAPAD was created “on the initiative of Japan to back up the realization of peace
through the ‘two-state solution’” (2013). In 2013, Kishida spoke at the CEAPAD
meeting: “I cannot stop hoping that when peace talks stall, Israel and Palestine will listen
to the international community, and through a ‘two-state solution’ can begin to make
progress towards realizing peace” (2013a).
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The Japanese position in the conflict is mostly motivated by an urge to support
Palestinians on grounds of human rights and for stability and prosperity in Asia, but its
behavior is influenced by the countering variables that are, firstly, its alliance with the
U.S., and, secondly, necessity to retain steady access to energy resources from proPalestinian Arab states. Israel is an important trade partner for Japan with respect to
specific fields, such as security technology, but it pales in comparison to Japan’s
economic interests with oil-rich Arab states. Alliance with the U.S., however, causes
Japan to tread lightly with any political position regarding the Palestinian question.
Indeed, Japan is among just a handful of Asian states that does not recognize the state of
Palestine, but in early 2018, after meeting with Japanese diplomats, PNA senior official
Nabil Shaath told Saudi newspaper Al-Watan that “Japan is preparing to enter the process
of recognizing a Palestinian state” (Shaath 2018). This statement has garnered attention
in the Middle East media, but little in Japan or the West. In any case, the geopolitical and
economic pressures on Japan force it to focus its role in the conflict on humanitarian
assistance toward the Palestinians. Therefore, the Japanese position on the IsraeliPalestinian conflict is foremost a human rights position.
Central Asia Plus Japan Dialogue
In his seminal work Great Games, Local Rules, Alexander Cooley argues that the
five Central Asian republics display “few tangible indicators of actual regional
coherence” (2012: 149). Trade within the region is constrained, human mobility is
restricted with most emigrating laborers going to Russia before a neighboring Central
Asian republic, and public agencies often refuse to share information with each other
(Cooley 2012, 149-50). Both Beijing and Moscow have concentrated efforts to deepen
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not only their own relations with the Central Asian republics, but also the integration
among the five republics. Yet, these attempts are always done without the full
participation of all five states, and with Chinese or Russian interests at the root of the
strategic engagement. In some capacity, a plurality of Central Asian republics are party to
the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union, and
the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and several other international
organizations. More often than not, however, these organizations are either dominated by
Russian, Chinese, or EU interests, or they are too large to focus on the issues specific to
Central Asia, and opportunities for progress on regional integration have little chance.
The Central Asia Plus Japan Dialogue does provide opportunities for multilateral
diplomatic engagement specific to Central Asia, as a region, which these other
international organizations do not. The Central Asia Plus Japan Dialogue started in
August 2004 as a foreign ministers’ meeting, and has continued with subsequent
meetings every year. Party to the Central Asia Plus Japan Dialogue are Japan,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. While not an official member,
‘permanently neutral’ Turkmenistan almost always sends a delegate with observer status,
and has occasionally hosted the meetings as well. This is not to say the Central Asia Plus
Japan Dialogue has been extraordinarily successful in achieving regional integration (or,
for that matter, improving democratization and human rights), but in none of these other
international organizations can high-level officials from all five Central Asian republics
gather with just one member from outside the region, thus making up five-sixths of the

275

parties represented. Moreover, that one outside member is not Russia or China; rather, it
is a democratic Asian state with a strong human rights record.
At the first Dialogue in 2004, Japanese Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko made
this objective explicitly clear: “I would like to emphasize the crucial nature of the
development of human rights and democratization in Central Asia” (Kawaguchi 2004).
She added, “I believe strongly that human rights and democracy can be realized within
each country's cultural and historical context, and in this area, too, Japan hopes to be able
to contribute its experiences and its knowledge” (2004). A review of the Central Asia
Plus Japan Dialogue foreign ministers’ joint statements from 2004 to 2017, however,
shows few references to democracy, and even less references to human rights, rule of
law, or market economy (see Table 7.7). References to democracy and human rights have
vanished in both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy between Japan and the Central
Asian republics with the exception of Kyrgyzstan, the only semi-democratic state in the
region. In April 2017, Foreign Minister Kishida wrote five nearly-identical columns for
one newspaper in each of the five Central Asian republics. As seen in Table 7.7, of the
five, democracy was mentioned in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, but
omitted from the columns of mostly the same content in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Yet,
in the three cases it was mentioned, all three were referencing Kyrgyzstan’s progress as a
model. References to democracy are constrained, and the few times it is mentioned, it is
to point out the successes in Kyrgyzstan, never the dearth elsewhere in the region.
Nonetheless, the Central Asia Plus Japan Dialogue is the only forum in which
“almost exclusively, Central Asians [are] discussing Central Asian matters” (Barber
2018, 32). Cooley notes the rows that exist among Central Asian political elites:
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Officials from Kazakhstan frequently complain about being grouped with its
relatively weaker and poorer neighbors, while Uzbekistan consistently expresses a
preference for addressing regional problems through bilateral means, rather than
multilateral or regional organizations. Turkmenistan’s long-standing “policy of
neutrality” allows Ashgabat to altogether avoid making formal commitments to
outside powers, regional forums, or international organizations (2012: 151).
Yet surprisingly, the Central Asia Plus Japan Dialogue brings them together, and Tokyo
is able to provide a facilitator role which does not raise the suspicion of any of the
Central Asian administrations that it is like Beijing or Moscow, and vying for geopolitical
influence in the region. It is not a forum whereby Tokyo announces ODA packages, since
these are normally done bilaterally, but it is where Japan inserts its solutions to issues in
Central Asia. Abe explained his view of the Central Asia Plus Japan Dialogue while in
Kazakhstan in 2015: “if something – an issue – calls for a regional solution, then Japan
can be a ‘catalyst’ that all parties trust” (Abe 2015d).
Other Dialogues
It was Iranian President Mohammed Khatami who introduced the initiative,
Dialogue Among Civilizations, to the UN in 2000. It was Japan which acted on it. Along
with the aforementioned, other political dialogues between Japan and Muslim Asia also
exist. The Iran-Japan Human Rights Dialogue started the same year as Khatami’s
initiative, and continues at the foreign minister and vice foreign minister level. Over a
dozen conferences have taken place in rotation between Tokyo and Tehran, but joint
statements are not released and little detail is provided regarding the content of these
dialogues. Also, in 2017, the Japan-Arab Political Dialogue commenced, succeeding the
Dialogue among Civilizations between Japan and the Islamic World (2002-2010), and the
Japan-Arab Dialogue Forum (2003-2006). Dialogues appear to be the clear strategic
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option for Japan, but it is questionable how effective are these dialogues with opaque
outcomes.
Would Central Asian republics be less democratic and have worse human rights
records if the Central Asia Plus Japan Dialogue never took place? Is the Iran-Japan
Human Rights Dialogue having any effect on human rights in that country? No
significant outcome on democratization or positive effect on human rights is evident, but
at the same time, they are conduits for Japan to model its values. Japan may not be asking
the hard questions on democratization and human rights as the West would, nor does it
necessarily broach the topic – to do so would be inharmonious – but it is implied in
nonverbal, indirect communication characteristic of the Japanese language. To be direct
is rude and confrontational; rather, onus is on the listener to interpret implied meanings –
“to read the air” (ba no kūki wo yomu). An example of this is the indirect reference to
Kyrgyzstan’s progress in democratization by Kishida in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
Therefore, consistent dialogues are maintained with Muslim Asian states in order to
strengthen awareness of Japan, and its values. The strategy is to model. Perhaps the effect
is marginal, but is that any less effective than the West’s tough questions approach?
Human Rights and the Syrian Refugee Crisis
The Arab Spring of 2011 caught Japan considerably off guard. Whereas in the West it
was seen as both a demand for democratization and an opportunity to shape it into the
Western liberal democracy model, Japan was in a poor position to respond during the
most fervent events. On March 11, the Tōhoku Earthquake and Tsunami struck the
country, and crippled it with the Fukushima nuclear disaster looming. Four days later, on
March 15, the ‘day of rage’ started in Syria, whereby Arab Spring demonstrations were
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met with open fire from security forces. Support for the protestors was expressed
throughout the West, but Japan’s foreign minister did not issue any statement for a full
week. Fuel prices, not the promotion of democracy, were of vital concern for Tokyo due
to the events in both Japan and the Middle East.
In the months that followed, tens of thousands of refugees fled Syria due to an
intensifying civil war. By 2018, the number would surpass 6 million (Connor 2018).
Most refugees abroad settled in neighboring countries, but as refugee numbers continued
to swell, countries all over the world were faced with the challenge of resettling Syrian
refugees in their countries. Among the developed world, the Japanese response to refugee
crises has been unique for decades. Japan is a signatory to the Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees in 1981 and the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees in 1982,
but in major refugee crises, while Japan tends to provide substantial humanitarian
assistance, it also admits very few refugees to resettle in Japan. This would again be the
case.
Intense debates over accepting Syrian refugees have taken place in Western
countries. The large majority of Syrian refugees are Muslims, and thus, an urge to
securitize is obvious, for fear that refugee programs are welcoming religious terrorists
into Western societies. Since the civil war began, half a million Syrians were admitted as
refugees into Germany – the most of any country not bordering Syria. Among other G7
members, Canada has admitted over 50,000; the U.S., 20,000; the UK and France, over
10,000, each; and Italy has admitted 2,500 (Connor 2018). Yet for the seventh member of
the G7, Japan, only seven Syrian refugees were allowed entry (Yamagata 2017, 1). Even
after substantial pressure from its Western G7 partners, Japan announced it would accept
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just 150 Syrian refugees as students over five years, starting in 2017 (Yamagata 2017, 5).
Somehow, Japan gets a pass on the burden of accepting refugees by the global media, and
little debate takes place on the issue in Japan. When presented with the issue a wellknown writer in Japan, Sono Ayako, commented that “Japanese people do not know how
difficult it is for people who have different backgrounds, religions, cultures and physical
appearance to live together” (Yamagata 2017, 9).
In September 2015, political cartoonist Hasumi Toshiko shared an illustration of a
Syrian refugee girl on Facebook that caught the attention of many, both in Japan and
abroad. The cartoon was based on a photograph taken of a six-year old Syrian girl by a
photographer working with Feed the Children at a refugee camp in Lebanon. Hasumi’s
illustration distorted the intended meaning of the photograph by adding a menacing glare
to the girl’s eyes, and including thought bubbles. The thought bubbles start innocuously
enough, written in Japanese: “I want to live in safety. I want to be sent to a life that is
pure. I want delicious food. I want to play freely. I want to dress up. I want to live in
luxury. I want to go where I can live without hardship.” Then, in much larger text, “at
someone else’s cost! I got it…I’ll be a refugee!” A few months later, Hasumi published
an illustration book, Sōda Nanmin Shiyō – Hasumi Toshiko no Sekai (I’ll Be a Refugee! –
The World of Hasumi Toshiko), which included a modified version of the controversial
Syrian girl illustration on the cover.
Hasumi’s illustration does not wholly represent a national mood towards human
rights with regard to refugees. In fact, numerous Japanese joined non-Japanese who
decried the illustration and its message. It is difficult to argue, however, that it does not
express a prevalent theme in Japanese thinking, when Japan consistently deflects
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admission of refugees into the country. Just days after Hasumi uploaded her illustration,
Abe addressed why Japan does not accept but a handful of refugees: “[b]efore accepting
immigrants or refugees, we need to have more activities by women, by elderly people and
we must raise [the birthrate]” (BBC 2015). The same month, Abe pledged $810 million to
aid Syrian and Iraqi refugees while speaking at the UN General Assembly (BBC 2015).
Abe, has never made a public statement regarding Hasumi’s illustration, and it
would not be expected for a government official to comment on such, but there is a
common theme between them in terms of securitization to note. In both cases, the threat
is not terrorism, as it is in the West, but rather, a threat to Japan’s economic security.
Checkbook diplomacy fills the void of humanitarian obligation, and secures the referent
object (Japan’s economy) from the threat (immigrants). Therefore, this is not Islam as the
threat, as it is perceived to be in the West with a Trojan horse narrative. It does, however,
have a negative effect on perceptions of Japan by both Muslims who share religious
identity with Syrian refugees, and the wider international community. A year later, in
September 2016, Japan announced a new aid package of $2.8 billion over the course of
three years at the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants. Japan unequivocally makes
generous contributions for refugees and several Japanese NGOs are active in aid efforts
for Syrian refugees, but expectations are made, norms are constructed, and comparisons
are drawn among DAC members, and despite whatever large amount of ODA packages
Japan contributes, it remains conspicuous for its petty acceptance of refugees into its
country. This can be noted of course by Syrians in need, but also DAC members and
Muslims across Asia.
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Conclusion
In June 1957, Prime Minister Kishi addressed the U.S. House of Representatives, stating:
“It is because of our strong belief in democratic principles and ideals that Japan
associates herself with the free nations of the world.” In April 2015, his grandson, Abe
Shinzō, spoke the same words, at the same podium, holding the same office. There are
multiple impetuses why democracy, human rights, and other values are expressed, in the
manner which they are expressed, in Japan’s foreign policy with Muslim Asia. These can
be expressed in two framings.
First, the geopolitical perspective is undeniable, but also incomplete. According to
this perspective, Japan is using an ideational strategy for material interests. This is
namely a counterstrategy regarding a rising China. In May 2012, a minor row erupted
when, to Beijing’s chagrin, Japan decided to host the World Uyghur Congress (WUC)
general assembly in Tokyo. Weeks prior to the general assembly, Beijing sent a letter to
several parliamentarians in Japan, including Abe, requesting Japan to not have any
contact with WUC. While geopolitical interests were obvious to any observer, the WUC
and Japanese used the opportunity to express a shared geoculture. The WUC seeks to
create a democratic state in East Turkistan from the present Xinjiang Autonomous
Region in China, and denounces any violence in their protests – both of which pleases
Tokyo, but rousing Beijing was possibly more pleasing.
When WUC leader Rebiya Kadeer visited Tokyo, she irritated Beijing even
further by making a visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine – a Shinto site that honors
spirit including wartime Class-A war criminals. When asked about it, she called it a “a
cultural [visit], not a political act,” thus highlighting the constructed geoculture between
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the WUC and Japan. Nonetheless, the geopolitical aspects are difficult for any observer
to dismiss (Hammond 2013). In fact, the geocultural language may be no more than a
smokescreen to conceal the overt geopolitical interests on both sides. It does, however, do
more for Tokyo insofar as the plight of the WUC is of interest to much of Muslim Asia,
and Japan’s support of the organization facilitates for trust-building.
This chapter demonstrates that references to rule of law are more often than not
pointing toward maritime international law, and the South China Seas. It is not about
order within states in Muslim Asia. Japan is framing itself as the model of an Asian,
democracy, free society who respects human rights. This language constructs Japan as a
model to appeal to Muslim Asia just as it did in the early twentieth century as a model to
modernize, but not Westernize. Yet, at the same time, this distinguishes Japan from
China, and to a lesser extent, Russia. It does not distinguish Japan from the West, but that
is where the ‘Asian values’ come into play.
Second, it is obvious there is much more at play in values-based diplomacy than
just geopolitics. Japan is hedging that its ‘Asian liberal democracy,’ with ‘Eastern values’
such as harmony, moderation, tolerance, lovingkindness, and benevolence, coupled
together with ‘universal’ or ‘basic values’ of freedom, human rights, rule of law, and
market economy is the right path to peace, prosperity, stability, and attainment of
minpon-shugi in practice. Minpon-shugi is people-based, but it is also security, quality of
life, social harmony, benevolence – it is human security, which is the essence of desire
for peoples throughout wide swaths of Muslim Asia. To spread this message is a
significant transformation for Japan. There is a conviction of how development needs to
take place in Asia, and this is based on its own historical experiences. The point is not so
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much to be right or wrong about this conviction as it is evident in their belief. Therefore,
it is essential for Japan’s strategy for Asia, including Muslim Asia.
Where does Islam and securitization fit into this? Japan is not blending itself fully
into Asia. This is evident from the examination of the refugee case. It sees itself,
however, as part of the same sub-structure system, and a model that is replicable
precisely because of likeness. Islam is addressed through expressions of moderation and
tolerance, and through the belief that economic growth leads to peace, prosperity,
stability, and lessens the possibility of violent religious extremism. The conclusion is
evident from both the ODA activities examined in the previous chapter as well as the
statements examined in this one.
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Figure 7.1: Abe’s Framing of “Asian Values,” at Shared Values and Democracy in Asia
Symposium, Tokyo, January 2016
“Asian thinking”
“universal values”

lovingkindness
benevolence

contributes
to

democracy
freedom

fraternity
human rights
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to
peace

harmony
trade
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Table 7.1: Japanese Elites’ References to ‘Democracy’ in Muslim Asia, 2013-2018
date
diplomat
place
forum
context (times)
18 Jan. 2013
Abe
Indonesia
Speech
Indonesia’s (2);
Japan’s (1)
3 May 2013
Abe
Turkey
Press conference “…in Middle East”
(1)
24 Aug 2013
Abe
Saudi Arabia
Newspaper
regarding situation in
interview
Egypt (1)
25 Aug 2013
Abe
Kuwait
Newspaper
regard situation in
interview
Egypt (1)
27 Aug 2013
Abe
Qatar
Newspaper
“…in Middle East”
interview
(1)
28 Aug 2013
Abe
Qatar
Press conference Japan’s counterterrorism strategy (1)
21 Mar 2014 Kishida
Bangladesh
Newspaper
Bangladesh’s
column
progress in… (1)
16 Jul 2014
Kishida
Kyrgyzstan
Newspaper
Kyrgyzstan’s
column
progress in… (2)
12 Aug 2014 Kishida
Indonesia
Newspaper
Japan & Indonesia’s
interview
shared values (2)
26 Oct 2015
Abe
Kyrgyzstan
Newspaper
Japan & Kyrgyzstan’s
interview
shared values (2)
21 Nov 2015
Abe
Malaysia
Newspaper
Japan & Malaysia’s
interview
shared values (3)
15 Jan 2017
Abe
Indonesia
Newspaper
Japan & Indonesia’s
interview
shared values (1)
29 Apr 2017 Kishida Turkmenistan
Newspaper
Referencing
column
Kyrgyzstan’s…(3)
30 Apr 2017 Kishida
Uzbekistan
Newspaper
Referencing
column
Kyrgyzstan’s…(3)
30 Apr 2017 Kishida
Kyrgyzstan
Newspaper
Referencing
column
Kyrgyzstan’s…(3)
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Table 7.2: Japanese Elites’ References to ‘Human Rights’ in Muslim Asia, 2013-2018
date
18 Jan. 2013
24 Aug 2013
25 Aug 2013
26 Oct 2015

diplomat
Abe
Abe
Abe
Abe

place
Indonesia
Saudi Arabia
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan

forum
Speech
Newspaper interview
Newspaper interview
Newspaper interview

21 Nov 2015

Abe

Malaysia

Newspaper interview

15 Jan 2017

Abe

Indonesia

Newspaper interview

19 Nov 2017

Kōno

Bangladesh

Newspaper interview

context (times)
Indonesia’s strong record (1)
in regard to Egypt (1)
in regard to Egypt (1)
Japan & Kyrgyzstan’s shared
values (1)
Japan & Malaysia’s shared
values (3)
Japan & Indonesia’s shared
values (1)
Regarding Rohingya crisis (1)

Table 7.3: Japanese Elites’ References to ‘Rule of Law’ in Muslim Asia, 2013-2018
date
18 Jan. 2013

diplomat
Abe

place
Indonesia

forum
Speech

24 Aug 2013
25 Aug 2013
8 Oct 2013
10 Oct 2013
12 Aug 2014
6 Sep 2014

Abe
Abe
Abe
Abe
Kishida
Abe

Saudi Arabia
Kuwait
Brunei
Brunei
Indonesia
Bangladesh

Newspaper interview
Newspaper interview
Newspaper interview
Press conference
Newspaper interview
Newspaper interview

22 Apr 2015

Abe

Indonesia

Newspaper interview

5 Aug 2015
26 Oct 2015

Kishida
Abe

Malaysia
Kyrgyzstan

Newspaper interview
Newspaper interview

21 Nov 2015

Abe

Malaysia

Newspaper interview

22 Nov 2015

Abe

Malaysia

Press conference

15 Jan 2017

Abe

Indonesia

Newspaper interview

11 Feb 2018

Kōno

Brunei

Newspaper column
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context (times)
Indonesia’s record (1); open
seas (1)
in regard to Egypt (1)
in regard to Egypt (1)
South China Sea (1)
open seas (1)
open seas (1)
Japan’s approach to int’l
conflicts (1)
Referencing Bandung
Principles (1)
South China Sea (1)
Japan & Kyrgyzstan’s shared
values (1)
Japan & Malaysia’s shared
values (3); open seas (1)
shared values with U.S. (1);
open seas (1)
Japan & Indonesia’s shared
values (1)
open seas (1)

Table 7.4: Appearance of Terms in Strings in Japan Diplomatic Bluebooks, 2013-2017
Edition
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
TOTAL

total
strings
6
13
22
26
23
90

democracy
5
10
18
22
18
73

human
rights
3
9
13
16
15
56

288

rule of law
3
7
16
19
13
58

freedom/
liberty
1
10
12
15
11
49

market
economy
3
0
3
3
5
14

Table 7.5: Utterance Frequency of Select Terms by Japanese Elites’ in Muslim Asia,
2013-2018
Term
Frequency
Coverage
262
0.56%
支援 (shien) “assistance”
207
0.44%
安定 (antei) “stability”
191
0.41%
発展 (hatten) “development”
171
0.37%
平和 (heiwa) “peace”
127
0.27%
成長 (seichō) “growth”
110
0.24%
繁栄 (han’ei) “prosperity”
106
0.23%
技術 (gijutsu) “skill/technique”
102
0.22%
貢献 (kōken) “contribution”
98
0.21%
投資 (tōshi) “investment”
86
0.18%
インフラ (infura) “infrastructure”
83
0.18%
エネルギー (enerugī) “energy”
72
0.15%
テロ (tero) “terrorism”
52
0.11%
民主 (minshu) “democracy”
17
0.04%
人権 (jinken) “human rights”
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Table 7.6: Comparison of Japan and U.S. Voting Records on UN Resolutions Regarding
Israel and Palestine
Resolution
UNGA Res. 2253: condemns Israel’s capture of
East Jerusalem
July 1967
UNGA Res. 3236: recognition of Palestinian right
to self-determination
November 1974
UN observer status for Palestine
November 1974

Japan
In favor

U.S.
Abstains

Abstains

Against

Abstains

Against

UNGA Res. 3379: Zionism is a form of racism
November 1975 (repealed 16 years later)

Abstains

Against

UNESCO Res. condemning Israel over Palestinian
rights
May 1976
UNSC Res. 608: calls upon Israel to cease
deportation during first Intifada
January 1988
UNGA Res. 4321: amid the first Intifada, calls on
Israel to withdraw from occupied territories
November 1988
UNGA Res. 43177: acknowledges Palestinian
statehood
December 1988
UNGA Res. 9427: grants Palestine rights to
participate in General Assembly
July 1998
UNSC Res. 1860: calls for a ceasefire in Gaza
January 2009

In favor

Against

In favor

Abstains

In favor

Against

Abstains

Against

In favor

Against

In favor

Abstains

UNGA Res. in support of the Goldstone Report in
Gaza
November 2009
UNESCO full membership for Palestine
October 2011

Abstains

Against

Abstains

Against

UNGA to grant Palestine observer state status
November 2012

In favor

against

UNSC Res. 2334 condemning Israeli settlements
in Palestinian territories
December 2016
UNGA nonbinding res. condemning U.S. move of
embassy to Jerusalem
December 2017

In favor

Abstains

In favor

Against
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Outcome
99 in favor
0 against
20 abstentions
89 in favor
8 against
37 abstentions
95 in favor
17 against
19 abstentions
72 in favor
35 against
32 abstentions
26 in favor
1 against
10 abstentions
14 in favor
0 against
1 abstention
130 in favor
2 against
16 abstentions
104 in favor
2 against
36 abstentions
124 in favor
4 against
10 abstentions
14 in favor
0 against
1 abstention
114 in favor
18 against
44 abstentions
107 in favor
14 against
52 abstentions
138 in favor
9 against
41 abstentions
14 in favor
0 against
1 abstention
128 in favor
9 against
35 abstained

Table 7.7: Central Asia Plus Japan Dialogue Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Joint Statement
References to ‘Democracy’ or ‘Human Rights,’ 2004-2017
date
democracy
human rights
rule of law
market
economy
28 Aug. 2004
3
0
0
1
5 Jun 2006
1
1
0
2
7 Aug 2010
1
0
0
0
10 Nov 2012
2
1
1
2
16 Jul 2014
1*
0
1
0
1 May 2017
0
0
1
0
* Regarding Afghanistan; not Central Asian republics.
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CHAPTER VIII
SANCTIONS AND INTERVENTIONS
In 1951, the UK called for an international embargo on Iranian crude oil after its prime
minister nationalized the oil fields. The sudden nationalization of Iranian crude oil came
directly to the detriment of the British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), which had
control over essentially the entire oil industry in Iran for nearly two decades, and had
concession contracts up until 1993 (Luttrell 2015, 203). Despite this, in February 1953
Japanese oil company, Idemitsu, made a nine-year contract with National Iranian Oil
Company (NIOC), and Idemitsu’s tanker, Nisshō Maru, left the port of Abbadan with a
full load of 22,000 barrels of crude oil in March (Kubota 2009, 242-43). Not only did
Idemitsu act in violation of the British-led embargo, but it also purchased the crude from
Iran at 30 percent below market value, thus further vexing AIOC (Kubota 2009, 242).
A year prior, an Italian tanker carrying Iranian oil was intercepted by the British
Royal Navy and escorted to British-held port of Aden, where the AIOC successfully
argued in Aden prize court that it was the rightful owner of the cargo (Luttrell 2015, 203).
The British Royal Navy’s gunboat diplomacy and AIOC’s active litigation in court
dissuaded other tankers and effectively sealed off oil exports from Iran. Yet, the Nisshō
Maru risked interception by the Royal Navy and safely arrived at the port of Kobe weeks
later. AIOC promptly sued Idemitsu in Japanese courts, claiming ownership of the cargo,
but Idemitsu would inevitably win in court. Reportedly, the Nisshō Maru was sent off by
a cheering crowd in Iran, and greeted with cheering crowd in Japan, as it represented an
act of defiance of the supermajors and Western powers.
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Idemitsu was criticized not only by the British and supermajors, but also many
government officials in Japan, yet the move was widely popular among the Japanese
public. Idemitsu “was one of only a handful of companies” that challenged the British
call to boycott Iranian oil (Azimi 2010). The president of the company, Idemitsu Sazō,
who made the decision to send the Nisshō Maru for a delivery, would comment later:
In the beginning, as a Japanese I considered it wrong to do something like
ignoring international loyalty, so I endured [italics added] for a year and a half.
Why I decided to do it was because the UK and the U.S. were looking to make a
distributor to sell Iranian oil. I thought, “this is my chance” (Kubota 2009, 241).
A pragmatic businessman, Idemitsu added, “It was a buyer’s market” (Kubota 2009,
242)! The Nisshō Maru Incident, as it is called in Japan, would spearhead a new era of
direct relations between Muslim Asia and Japan. While 22,000 barrels was not a large
figure in the grand scheme of Iranian crude sales and Japanese consumption, it carried
great symbolic value. “It was Japan who was the first to unload Iranian oil out from the
control of the international oil cartel” (Kubota 2009, 243). It is noteworthy in Idemitsu’s
statement how he endured the embargo for a year and a half as a Japanese, and thus, as a
loyal member of an international community, yet the impetus to act was the risk of an
economic monopoly on his industrial product. This acceptance of endurance as a loyal
member of an international community as a Japanese is consistent with attitudes on
sanctions of states in Muslim Asia up into the twenty-first century. It also illustrates,
however, a threshold to that international loyalty that is based on economic self-interest,
and by extension, national security concerns. Idemitsu acted when he sensed Japan’s
security would worsen due to the direction the UK and U.S. were leading this sanction
regime.
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Idemitsu’s statement reflected a struggle between Japan’s own interests, and
perceived role as an upright model state in the international society. This struggle persists
today, and relates to how Japan has responded to sanctions and interventions in Muslim
Asia. If values such as democratization, human rights, and rule of law are now
emphasized and proselytized in Japan’s foreign policymaking, there must be
consideration of the punitive mechanisms to deal with states that egregiously defy such
values. That is not to say Japan actively desires to be the actor who carries out such
punitive mechanisms, but options such as economic sanctions and armed interventions
must be in the toolbox. This chapter considers Japan’s position on economic sanctions
and armed interventions in Muslim Asian states, as it relates to its values-based
diplomacy and securitization of Islam. Insofar as securitization is the “identification of an
existential threat to a valid referent object and the call for exceptional measures,” the
U.S., its view of Islam, macrosecuritization, and its vision for Asia are significant factors
in consideration of Japan’s position on sanctions and interventions in Muslim Asia, but
Japan also has its own normative predispositions that are expressed (Buzan and Wæver
2009, 257). These norms also have to be balanced in Japan’s strategy.
This chapter examines Japan’s perceived role in Muslim Asia regarding punitive
measures, economic sanctions and armed interventions. This relates to the competing
visions for Asia, examined in Chapter 3, as Japan’s perceived role in Muslim Asia is
influenced by the roles taken by other great powers, namely the U.S., but also China. To
explore Japan’s perceived role, and how punitive measures relate to it, role theory is
applied. Role theory asserts that a state’s behavior is determined by perceived
expectations from both Self and Others. The practices that emanate from these
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expectations are honed through experience and social interactions. Here, the experience
and social interactions are the cases of sanctions and interventions, which reveal a
changing and refining of not only Japan’s role, but also its norms and identity. In 1970,
K.J. Holsti introduced role theory into foreign policy analysis. “Conventional terms such
as ‘great power’ or ‘middle power’ do not necessarily indicate how much diplomatic
influence states wield within any set of relationships” (1970: 242). Role theory is a means
to break this down. Japan may be considered a great power or middle power, but this is
exerted in ways differing from the U.S., or other powers. Role theory brings both agency
and structural variables into consideration to explain foreign policy behavior. It is what
Holsti called the national role conception:
A national role conception includes the policymakers’ own definitions of the
general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state,
and of the functions, if any. Their state should perform on a continuing basis in
the international system or in subordinate regional system. It is their “image” of
the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external
environment (1970: 245-46).
At the same time, “[n]ational role conceptions are also related to, or buttressed by, the
role prescriptions coming from the external environment” (Holsti 1970, 246).
This chapter shows, however, that Japan’s role regarding sanctions and
interventions in Muslim Asia is in a state of flux between agency interests and structural
influences that are evident in Idemitsu’s statement. In other words, ‘role expectations’ are
in a state of conflict between “domestic and/or individual expectations as to what the
appropriate role is and what it implies,” and the “implicit or explicit demands by others”
(Harnisch 2011, 8). This chapter proceeds by examining cases of sanctions and
interventions, but the two are treated separately. The chapter then concludes with
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thoughts on Japan’s role, identity, and norms regarding sanctions and interventions, and
how they relate to its values-based diplomacy.
Sanctions
Any analysis to Japan’s approach on sanctions must consider Japan’s own experiences as
a sanctioned state, and the impact of this experience has on identity. For the U.S.,
narratives of World War II start with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor; for Japan, the
Pacific War started with the U.S. embargo of crude oil exports. In September 1940, the
U.S. banned all iron and scrap steel exports to Japan to demonstrate disapproval of its
expansion into Asia, and in July 1941, all Japanese financial assets in the U.S. were
frozen, effectively embargoing oil exports. The UK and Netherlands joined the embargo
days later. If Japan was to “secure its capability to wage war, then it would inevitably
have to risk – or make – war” (Yergin 1993, 319). As winter approached, the hardships of
the embargo were felt in both the military and society.
At the Imperial Conference on 5 November 1941, Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki
remarked: “The United States has from the beginning believed that Japan would give up
because of economic pressure,” concluding, “I fear that we would become a third-class
nation after two or three years if we just sat tight” (Yergin 1993, 322). Tōjō’s statement is
revealing of identity and role, and the effect the embargo had on these. In the 2010s, a
similar tenor is expressed in statements by Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei: “The
purpose of sanctions and economic pressures is to prevent the developing efforts of the
people of Iran” (2014). After the American withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018,
Khamenei commented, “[w]e will never accept their bullying…[a]ny retreat by Iran will
make America more blatant and impudent…Resistance is the only option” (2017). Both
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Japan of the early 1940s and Iran of the 2010s share an experience of American
sanctioning to the point whereby inaction is impermissible. Japan chose war by deducing
it was the only means for state survival; Iran has not. In the ongoing Iran case, however,
Tokyo is very conscious of the decision it made when put in a similar position, and the
outcome of that decision. Even in the postwar era, this historical experience must weigh
heavily on policy decisions to join economic sanctions, particularly since it has been the
U.S. – the same state who sanctioned Japan in the early 1940s with crippling embargoes
– which is encouraging Japan to join in economic sanctions regimes today.
Japan experienced crippling sanctions by the West which were ultimately
counterproductive in the sense that they contributed to the inevitability of war. This
section continues with a review of two cases of sanctions carried out against states in
Muslim Asia, and Japan’s response to these sanctions. There is a consistency evident in
Japanese thinking, that the decision to sanction a state can contrast with state security
interests and the desire to be a model member of the international community. Moreover,
it reveals a hierarchy of needs and values in foreign policy, which can change with time.
Japan does implement sanctions pursuant to UNSC resolutions, and also has cases
whereby it has implemented unilateral sanctions. In 1990, Japan was the first state to
sanction Iraq over its invasion of Kuwait, well before a UNSC resolution was passed.
Japan has also joined the West in non-UN sanctions; it was the only Asian state to join
the West in its sanctions regime against Russia after the 2014 invasion of Crimea. Japan
has also resisted UN sanctions in the past, such as maintaining trade with and investments
in South Africa during apartheid. It is also likely that Japan was prepared to violate a
sanctions regime against the Taliban in 2000, when Japanese officials offered a proposal
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whereby they could protect the Buddhas of Bamyan statues in exchange for monetary
compensation (Zaeef 2010, 127: Schmetzer 2001).1 Japan has experience with sanctions
regimes from just about all angles, and this chapter argues that Japan’s decision to
sanction a state is based upon a hierarchy of needs and values, which are reflective in its
perceived role of Self. This chapter looks at two key cases: the 1990s South Asia arms
race, and the 2000s sanctions regime against Iran. In both of these cases, the development
of nuclear weapons was the crux of the regime, which was of acute concern for Japan
based upon its postwar values and identity.
Sanctions and Non-Nuclear Norms
In 1967, Prime Minister Satō Eisaku announced the Three Non-Nuclear
Principles. The principles committed Japan to nonproduction, non-possession, and nonintroduction of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory. The context of the principles was
a more complex deal Satō made with U.S. President Richard Nixon: Tokyo would join
the NPT at Washington’s request (which it did in 1976), and in exchange, the U.S. would
not place nuclear weapons at bases in Japan, and Okinawa would be restored to Japanese
sovereignty (which it was in 1972, albeit with multiple American military bases
remaining). The principles were passed as a resolution in 1971, which strengthened the
norm behind the principles, but they were never codified into law.2 Satō clarified,
however, that the Three Principles would not prevent Japan from developing peaceful
nuclear energy technology, which already had been developing in Japan for two decades.

1

If public, this might have been permitted by the sanctions regime, but it was conducted in a secret
meeting, according to reports (Zaeef 2010, 127).
For achieving the principles which strengthen Japan’s normative commitment against nuclear
proliferation, Satō received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974.
2
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The nuclear non-proliferation norm is perhaps more than anything, one which
Japan ardently champions internationally. The norm is unifying, and central to Japan’s
postwar identity and cultivated through narratives of historical experience. It is uniquely
the only people to have experienced atomic bombings of their cities in warfare.
Regardless of opinions of nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century, if there is any
international norm which Japan is willing to champion and on which it takes a leadership
role, it is bans on nuclear weapons. This is normativity seen at all levels, from political
elites to grassroots. In Muslim Asia, this norm is notably shared in Southeast Asia and
Central Asia – both regions have nuclear weapons moratorium treaties that declare the
regions ‘nuclear weapon free zones’ as of 1997 and 2009, respectively. In bilateral
meetings particularly between Japanese and Kazakhstani diplomats, reference is nearly
always made that both countries share the experience of ‘suffered harm from nuclear
weapons,’ and both use this in a way to shape the foundation of shared norms. The
circumstances of how nuclear weapons were used in each case, however, are
considerably different. For Kazakhstan, the experience was four decades of Soviet tests
near Semipalatinsk, exposing locals to dangerous levels of radiation. The circumstances
of the two cases were very different, and yet “Japan and Kazakhstan share a narrative that
nuclear weapons were inhumanly used on their territories, by an external power, with
disregard for the civilian population” (Barber 2018, 28).
For Japan, there are models of nuclear weapons-free regions in Muslim Asia, and
norms can be shared on this basis. Many Muslims recognize the American use of nuclear
weapons on Japan in 1945 as an act of dehumanization, and admire Japanese society for
overcoming this experience. Miyata explains that “America’s use of nuclear weapons is
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repeatedly emphasized in the Muslim Middle East because, postwar, it is seen with a
striking resemblance to America’s armed intervention in Iraq” (2014b: 222). For Japan,
the narrative has never focused widely on the dehumanization aspect, in part, because
postwar Japan largely entrusts the U.S. with its national security, and exists under the
American ‘nuclear umbrella.’ The basis of the Japanese narrative regarding the nuclear
bombings is more focused on the destructive force of the weapon, itself, and if Japan’s
narrative can perpetuate recognition of this norm by states in Muslim Asia to the point
they commit to non-nuclear weapons regimes, this is satisfactory. Japanese are certainly
not going to defend the American use of the weapon, but they also not going to join with
narratives of dehumanizing behavior by the U.S. while under its nuclear deterrence
umbrella. Concerns over nuclear weapons were exacerbated for Japan in 2016 and 2017
when North Korean increased its testing of nuclear weapons and of ICBM rockets which
flew over Japan’s territories. How does this strong norm interact with the cases of, firstly,
the one nuclear-weapons state in Muslim Asia, Pakistan, and secondly, the ongoing
global concern over Iran acquiring nuclear weapons?
South Asian Nuclear Arms Race
In 1965, Pakistani Minister of Foreign Affairs (and later Prime Minister) Zulfikar
ali Bhutto famously declared: “The Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilizations have this
capability [nuclear weapons]. The Communist powers also possess It [sic]. Only the
Islamic civilization was without it, but that position was about to change” (Singh 1979,
E21). Yet, after India detonated its first nuclear weapons test in 1974, Islamabad seemed
to counter Bhutto’s prediction by attempting several South Asian non-nuclearization
regimes – all rejected by New Delhi. In the first decades of the postwar period, Japan
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kept diplomatic distance from both India and Pakistan. It was neutral in the 1965 war
between the two, and found South Asia altogether too volatile for economic interests
(Mathur 2012, 12). After India detonated its Smiling Buddha nuclear bomb tests in 1974,
Japan reacted by forming together with Western states the Nuclear Suppliers Group to
limit India’s access to nuclear technology, equipment, and materials. By the end of the
Cold War, Japan was warming to both India and Pakistan primarily through ODA. On 11
and 13 May 1998, India conducted its second series of tests. Pakistan responded by
conducting its first public nuclear weapons tests on May 28 and 30.
The Japanese Diet immediately issued a resolution condemning the tests (Mathur
2012, 23). Within days, while member of the UN Security Council, Japan together with
three other non-permanent members introduced Resolution 1172 to unanimously
condemn India and Pakistan’s tests. The Prime Minister ordered the Japanese
ambassadors in New Delhi and Islamabad to return to Japan. These swift actions were
mostly symbolic, but punitive actions were also carried out.
Together with the U.S. and Western states, Japan applied economic sanctions to
both India and Pakistan, and cut off bilateral aid programs. All yen loans to Pakistan
totaling $231 million in 1997-98 were cancelled, as was all grant aid totaling $55 million
(Morrow and Carriere 1999, 5). Japan cancelled $1.2 billion in yen loans to India, and
$30 million in grant aid. Japan’s ODA cancellations were the most significant of any
donor state (Morrow and Carriere 1999, 5). In the 1990s, Japan was the top source of
ODA for both India and Pakistan, but the sanctions affected Pakistan more because of a
much deeper dependency on ODA. On June 12, the G8 members unanimously declared
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they would collectively use their shares to oppose any non-humanitarian aid by the IMF,
the World Bank, or the ADB to India and Pakistan (Morrow and Carriere 1999, 5).
There is evidence the sanctions had an impact. Kondō makes the observation:
Actually, economic sanctions were imposed on both countries and the elation
after the tests was dissolved and interest in the weapons, themselves, was
weakened. Thereby, the people’s main concerns returned to economic and social
problems, and soon, the people criticized their government for hastily carrying out
tests without considering the possibility of an international reaction to sanction
(2014: 187).
This is the strategy for the economic sanctions, but through carrying them out, it became
evident that domestic destabilization was not the best outcome for even Japan’s interests.
In one sense, Japan’s actions after the May 1998 nuclear weapons tests were an
expression of its normativity, but both Indian and Pakistani officials noted that it was not
proportionate to Japan’s response in previous cases. In 1996, China conducted a series of
nuclear tests, yet Tokyo only temporarily froze scheduled grant aid to China, and not its
yen loans (Mathur 2012, 24). Also in 1996, France conducted a series of tests in the
South Pacific, which Japan was quick to condemn, but France was not sanctioned in the
least. Officials in both New Delhi and Islamabad also pointed out hypocrisy of Japan
moralizing the issue while existing under the American nuclear umbrella (Mathur 2012,
24).
Tokyo’s conditions for loosening of sanctions were for India and Pakistan to
abandon their nuclear weapons programs, and join NPT and CTBT: “India and Pakistan
[must] not commence a dangerous nuclear arms race and conclude NPT and CTBT
unconditionally” (MOFA 1998). Yet in the following three years, neither India nor
Pakistan carried out further tests, but at the same time neither abandoned their nuclear
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weapons programs, or joined NPT or CTBT. By August 2000, Japan was already
indicating it was considering an end to the sanctions on India (Mohan 2000, 1), and in
August 2001 the U.S. was indicating the same, but both remained cautious about Pakistan
following Pervez Musharraf’s 1999 military coup (Perlez 2001). Musharraf’s government
was aware “the sanctions were fomenting a mood in both countries to support NPT via
internal strife,” and thereby formulated a strategy to loosen the sanctions without
compromising on the nuclear weapons development (Kondō 2014, 187). Musharraf took
measures to demonstrate that Islamabad could sufficiently manage the weapons, engaged
in dialogues with Washington and New Delhi, and discussed joining CTBT, albeit, never
committing. Counter to a dominant narrative, Islamabad was working towards removal of
its sanctions prior to 9/11, and likely would have achieved this, as well as normalization
of its nuclear arsenal. Just three days prior to 9/11, a source from the Japanese
government leaked to the media the Cabinet of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō was
seeking LDP approval to remove the sanctions on India, but still considering the
sanctions on Pakistan (Hisane 2001).
Musharraf’s strategy was working, but 9/11 was precisely what he needed to
normalize his nuclear arsenal. The U.S. and Japan removed sanctions on both India and
Pakistan within weeks after the attacks. In October, Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary
announced that Japan was simultaneously discontinuing sanctions on India and Pakistan:
both India and Pakistan have been maintaining their moratoria on further nuclear
tests for the past three years and declaring their intention to maintain it.
Furthermore, both countries have stated that they will ensure strict controls of
nuclear and missile related goods and technologies. To that extent, Japan’s
measures have obtained due achievement (MOFA 2001).
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The objectives were undoubtedly watered down. The statement adds at the very end,
“Japan will continuously urge India and Pakistan to make progress in the field of nuclear
non-proliferation, including signing of the CTBT” (MOFA 2001).
The sanctions regime was framed as a victory precisely because nothing occurred.
Rather, realistically the sanctions were destabilizing Pakistan, and thereby
counterproductive to Japan’s larger strategy. After ending sanctions on Pakistan, Japan’s
ODA was never restored to the pre-1998 levels: “Japan continued to bear in mind the
security issue while restricting the fields of targeted aid to the societal sector,
modernization of customs, and the economic sector” (Togawa and Tomomatsu 2011, 76).
The exogenous circumstances of a new ‘War on Terror’ and the renewed geopolitical
significance of Afghanistan allowed for a normalization of both India and Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons status, but it is significant to note that the U.S., Japan, and other states
were already working toward ending the sanctions before the events on 9/11. From the
Japanese perspective, there was not a significant factor in this case to securitize Islam,
although Islam was and still is an important factor for both India and Pakistan. Japan
went to great efforts to condemn and sanction India and Pakistan equally for the tests.
When war broke out between the two in 1999, Japan remained neutral. In fact, Islam is
oddly among the factors why Washington wanted the sanctions against Pakistan
removed; besides needing tactical access to Afghanistan, there was also the concern
religious extremist elements of the Pakistan military and ISI would align with al Qaeda.
Thus, removing the sanctions was to thwart the possibility of a religiously-based alliance.
Over time, Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons has become viewed both by
the Japanese and globally as more problematic than India’s possession, which has an
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Islamic aspect to it. The religious aspect increases the possibility that Pakistan’s nuclear
technology or weapons, themselves, proliferate outward from the regional security
complex. With India, there has always been little concern over this. Yet, in a comparative
case whereby Pakistan is interpreted as the Muslim state and India as the non-Muslim
state, it is difficult to credibly argue the difference in gradual acceptance of their nuclear
arsenals is securitizing Islam in Pakistan. There is also the instability of the government
in Islamabad contrasting to a more stable New Delhi, the military junta ruling Pakistan
versus a democratically-elected government in India, and Islamabad’s proximity to and
possibility of terrorist organizations acquiring, either by a consenting transaction or
thievery, nuclear materials, technology, or weapons from the Pakistani military and ISI.
All of these factors fog the conclusion that Islam is a factor. For the Japanese, this
concern over Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal manifested itself when Pakistani nuclear
scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, confessed in 2004 that he provided the North Koreans with
nuclear technology. The case does set precedents in several difference ways, as many in
Japan would discuss this normalization process as the ‘Pakistan model’ – one which sets
a perilous precedent in their view. Currently, Japan is fiercely resisting North Korea’s
progress toward nuclear normalization via the Pakistan model. Now, with Pakistan
becoming a ‘normalized’ nuclear state, Japan’s strategy is to support stability in Pakistan
rather than sanction the government so that it will denuclearize. As well as the North
Korea case, this has ramifications when considering developments in Iran.
Iran Nuclear Program
The U.S.-led sanctions regime against Iran had its start in November 1979 during
the American Embassy hostage crisis. By January 1980, Washington was appealing to
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European allies and Tokyo to join to build a more effective regime against Iran, which
would include sanctioning Iranian oil (Enayat 1994, 379). Tokyo refused the request,
arguing that it was already a “hostage” with the amount of financial investments sunk
into Iran while the revolution was taking place, but conceded that Japan would not
increase oil purchases from Iran during the hostage crisis (Enayat 1994, 379).
The U.S. sanctions were removed when the hostages were released, but a second
round of sanctions was applied in 1984 when the U.S. designated Iran a state sponsor of
terrorism, and strengthened sanctions in 1987. In 1995, U.S. President Bill Clinton
expanded the sanctions on Iran due to concerns over the nuclear program developments,
banning American involvement in Iran’s oil industry. The next year, the U.S. Congress
passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, which was key in flipping U.S. strategy on Iran
from applying only primary sanctions to opening it up to include secondary sanctions,
which compelled other countries to enforce the regime. American allies, such as Japan,
were now discouraged from trading with Iran, else face the possibility of the U.S.
penalizing their companies investing more than $20 million annually in Iran’s oil and
natural gas. This round of sanctions, however, still did not have a significant impact on
Japan. Most firms were able to continue operating in and with Iran, and oil imports from
Iran continued to increase through the 1990s, but it did cause firms to refrain from
additional investments in the oil and natural gas sector (Nukii 2014, 19).
This changed abruptly in the first years of the twenty first century. In 2002, a
secret nuclear development program was discovered in Iran, and in 2005, Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ordered the resumption of the uranium enrichment
program (Nukii 2014, 19). In 2006, the U.S. froze assets of foreign entities suspected of
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assisting Iran. To implement this, an office was created in the U.S. Treasury Department
with the ad hoc purpose of enforcing the sanctions rules. Despite Washington’s warning
not to do so, in 2004 Japanese oil firm INPEX commenced a joint-venture with the NIOC
to develop the Azadegan oil field (Faiola and Linzer 2006, A14). With every drop of the
estimated 36 billion barrels of oil from the Azadegan field expected to go to Japan, the
field was enough to make up six percent of Japan’s annual oil imports for years (Kafura
2016). U.S. sanctions were reinforced by UN Security Council resolutions 1747 in 2007,
1803 in 2008, and 1929 in 2010, and Japan’s Diet passed measures to accompany all of
these UN Security Council resolutions. In fact, Japan was sitting on the UN Security
Council during Resolution 1929 in June 2010, and supported it. By 2010, both Japan and
the EU were passing sanctions legislation on par with the U.S.’s sanctions. In doing so,
their companies decided that the risks of doing business in Iran had begun to outweigh
potential gains, and pulled out in increasing numbers. Japan responded by decreasing its
reliance on Iranian oil by roughly ten percent annually. Between 2007 and 2012, Japan’s
oil imports from Iran dropped roughly 40 percent (Smith 2012).
In July 2010, the U.S. tightened its sanctions with the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA), prohibiting foreign entities
from using American banks if they did business with Iran. Japan responded by passing its
own legislation the next month banning new FDI projects, restricting financial
transactions, and freezing assets of entities connected to the nuclear sector. Japan’s
sanction measures were an effort to dutifully show compliance with the U.S. and UN
sanctions, but at the same time, exemptions were needed because Japan could not sever
its dependency on Iranian oil so hastily. In 2003, Iranian oil made up 15.6 percent of
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Japan’s total imports (Nukii 2014, 20), but this steadily declined to 9.7 percent in 2010,
and 4.6 percent in 2015 (Japan Customs 2017).
These concerns only worsened in early 2011, when the Arab Spring and Great
East Japan Earthquake exacerbated energy costs for Japan. In December, the U.S. enacted
the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to prevent foreign financial institutions
from conducting business with Iran. The NDAA would be the most sweeping secondary
sanctioning by the U.S. to discourage transaction with Iran by any third-party state, and
resultantly, “drastically reduce Iranian oil imports to any principal country, including
Japan” (Aoi 2015, 119). Despite exacerbating energy concerns, Japan, too, passed a new
round of sanctions at the same time that would freeze the assets of entities linked to Iran
(Kafura 2016). U.S. Secretary of State Clinton praised Japan’s commitment to the
sanctions, calling it “especially noteworthy” despite “extraordinary energy and other
challenges” (Kafura 2016).
Yet, the sanctioning of oil was having a noticeable impact on Japan’s economy. In
March 2012, together with several EU nations, Japan appealed to the U.S. for sanctions
exemptions for Iranian oil, based on a clear track record of compliance with the regime to
that point. A U.S. State Department official referenced Japan as a compliant state in the
secondary sanctions: “Japan was a model,” adding, “[i]f Japan was able to do what it
did…that should be an example to others that they could potentially do more”
(Mohammed and Quinn 2012). Despite the exemptions and Japan serving as “a model,”
the existing sanctions were still too stringent for full compliance by Japanese firms. In
December 2012, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ was fined $8.6 million by the U.S.
Treasury Department for financing much of Japan’s oil purchases from Iran (Nukii 2014,
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20). In June 2013, the bank received a staggering $250 million fine by the New York
State Department of Financial Services for the same violation (Nukii 2014, 20).3
In September 2013, Prime Minister Abe and President Hassan Rouhani met on the
sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York. MOFA summary notes on the
meeting indicate that Abe told Rouhani, “I strongly expect Iran to dispel concerns of the
international society and restore international confidence” (Abe 2013a). The use of
transitive language, “[you] dispel concerns” placed the onus on Iran to act, but
emphasized building trust without directly referencing the nuclear program. This
expressed Abe’s understanding that Iran had a responsibility to observe the obligations of
full membership in the international society. Abe reportedly added, “a window of
opportunity is not always open, and showing flexibility taking this occasion would be a
key in order to solve the issue” (Abe 2013a). The “window of opportunity” Abe was
likely alluding to was the P5+1 negotiations, which two months later arrived at an interim
agreement. Just days prior to the interim Joint Plan of Action (JPA),4 Japanese Foreign
Minister Kishida visited Tehran, where he urged Rouhani and Foreign Minister
Mohammad Javad Zarif to ratify CTBT, and according to Kishida’s own account after his
return to Tokyo, he “worked with the Iranians on some specific proposals” which were
worked into the P5+1 summit (Kishida 2013b). He added, “our country is working from a
unique position” regarding the negotiations, aiming for “consensus building” (Kishida
2013b).

3

U.S. states, such as New York, were also applying secondary sanctions against foreign entities for
conducting business with Iran.
4

According to JPA, Japan as well as China, India, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey were allowed to
resume purchases of Iranian oil from January 2014 until July 2015.
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Considering the “unique position,” Japan’s absence from the P5+1 negotiations is
noteworthy. P5+1 was preceded by negotiations that started in 2003 between Iran and the
EU3 (UK, France, and Germany). These were opened up in 2006 to include the U.S.,
China, and Russia. At that time, Japan was Iran’s third largest trading partner and by a
long stretch its largest consumer of oil, at 22 percent of Iran’s export that year (Faiola and
Linzer 2006, A14). Japan’s Arc foreign policy was just in formulation, Tokyo was
already engaging with Tehran via the bilateral human rights dialogue for a number of
years, and, of course, it had a deep interest in nuclear non-proliferation in Asia. It was
member of the Six-Party Talks regarding nuclear weapons development in North Korea,
and together with Germany, India, and Brazil, advocating for inclusion as permanent
members to the UN Security Council. Yet, while even Italy was invited to the P5+1 talks
and briefly joined the negotiations in 2006 and 2007, Japan never was.
When the talks started in 2006, Japanese leaders complained about being left out,
despite “being asked to make the largest potential sacrifice” (Faiola and Linzer 2006,
A14). Other Japanese officials optimistically suggested it provided them the opportunity
to operate outside the framework of P5+1 agreements. Yoshimura argues Japan had a
unique role to inform Iran of the risks of nuclear development, thinking beyond just
concerns over weapons development:
There are military great powers and economically developed states which
compose the models for developing countries. Such existing thinking must be
questioned from its core, whether militarily or economically, and we [Japan] can
warn through the lessons of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Fukushima that the source
of great power status, or a developed country’s power has become fixated on poor
examples (2014: 226).
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Indeed, this is an applicable perspective none of the nuclear weapon-holding P5 members
could provide. Miyata suggests the other members discounted the need for Japan to join
on account of its postwar security dependency on the U.S.: “It seems the reason Japan
could not participate in the nuclear negotiations was expressed in the lack of trust of a
Japanese foreign policy that only emphasizes its alliance with the U.S.” (2015: 274). This
might explain why others did not see a need for Japan to join, but what about the U.S.
itself? Oddly, this question has rarely been raised.
The sanctions would have never achieved such an economic crippling affect since
2006 if it were not for Japan’s reluctant acquiescence, and reluctant acquiescence is
precisely how to describe Japan’s role in the sanctions regime. In June 2006, Abe was
serving as the Chief Cabinet Secretary for former Prime Minister Koizumi. Abe
expressed doubt at the time about the possibility of sanctions on Iran: “It might not
damage Iran, but could cause confusion in the world economy” (Abe 2006). The same
week, as foreign minister, Asō clarified that it was premature for Japan to consider
sanctions against Iran (Preble 2006). This is Japan weighing the hierarchy of needs and
values in its foreign policy, namely non-nuclearization, alliance with Washington, energy
dependency, and its own sanctioned experience.
Tokyo’s reluctance to support U.S.-led sanctions should not be misconstrued,
however, as lack of interest in Iran’s nuclear developments. Japan was deeply concerned;
again, the concern sprang from the core of its postwar identity. In a 2010 Pew Research
Survey, 75 percent of Japanese respondents expressed a negative view of Iran, which was
higher than any other Asian state where the survey took place, and even higher than
American respondents at 67 percent (Pew 2010, 43). In the same survey, Japanese
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opposition to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons was at 96 percent – the second-most
unanimous view in the world (to Germany at 98 percent) (Pew 2010, 45). Japan had
sincere concerns over nuclear technology sharing between Iran and Syria, and more
pertinently, North Korea. Unequivocally, Tokyo distrusted Tehran’s intentions with its
nuclear program, and did want a solution, but reluctant acquiescence to economic
sanctions was tolerated as the bigger power’s strategy. Thus, carrying out its role took a
backseat to the strategy of Japan’s main ally to a certain extent.
When Tokyo acquiesced to the sanctions regime and reduced its oil imports,
product exports, FDI, and financial services linked to Iran, much of that vacuum was
filled by traditional rival, China, and, to a lesser degree, by South Korea and India, which
had paid less heed to U.S. sanction regimes (see Table 8.1). Indeed, INPEX’s 75 percent
share in the Azadegan project gradually whittled down to ten percent, and INPEX
eventually pulled out of the project altogether in 2010, only to be replaced by China
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) (Kafura 2016).5 Japan seemed to only be
hurting itself by complying with the sanctions. Secondly, there is also a more pragmatic
explanation for Japan’s softer position on Iran: government-owned Japan Bank for
International Cooperation had roughly $3.7 billion in existing loans to Iran (Nukii 2014,
20). If significant friction between Japan and Iran were to develop, Japan would risk
never receiving repayments.
Thus, notwithstanding the threat of nuclear proliferation which was an earnest
concern for the Japanese, another threat emerged in the sanctions regimes in Japan’s

5

CNPC was dismissed from the Azadegan field in 2014 after Tehran complained the development was
moving too slowly (Kafura 2016).
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perception: the American threat that amplified the risk of conducting business in Iran,
which already existed. Thus, secondary sanctioning was Washington threatening close
allies, like Tokyo. As progress was being made in the P5+1 negotiations with Iran, “[i]n
Japan, business interest in Iran after the lifting of sanctions is high, and the attraction of
lectures relating to Iran is high, so corporations are conducting their own in-house
seminars” (Murakami 2014, 44). One such seminar was given in 2015 by Security and
Trade Management Advisor for Mitsui, Aoi Tamotsu, who later used his lecture on
business in Iran for the basis of an article:
At present, it is necessary to be overall watchful while cautiously moving
forward. By ‘overall watchful,’ that is Japan-U.S.-Iran; I mean be always
cognizant of Japan’s triangular relationship. When Japanese firms make business
connections with Iran, consider U.S. relations, meaning it is necessary to
sufficiently ascertain [italics added] whether this transaction will be within the
range of lifted sanctions. Also, it is necessary to always be cognizant that
considering Iran and U.S. relations, depending on the circumstances there will be
the possibility that sanctions are reinstated (2015: 128).
A similar conclusion was reached by Middle East scholar Murakami Takuya: “Because
Japan has the bitter experience of not being able to prevent the loss of development rights
at the Azadegan oil field due to American pressure at the time, Japan must be cautious
when ascertaining [italics added] the shift in nuclear negotiations” (Murakami 2014, 44).
Both Aoi and Murakami’s opinions used two of the same words: “caution”
(shinchō) and “ascertain” (mikiwameru). Clear from this interpretation is that the
sanctions regime was a threat to business interests. Moreover, the position of the
Japanese government as a sanctioning agent was not even addressed. Firms perceived a
threat from Washington before one from their own government in Tokyo. If sanctions
were to be reinstated, the question of whether or not Tokyo supported them was not even
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of concern. Rather, businesses have to be wary because of American actions, and indeed,
this threat has manifested itself. In May 2018, U.S. President Trump announced the U.S.
would withdraw from the P5+1 agreement. Both Foreign Minister Kōno and Chief
Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide described the decision using the same word: “zannen”
(‘a pity’).
Interventions
The contemporary non-interventionist norm in Japan is naturally based upon the
experiences of war, but this, alone, is not enough to form the basis of this noninterventionist norm. Rather, the norm was cultivated and reinforced through postwar
institutional arrangements. Article IX, as a renunciation of war, is the most eminent part
of Japan’s Constitution: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and
order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the
threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.” It adds, “land, sea, and
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.”
The norm was still not institutionally embedded in Japan’s identity and role in
Asia in 1947. Japanese soldiers in Vietnam and Indonesia who never repatriated after the
Second World War were concurrently joining independence movements in those
countries. While MacArthur ordered that Japanese would not be permitted to fight with
the U.S. in Korea, many Japanese young men, unemployed and with battlefield
experience, are known to have joined U.S. military units traveling from bases in Japan to
Korea (Morris-Suzuki 2012, 2). Also, during both the Korean and the Vietnam wars,
Japan sold large amounts of materiel to the U.S. military, including napalm. These acts
were done discreetly, but illustrate that in the years immediately after the Peace
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Constitution, Japan was already taking a malleable approach to this norm, and it was
hardly developed.
In 1954, the Police Reserve was renamed the Japan Self Defense Force (SDF) and
acquired the new charge of defending the country from external threats in a supporting
role to the U.S. forces in Japan. SDF troops are civilians, and yet the institution is by all
accounts a modern military with Air, Marine, and Ground SDF branches, but deliberately
avoids using the term ‘military’ to attempt adherence to Article IX. It was an arrangement
of which both Tokyo and Washington approved at the time, and takes advantage of a
loophole which allows the norm to persist.
By the late 1960s, the non-militarization norm was strengthening. In 1967, to
accompany the aforementioned Three Non-Nuclear Principles, another ‘Three Principles’
were passed by the Diet: Three Principles on Arms Exports. The principles would prevent
the export of arms to: (1) communist bloc countries; (2) countries under arms exports
embargo by the UN Security Council; and (3) countries involved or likely to be involved
in international conflicts. In 1976, the restrictions were tightened to a ban on all arms
exports, save some technology transfers between the SDF and the U.S. military. In the
same year, Japan self-imposed a restriction on defense spending of no more than one
percent of its annual GDP. This allowed it to grow, but relative to the nation’s wealth.
The rule did much to shape Japan’s role and identity by allowing a quantifiable
appearance of constraint for observers both domestic and international, but in reality the
defense budget of the late 1970s was already eighth largest in the world, and by the end
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of the 1980s Japan’s defense budget was third only to Cold War rivals the U.S. and
USSR (LaFeber 1997, 372).6
The norm was further codified in Japanese foreign policy by Prime Minister
Fukuda Takeo in 1977, when he announced the ‘Fukuda Doctrine’ for Southeast Asia
while in the Philippines. Just four years after the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, it
spelled out for Washington, Beijing, and all Southeast Asians how Japan intended to
interact with the region. The first principle of the Fukuda Doctrine is most germane:
“Japan, a nation committed to peace, rejects the role of a military power.” Fukuda did
deem it necessary to mention Japan had the capability to remilitarize and produce nuclear
weapons, yet each would be in violation of Article IX. There were geopolitical
ramifications, as it was perceived as Japan filling a void left by the U.S. withdrawal from
Vietnam, and strengthening relations with ASEAN as a counter to both the Soviet Union
and China, and an insurance policy in light of declining U.S. hegemony. Yet, the
emphasis on exerting power politics with a pledge to non-militarization was baffling, but
acceptable to many in Southeast Asia. It was also a reaffirmation of the Yoshida
Doctrine, since the second and third principles were carried mostly through geoeconomic facets, but paradoxically, they were intended to surpass direct material interests
in Southeast Asia, and fix a shared geoculture. As far as greater Muslim Asia is
concerned, Southeast Asia serves as the gate for twenty-first century policy predicated on
an Asian geoculture.

6

In the mid-1980s, amid much public debate, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro called for abandoning the
principle, and his cabinet decreed such in 1987, yet defense spending only occasionally surpassed one
percent of annual GDP less than a hundredth of a percentage point in the late 1980s. Thus, all that was
really achieved was rounding down to one-percent.
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The Yoshida Doctrine, the Fukuda Doctrine, and further principles and rules
allowed Japan a strategy to “‘depoliticize’ Asia,” preserve Article IX of its Constitution
and strengthen its normative position, and actually follow through with its commitment
while ensuring its own national security (Miyagi 2018, 122). National security was
largely delegated to the U.S., and Japan’s engagement with the world would foremost be
driven by economic interests. These doctrines and principles saved Article IX. Japan has
no primordial predisposition to noninterventionism or pacifism, and the experiences of
World War II would not be enough to have constructed such a robust norm, but the
Yoshida Doctrine facilitated it. In turn, however, the doctrines and principles would
never have been possible without Cold War geopolitics. For Japan, however, the end of
Cold War order came abruptly with the Gulf War in 1990.
Gulf War and Gulf Trauma
Since the 1980s, the U.S. has repeatedly pressured Japan to break its one-percentof-GDP restriction on defense spending, and take up a larger role in collective security in
Asia, which is an astonishing transformation given the role U.S. advisors had in crafting
Article IX of Japan’s Constitution. In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. At the time,
Japan was the single largest importer of Kuwaiti oil, purchasing 0.4 of the total 1.8
million barrels per day exports in the first half of 1990 (CIA 1990, 8) (See Table 8.2).
Japan was also the single largest importer of Persian Gulf oil, accounting for over a third
of OECD imports from the Gulf (CIA 1990, 6). The U.S. quickly formed a broad
coalition to intervene, yet Japan was not part of it. When U.S. President George H. W.
Bush requested from Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki assistance in transport and
supply to the Persian Gulf, Kaifu refused based on Japan’s constitutional constraints. The
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U.S. Congress adopted a resolution criticizing Japan for its lack of support, and ranking
House Democrat Richard Gephardt even notified Kaifu that the U.S. would practice
import restraints on Japanese automobiles if Tokyo failed to make a meaningful
contribution to the Gulf War (Catalinac 2007, 67). Tokyo initially announced a $1 billion
contribution to support the multinational force, which in time, rose to nearly $13 billion –
nearly a quarter of the total cost of the war (Fuse 2015, 34). Yet, Japan hardly received
any credit for its contribution to the war. When the Kuwaiti government penned a fullpage message of appreciation to the coalition in the New York Times, there was no
mention of Japan.
While the U.S. was heavily dependent on Iraq as a key Gulf supplier and Western
Europe on Iran, Tokyo deliberately developed strategic relationships with the wealthy,
small Gulf emirates like UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait rather than depend on volatile, war-torn
states like Iran and Iraq (CIA 1990, 6). Thus, insofar as the Gulf War was a war over oil,
Japan had much more at stake from Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait than any other
consumer state. Yet, where was it among the coalition to liberate Kuwait? The financial
assistance Tokyo offered was crucial for the war effort, but both the Kuwaitis and
coalition partners noted there were no Japanese boots on the ground. Still under pressure
by Washington to contribute, in April 1991, two months after fighting had stopped,
Tokyo finally allowed for limited support by dispatching Marine SDF for minesweeping
in the Persian Gulf. Although this was a major step as the first ever SDF deployment
abroad, and, indeed, they successfully cleared 34 mines, it did very little to shake the
negative reputation (Middlebrooks 2008, 39).
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The end of the Cold War was a critical juncture in Japan’s security policy, but the
realization that this critical juncture had arrived did not really set in with the political
leaders until the Gulf War. The norm of non-militarization had strengthened from the
1947 Peace Constitution to the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine. It was a source of identity and
pride for Japanese in that their nation is a uniquely peaceful great power. Yet, in light of
events in the Persian Gulf War, Japan was seen as a freeloader, getting its massive supply
of oil secured by others, motivated only by economic interests, and unwilling to
cooperate with an international coalition. The concern over obligation to an international
coalition as Japanese echoes the aforementioned statement by Idemitsu in 1953.
International normative obligations contrasted with state normative obligations which
were reinforced through self-constraining rules and laws. In Japan, the condition became
known as ‘Gulf Trauma.’ The financial contribution to the war effort was defined as
‘checkbook diplomacy,’ but uttered only in disdain. A quintessential shame culture as
identified by Ruth Benedict (1946) was compelled to respond in order to resuscitate its
reputation among its peers, thus saving face.
From the experience of Gulf Trauma, Japanese were compelled to reevaluate their
role in the international society – a reevaluation that is still not settled. Changes of roles
come about in two ways: adaptations and learning. Gulf Trauma was the latter, and more
specifically, it was a case of complex learning, because it demonstrated “changes in the
actors’ own preference ranking or a transformation of the underlying understanding about
the nature of the political system within which the actor functions” (Harnisch 2011, 10).
In June 1992, the Diet passed the International Peace Cooperation Law, which would
allow for a very restricted use of the SDF in overseas UN peacekeeping operations. SDF
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dispatches were to be limited to operations under a unified UN command, and
necessitated a UN Security Council resolution before Japan could participate. Moreover,
the recipient country must be in concurrence according to the Law. The conditions were
designed to be deliberately restricting, but that year the first peacekeeping deployment of
SDF was sent to Cambodia under a UN flag. In the 1990s, various peacekeeping
dispatches of SDF took place across Asia and Africa, including a transport logistics unit
for the UN Disengagement Observer Force in Golan Heights in 1996 (see Table 8.3).
In 1993, veteran politician Ozawa Ichirō, who was LDP Secretary General during
the Gulf War and was one who endured much of the American pressure, broke away
from the LDP, and called for sweeping reforms so that Japan could become a “normal
nation” (futsū no kuni). Ozawa expressed that it was time for Japan to shed postwar
security arrangements, and make a more proactive contribution to the international
society. The recent experiences in the Persian Gulf War prompted a question at home: is
Japan a ‘normal nation?’ Is it time for Japan to become one? Increasingly, the view that
was once limited to the fringe far-right that Article IX of the constitution must be
amended was becoming more mainstream. Ozawa was not member to this camp, but his
notion of ‘normal nation’ was the bridge to wider discussions on Article IX, Japan’s
contribution in collective security operations overseas, and identity and role.
War on Terror
The attacks on the U.S. on 11 September 2001, sparked new debate in Japan
about further widening the use of SDF overseas beyond just UN peacekeeping missions,
and now including collective security actions together with its ally, the U.S. This was a
means to mend the mistakes that caused Gulf Trauma a decade earlier. Within weeks
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after 9/11, the Diet passed the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, whereby the SDF
could cooperate with allies on foreign soil or on high seas in support activities, in noncombatant zones, and without necessitating a centralized UN command or a UN Security
Council resolution. The Law legally defined Japan’s actions overseas in terms of selfdefense. While opposition parties objected, domestic support for the bill was wide (Sato
2008, 96). In 2001 Prime Minister Koizumi initially envisioned dispatching Ground SDF
into Afghanistan together with NATO, and making a contribution on par with Britain or
Canada, but as the war progressed, without the proper legislation passed this sort of
Ground SDF operation became less likely. Nonetheless, Japan supported the war by
providing fuel for coalition vessels in the Indian Ocean. The operation continued until
January 2010 when new DPJ Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio let the law expire over
concerns of unconstitutionality. Between 2001 and 2012, Japan offered $7 billion to
support the war in Afghanistan, which made it the second-largest financier to the U.S.
(Tuke 2013).
Like Afghanistan, Prime Minister Koizumi was quick to express support for the
U.S. in the Iraq invasion in 2003 due to lessons learned from Gulf Trauma, but policy
changes which would reshape the non-intervention norm were necessary for Japan to
carry through with its commitment. In July, the Diet allowed for SDF participation
through humanitarian assistance, postwar reconstruction, and domestic security by
passing the Iraq Reconstruction Support Law, with the support of the LDP, New
Komeito, and opposition DPJ. This would be the first overseas dispatch of the SDF in a
non-UN peacekeeping operation. After a UN Security Resolution was approved in
October for reconstruction in Iraq, in December a plan was drawn up to send roughly
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1,000 Ground SDF troops to southern Iraq for non-combat operations, although the
government had difficulty convincing opposition parties and the public that it truly was a
‘noncombat zone’ (Catalinac 2007, 66). The Marine SDF operated off the coasts of
Oman and Yemen, refueling nearly a thousand ships during its 14-month deployment
(Smith 2014, 13).
Many observers link Japan’s commitment to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to
the development of a nuclear weapons program in North Korea. Tokyo had to
demonstrate commitment to Washington’s interests in order to receive support over
security concerns in Northeast Asia. The link between North Korea and the Middle East
was solidified with its inclusion in the Axil of Evil. From Tokyo’s perspective, that is
evidence Washington had linked North Korea with Iraq and Iran. Catalinac, however,
raises a pertinent question to counter this argument:
If Japan was motivated to support the United States in Iraq because of the threat
of North Korea, why did it not do more? Why did it not pass the legislation earlier
and commit troops to the actual invasion? In the end, Japan’s response was not
exactly a strong show of force (2007: 70).
While plausible, Japan committed to both of these wars before earnest progress was made
in North Korea’s weapons program. Moreover, once North Korea’s ICBM tests presented
a viable threat to the U.S. mainland, Tokyo and Washington were easily in a consensus
on defining North Korea as a security threat. Japan’s commitment to the U.S.-led wars
was more about Gulf Trauma than North Korea, securitization of Islam, or anything else.
It was the risk of being left behind.
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Counterpiracy in the Gulf of Aden
Japan’s involvement in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq met some controversy at
home, but the largest non-humanitarian SDF deployment has been in the Gulf of Aden
since March 2009. Located between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, the Gulf of Aden is a
strategically significant stretch of water between Asia and Africa for global shipping
routes. The 21,000 ships that annually cross the Mediterranean Sea and Suez Canal en
route to Asia and the Pacific must pass through the Gulf of Aden (Teo 2015, 175). The
War on Terror, alliance with Washington, and economic interests as well brought Tokyo
to consider acting on the piracy issue in the Gulf of Aden. Once the mission started,
however, it became framed less as counterterrorism and more as a counterpiracy mission
based on ‘rule of law,’ and free and open seas.
After UN Security Resolution 1816 was passed in June 2008 to authorize
countries concerned to enter Somalia’s territorial waters and apply “all necessary means”
to prevent piracy, the Diet passed the Anti-Piracy Law the following month. At the time,
Asō was Prime Minister, and was key in pushing through the legislation. When a DPJ
lawmaker argued in October 2008 that Tokyo should support counterpiracy measures in
the Gulf of Aden, Asō quipped, “[t]o be frank, that is like something an LDP member
would suggest” (Shugiin 2008). With the Anti-Piracy Law, the Marine SDF is allowed to
escort foreign commercial ships, rather than just Japanese-owned freighters. Also, the
Marine SDF is allowed to engage pirate vessels if warning signals are ignored. A very
broad coalition that included NATO members, but also China, India, Pakistan, and even
Iran was dispatched to the Gulf of Aden (Teo 2015, 183). In June 2011, for the first time
Japan leased an overseas SDF base. The new base in Djibouti would facilitate the
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counterpiracy operation, and also serve as a base for operations to evacuate Japanese
nationals in Africa and the Middle East, if needed.7 The timing of the base project is
surprising, considering that the center-left DPJ, which was in power at the time, carried
through with the decision to lease, and build the base. Moreover, it was built at a cost of
4.7 billion yen, and completed just three months after Japan experienced the most
expensive natural disaster in world history to date.
Taking part in the counterpiracy coalition was significant for carrying out Japan’s
role and strategy in several regards. It demonstrated Japan in the role of a ‘normal
nation,’ it allowed for an effective defense partnership between Japan and the U.S., where
Japan could stand on a more equal footing. Similarly, it gave Japan’s SDF the
opportunity to take part in a broader coalition of states. It also transformed Japan’s role as
a guardian of sea-lanes far afield, near the Middle East. Lastly, it garnered wide support
from both LDP and opposition parties in Japan. It served as a clear illustration in the
shifting of norms in Japan, since the DPJ, which tended to represent the center-left
opposition to SDF engagement in overseas peacekeeping operations in the early 1990s,
was now together with the LDP in supporting use of the Marine SDF in a counterpiracy
coalition as well as placing a SDF base overseas. The coalition has been successful in
decreasing cases of Somali piracy since 2012 and in November 2016 NATO ended its
Operation Ocean Shield mission, but the Yemeni civil war is causing many coalition
states, including Japan, to retain forces in the Gulf of Aden, mainly over concerns of
shipping disruptions.

7

The base was first used for civilian evacuations from South Sudan in July 2016.
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Abe’s Defense Reforms
Since returning to the office of Prime Minister in December 2012, Abe has been
more effective than any of his LDP predecessors in carrying out defense reforms which
revised the norm. First, in April 2014 he overturned the 1976 total arms exports ban as
well as the 1967 Three Principles on Arms Exports. These were replaced with the ‘Three
Principles of Defense Equipment Transfers,’ whereby all arms exports are permitted if
approved by the newly created National Security Council, and (1) prohibited in cases
where the transfer violates international treaties to which Japan is party, obligations under
UN Security Council resolutions, or a country party to a conflict; (2) permitted only in
cases whereby the transfer contributes to promoting peace and international cooperation,
and Japan’s security; (3) prohibited from allowing extra-purpose use and transfers to third
parties. The first arms export under the new Principles took place in July 2014 when
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries sold components of PAC-2 missiles to the U.S. for export to
Qatar. Japan has already pitched direct arms sales to several countries including Turkey,
India, and Australia, but to date the only successful transfers have been donations of
patrol vessels to the Philippines and Vietnam. Its two biggest arms manufacturers,
Kawasaki Heavy Industries and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries are both known for civilian
products, and their defense products have the disadvantage of not having been widely
tested on the battlefield.
Second, In March 2017 Abe stated that the defense budget cap of one-percent-ofGDP would be abolished.8 Abe’s declaration was purely symbolic, since there is no legal

As previously mentioned, Prime Minister Nakasone’s cabinet already decreed abandoning the principle in
1987, yet since then defense spending has only occasionally surpassed one percent of the annual GDP and
8
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basis for retaining the principle; it exists only as a norm, so therefore, Abe’s statement
was an effort to challenge this norm. Since then, there have been notable increases in the
fiscal 2017 and 2018 defense budgets, yet neither surpassed one percent of GDP.
Thirdly, Abe’s most ambitious revision has been to transform Article IX in some
form to accommodate collective security actions with allies. When Abe returned to the
office of prime minister in December 2012, he expressed the intent of pressing for a
constitutional amendment to replace Article IX. This idea was met with wide resistance
among the public, in the Diet, and among LDP party members, so Abe’s Cabinet
compromised this objective in July 2014 by ‘reinterpreting’ the language in Article IX to
allow for collective self-defense. The decision received much international attention, as it
was condemned by China, but supported by the U.S., Philippines, and Indonesia. The
reinterpretation of Article IX was codified in September 2015 by a series of bills in the
Diet that would allow the use of SDF to defend allies overseas. While campaigning for
support for the bill in February, Abe used the recent case of ISIS beheading two Japanese
nationals in Syria as a reason why Japan must have this legislation by pointing out that
Japan failed to act during the hostage crisis due to “restrictions on its purely defensive
armed forces,” which could not “conduct rescue missions, evacuations and other overseas
operations to protect Japanese nationals” (Fackler 2015, A9). While the constraints on
action Abe noted were true, they hardly related to acts of collective self-defense and
defending an ally overseas, which was the crux of the legislation.

by no more than less than a hundredth of a percent. Abe’s intention was to create even more normative
flexibility than the minuscule amount Nakasone achieved.
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Since returning to office and pursuing legislation to allow SDF participation in
collective self-defense, Abe has also revived the nebulous idea of an ‘NATO of Asia’
together with the U.S., Australia, and India. The idea of deepening security relations with
these states was first pursued during the Koizumi administration. In December 2006, the
Deputy Press Secretary Taniguchi Tomohiko made the statement, “there is ample room
for Australia, Japan, the U.S., and India to work closely together, because these four
nations are very much concerned about the peace and stability over the sea lanes that is a
vital link between this part of the world and the Persian Gulf region” (2006). When Abe
served his first term as prime minister in 2007, the four parties met just once as the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or ‘the Quad.’ In November 2017, it was revived with a
second meeting. Abe has been an active supporter of the Quad, but with a deep economic
dependence on Beijing for development of its resource sectors, Australia has expressed
concerns over isolating China, and India has expressed concerns over tightening relations
with the U.S. Abe’s goal is to put Japan on a more equal footing, as a ‘normal nation’ in a
collective security alliance with close democratic allies, just like NATO, and building its
leadership role in Asia.
Obviously, the shared securitized threat is China when one considers the language
used on ‘free and open seas’ as well as an ongoing emphasis on the member states as
democracies. In fact, in his December 2012 English-language column in Project
Syndicate, Abe called the alliance proposal, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond”
(2012). If made into a viable security alliance, unlike NATO, it would significantly
transverse civilizations and expand to a very large maritime scope. By emphasizing that
the four states are democracies, and in fact, have little else in common, it is predicating
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itself on democratic peace theory – that democracies will always choose to forego war
with each other, and working together, can take on the responsibility of stabilizing the
region. Yet, at the same time, it appears as if democracy is simply the common
denominator that the four states share, and China does not.
What does the Quad mean for Islam? Using 2018 numbers, the combined defense
spending of the four Quad members is $764.3 billion, which is less than the combined
defense spending of the 29 NATO members, at $957 billion, but is still a substantial
combined defense budget, nonetheless. Therein lies, however, the risk. If, for example,
the U.S. experiences a large-scale terrorist attack, and in retaliation calls on its Quad
allies to defend it under collective self-defense, Tokyo would be obliged to do so. What if
the attackers originated from Syria, well beyond the geographic scope of the alliance?
Moreover, it risks bringing Russia into conflict. Or, what if Washington called on the
Quad to support securing a threat to Israel? What if conflict breaks out in Kashmir? Or,
there is a Pakistan-linked bombing in an Indian city? These are scenarios where Japanese
really do not want to respond. None of these four states are Muslim-majority states, and
while India does have a substantially large Muslim-minority population, the wide
civilizational framing of the Quad as an alliance among two non-European Western
states, a Hindu civilization, a Japanese civilization could contort into a wider dichotomy
of the Muslim world versus the rest, and not just the West. It also raises a prescriptive
question: Should the Quad include Indonesia or Malaysia? Assuming the Quad defies
odds and develops into a full alliance, this would be an important addition to both
reassure it will not present a threat to Muslims, and also carry out the stated objective of
protecting sea lanes, with the most crucial chokepoint at the Straits of Malacca. Neither
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state would have much to provide in terms of military power and are still young in the
process of democratization, but the symbolic and strategic inclusion would be valuable.
Yet, in asking this question regarding the Quad and Islam, one could retort with a
similar question: What has NATO meant for Islam? In this case, too, Islam was not the
threat to be securitized which justified the creation of the alliance. And yet, most NATO
interventions have taken place in Muslim countries. Moreover, consider the proclivities
of the other Quad members. Australia would gladly shift focus from China to elsewhere.
The U.S. has consistently prodded Tokyo to be proactive in its coalitions. India’s primary
perceived threat since the 1947 partition has been Pakistan. Assuming the Quad develops,
any one of these three partners could easily turn this collective security alliance into an
institution to securitize Islam, and with an armed alliance to support it.
Conclusion
The preface to the Japanese Constitution reads: “We desire to occupy an honored place in
an international society striving for the preservation of peace.” The meaning of this
statement – Japan as peaceful – has not changed. Yet, this leads today to a question: How
do you occupy the place? Moreover, how do this in dealing with Islam? Punitive
measures were not emphasized in the Arc as presented by Asō in 2006, but he did
mention at the time,
since the end of the war, Japan has been making achievements in pacifism, such
that no one can possibly point a contemptuous finger at Japan. Find for me even
one other country that has an organization like Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, that
for 60 years has shot not a single round of artillery, nor a single bullet from a gun
(2006).
Can this obvious source of pride, and essence of national identity be maintained?
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From the Yoshida Doctrine to the Abe Doctrine
The incremental motions of revising/weakening Japan’s non-interventionist norm,
which really started with Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro in the 1980s, but have been
manifest most evidently with Abe since 2012 are reflective of a realist worldview, as was
the Yoshida Doctrine, the Fukuda Doctrine, and constraining principles. Yet, it says a lot
more about the changing dynamics of international politics across Asia and less about
Japan’s view of Islam as an imperiling force which must be securitized. Seeking ‘normal
nation’ status through strengthening self-defensive capabilities is a view held not only by
hawkish political elites, but also a significant segment of society, and opposition political
parties. On the other hand, a comparably large segment of society is still adamantly
opposed to these measures on the basis of Japan’s values, norms, and identity.
Hirata Keiko has a typology of four role conceptions in Japan based on
ideological predispositions: the mercantilists, normalists, pacifists, and nationalists (2016:
58). While a useful framework, it is based primarily on security dynamics in Northeast
Asia and thus, says nothing about the securitization of Islam in the twenty-first century.
To conclude, this chapter builds on Hirata’s role conceptions to construct a typology as it
relates to securitization of Islam (see Table 8.4). There are three camps in Japan
regarding interventions in Muslim Asia. Like Hirata’s types, individuals may move back
and forth between types based on behavior.
Firstly, there are those whose ideology is Japan as Pacifist. They reject
interventions altogether as a form of neo-imperialism, characteristic of the Western
powers, counterproductive as strategy, perhaps share a view of Asianist solidarity with
Muslims, and thus do not view it as permissible by Japan, let alone the West. Among
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political leaders, this view is mostly limited to the Japanese Communist Party and Social
Democratic Party. Japanese scholars of Islam and the Middle East, however, are widely
in this camp, primarily based on the concern of the image that Japan could potentially
attain as an armed American ally. Yamamoto Takehiko writes on Japan’s progress
towards collective self-defense:
It is not impossible to think that in the eyes of Islamic fundamentalist groups such
as ISIS, such measures would reflect as a declaration of intention to be an
unwavering member of an anti-Islamic coalition to which the U.S. plays a central
part. If this happens, they will increasingly see Japan as hostile, and even in
logistical support, Japan’s dispatched SDF support units could be included among
their attack targets (2015: 62).
Miyata argues “I look at an American foreign policy with the Middle East which made
terrorism proliferate, and I feel as though there is extreme risk for Japan’s foreign policy
as well” (2015: 266). These attitudes are widely shared among Japanese scholars of Islam
and the Middle East, but are widely debated in society, and the current political
leadership tends to dismiss such concerns.
Secondly, there are those who view Japan as a Unique Contributor to
international society. Western interventions in Muslim Asia are permissible; that is what
they do. Japan, however, should never take part due to its role. This is a view expressed
by some scholars of Islam and the Middle East, insofar as they choose to focus only on
Japan’s image and role, and say nothing about the interventions, themselves. Fuse
Hiroshi points out that in the Middle East, Japan’s “image as a peaceful, economic power
is strong. It is out of place for Japan to take part in military assistance in the Middle East,
and it does not seem as if the people there are expecting this from us” (2015: 34). Naitō
Masanori writes:
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As a result of the negative view towards military cooperation, Japan has not built
up adversaries around the world…This is the power of Japan’s brand, and must
also be its historical heritage. Therefore, being able to use collective self-defense
is, in a word, dangerous. It will only increase animosity among neighboring
countries and create a state of tension; it is not defense (2015: 224-25).
Both of these thoughts reflect a role for that they do not want revised. Like the first
group, they also detest the withering of Japan’s norms of non-interventionism, Article IX,
and non-militarization, but also accept the urge for someone to securitize Islam – just not
Japan.
This is an interesting view, and it seems to reflect a wide swath of both Japanese
society and the political class. In a 2016 survey by scholar Fukuda Mitsuru at Nihon
University, he asks the question: “Is the threat from radical Islamic terrorism toward
Japan increasing?” To this, 83.2 percent of Japanese adults responded affirmatively
(2016: 146). Yet, in the same survey he asks, “Should Japan actively participate in the
War on Terror to combat groups like ISIS?” To this, only 31.8 percent responded
affirmatively (2016: 146). Therefore, one could surmise at least a third of the country
senses a threat from Islamic terrorism, but at the same time does not want to confront it
with the use of force. This view was also evident in April 2018 when the U.S., UK, and
France bombed government sites in Syria. The strike was controversial globally, but
Tokyo was quick to express its support, and likely relieved it was not asked to join. This
group sees that security threats do emanate from Islam, but are adamant it is not Japan’s
role to be part of the security sector, due to institutional constraints that have shaped
Japan’s identity. In other words, non-militarism is uniquely for Japan; not for everyone.
The position is anything but a revolutionary one; there is no proclivity to induce systemic
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transformations. Rather, Japan has its role in global politics, and militarism is not part of
that self-image.
Lastly, there are those who would accept Japan as a Securitizer of Islam. A
intervening coalition including Japan, assuming varying degrees of self-constraining
rules, is permissible, which is the position usually displayed by Abe and many of the
current political elites. This group is increasingly formulating foreign policy according to
a Realpolitik understanding of Asia. While many observers claim Abe and Asō are
motivated by nationalist proclivities, it appears here that realist thinking dominates, and
nationalist behavior is a tool to support a realist foreign policy. They see the rise of China
and the decline of the U.S., and are pursuing the strengthening Japan’s defensive
capabilities in the interest of balancing power. These measures are starkly opposed by
Japanese scholars of Islam over the concern Japan will become an intervening force,
whether by its own volition or obligation to the U.S. This group also includes Tokyo
Governor Koike Yuriko, who is an Arabist, but also supporter of reinterpretation of
Article IX and Japan’s right to collective self-defense.
While the more conservative political elites such as Abe, Asō, and Koike often
display the characteristics of the last group, less-conservative political elites have actually
demonstrated less interest in developing relations with Muslim Asia countries, altogether,
regardless of interventions. When the DPJ was in power from 2009 until 2012, two
interesting developments occurred. First, the party still pursued Japan joining in
counterpiracy measures in the Gulf of Aden and opening a Japanese SDF base in
Djibouti. Second, the DPJ was notably focused on strengthening relations with East
Asian neighbors China and South Korea, and compared to conservative LDP leaders like
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Asō who proposed the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity, DPJ leaders demonstrated notably
less interest in developing Japan’s ties with Muslim Asia through any facets of contact
(Sakai 2016, 118). In fact, none of the three DPJ prime ministers from 2009 to 2012 even
visited the Middle East or anywhere else in Muslim Asia, save for two separate
international conferences in Indonesia.
Abe calls his defense agenda ‘proactive pacifism.’ This term has been detested
among many of his critics as a nonsensical notion, but it does express an interest in
bridging the divide between the roles as a pacifist, non-militarized great power, and at the
same time emerge as a ‘normal nation’ with a SDF actively contributing to stabilization
of order in Asia. It also makes his revisions somewhat more palatable to the second group
listed above. What many see as an inter-role conflict, whereby there are “clashing role
expectations about self and others,” Abe believes he can bridge (Harnisch et al. 2011,
256). Abe has not outright abandoned Japan’s identity, but seeks to modify it due to
structural dynamics, undoubtedly with risks. “Inter-role conflict will often also produce
intra-role conflicts (domestic contestation of role conceptions) and they also might have
considerable impact on the international social order” (Harnisch et al. 2011, 256). SDF,
however, is an armed force with an obvious use-of-force component. When Abe
introduced this notion of proactive peace in his address to the UN General Assembly in
September 2013, he declared: “I pledge here that I will make Japan a force for peace and
stability, just as it has been until now – or rather, to a degree even greater than it has been
thus far,” and linked this role for Japan as a proactive peace force particularly in regard to
the free and open seas, maritime order, and international rule of law: “For Japan, whose
national interests are firmly connected to the stability of seas that are open, changes to the
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maritime order through the use of force or coercion cannot be condoned under any
circumstances” (2013b). What is the compelling component behind this “cannot be
condoned” declarative language? It is difficult to see how proactive pacifism will
resemble anything like pacifism.
This chapter demonstrates that any consideration of Japan’s position on sanctions
and interventions in Muslim Asia cannot take place without properly considering the role
of the U.S. Japan has demonstrated doubt regarding the effectiveness of economic
sanctions, despite sharing the concern of nuclear proliferation. Moreover, Japan has
demonstrated a willingness to make sanctioning malleable based on a hierarchy of needs
and values. All the while, Japan has made tremendous sacrifices to adhere to the
sanctions regime against Iran to resolve a security threat mutually shared with a strategy
is does not firmly support. Again, Idemitsu’s thinking can be applied here; Japan adhered
to, and endured the U.S.-led sanctions regimes in accordance with its international
loyalty, as Japanese. The U.S. military interventions in Muslim Asia have induced
changes to Japan’s identity as a pacifist nation, making it behave more like a ‘normal
nation.’ Whether Japan will become a ‘normal nation’ is a question not yet resolved.
Naitō expresses concern over this dynamic: “To think that in the Middle East, Japan must
return a favor [ongaeshi] because the U.S. protects East Asia – if this is the idea, it will
bring about extraordinary risk not just for Japan but for the world” (2015: 6). As
discussed in Chapter 6, ongaeshi is integral to Japanese thinking, which means Japan’s
willingness to join the American ‘Coalition of the Willing’ means it did this with the
expectation of reciprocal support if and when it is needed. The assumption of returning
the favor is reinforced by Japan’s shame culture and the Gulf Trauma it endured.
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This chapter uses the term ‘reluctant acquiescence’ to describe Japan’s attitude
toward commitments to the U.S. regarding sanctions on Iran, and it also describes Japan’s
approach to the War on Terror as well. Holsti describes such a role as ‘faithful ally,’
although he points out that very few faithful allies truly exist. “For many states alliances
are potentially useful for protective purposes, but the state which receives an external
guarantee does not reciprocate by supporting the guarantor” (1970: 267). In this case,
considering the concept of ongaeshi, we see that Japan is taking the role of faithful ally,
but other roles and normative proclivities create contrast with the role as faithful ally, and
reveal a reluctance in behavior.
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Table 8.1: Iranian Crude Export Destinations (thousand bbl/d)
consumer
2006
consumer
2011
consumer
1. Japan
448 (18%) 1. China
543 (21%)
1. China
2. China
335 (13%)
2. India
341 (13%)
2. India
3. India
305 (12%)
3. Japan
251 (10%) 3. S. Korea
4. S. Korea
204 (8%)
4. S. Korea
239 (9%)
4. Turkey
5. Italy
191 (8%)
5. Turkey
217 (9%)
5. Italy
6. Turkey
179 (7%)
6. Italy
204 (8%)
6. Japan
7. France
135 (5%)
7. Spain
170 (7%)
7. UAE
8. S. Africa
127 (5%)
8. Greece
158 (6%)
8. Spain
other
579 (23%)
other
404 (16%)
other

2017
648 (25%)
502 (19%)
314 (12%)
165 (6%)
155 (6%)
138 (5%)
127 (5%)
114 (4%)
341 (13%)

TOTAL

2,620 (100%)

2,503 (100%)

TOTAL

2,527 (100%)

TOTAL

Source: adapted from U.S. Energy Information Administration
Table 8.2 Oil Consumption Jan. – Jun. 1990 (million bl/day)
OECD total
U.S.
Japan
total consumption
37.9
17.0
5.5
crude & product imports
28.9
8.5
5.3
Persian Gulf imports
9.7
2.1
3.3
total consumption share
25.6%
12.4%
60.0%
Iran imports
1.6
negligible
0.32
share of Gulf exports
16.5%
<1%
9.7%
total consumption share
4.2%
<1%
5.8%
Iraq imports
1.7
0.58
0.25
share of Gulf exports
17.5%
27.6%
7.6%
total consumption share
4.5%
3.4%
4.5%
Kuwait imports
1.1
0.16
0.39
share of Gulf exports
11.3%
7.6%
11.8%
total consumption share
2.9%
0.9%
7.1%
Qatar imports
0.25
negligible
0.24
share of Gulf exports
2.6%
<1%
7.3%
total consumption share
0.7%
<1%
4.4%
Saudi Arabia imports
3.5
1.3
0.82
share of Gulf exports
36.1%
61.9%
24.8%
total consumption share
9.2%
7.6%
14.9%
UAE imports
1.3
0.02
1.1
share of Gulf exports
13.4%
1.0%
33.3%
total consumption share
3.4%
0.1%
20.0%
Source: adapted from CIA Freedom of Information Act Collection, 1990
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Table 8.3: Major SDF Deployments*
Location
Persian Gulf
Marine SDF
Cambodia
Ground SDF
Mozambique
Ground SDF
Rwanda
combined
Golan Heights
combined
East Timor
Ground SDF
Afghanistan
combined
Indian Ocean
Marine SDF
Air SDF
East Timor
Ground SDF
Iraq
combined
Iraq
Ground SDF
Marine SDF
Air SDF
Gulf of Aden
Marine SDF
Djibouti
Marine SDF
South Sudan
Ground SDF

Mission
SDF No. Task
Recovery assistance
Apr. 1991-Sep. 1991
abt. 510
minesweeping
PKO Law enacted in June 1992
UN PKO
Sep. 1992-Sep. 1993
abt. 600
repair infrastructure & supply food,
medicine
UN PKO
May 1993-Jan. 1995
abt. 50
coordinate transport operations
Refugee assistance
Sep. 1994-Dec. 1994
abt. 380
material and personnel airlift
UN PKO
Feb. 1996-Jan. 2013
abt. 50
transportation logistics for UN
Disengagement Observer Force
Refugee assistance
Nov. 1999-Feb. 2000
abt. 110
material and personnel airlift
Refugee assistance
Oct. 2001-2014
abt. 140
material and personnel airlift
Antiterrorism Special Measures Law enacted in November 2001
Anti-terrorism
Nov. 2001-Nov. 2007;
abt. 320
refueling support for, and material
Jan. 2008-Jan. 2010
supplies to allies
UN PKO
Feb. 2002-Jun. 2004
abt. 550
repairs of roads, bridges, and reservoirs
Refugee assistance
Mar. 2003-Apr. 2003
abt. 50
material and personnel airlift
Jul. 2003-Aug. 2003
abt. 100
material and personnel airlift
Recovery assistance
Jan. 2004-Sep. 2006
abt. 700
medical, water treatment, rebuild public
facilities
Feb. 2004-Apr. 2004
abt. 320
transport vehicles and equipment
Dec. 2003-Dec. 2008
abt. 210
material and personnel airlift
Counterpiracy
Mar. 2009-present
abt. 400
merchant ship escort, surveillance
Anti-Piracy Law enacted in July 2009
Base
abt. 180
Jun. 2011-present
facilitates for counterpiracy operations,
evacuation preparation
UN PKO
Nov. 2011-May 2017
abt. 350
road and infrastructure construction;
rescue of peacekeepers (from Nov. 2016)

* Excludes deployments of less than 50 soldiers and disaster relief missions.
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Table 8.4: Competing Roles Evident in the Japanese View on Interventions
Japan as Islam Securitizer
West interventions are condoned

Japan as Unique Contributor
West interventions are condoned

Islam as threat
SDF participation is condoned
Universal roles
Japan is a ‘proactive pacifist’
state who joins with U.S.-led
coalitions in Muslim countries

Islam as threat
SDF participation is condemned
Unique Roles
Japan is a (proactive) pacifist
state and ally to U.S., but
contributes to global order in
unique ways
‘normal nation’ may be defined
by freer use of SDF, but even so
conflict in Muslim states are not
Japan’s fight

‘normal nation’ defined by freer
use of SDF in overseas
coalitions, including in Muslim
states
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Japan as Pacifist
West interventions are
condemned
Does not consider Islam a threat
SDF participation is condemned
Universal roles
Japan is a pacifist state and
proselytizes pacifism globally
‘normal nation’ rejected, as it
implies adapting to neo-colonial
behavior, which is
counterproductive to peace and
prosperity

CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
Louis D. Hayes argues that “Japan’s foreign relations, those of a formal sort having
existed for a relatively short time, have been shaped by two dominant factors: isolation
and dependence” (2018: 195). This is a most appropriate framing to reach a conclusion
on Japan’s relations with Islam in Asia. Unlike the late nineteenth century British notion
of splendid isolation, Japan’s isolation cannot be ‘splendid’ because it is simultaneously
dependent on the outside world. Local life is broadly homogeneous, often chooses to look
inward, and often frames the world in a binary uchi/soto (inside/outside) mode,
increasingly eschewing much of gaikoku (the outside world). Problems in gaikoku, like
Islamic terrorism, are often considered as distant, and Japan is neither here nor there –
not even on the same map. Yet, the state must be deeply engaged. Moreover, if ‘isolation’
is interpreted in terms of ‘distance,’ the two variables can be considered in terms of
quantifiable, interval measurements. Thus, dependency and distance shape foreign policy.
How does this relate to Islam? How does it relate to Asia?
Concerning distance, there is considerable geographical distance between Japan
and Muslim Asia. Yet, with the construction of a notion of a Greater Asia, ideational
distance is nearer than before. Secondly, dependency is predicated on an innate sense of
inferiority, not inferiority of the people or state, but to the contrary, an inferiority within
the international system that it cannot sustain in isolation as a resource-poor state. This
view is predicated on a view of Self as a power in the international system akin to the
U.S., China, or Russia, but without their advantages of resource abundance. Thus,
economic exchange comes from a position of state survival, not necessarily state wealth:
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bring in resources to develop and sustain a modern state, and export products to global
consumers to bring back and accumulate capital – all to sustain Self. Therefore, it creates
a dovetailing of geo-economics with geopolitics in Japan’s foreign policy. The flow of
this economic exchange must be steady, without disruptions, and therein lies the Islam
factor. Islam presents a potential to disrupt the flow of this economic exchange. Yet, at
the same time, Muslim consumers of Japanese products are also an opportunity in this
exchange. Islam can decrease Japan’s security; Muslims can increase Japan’s security.
This argument falls squarely in the paradigm of realist thinking, despite the
tendency of some realists to overlook factors such as resource dependency, markets, and
most significantly, religion. Yet, it is realist because it focuses on state survival.
Traditional security is provided for Japan through its arrangements with the largest
power, the U.S., but bandwagoning came serendipitously, and allowed for the Yoshida
Doctrine, putting economics first for the sake of state survival. In 1965, Pakistani Foreign
Minister (and later Prime Minister) Zulfikar Ali Bhutto called the Japanese “economic
animals,” in what was a backhanded compliment. Economic exchanges have long taken a
dominant position in Japan’s relations with Muslim Asia, and this is reflected in the
Yoshida Doctrine, the Fukuda Doctrine, the Nikaidō statement, and an underlying sense
of a volatile existence, as a state with negligible natural resources. Scarcity underscores
insecurity, but rather than leading to violent conflict (again), stability is the means to
ensure and perhaps even improve Japan’s vitality. To survive, it needs to put economic
interests first, which means a steady supply of energy resources, constant output of export
products, and political stability among all trading partners. This is why Japan’s vision for
Asia is predicated on order before justice. And order comes about through stability,
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which is reinforced by economic development, democracy, and emphasized here,
harmony.
At the same time, however, none of this explains the Arc, and values-based
diplomacy. Japan is not forced to promote its values to ensure stability for this resourcesin, products-out strategy in foreign policy. This is where the constructivist perspective is
useful to reveal role, identity, and norms. Through maturity of its own economic and
political system, Japan has discovered in the last quarter century that it has a model which
can be emulated, and it can proselytize. This model is for the good – it targets the security
of a way of being. It is different than the liberal democratic model offered by the West; it
is different than the illiberal democratic model offered by Moscow; and, it is different
than the state capitalist model offered by Beijing. This is putting geo-culture at the
forefront of Tokyo’s foreign policy.
In fact, there is very little correlation between model proselytizing and
dependency, or model proselytizing and distance. Indonesia is among the highest cases of
model proselytizing, and is a state on which Japan is highly dependent and among the
nearest of Muslim Asia. Yet, Kyrgyzstan is also among the highest cases of model
proselytizing, but is a state on which Japan is hardly dependent and among the farthest
away. Illustrated from these cases, there is more correlation between strength of
democracy in the Muslim Asian state and Japan proselytizing its model (see Figure 9.1).
Perhaps it is the most remarkable finding in this project that Japan is demonstrating itself
as something replicable to states across Muslim Asia. This defies the arguments that the
ideological predisposition of Nihonjinron, or some sort of Japanese exceptionalism drives
foreign policy. Rather, evidence here shows a perceived likeness, and a solution based on
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empiricism. It demonstrates an approach of ‘we did it this way; so can you.’ This is
illustrated in Akamatsu’s Flying Geese Theory (FGT), Asō’s analogy of the ‘escortrunner,’ and the view that Japan is leading Asia. It is also evident in the ‘help, to selfhelp’ approach to ODA. It is not charitable giving, but rather ongaeshi – ‘we lend to you,
we work together for your development, and it results in a positive sum outcome for both
of us as well as a deepened long-term relationship.’
Japan, Religion, and Securitization
How does this modeling reconcile with the securitization of Islam? To reach a
response to this question, a brief outline of religion and the state in Japan is necessary.
Article XX in the Constitution in Japan ensures separation of religion and state, and U.S.
authorities did much to drive a wedge between religion and the state during the postwar
occupation by dismantling what they called “State Shintoism,” but religious undertones
are obvious in many aspects of Japanese society, including the public and political
sphere. Broadly, religious identity is weak, yet religious practices, values, and ethics are
strong. In fact, these characteristics persist in modernity precisely because identity is
weak. By this, practices, values, and ethics persist because followers carry these out as
Japanese, not as Buddhist, Shinto, or Confucianist. Moreover, society is significantly
influenced by a hybrid of all these religions. The norm is to synergize. Therefore,
monotheism can appear baffling to Japanese, as is religious exclusivity. This is true for
Christianity, which makes up roughly two percent of the population, but Islam as well. In
fact, the term for ‘religion,’ shūkyō (宗教), first appeared in the Japanese language during
the nineteenth century to relate to the narrowly conceptualized English word (Reader and
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Tanabe 1998, 5). Therefore, many consider shūkyō to be limited to religious exclusivity
and monotheism, more characteristic of Abrahamic traditions.
One example of a link between religion and state in Japan is the visits by political
leaders to the controversial Yasukuni Shinto Shrine in Tokyo. In 1978, Yasukuni
enshrined 14 Class-A war criminals together with the souls of nearly 2.5 million who
fought in various wars, despite strong condemnation from China, South Korea, North
Korea, and Taiwan. While not the first acting prime minister to visit Yasukuni, Koizumi
Junichirō received international attention in the early 2000s when he visited the shrine to
worship once every year he was in office. Abe Shinzō has made several visits as a
parliamentarian, but only once as Prime Minister in December 2013.1 Asō Tarō visited
and prayed at the Shinto shrine in October 2009 as a parliamentarian, but paradoxically,
Asō happens to be Catholic. While condemned by neighbors, these visits were widely
popular with the Japanese public. Both the LDP and opposition Constitutional
Democratic Party of Japan (CDP) and Democratic Party for the People (DPP) take no
official position on the shrine visits, and have parliamentarians who regularly visit.
Kōmeitō, a party founded by, and maintains close links to the Sōka Gakkai sect of
Buddhism, opposes visits and does not permit its members to do so.
There is a mainstream of religion (uchi) that is accepted as contributing to the
Japanese lifestyle, and there are those which fall outside (soto) of this definition. Soto
religion, at times, can be thought of in terms of cult, and in these cases securitized.
Japan’s only brush with religious terrorism in the postwar era came in the two sarin gas
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Since the enshrinement, all Japanese emperors have refused to visit.

344

attacks in Matsumoto in 1994, and Tokyo in 1995, both from Aum Shinrikyō – a
doomsday cult centered around a blind yoga instructor, Asahara Shōkō. These incidents
were a critical juncture in the state’s approach to religious terrorism. Prior to this, the
state displayed very little interest or concern over religious groups – even soto religions.
After these attacks, religious groups were looked at with suspicion (Cho and Katzenstein
2011, 183). There is no connection between Islam and Aum Shinrikyō, but the incidents
spurred a heightened awareness of religious violence, which necessitated an imperative to
securitize potential threats, and specifically threats originating from soto religion – those
outside the mainstream of the constructed Self. After 11 September 2001, a global metanarrative has allowed this approach to coalesce into securitization of Islam in Japan as
well. The Aum Shinrikyō attacks set a stage for securitization of soto religion in Japan;
the global meta-narrative shifted that focus onto Islam.
Having established that Japan does securitize Islam because it was
predispositioned to securitize religiously-inspired threats from Other prior to emergence
of the global meta-narrative, this securitization manifests in very different ways. Japanese
do not fear threats of Islamic terrorism in Japan’s cities. Moreover, there is not the fear of
a global jihad reaching the archipelago. Rather, the perceived threat revolves back to
stability. Japan’s existence is predicated on a level of global stability that allows for its
resources-in, products-out strategy, which is the only means known for the state to
survive. As this project illustrates, in the postwar era the biggest disruptions to resourcesin have come from conflicts in Islam. The 1973 oil shock, the Islamic Revolution in Iran,
the Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Arab Spring, Saudi-Iranian rift, and the
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2017 Qatari diplomatic crisis elevated concerns in Japan about Islam as a disrupting
force. Moreover, so are the nuclear ambitions of Pakistan, then Iran.
On the other hand, if Islam, as a thing, is a force that imperils Japan by creating
risks to its security, Muslims, as people, are another force which offer expanding
opportunities for Japan to improve its security. Securing consumer markets overseas is
essential for bringing in capital, and thus, survival of the state, and Muslim Asia includes
some of the fastest growing middle-class populations in the world. FGT is undoubtedly
present in Japan’s thinking of itself and Asia. So much so, it is a source of pride, because
Japan views itself as the goose at the tip of the formation. It is also evident in the
emphasis on “quality infrastructure” in Asia, while simultaneously using language to
stress it is a model and form of development which Beijing would not be able to provide.
Findings
Having considered the dynamics how Japan reconciles the perceived threat from Islam in
its foreign policy in Asia, this chapter proceeds by applying typological theory to the
findings from the ‘Strategy’ portion of this project. Taking the findings into account, a
theory is presented on differing ways Japan approaches Muslim Asia. In this typology
there are four ‘zones’ of Islam identified across Muslim Asia (see Map 9.1). Two of these
zones directly correspond with the regions of Muslim Asia presenting in Chapter 1, but
these zones are fluid and can change. What they demonstrate is four views of Islam
embedded in Japan’s foreign policy, and therefore, four strategies Japan applies.
Zone 1: Muslim Southeast Asia
This is the most stable of the zones, although this is not to say it is entirely so. It
includes the issue of Bangsamoro in the Philippines, insurgencies in Muslim-majority
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Southern Thailand, and religiously-inspired conflicts in Indonesia. Yet, it is most stable
in the sense of Japanese engagement with the zone of a sizable 230 million Muslims.
Both Bangladesh and Myanmar were up to recently part of this zone as long-term
recipients of Japanese development assistance, but the July 2016 ISIS killing of seven
Japanese nationals in Dhaka and ongoing Rohingya crisis in southeast Myanmar cause
these two to slip into Zone 2. The Fukuda Doctrine set the normative rules for Muslim
Southeast Asia. Muslims are a relatively significant factor in relations, but not so much
Islam. In other words, Southeast Asian Muslims are crucial in Japan’s knowledge and
appreciation of Islam because of the depth and breadth of interpersonal relations.
Business connections are strong, as are interpersonal relations via tourism, student
exchanges, and international families. Indonesians, Filipinos, and Malaysians make up
nearly half of the Muslims in Japan. Indonesian and Malaysians make up the largest
number of Muslim tourists (nearly a quarter of a million annually, each), and rapidly
increasing. Meanwhile, the largest overseas Japanese populations in Muslim Asia are
found in this region.
From regional security complex theory, Buzan and Wæver argue that “insecurity
is often associated with proximity,” but this is not necessarily the case here (2003: 46).
Rather, it counters Buzan’s dictum on proximity, and is the least securitized Islam among
the four by Japan. Regarding energy resources, Indonesia is the only essential supplier of
coal to Japan in Muslim Asia, and Malaysia will remain an essential supplier of LNG for
the next decade. Indonesia is of paramount importance for Japan’s access to markets, and
Java alone provides one of the most crucial industrializing population bases in the world.
Indonesia has also been the single largest recipient of Japanese ODA. The region has
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been a favorite for Japanese FDI since the 1970s due to resource abundance, cheap and
abundant labor, proximity to Japan, and a favorable political and social environment.
Muslim minorities in countries such as Singapore and Thailand also make up some of
Japan’s biggest consumer markets. In the future, this relationship between Japan and
Muslim Southeast Asia can potentially be strengthened through CPTPP, or some other
form of an economic trade bloc. Insofar as soft power and export markets are objectives
of Japan’s ODA, Southeast Asia is a success story.
Zone 2: Zone of Instability
This is the most varied zone, largest, and probably the most fluid, but generally
the zone of instability and the greatest perceived threats from Islam. A norm to securitize
is reinforced in this zone through the following events: (1) in 1971 when the Japanese
Red Army based itself in Lebanon; (2) the oil shock of 1973; (3) the 1979 Islamic
Revolution in Iran which resulted in tremendous losses at Japanese FDI projects; (4)
Pakistan securing nuclear weapons in 1998; and (5) Islamist terrorism in the twenty-first
century, including several Japanese nationals killed in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001,
January 2015 two killed in Syria by ISIS, and the abovementioned July 2016 ISIS
incident in Dhaka. While parts of the region have an energy security significance, these
carry great risks for large-scale investment.
Interestingly, much of the zone is congruent with an axial corridor identified by
Alfred Thayer Mahan in his 1900 work, The Problem of Asia and Its Effect on
International Politics, as the “debatable and debated ground.” Viewing this zone as a
stretch of Asia across 40 to 30 degrees north latitude (see Map 9.2), Mahan prophetically
wrote: “Between these two parallels are to be found, speaking roughly, the most decisive
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natural features, and also those political divisions the unsettled character of which renders
the problem of Asia in the present day at once perplexing and imminent” (1900: 21).
Included in this zone “are the Isthmus of Suez, Palestine and Syria, Mesopotamia, the
greater part of Persia, and Afghanistan – with the strong mountain ranges that mark these
two countries and Armenia – the Pamir,” and “the cities of Aleppo, Mosul, and Bagdad
[sic], of Teheran and Ispahan, of Merv and Herat, Kabul and Kandahar” (1900: 21-22).
He adds: “No one of these is in the territory of a state the stability of which can be said to
repose securely upon its own strength, or even upon the certainty of non-interference by
ambitious neighbors” (1900: 22). Mahan also points out that, in fact, the greater part of
Japan’s territory and “the centre of her power” also lies within this belt (1900: 22). While
more known for his theory on naval power, Mahan’s works have been widely translated
in Japan, and served as the most influential readings in the subfield of geopolitics since it
was introduced as a discipline (Sawabe 2017, 26). His The Influence of Sea Power upon
History (1890) was an assigned textbook in all secondary schools and teacher’s colleges
by the Meiji Emperor (Sawabe 2017, 26-27). Therefore, it is plausible that a strand of
Mahan’s prophetic description of this zone persists in Japan’s foreign policy view today.
Iran and Iraq are both potential essential suppliers of crude oil, and when Iran
completes its first LNG export complex, it could become an essential supplier of LNG as
well. Both, however, currently provide energy resources for Japan in constrained
amounts. While securitization of Islam partially explains risk with both Iraq and Iran, the
U.S.-led interventions in Iraq and sanctions against Iran, respectively, exacerbate this
risk. With Iraq, the risk continues with weak governance and ISIS. With Iran, the risk
continues after the American withdrawal from the JCPOA. On top of this is Japan’s
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normative concerns over nuclear proliferation, firstly, in Pakistan, and more recently,
Iran. There is clear tepidness to deepen economic relations here, despite the opportunity it
provides.
Risk continues beyond Mahan’s zone, in Yemen, which has little to offer in terms
of energy resources and amid a civil war, and the Gulf of Aden which Japan is actively
using its marine SDF to secure. In some cases, Japan is attempting to resolve conflict.
This is reflected in the diplomatic slogan, “the best way is to go in the middle,” often
reiterated by the Prime Minister and ministers of foreign affairs since January 2015, and
also the Corridor for Peace and Prosperity in Palestine. In terms of interventions,
however, Japan has reluctantly acquiesced in Iraq and Afghanistan, but when ‘possible,’
prefers to not be party to the security sector and instead taking the role Japan as a unique
contributor.
Turkey is the most incommensurable of all states in Muslim Asia for this
typology. The dependency variable is significant, not necessarily with energy exports, but
rather, with a large and growing consumer base for Japanese products – a characteristic
shared also with Egypt. Also shared between Turkey and Egypt are their transcontinental
qualities, which contributes to their incommensurability. These characteristics, as well as
Turkey’s status as a secular state, make it more similar to Indonesia in Japan’s view than
any other Middle East country. While tempting to create a sui generis type for Turkey, it
is in Zone 2 because of recent involvement in the war in Syria, occasional terrorist
incidents, the failed coup attempt in July 2016, and President Recep Erdoğan’s shifting
away from the West (his autocratic power consolidation is of less concern).
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Zone 3: Essential Suppliers
This zone encompasses only the Persian Gulf energy suppliers. This zone once
included Iraq and Iran, even recently, but not currently. Stability in this zone is a
necessity at all costs, which means values, from the values-based diplomacy, are
insignificant. There is very little discussion of human rights violations or democratic
deficiencies in these countries. This calls for strategic pandering at times, such as during
the 1973 oil shock, in the interest of ensuring steady access to energy supplies. The two
most essential suppliers of crude oil are Saudi Arabia and UAE. Also essential, but at a
lower threshold, are Qatar and Kuwait. Both Qatar and UAE are essential suppliers of
LNG with deep bilateral ties built on this energy trade relationship. Saudi Arabia may
also become an essential supplier of LNG, but not currently.
This form of relationship between Japan and these energy-suppliers, however, is
very much temporary and a phenomenon of just the last six decades. It was Japan that
ruined the Kuwaiti pearl industry in the past; it may be Japan which turns its back on
Kuwaiti oil in the future. Saudi Arabia and UAE are already planning for post-oil
economies. The Saudi-Japan Vision 2030 could be an important part of this post-oil era.
Nevertheless, in the short- and medium-term, retaining supplies of fossil fuels is essential
for Japan, but for the long-term, the energy resource dependency variable will dissipate
from this relationship.
Zone 4: “Secular Muslims”
This zone includes all the post-Soviet republics in Central Asia, and to a much
lesser extent includes Azerbaijan. The name of the zone, “Secular Muslims” denotes the
positive distinction Asō remarked when describing the area in 2006. It also includes
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Xinjiang Province in western China, insofar as Japan has showed an inclination to
support Uyghur dissent, to Beijing’s chagrin, by allowing the World Uyghur Congress to
meet in Tokyo in 2012, and the opening of Xinjiang Province by Beijing to restricted
Japanese FDI only in the last decade. This zone is Japan’s tabula rasa in terms of ODA
and applying its values-based diplomacy. It is neither a major energy supplier nor export
market for Japan, but a zone to ‘cultivate’ as an “escort runner.” That is not to ignore the
vibrant energy sectors in certain post-Soviet republics. Turkmenistan has the potential to
be an essential supplier of LNG. Kazakhstan has the potential to be an essential supplier
of coal and crude oil. Yet just a negligible amount of these states’ resources makes their
way to Japan’s ports. China is actively reorienting the transport infrastructure in Central
Asia to the east with BRI, but not as far east as Japan. Russia, meanwhile, is also
motivated to prevent the resources from reaching Japan so that its own reserves in
Sakhalin and Siberia remain more viable options. Russia is blocking Japan’s access due
to competition in supply; China is blocking Japan’s access due to competition in demand.
Nonetheless, Xinjiang provides new, but constrained FDI opportunities.
The fall of the Soviet Union opened the Central Asian republics to Japanese
exports and FDI, which had been practically sealed off for over a century. Before China
or the U.S., it was the Japanese who first used the slogan ‘Silk Road Diplomacy’ in 1997
to describe their foreign policy with the newly independent republics in Central Asia
(Kawato 2008, 17-18). Since then, Japan has approached Central Asia to emphasize its
values in young countries where it saw similarities to itself. One way this is done is
through the application of Japan Centers, where Japan is instructing how development is
done. Another way is the ongoing Central Asia Plus Japan Dialogues. These are displays
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of liberal normativity usually associated with the West, and an example of Japan defying
its own proclivity toward an identity based upon uniqueness. Japan is admitting its model
is replicable – and of all places, replicable in landlocked, resource-rich, sparselypopulated societies of ‘secular Muslims.’ Cultural, geographical, historical, and
developmental indicators all show great differences with Japan, yet perceptions highlight
the similarities. This is not about access to energy or access to markets; if these were all
that drove Japanese foreign policy, it would have lost interest in Central Asia long ago.
This is about role and identity.
Theoretical Contribution
Religion is a force that cannot be ignored because it informs epistemology,
identity and role to varying degrees and in varying manners. In all its facets of interaction
with Muslim Asia, Japan cannot escape the Islam variable in its strategy due to the
contemporary global meta-narrative. This even applies in the “Secular Muslim” zone,
where Asō felt compelled to draw the distinction. Moreover, Japan does not escape its
own religiously-informed proclivity, which might not be well recognized. The theoretical
contribution is the new approach to Islam. Japan does not evade global narratives of
securitizing Islam, but this project shows another strategy to reconcile with it. Japan’s
approach is not the one taken by the West, Russia, or China. Dominating paradigms in
international relations such as realism, liberalism, and Marxism, can account for some of
Japan’s behavior, but given that all three discount the religion variable, are lacking in
explaining real world phenomena.
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Further Research
This project aims to give a thorough treatment to Japan’s relations with Muslim Asia, and
serve as an essential reference for anyone looking into this subject, but at the same time
painstaking abridgement is necessary. Primary and secondary sources are extensive, and
it comes as a pleasant surprise that such depth and breadth exists on this topic, but at the
same time this project is filling a gap in the literature. Several research paths closely
related to this project are left unpursued; here are five of those paths.
First, this project demonstrates that Muslim Southeast Asia has served as an
essential gateway to broader Muslim Asia for Japan. In particular, Indonesia has served at
the linchpin of that relationship. Indonesia has the world’s largest Muslim population,
and while it has not been immune to Islamic extremism and terrorist incidents – even
ones in which Japanese citizens were killed and injured, such as the 2002 and 2005 Bali
bombings – there is little evidence of broad securitization of Islam in Indonesia by Japan.
On the contrary, the prevalence of Islam in Indonesia hardly weighs on the consciousness
of Japanese who go there, or interact with it, as something which must be securitized.
Why is this, and what kind of learning is taking place between Japan and Indonesia?
Harry J. Benda’s 1958 classic work, The Crescent and the Rising Sun, analyzes
Indonesian Islam under Japanese occupation. While extensive and essential, it only
focuses on this brief period. Japanese are encountering Islam through Indonesians more
than anyone else, and increasingly so. What does this mean for the image of Islam?
Actually, this project reveals a number of linchpin countries within Muslim Asia,
whereby a study specific to that country’s relations with Japan would contribute to this
research project. A lot of work on Japan’s relations with Turkey has been done by
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scholars such as Renée Worringer and Bahadır Pehlivantürk, but much of it tends to
overlook the Islamic factor, given that Turkey is nominally a secular state. Both Turkey
and Japan share separate security arrangements with the U.S., peripheral statuses with the
West, normative interests in Central Asia, and atonement issues with historical atrocities
as empires. Also, Iran has a depth of bilateral relations with Japan that would complete an
entire project, and again, would need to bring in the concept of reactionary relations to
unpack mutual perceptions. Additionally, Japan has given special emphasis to the smaller
Gulf emirates among its energy suppliers, namely Qatar and UAE. More can be written
on this strategy, and obviously Islam permeates as a key factor in these relations.
Next, because this project focuses on foreign policy and mostly the political class,
it does not open the discussion of comparative mysticisms between Islam, and Japanese
teachings in Shinto and Buddhism. The late Izutsu Toshihiko pioneered this research
project in the twentieth century, but there is much work to be added. Miyata Osamu
occasionally emphasizes parallels between Islamic mysticism and Japanese teachings in
Zen and the concept of fūdo (風土) (‘social-physical climate,’ or ‘environmental milieu’)
to support points in his work (2014a: 62-63; 2017: 260-61). Nonetheless, there is a dearth
of substantial literature on this topic, particularly scholarship in the English language.
Third, the number of Muslims in Japan is small, but it is growing and their
experiences are certainly worthy of extensive research. Miyata shares an anecdote of an
Iranian long-term resident of a small town in Japan who passed away, and without
knowledge of Islamic burial practices, local authorities had his body cremated, inevitably
resulting in the Iranian embassy issuing a complaint (2017: 241). More recently, there
was also a top-division Egyptian sumo wrestler, Ōsunaarashi, who struggled with the
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pressures to observe an intensive diet and training regimen while fasting during
Ramadan. It can be challenging to conduct business in Japan without joining colleagues
or clients in drinking alcohol. The duality of adherence to one’s religious practices and
the social expectations of life in Japan can reveal much about Japan and Islam, but also
makes for a fascinating sociological study altogether. Some Muslim migrants to Japan
have carved out a niche role in society, such as the case explored in Chapter 5 of
Pakistanis facilitating a grey market for used automobile exports. Komura Akiko has
done work in this field in Japanese, but, again, there is a dearth in the English language
literature.
Fourth, this project ‘splits the baby’ as it were in terms of the scope of the Ummah
and the Muslim world. Since this project examines Islam as part of Asia, from Japan’s
view, it looks at Islam from Mecca eastward. Indeed, in aggregate numbers, this is more
than three-fifths of the Muslim world, but it does leave out a diverse array of Muslims
from Mecca westward. Japan is very active on the continent of Africa in terms of energy,
markets, ODA, and UN peacekeeping. What are Japan’s encounters with Islam in Africa,
and how have they shaped its view of both the religion and the continent? This goes into
a region that forms a separate geoculture, and beyond the Arc framework, but nonetheless
is the opening to a critical corresponding work. Egypt is an obvious bridge between the
Middle East and Africa, and Japan has a vital relationship with Egypt, but because it
(mostly) is not Asia this project does not extensively analyze Egypt’s bilateral relations
with Japan. Looking at Muslim Africa, Egypt is key, but so are Nigeria, Sudan, and
Algeria.
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Lastly, this is a project whereby one could say Japan is the subject while Islam, or
more specifically, Muslim Asia is the object of the research. It examines how Japan
views Asia, and Islam as part of it. Japanese scholars of Islam often point out that many
non-Japanese Muslims comment that Japan is a society that displays broad alignment
with Islamic values, yet basic religious practices for Japanese include ancestor worship
and cremation (Komura 2015, 229: Miyata 2017, 261-62). Is Japan truly a model for
statecraft from the view of states in Muslim Asia? Are Japanese “economic animal”
activities in Muslim Asia ever considered counterproductive to the interests of the people
in these states? What is the conceptualization of Asia for Muslims from Turkey to
Indonesia, how does Japan fit into that conceptualization, as well as the Ummah? A
complementary study would be the reversal of this setup. While it appears briefly at
different points in this project, a thorough analysis of how Muslims view Japan is needed.
Within this idea, how do Muslims conceptualize Asia, as it relates to their own states, to
the Ummah, and inclusive of Japan?
Postscript
The outcomes of this project allow for thoughts prospective in nature, to which this is,
hopefully, just the beginning. There is the tendency among Japanese scholars of Islam to
dwell on the favorable view Japan garners among Muslims in Asia. Sakai Keiko
discusses this view in terms of an ‘unrequited love’:
Since the 1970s, the favorable view of Japan among Middle east countries is the
counter side to the unfavorable view toward the West. The Middle East countries
that suffered Western colonialism embrace the development of non-Western
Japan with an endless yearning. This is a sentiment that you could call ‘unrequited
love’ that has persisted since before the Second World War (2016: 123).
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In general, this is true, but at the same time it is an embellishment of the place Japan has
in the consciousness of Muslims in Asia, particularly beyond Southeast Asia. In fact,
inflating Japan’s role in the international community is not unique to this group of
scholars; rather, its common in Japanese society to do so. This was noted as early as 1984
by Masao Kunihiro: “There is an increasing tendency for even the ordinary people of
Japan to overestimate Japan’s worth” (1984: 48). In many cases, it is probably done
because of publishers’ interest to reach a wide readership, and to do so in Japan, in the
Japanese language, to Japanese readers, necessitates lionizing the role of Japan in the
international society.
There is risk in doing this. When Japan was omitted from the Kuwaiti statement
of appreciation in 1991, when Japan became embroiled in conflicts such as the 2015 ISIS
hostage crisis, or when Japan was left out of crucial negotiations such as the Iranian
nuclear deal, it leaves the nation with a sense of bewilderment due to this understanding
of an exaggerated role and broad favorability. In a 2015 Pew Research survey, 48 percent
of Pakistanis indicated a favorable view of Japan and 15 percent an unfavorable view, but
37 percent either did not know or refused to respond (Stokes 2015, 14). In a similar
survey by the BBC in 2014, 40 percent of respondents in Turkey had a favorable view of
Japan and 18 percent unfavorable, leaving 42 percent not knowing or refusing to respond
(BBC 2014, 21-22). It is this 37 percent of Pakistanis and 42 percent of Turks which
should be of concern. This is why dialogues, ODA activities, and FDI will remain crucial
into the future. Japan’s influence in Asia is increasingly eclipsed by China, which is
nearer, larger, and much more willing to take risks with investments. Japan must
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preserve, if not, double down on its engagements to retain a stake in the consciousness of
the Muslim societies in Asia.
Favorability is evidence of soft power. Japanese scholars of Islam as well as
diplomats are prone to frequently highlight the popularity of Japanese arts, film, and
popular culture in Muslim countries. This can be considered a tool of foreign policy, and
there is no reason to fault political leaders for usurping these to their advantage. At the
same time, however, these soft power advantages, which have taken a long time to build
up, can vaporize in short order. Japan’s refusal to admit Syrian refugees, for instance, can
tarnish this reputation, just as poor use of hard power can. Therefore, it is crucial that
Abe’s proactive pacifism is done correctly, although it is not clear what ‘done correctly’
would entail. It is difficult to envision what comes out of this approach, but if it means
Japanese soldiers will inevitably be in Muslim Asia “killing people and breaking things,”
as Colin Powell defined the job of a trained soldier, this favorability could vanish with
just one mishap.
At the same time, humility is in order. In 2013, while Tokyo was competing
against Istanbul to host the 2020 Summer Olympic Games, Tokyo Governor Inose Naoki
made the comment: “In Islamic countries, the only thing they share in common is Allah
and they are fighting with each other” (Belson 2013, D4). In the same interview, he
pushed the narrative of Japan as exceptional, even citing Samuel P. Huntington’s The
Clash of Civilizations to justify his understanding that Japan was a unique civilizational
state. As if the comments were not enough, he added, “I’m sure people in Turkey want to
live long, and if they want to live long, they should create a culture like what we have in
Japan. There might be a lot of young people, but if they die young, it doesn’t mean
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much” (Belson 2013, D4). This attitude can easily induce behavior that would destroy the
soft power advantage Japan has garnered over the decades.
In the postwar era, Japan has been remarkably successful in balancing its
resource dependency, and export and FDI activities, with its U.S. alliance obligations and
non-interventionist norms. Now, it is overtly bringing in its own values to its foreign
policy in Muslim Asia. The model, based on a concept of harmony, is enticing to be sure,
but the replicability of this model is questionable. Nonetheless, societal harmony is
undeniably lacking throughout much of the world, and if this is the unique contribution
Japan can make to Muslim Asia which would perpetuate growth, development, stability,
and minimize the lure of religious extremism, it is for the world’s benefit.
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Figure 9.1 Evidence of Values-Based Diplomacy and Level of Democratization
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Map 9.1: Japan’s Zones of Islam in Asia
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Map 9.2: Mahan’s “Debatable and Debated Ground”
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